Another B787 Fire?

[ILB]

There is a quote from the AVHerald on Pprune saying that we will be told the cause of the fire today, evidently galley equip left turned on and resulted in fire. I took a look at the AVherald site and there was no mention of the incident at all, maybe it got pulled or perhaps the quote on Pprune was not "real". http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518971-ethiopean-787-fire-heathrow-9.html#post7938551

From the AvHerald: http://avherald.com/h?article=45c377c5&opt=0

The cause of the fire is unknown at this time. The aircraft had arrived in Heathrow as flight ET-700 at 06:30L (05:30Z) and was scheduled to depart for the return flight ET-701 at 21:00L (20:00Z). On Jul 13th 2013 the AAIB reported that there had been smoke throughout the fuselage causing extensive heat damage in the upper portion of the rear of the fuselage and stated: "However, it is clear that this heat damage is remote from the area in which the aircraft main and APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) batteries are located, and, at this stage, there is no evidence of a direct causal relationship."

[inchman]

Ah so it was buried in ANA B788 near Takamatsu on Jan 16th 2013

AV Herald doesn't normally report incidents which are not in (or nearly in) the air.

According to the FAQ on the site:

Incidents will be reported only during active flights, meaning from entering the takeoff runway to leaving the landing runway, other incidents at the gate or during taxi are summarily dismissed.

There have been some exceptions and I'm a bit surprised he didn't make this one an exception, but he "got it in there" under another "in the air" incident.

[blues deville]

Initial AAIB reports indicate ELT (lithium) battery may be the cause.

[Kasey]

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-23364389

[blues deville]

"On Jul 18th 2013 the AAIB reported in their special bulletin with respect to ET-AOP, that fire fighters encountered a fire above the ceiling panels close to the rear of the cabin, a halon extinguisher was not effective, only after a panel was moved and the fire was doused with water and foam the fire was extinguished. The origin of the fire coincided with the emergency locator transmitter (ELT), with no other systems in the vicinity storing sufficient energy to initiate a fire. The ELT is powered by a set of Lithium Manganese Dioxide Batteries, which showed disruptions of cells. It is unclear however whether the combustion started as result of energy release within the battery cells or by an outside event like a short circuit. Some 6000 units of this transmitter have been produced, ET-AOP is the only such incident so far. The AAIB recommended to the FAA to "inert" (deactivate) the ELTs in Boeing 787s until appropriate airworthiness actions can be taken and to conduct a safety review of all Lithium battery powered ELTs on all aircraft types."

[Mitch Cronin]

Deactivate the ELT's???? I'm thinkin' not, if you're flying.

[deicer]

Hmmm....

The common thread in a lot of aviation incidents (this one, the Korean freighter that crashed, etc) seems to be Lithium Batteries.

Maybe they should still continue to build excellent airframes, but stick to battery technology that is tested and true?

[inchman]

So the question is, has an ELT ever helped to locate a downed airliner? Has there been, in recent years, other than the Andean football team flight, a transport category aircraft that has crashed and not been found shortly after the downing? Is it really worth the minor, but now apparent, risk to even have a fixed ELT on a transport category aircraft? Even though no lives were lost here, it is quite possible many might have been lost had the aircraft been in flight somewhere in the middle of nowhere just due to an extraneous safety item.

I can see having an ELT on board for use in liferafts after water landings because there is no radar coverage, but most aircraft are now ADS or in radar coverage and on specific tracks, so finding them would not be that big a deal. So, is a fixed ELT really required?

[Moon The Loon]

This is in really, REALLY bad taste:

[conehead]

Nice one Moon.

[boestar]

Was in Miami last week and took the time to have a look at the Tesla Electric car in the showroom. Spoke to the guys displaying the car. The LiIon Battery in the Tesla is maintained at a CONSTANT 70 degrees Farenheit and is cooled by a Glycol mixture circulated through a radiator. This even with a Charge time as low as 25 minutes. Perhaps Boeing or Yuasa should look at a liquid cooling method. BTW the latest Tesla is a beautiful car. 0-60MPH in 2.9 seconds. Thats F1 range.

[conehead]

BTW the latest Tesla is a beautiful car. 0-60MPH in 2.9 seconds. Thats F1 range.

Price?

[boestar]

Starting at 70,000 topping out at 120,000 USD

Differences being range and acceleration for the most part. Higher price means faster and longer range

[mo32a]

And Tesla is now recommended by consumer reports.

If I was going to buy an electric vehicle that is the one I would buy.

[conehead]

Starting at 70,000 topping out at 120,000 USD

Differences being range and acceleration for the most part. Higher price means faster and longer range

I thought he was working on another model for the masses, something around the $30,000 range...

Quite the guy...

[boestar]

This is not the roadster you have seen in the past this is the latest 4 door sport sedan. Beautiful car by all accounts except that at 6'4" tall I cannot physically get in the damned thing. Placing of the door pillar and the roof line preclude my entry into the vehicle without some serious twisting and bending.

I am not sure you will see this type of performance in the 30K range.

The Motor is quite interesting as well as they have eliminated all air space that could cause drag on the rotating components within the motor. (The had a great cutaway on display) the clearances are very small and assist with efficiency. Everything inside is smooth as silk.

The interior is all leather with a large center console display (and I do mean large) the dash is also and LED type display. Some of the finishing touches are cool as well. The door handles are flush to the door skin until you touch them, then they pop out. It takes almost no force to open the door.

I dont think the 70K price tag is overpriced but 120K is a little steep for what really equates to a minor performance gain.

[blues deville]

Ethiopian 787 being repaired at LHR.

http://www.airliners.net/photo/Ethiopian-Airlines/Boeing-787-8-Dreamliner/2350423/L/

[boestar]

Cool...

[conehead]

Ethiopian 787 being repaired at LHR.

http://www.airliners.net/photo/Ethiopian-Airlines/Boeing-787-8-Dreamliner/2350423/L/

Hey! Where'd the big vertical thing go from the back end of the airplane?

[Kip Powick]

Hey! Where'd the big vertical thing go from the back end of the airplane?

It's right in front of you....but facing the wrong way

[conehead]

Oh yeah, now I see it. Must have fallen off, in the wind.

[deicer]

Does it point out to passing aircraft if there's an Ethiopian flight passing overhead?

[conehead]

Well, looks like they glued it back together...

[Guest]

It is amazing what you can do with artificial nail glue

[Don Hudson]

This is, frankly, astonishing...

NTSB Report on the Japan Airlines B787 APU battery fire - Report can be found here: http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2014/AIR1401.pdf

3. Conclusions

3.1 Findings

1. The battery failure did not result from overcharging, overdischarging, external short circuiting, external heating, installation factors, or environmental conditions of the airplane.
2. The battery failure resulted from an internal short circuit that occurred in cell 5 or cell 6 and led to thermal runaway that propagated to adjacent cells.
3. GS Yuasa’s cell manufacturing process allowed defects that could lead to internal short circuiting, including wrinkles and foreign object debris, to be introduced into the Boeing 787 main and auxiliary power unit battery.
4. The thermal protections incorporated in large-format lithium-ion battery designs need to account for all sources of heating in the battery during the most extreme charge and discharge current conditions and protect cells from damage that could lead to thermal runaway.
5. More accurate cell temperature measurements and enhanced temperature and voltage monitoring and recording could help ensure that excessive cell temperatures resulting from localized or other sources of heating could be detected and addressed in a timely manner to minimize cell damage.
6. Determining the initial point of self-heating in a lithium-ion cell is important in establishing thermal safety limits.
7. Boeing’s electrical power system safety assessment did not consider the most severe effects of a cell internal short circuit and include requirements to mitigate related risks, and the review of the assessment by Boeing authorized representatives and Federal Aviation Administration certification engineers did not reveal this deficiency.
8. Boeing failed to incorporate design requirements in the 787 main and auxiliary power unit battery specification control drawing to mitigate the most severe effects of a cell internal short circuit, and the Federal Aviation Administration failed to uncover this design vulnerability as part of its review and approval of Boeing’s electrical power system certification plan and proposed methods of compliance.
9. Unclear traceability among the individual special conditions, safety assessment assumptions and rationale, requirements, and proposed methods of compliance for the 787 main and auxiliary power unit battery likely contributed to the Federal Aviation Administration’s failure to identify the need for a thermal runaway certification test.
10. Stale enhanced airborne flight recorder data could impede future accident and incident investigations by delaying the full understanding of the recorded data; stale data could also impact aircraft safety if an operator’s maintenance activities were based on these data.
11. The poor audio recording quality of the enhanced airborne flight recorder could impede future aircraft investigations because the recorded conversations and other cockpit sounds might be obscured.

3.2 Probable Cause
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this incident was an internal short circuit within a cell of the auxiliary power unit (APU) lithium-ion battery, which led to thermal runaway that cascaded to adjacent cells, resulting in the release of smoke and fire. The incident resulted from Boeing’s failure to incorporate design requirements to mitigate the most severe effects of an internal short circuit within an APU battery cell and the Federal Aviation Administration’s failure to identify this design deficiency during the type design certification process.

Another interesting item concerns the flight data and cockpit voice recording on the B787 - odd thing to occur with such technology - wonder what the source of the problem is?

2.6 Flight Recorder Issues
2.6.1 Stale Flight Data

The EAFR is a new recording system with a new flight data recording format, and the 787 is currently the only airplane that uses the EAFR to record CVR, FDR, and other data. The investigation of this incident found that the EAFR recorded stale data for some parameters (see section 1.3). The recording of stale data impacted the early stages of this investigation because significant additional effort was required to identify stale data when possible as well as those parameters for which it was not possible to determine whether the data samples were stale. This process delayed the NTSB’s complete understanding of the recorded data.

Stale EAFR data could impact future investigations as well. The recording of stale data could lead to cases in which apparently valid data continued to be recorded after a parameter source stopped providing valid data, which could result in latent faults in the recording system for mandatory parameters.150 These mandatory parameters would thus be unavailable because an EAFR’s source would no longer be providing the data. In addition, the safe operation of an aircraft could be impacted if stale EAFR data were unintentionally used by an operator to assess and resolve maintenance issues.

149 In 2006, the FAA chartered a federal advisory committee, known as RTCA Special Committee SC-211, to develop a standard for the design, certification, production, and use of permanently installed, rechargeable lithium-ion battery systems. The committee included representatives from the FAA, US Air Force, US Navy, US Army, commercial air carriers, and battery and aircraft manufacturers. Boeing, Thales, and GS Yuasa were also members of the RTCA special committee. The resulting standard, DO-311, which was issued in 2008, is currently considered by the FAA to be an acceptable means of compliance to the special conditions for rechargeable lithium-ion batteries and battery systems.

150 Title 14 CFR 121.344, “Digital Flight Data Recorders for Transport Category Airplanes,” details mandatory parameter requirements. Title 14 CFR Part 121 Appendix M provides supplemental information to 14 CFR 121.344.

The NTSB concludes that stale EAFR data could impede future accident and incident investigations by delaying the full understanding of the recorded data; stale data could also impact aircraft safety if an operator’s maintenance activities were based on these data. At this time, the NTSB is concerned with the EAFR stale data recording issue on 787 airplanes because future EAFR installations might take greater advantage of the flexibility of the new recording format, which could mitigate the stale data issue. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require Boeing 787 operators to incorporate guidance about the EAFR stale data issue in their maintenance manuals to prevent stale data from being used for maintenance activities or flight recorder maintenance. In addition, the NTSB recommends that the FAA (1) evaluate whether the recording of stale data by the Boeing 787 EAFR, including whether the data are specifically identified as stale, impacts the certification of the recording system regarding the ranges, accuracies, and sampling intervals specified in 14 CFR Part 121 Appendix M and (2) take appropriate measures to correct any problems found.

2.6.2 Poor-Quality Cockpit Voice Recording
The investigation of this incident found that the audio recording obtained from both EAFRs was poor quality. The signal levels of the three radio/hot microphone channels of the audio recording (the captain’s audio selector panel, the first officer’s audio selector panel, and the jumpseat/observer’s position) were very low and used only about 25% of the available total dynamic range of the recorder. Further, throughout the recording, random full-deflection noise spikes could be heard. These random noise spikes were very short in duration but used the full dynamic range of the radio/hot microphone channel recording.

The recording from the cockpit area microphone channel of the EAFR was also poor quality. During the airborne portion of the flight that was captured on the recording, almost all of the individual crew conversations were completely obscured by the ambient cockpit noise. After the airplane landed, the cockpit noise was reduced, so the crew conversations became clearer. Once the airplane arrived at the gate and the engines were shut down, the crew conversations could easily be heard, and the overall quality of the recording was excellent. Thus, the issues with the EAFR audio recording did not impact this investigation because the conversations and sounds related to the circumstances of the incident occurred during the portion of the recording that was excellent quality.

The EAFR was certified under FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO) C123B, “Cockpit Voice Recorder Equipment,” which was based on the European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) ED-112A document, “Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recording Systems.” The installation and performance requirements in chapter I-6 of the EUROCAE document also include guidance to determine if a CVR installation would be acceptable. This guidance stated that the CVR should use all available dynamic ranges of the recorder and mitigate cockpit area background noise. The FAA took exception to this chapter of the EUROCAE ED-112A document and removed the chapter’s requirements from the final TSO C123B language. As a result, the CVR certifier and installer can determine what constitutes an acceptable recording without the use of any industry-approved standard regarding specific installation guidance.

The NTSB concludes that the poor audio recording quality of the EAFR could impede future aircraft investigations because the recorded conversations and other cockpit sounds might be obscured. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require Boeing to improve the quality of (1) the EAFR radio/hot microphone channels by using the maximum available dynamic range of the individual channels and (2) the cockpit area microphone airborne recordings by increasing the crew conversation signals over the ambient background noise. In addition, the NTSB recommends that the FAA either remove the current exception to ED-112A chapter I-6 in TSO 123B or provide installers and certifiers with specific guidance to determine whether a CVR installation would be acceptable.