Kip Powick

Well...well, a few at it again.....another cat-fight What I find amazing is that there is a great reluctance to call a spade, a spade and it is certainly not that pilots are bizarre, but rather that pilots are human. This entire incident appears to be purely "pilot-error" ...there I said it....... based purely on all that I have read in this thread, the drivers of that aircraft made a mistake.....an "error".................no one hurt,(except pride), no damage and that should be the end of it. The incident is merely a learning tool for others and a lesson learned about doing "visual" approaches.....at night...at a high density airport. Those that can not see that this incident was a pilot error, albeit minor, have failed to consider all the other hundreds of aircraft that have done the same approach to that specific runway and not made that "error". Have nice weekend (at anchor, in the sun and enjoying life)

I heard on the news that Justin said it will now not happen but...... who knows

Justin and friends looking for more of your money as you fly along the internet..... Flying The Fibe Gonna Cost More

If you were angry, I believe that is an UNSTABLE approach to the job so your flight deck buddy should GO-AROUND and look for an ALTERNATE driver

Sad.......Dead at 37......drug over dose.

One Way Flights

This is discussion is going nowhere.......No matter what the SOPs say, no matter what seat I occupy, if I am NOT happy with the approach, (perhaps a portion of the approach does not meet "my" standard) it is a "go-around". I'll do it and answer the questions later. To insinuate that I can not apply my personal standards to an approach is ludicrous.. SOPs are a guide, they are not cast in concrete and the interpretation can vary from pilot to pilot and thankfully most interpret them the same way, but discretion is permitted if the rationale is solid. I am sure you will rest easy because if you don't know it now, you will... I no longer fly, I am retired but I have 29,760 hours under my a$$ and I have done a few go-arounds when, perhaps if I pushed it, I could have made it but after the go-arounds....... no one questioned my judgement. I have flown with fellows who decided to go-around when according to SOPs, I think we could have made it.....BUT...that was his decision. Never seen an aircraft back into a mountain and whether anyone will admit it, when the whole scene turns to puppy-poo, the pilot better have a plan because if he dogmatic about an SOP he might just box himself, and others, into a corner....Believe me, I have seen it. Vs, I said it earlier before in a post...I am outta here and I am sure you know that as long as there are aircraft flying there will be accidents and post accident discussions, however unfettered defence of what could be considered as a "breach in the dyke" accomplishes nothing. I guess it is not politically acceptable to use the term "pilot-error" in accidents originating in Canada...........there always has to be some other factor that dilutes the responsibility......

To say the crew should have gone around based on what they saw, knowing all of what is now known is, well, hindsight... You addressed your last post to me so......perhaps you read something in my last comment that is really not there. I did not say the crew should have gone around.................................... I merely stated what my parameters are for flying an NP approach.

Absolutely not.....I feel that leaving the A/P on was a "contributing" link in the chain. In my book during a NP one does not descend below MDA until the guaranteed landing environment is visual..I feel the lights are a guide in an NP, they are not the landing environment.

OK ...understand...I'm disappointed with the written report and perhaps that is because I am looking at it strictly from a pilot's POV. There is a company FCOM and SOP and the question is, (and here the TSB falls flat), what is the expected and detailed procedure for this approach and particular type of approach. The TSB should have then spelled out clearly where there were distinct deviations from the SOPs/FCOM that resulted in the accident. The reader should not have to flip back and forth in an effort to find the relevant data and then attempt to put it all together and have to inquire from others who are more conversant with the SOPs and FCOM, for the information. Personally I think the report is barely acceptable, and could have been written with more continuity and clarity..Over two years and we still have to dig for the information. And finally, the TSB's mandate to include material that is totally irrelevant to the actual sequence of events that led to this accident does little to enhance the overall document...it is more of a distraction from the serious information that operators want to know. That non relevant information could have been added as an addendum, not included in the middle of an accident report. Thanks for the chat and now I'm gone

OK...I am confused...VSplat said that...... ..... autopilot disconnect is inconsequential. It self cancels at 50' below MDA, which for this airline, is set 50' above published minimum to ensure the aircraft doesn't descend below MDA in the event of a go around Based on that statement, the autopilot disconnect is set for 50 ft ABOVE the MDA....so my calculations are correct. The autopilot would be set to disconnect, for this approach at 863 ft MSL However, if the aircraft in question was not fitted with the self-cancel, would it not still be incorrect to do the approach and let the aircraft descend on auto pilot to the altitude it did??? Not beating a dead horse...just want to know if it is permissible to do a FPA approach and allow the aircraft to go past MDA on auto pilot or should it be disconnected and hand flown at MDA??

AC624 was airborne at 2205 on 28 March 2015.Footnote4 The captain occupied the left seat and was the pilot flying (PF), while the first officer occupied the right seat and was the pilot monitoring (PM). This was the first time these pilots had flown together.

I think we can all agree, there is certainly a lack of clarity as well as a lack of continuity in the report. Sort of like life We all know TSB is not going to redo or reopen the investigation just because a few AEFers have questions that they think the TSB should have foreseen and preempted them with answers.......... Have a nice week.

Sorry....50 feet below......OK Sorry about the 50 feet... Changes the autopilot on distance to 334 feet....

So we can assume that the pilots wanted 813 feet as the calculated MDA (TSB report) Therefore the altitude that should have been entered for autopilot disconnect would be MDA plus 50 feet which makes autopilot disconnect at 863 feet The TSB has the auto pilot disconnected at 30 feet above threshold altitude which would be 449 feet + 30 feet or 479 feet. That would mean the aircraft descended 384 feet below the calculated autopilot disconnect altitude on auto pilot...correct? (Calculations arrived at from TSB data) You have to search for the data......, it is there......., and I am very surprised this "nugget" is not written clearly in the report.