Questions for Pilots:

[Mitch Cronin]

What, if anything, have you so far learned from the sad tale of AF447, that you think you'll take to the job with you from now on? (or, if you're retired, what do you hope other pilots will learn from what we know so far?)

[Spinnaker]

Don't take a nap?

Kidding... I do think my employer gives me great training from upsets but this is a sobering reminder as to why. It comes down to always flying the airplane and respecting mother nature.

[blues deville]

Excellent question Mitch.

Before a pilot has to demonstrate any upset recovery skills, they should know the attitude and power setting to keep their modern glass aircraft at least straight and level until you can figure out plan 'B'. The AF CVR mentions they had no valid information. But they did have both engines running and an PFD or a stby attitude indicator. So they next thing to do would have been fly the aircraft using a basic attitude and power setting and then refer to an unreliable airspeed checklist. For Boeing's (I think Airbus is the same...can't remember) it's FD's, A/P and A/T off.....a good reminder that you have to do some aviating.

My current aircraft is 2.5 NU and 85%N1.

What is your aircraft?

[inchman]

Excellent question Mitch.

Before a pilot has to demonstrate any upset recovery skills, they should know the attitude and power setting to keep their modern glass aircraft at least straight and level until you can figure out plan 'B'. The AF CVR mentions they had no valid information. But they did have both engines running and an PFD or a stby attitude indicator. So they next thing to do would have been fly the aircraft using a basic attitude and power setting and then refer to an unreliable airspeed checklist. For Boeing's (I think Airbus is the same...can't remember) it's FD's, A/P and A/T off.....a good reminder that you have to do some aviating.

My current aircraft is 2.5 NU and 85%N1.

What is your aircraft?

Good practice.

Ever since AF447, I (try to) build this into my cruise check. It's normally between 2 and 2.5 NU and about 87% or 1.3 EPR, but I use the actual numbers from the ADI and the FMC every flight level change (when I remember) and I say it out loud so the F/O looks at it, too.

Interestingly, we were climbing out of SCL on Sunday night through about FL180 in moderate turb, rain and snow, the AOA's screwed up, causing the min maneuvering speed indicator to go right up into the max airspeed range. The autopilot bumped the nose down about 5 degrees. Initially, I thought that the bump was just a downdraft, but the speed starting climbing like crazy. Off with the A/P at that point because we would quickly have accelerated into an overspeed. With the turbulence, it was impossible to tell anything by the seat of our pants.

All airspeeds agreed, groundspeed made sense (sort of (~400 kts)) and altimeters were climbing so I just flew pitch based on a rough guess of what it was before the bump while staying out of the red and left the power at climb while we checked power, flaps, speedbrakes and gear. It's amazing how many times one rechecks things when you can't locate a cause.

It might sound simple, but it was VERY disconcerting to be flying well below the hook at 300 kts indicated.

Is it a static port problem? ... Are we really above FL180 in the mountains? Are we about to stall at 300 kts IAS?

Night time, MOUNTAINS, flying in moderate rain, thunderstorms in the area, at least moderate turbulence, St. Elmo's fire all over the windscreen, conflicting information all caused this to be the most concerning couple of minutes of my career. A moment earlier, our primary attention was simply picking our way around the heaviest of the weather and we were just talking about slowing to help get rid of some static before we had a big discharge. Things changed in a hurry.

It could have gotten out of hand quickly, but with the help of the other two pilots confirming what information we did have and getting back to basics we kept it within the envelope and got our a$$es out of there.

A few minutes after clearing the weather, the hook came down to just below our actual airspeed for a while (and would chase any speed changes we made), then finally settled down off screen where it should have been.

In retrospect, I would much rather have had a V1 engine fire at all up weight.

So, keep in mind that it never happens where you expect it to. In this case, having those cruise parameters in mind didn't help at all

Next time I fly, I'm going to get some baseline pitch and power numbers for climb at various altitudes ...

[bluemic]

For those who don't follow PPRuNe...

AVmail: June 6, 2011

Letter of the Week: Airbuses Fly "Like a Video Game"

I would like to offer my comments and perspective with regard to the Air France Flight 447 accident. I have been a A-330 captain since 2003 and have over 4500 hours in the aircraft. While many A-320 pilots undoubtedly have more series time, I believe this probably makes me one of the most experienced A330 pilots in the world.

When asked how I like the aircraft, I tell people that there is likely no easier airplane to take over an ocean, and that the systems design and presentation is superb. That said, the automation is more complex and less intuitive than necessary, and the pilot-aircraft interface is unlike that of a conventional aircraft. Most important with regard to this accident is the fly-by-wire sidestick control. The sidestick itself has a very limited range of motion, making inadvertent over-control very easy. Of even greater significance, the stick itself provides no "feel" feedback to the pilot. That is, unlike a conventional aircraft, the pilot does not get a sense through pressure of how much input is being sent to the control surfaces. The most important advice I give to pilots new to the Airbus is to treat the aircraft not as an airplane, but as a video game. If you wait for the sidestick to tell you what you are doing, you will never get an answer.

Taking into consideration that Air France 447 was at FL 350 (where the safe speed envelope is relatively narrow), that they were in the weather at night with no visible horizon, and that they were likely experiencing at least moderate turbulence, it does not surprise me in the least that the pilots lost control of the aircraft shortly after the autopilot and autothrust disconnected.

Let's keep in mind that these are not ideal conditions for maintaining controlled flight manually, especially when faced with a sudden onslaught of warning messages, loss of autofllght, confusing airspeed indications, and reversion to "alternate law" flight control, in which certain flight envelope protections are lost.

A very bad Airbus design feature is thrust levers that do not move while in autothrust. They are instead set in a detent which would equal climb trust in manual mode. If the pilots did not reset the thrust levers to equal the last cruise power setting, they likely eventually ended up in climb power, making it difficult to reset the proper cruise power setting and adding to what was likely already a great deal of confusion.

But the real problem probably occurred immediately after the pilot flying grabbed the sidestick and took over manually. Unfortunately, airline pilots rarely practice hand-flying at high altitude, and almost never do so without autothrust engaged. As a result, we forget that the aircraft is very sensitive to control inputs at high altitude, and overcontrol is the usual result. Because the Airbus sidestick provides no feedback "feel" to the pilot, this problem is dramatically compounded in this aircraft.

I believe the Air France pilot grabbed the sidestick, made an immediate input (because as pilots, that's what we tend to do), and quickly became quite confused as to what the aircraft was truly doing. This confusion likely was exacerbated by fixating on airspeed indications that made no sense while trying to find a power setting with no airspeed guidance.

When transitioning from autopilot to manual control at altitude in the Airbus, the most important thing to do at first is nothing. Don't move a thing, and then when you do, gently take hold of the sidestick and make very small inputs, concentrating on the flight director (which, in altitude hold, should still have been providing good guidance). Of course, this is much easier said than done with bells and whistles going off all over the place, moderate turbulence and a bunch of thunderstorms in the area. As I said before, treat it like a video game.

So why did the Air France pilot find himself at the limits of sidestick travel, and then just stay there, maintaining a control input that simply could not logically be correct? When things go really bad and we are under intense pressure, it is human nature to revert to what we know from previous experience. Remember, the Airbus flies like no other aircraft in that the sidestick provides no feedback to the pilot. It is a video game, not an airplane.

I believe the Air France pilot unintentionally fell back on all of his previous flying experience, in which aircraft controls "talkedF" to him when he moved them. Distracted by many confusing inputs, he instinctively expected to be able to control the aircraft by "feel" while dividing his attention to address other matters. I've seen it happen in the simulator, and in an Airbus this is a sure way to lose control of the aircraft and is possibly the most dangerous aspect of Airbus design philosophy.

One last note: Airbus pilots often claim that the aircraft "can not be stalled." When the flight controls are in "normal law" this is a reasonably true statement. However, in "alternate law," as was the case here, stall protection can be lost. If we ever practiced this in the simulator, I don't remember it.

Lest anyone think I am blaming the Air France pilots for this accident, let me be clear. Despite all of my experience in the aircraft, I am not the least bit certain that I would have been able to maintain control under the same circumstances. I do feel certain that were you to spring this scenario on pilots in a simulator without warning less than half of them would have a successful outcome. Safely flying the 320, 330 and 340-series Airbus requires something of a non-pilot mindset.

Name Withheld

Editor's Note:

We have spoken with the writer of this letter to confirm his identity and honored his request for anonymity.

[Johnny]

My own "Jet Upset" policy on Airbus products, at High Altitude:

1. Feet FLAT on the floor, I have huge fear of the rudder ripping the tail off.

2. Give the Aircraft time to settle itself out, resisting all urges to grab the side stick.

3. The only control I will touch, initially, is the Thrust Levers. Controlling an overspeed or stall condition as required.

4. Order a coffee from the back-end and discuss the predicament with my partner.

5. Then, and only then, touch the Side Stick.

[handyman]

Sad really, 20 years ago this would have simply been an incident for the airlines mechanics and internal safety department. These days pilots have lost, or never learned, the basic skills of partial panel flying and that (power +attitude = performance). Too often we just follow the magenta highway without having a clear understanding of the situation and location outside. I recently walked into a cockpit only to find the two seat warmers deep into a discussion oblivious to the outside world with checks long overdue.

What will make things change? Hopefully not more examples of AF447 or other similar and probably avoidable accidents. I'm not holding my breath. I fear since the career is truly diminishing the only relieve we will see is improvements in technology where pilots can select manually or have the system automatically recover the aircraft to a "safe mode" (straight and level) until the pilots can sort things out. Who knows, maybe they will eventually hire monitors and have the entire flight from gate to gate automated?

Lastly, the young pilots today are mostly trained on glass so converting to round dials is far from natural. When I was young I remember a crusty old tester who made us fly an NDB approach using oral null techniques. The guys I fly with haven't even heard of this. In a few years they will be asking what is an ADF?

Progression, sometimes it's not worth it.

Comment removed as it was taken out of context and understanding of how and when it was said.

[Don Hudson]

Yes, great question Mitch. There have been about a dozen loss-of-control fatal accidents as a result of simply stalling the airplane. Pitch and power are one item in one's kit and there are others.

Pilots have been saying the following, in various ways, since the early 90's when Airbus created the first feasible, reliable fly-by-wire, protection-oriented autoflight system. A great deal of change, in the Airbus philosophy and design as well a within airline managements, as a result of early accidents, mode confusion and an unwillingness bordering on (what I have seen personally) a fear to "fly the machine". After a while guys who flew the B727, DC9, Lockheed and all manner of craft before joining an airline, would not disconnect and just fly the machine! Where does that come from and why?

"Automation" is not the problem. It provides a far safer flight environment than steam, with fewer crew.

How does that translate into outcomes in a business with extremely thin profit margins and shareholder pressures?

Think back to the Industrial Revolution for a moment. There is a notion which even today survives from the Industrial Revolution which may subtlely (invisibly) inform modern aviation and especially airline management thinking, and that is, "Automation will save us money through reduced staffing and training and will accomplish the tasks set out for it more reliably than people can."

To counter this subtle influence and provide fertile ground for more than a passing bread-and-butter comprehension of the real nature of the high-risk business they're in I think that to qualify for management positions which have direct, significant influence over flight operations, from the CEO and President right down to the newbie MBAs coming into the aviation business should be required to be not just familiar with, but proficient in flight safety principles including human factors, so that they understand the concepts behind organizational accidents and the value of proactive instead of reactive programs and can support such preventative programs from a basis of understanding and not from a box-tick mentality or a bow towards the regulators or the lawyers.

The changes anticipated by such an approach do not only affect flight safety programs. They affect the priorities and character of standards and training programs and, where the rubber meets the road, in recurrent training regimes. They may even affect scheduling and the notions behind fatigue risk management.

These notions will not be popular with financial people, so financial people especially, should ride in cockpits for period to get an idea of the kind of business they're in. It is far too easy to forget, and make inappropriate decisions for aviation when sitting in front of a computer screen, number crunching, and knowing one has to present "cost savings" at one's next high-level meeting because that's what the boss wants.

Such "automation-thinking" has even influenced the regulators and is even supported in the regulations. For example, the CARS do not require that even the approach to the stall be demonstrated on an IFR/PPC ride if the aircraft is a fly-by-wire aircraft. Additionally, the CARS and training standards in the CARS require a "minimum loss of altitude" whether close to the ground, (logical) or in all other flight regimes. That means "powering out of the stall" is preferred to lowering the nose to reduce the AoA. The same likely applies in the JARS and FARS.

Where would the crew of AF 447 obtain their knowledge of stalls and stall recovery if it is not required by the regulatory authority? Where and how do any of us obtain such knowledge and experience?

This is just one example of how the industry has molded itself around "automation thinking" and the "solutions" such technology offered and first conceived of as a result of the Industrial Revolution. It is time to change our perceptions and therefore our relationships, with technology and "automation".

This view may be a slight exaggeration - the industry's record is admirable and most airlines' record reflects extremely high standards of safety, though the commuter industry in the US has shown a need for change. But the industry's record is, (as I stated years ago) changing; - the trend is going back up and the thinking outlined above is, I believe, why. We have to change that thinking...even if just a little and that change needs to be initiated by pilots, no one else.

Mitch, you asked what pilots think of what lessons come from AF 447.

We must resist at all cost, the tendency of some airline managements to discourage hand-flying including manual thrust control. To teach about the aircraft and not merely how to operate the "computer platform" is one big thing that I believe should come out of AF 447. The finance people won't likely agree with this but if the boss says make it happen, then that settles the matter.

In addition to the above, I think it is necessary to know one's airplane as thoroughly as possible, to fly it and stay in the books. Automation makes life very easy and so it is equally easy to subtlely lose one's edge over time, (a different kind of 'normalization of deviance'!) if both the standards/training regime and one's own initiative do not provide the necessary push to keep standards impeccably high.

Clearly, such standards are extremely high already...just reading Inchman's post certainly confirms this and so does the industry's record!

But Loss of Control accidents are on the increase and are the #1 cause of fatal accidents, followed by CFITs. The accidents are not being caused by weather, navigation error, technical/mechanical or even software failure. They are being caused by human factors, some subtle, some obvious. Error-trapping behaviours, CRM and HFACS are all being taught by airlines that know how to do this business safely and learned by line pilots who equally comprehend.

AF 447 was a "performance-based" accident. It is not the result of "the computers", of automation, of flight into a thunderstorm. The challenge is to discover why a pitch-up made sense to the PF and why pulling back on the stick when the descent rate could not be arrested and the airplane was rolling up to 40deg bank while descending at 10,000+ fpm.

Inchman, my hat is off to you sir.

Don

[Tango Foxtrot]

The part of all this that is bothering me the most is..... Long before any real evidence was found, educated people guessed?, that faulty pitot heads, contributed to the crash. Later proven to be true. If this was a known problem, why were these aircraft flying?

Don, lately I have been thinking maybe the underlying problem starts with Ab Initio training. Specificaly the aircraft types used to train. Many training aircraft are unsafe to spin. I personaly will not fly in a Tomahawk ever! (never have, never will!) Perhaps a return to a more basic aircraft that you can spin, end up inverted etc. for training is desireable. I haven't had any recent experience with flying schools, but even twenty five years ago, flying schools would not let students spin certain aircraft because they were scared of damaging the aircraft's gyros. Looking at a modern 172, leaves me thinking it is even worse now.

Any comments?

Tony!

[pair of pratts]

Don, lately I have been thinking maybe the underlying problem starts with Ab Initio training. Specificaly the aircraft types used to train. Many training aircraft are unsafe to spin. I personaly will not fly in a Tomahawk ever! (never have, never will!) Perhaps a return to a more basic aircraft that you can spin, end up inverted etc. for training is desireable. I haven't had any recent experience with flying schools, but even twenty five years ago, flying schools would not let students spin certain aircraft because they were scared of damaging the aircraft's gyros. Looking at a modern 172, leaves me thinking it is even worse now.

Any comments?

Tony!

It's amazing how easily a plane can get a reputation. I received my private licence on the Tomahawk. It was not unsafe to spin (at least after the modifications were made) and actually taught the student that the proper recovery technique was required instead of just letting go of the controls. We were prohibited to spin solo but we sure got enough practice with the instructors to see that precise control inputs were needed. One flight in particular (one away from my flight test) reinforced that principle as I alternated right and left rotations in the same spin before letting the instructor recover. The next 3 spins plus the one on the flight test were flawless but that one flubbed recovery reinforced the need to follow proper procedures. Here are a couple of links about the "Traumahawk" that talk about its reputation:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piper_PA-38_Tomahawk

http://www.aopa.org/asf/asfarticles/sp9702.html

[conehead]

In the CF-18, there was software to aid spin recovery for the pilot. When the system sensed a spin, it would blank out the display screens and put up a display of an arrow, pointing left or right, indicating which way to push the control stick. I don't know if this system actually worked, as we lost a aircraft due to a spin halfway between Baden and Lahr..

[Tango Foxtrot]

Pair of Pratts;

"before letting the instructor recover" ? My point exactly! Not a good aircraft for students.

My experience with Tomahawks came as a mechanic. Working on them, running and taxiing them etc. Why train on a machine like that, when there are so many better aircraft?

[boestar]

I learned to Fly out of NC3 in a 172 and was never disallowed from spinning the aircraft. In fact on my flight test the examiner held back from calling for the recovery because he had never seen such a well developed spin in a 172. almost 4 full rotations before executing the recovery. I believe in the US they no longer have to demonstrate anything beyond an incipient spin on the flight test. And as such flight schools do not teach it.

[pair of pratts]

Pair of Pratts;

"before letting the instructor recover" ? My point exactly! Not a good aircraft for students.

My experience with Tomahawks came as a mechanic. Working on them, running and taxiing them etc. Why train on a machine like that, when there are so many better aircraft?

Since it appears that you didn't read the links I provided, here is the meat and potatoes:

Looking at the stall/spin scenarios in some detail, we found that the vast majority of them occurred at low altitude where, by our estimate, it would have been difficult — if not impossible — to recover from an incipient spin, regardless of aircraft type. A common misperception is that of a student and instructor deliberately spinning the Tomahawk at a safe altitude and then becoming locked into an unrecoverable situation. Fortunately, this type of accident is an exception.

There were a few instances in which the aircraft may have been mishandled, and we believe that the solution is in understanding the Tomahawk's characteristics clearly and providing ample altitude. The Tomahawk typically may take longer to recover from a developed spin than would a Cessna. The basic spin recovery method of opposite rudder, nosedown elevator, and neutral ailerons is recommended, but there was a revision to the pilot's operating handbook that is important to note. According to the POH, "The immediate effect of applying normal recovery controls may be an appreciable steepening of the nosedown attitude and an increase in the rate of spin rotation. This characteristic indicates that the aircraft is recovering from the spin, and it is essential to maintain full antispin rudder and to continue to move the control wheel forward and maintain it fully forward until the spin stops."

Because there are no flight data recorders on light aircraft, we can only speculate on what happened in fatal PA-38 spin accidents. One theory is that as antispin controls are applied, if the aircraft responds as described above, pilots not familiar with this characteristic could panic and start experimenting with alternative control inputs; this would delay or stop the spin recovery. We suspect that if they are aware of this trait, most pilots will have the patience and motivation to maintain the tested control inputs until recovery begins.

Some Tomahawk critics contend that the aircraft should not be stalled or spun. After looking at hundreds of accidents involving both the PA-38 and comparable aircraft, we note that some caveats are in order. No aircraft should be stalled or spun at low altitude, but we would extend the margins a bit in a PA-38. Before going solo, pilots should check out with an instructor who has considerable spin experience in the PA-38 and should have spins demonstrated to them, if circumstances permit, in strict accordance with the POH. In conducting our review, we spoke to several Tomahawk instructors and a large flight school that had years of PA-38 experience. They had conducted literally thousands of successful spin entries and recoveries. The key point is that pilots must not expect this aircraft to behave similarly to other trainers. It has its own personality and procedures to follow; ignore them at your risk.

Let me summarize in case you decided not to read that either. To spin a Cessna 150/152, you almost need to snap roll the entry. Just before the stall, you need to apply full rudder and full aft yoke in order to get into a spin. Should you try to enter a spin by cross-controlling in a turn (simulating the killer turn to final), it would stall and drop a wing but not develop into a nose-down, full spin. And to recover (at altitude), the controls could be let go and the aircraft would recover on its own. The Tomahawk would spin if yaw wasn't controlled at the point of stall. The recovery required positive and correct inputs. So what is the better training experience? The one where its hard to get into a spin but easily recovers or the one that enters easily and requires a proper recovery to reinforce the need for precise piloting techniques.

[boestar]

My answer.....BOTH.

Get the student used to the idea and technique then make it difficult.