A321 Tail Strike

[Guest]

The article is interesting in that it says the tail strike was because the 1st officer thought the aircraft had bounced on landing, but to me  the total hours (not those on type) but the total flying hours reported for the 1st officer are scarey if accurate. Surely the 1st officer has more than 341 total flying hours?  

A321 struck tail after pilot falsely perceived bounce

• 03 January, 2017
• SOURCE: Flightglobal Pro
• BY: David Kaminski-Morrow
• London

Swiss investigators believe an Airbus A321 sustained a tail-strike at Geneva after a pilot mistakenly believed the aircraft had bounced on landing.

The Swiss International Air Lines jet (HB-IOC) had touched down on runway 05 following a service from Zurich on 9 March 2014.

Swiss investigation authority SUST states that the flight had been uneventful and that the aircraft made contact with a 1.4g impact.

The first officer felt, however, that the touchdown had been “unusually hard” and believed the aircraft had momentarily become airborne again.

SUST says, however, that this was “not the case” and attributes the erroneous interpretation to lack of experience. The first officer had just over 200h on A320-family jets, from 341h total flying time.

In response to the perceived bounce, the first officer initiated a go-around, but pulled her side-stick to the rear stop. The thrust levers were advanced to the take-off position.

SUST notes that the two side-sticks are not linked and that the captain, as a result, did not receive timely tactile feedback regarding the position of the first officer’s side-stick.

The crew training manual for the aircraft warns that a bounced touchdown is among the main reasons for tail-strikes, and cautions against excessive rotation rates in the event of a go-around close to the ground.

Owing to its length, the A321 is susceptible to tail-strikes at a pitch attitude of 9.7-11.2°, depending on whether the landing-gear is fully compressed.

As the aircraft climbed away during the go-around, air traffic control inquired as to whether the jet’s tail had contacted the runway, but the first officer responded: “Not that I know.”

The aircraft suffered damage to the underside skin of its aft fuselage but completed a second approach to runway 05 and landed without further incident. None of the 78 occupants was injured.

SUST found that software modifications to the flight control computers, designed to reduce the risk of tail-strikes, had not been implemented on the aircraft involved.

[boestar]

There has to be a ZERO missing.

 

[DEFCON]

A cadet perhaps?

In today's world the addition of another zero would put her in command.

[blues deville]

2 hours ago, boestar said:

There has to be a ZERO missing.

 

Apparently not.

Accident: Swiss A321 at Geneva on Mar 9th 2014, tail strike on landing

Aviation Herald: last updated Wednesday, Dec 28th 2016 23:07Z A Swiss International Airlines Airbus A321-100, registration HB-IOC performing flight LX-2806 from Zurich to Geneva (Switzerland) with 72 passengers and 6 crew, landed on Geneva's runway 05 at 13:57L (12:57Z) when the crew initiated and reported a go-around. The next aircraft waiting for departure was cleared for takeoff and departed. ATC subsequently queried whether their tail had contacted the runway surface, the pilot replied "not that I know". The aircraft positioned for another approach to runway 05 and landed without further incident about 20 minutes after the go-around. A post flight examination showed substantial damage to the underside of the aircraft's tail.  The airline confirmed the aircraft contacted ground during landing. On Mar 18th 2014 Switzerland's SUST announced that an investigation has been opened into the accident of HB-IOC, which occurred on Mar 9th 2014 in Geneva. The aircraft suffered a tailstrike after a balked landing. On Dec 28th 2016 the SUST released their final report in German concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were: The tail of the aircraft contacted the runway surface because the pilot flying pulled the side stick abruptly to the aft stop while initiating a go around. The following factors contributed to the occurrence: - due to limited experience the pilot flying rated the landing as a bounced landing  - as the two side sticks are not coupled the pilot monitoring had no tactile feedback to detect the brusque side stick movement in time.  - the crew did not detect the high pitch angle The SUST reported the first officer (31, CPL, 341 hours total, 201 hour on type) was pilot flying, the captain (49, ATPL, 11,334 hours total, 1,160 hours on type but 4,261 hours on A320 family aircraft) was pilot monitoring. On final approach, expecting late landing clearing due to preceding arriving traffic, the first officer disconnected autopilot and autothrust. The crew subsequently received landing clearance at 500 feet AGL due to the preceding arriving aircraft delay in vacating the runway. The aircraft touched down 245 meters past the runway threshold, the first officer perceived the touchdown as unusually hard (FDR revealed +1.4G within the normal range) and perceived the aircraft bounced (FDR revealed no bounce) hence decided to go around and pulled the side stick abruptly to the aft stop. The spoilers had already deployed. A second after the side stick input the first officer called "go around", and pushed both thrust levers into the TOGA detent. Immediately afterwards the tail contacted the runway surface, before the aircraft became airborne again about 580 meters past the runway threshold. Following gear up and reducing flaps the captain informed ATC, they were going around and received instructions to climb to 7000 feet. After being handed off to Geneva Approach the captain commented, that in his opinion the go around was not necessary, however, he does support the decision to go around. A member of the apron control had observed the tail strike and reported the observation to ground control, who in turn instructed a runway inspection and informed Geneva Approach control. Approach control queried the crew whether they had experienced a tail strike during the go-around, the captain radioed that he didn't know about a tail strike. Both crew shared the view that no tail strike had occurred, however asked the cabin crew member located in the aft galley about any observation, the flight attendant reported she had heard a bang which probably was caused by a trolley moving in the galley. The flight crew checked the cabin pressurization without finding any anomaly, the crew remained uncertain about whether a tail strike had occurred or not, the relevant checklist was not consulted. While preparing for the second approach the first officer stated she was startled by the hard touch down, she had never done such a hard touch down before. The captain mentioned that he erroneously had placed the flap lever into position 2 instead of 3.  The aircraft landed on runway 05 without further incident. Ground control subsequently informed the crew that one of their staff had observed the tail strike. A subsequent inspection revealed damage to the underside of the tail section of the aircraft including structural damage (editorial note: which would qualify for an accident rating). The aircraft manufacturer suggested however to rate the damage as "minor" and put it into the category "permanent repair with inspection required". [RAB Comment - AB apparently prefers their own definitions of incident/accident.  Looks bad in the stats.  The aircraft was ferried to AB's heavy mod facility in Dresden where it was out of service for approx a month.] The runway inspection did not find anything out of the ordinary. The SUST analysed that there was no technical anomaly. The SUST analysed that the first officer had mentioned all relevant and necessary details of her approach and landing in the approach briefing, including the mention of landing with autopilot and autothrust disengaged. The SUST analysed that there was no indication that the late landing clearance had any impact on the later event. It is obvious that the reason for the go around and tail strike was the landing, that the first officer perceived as hard and bounced. It can only be explained with her little experience with the Airbus aircraft, that she perceived a landing with a maximum vertical acceleration of +1.4G as hard and bounced. Startled,  she pulled the side stick fully to the aft stop. During landing the elevators are directly controlled by the side stick, the deflection of the elevator is thus directly proportional to the stick deflection. The spoilers had already deployed, the thrust levers were not in the TOGA detent yet, when the first officer pulled the stick to the aft stop. The aircraft was not yet capable of flight in this configuration, therefore the brusque stick control input caused the tail strike. Monitoring the pitch angle is of decisive importance during a go around. The captain could not detect the stick movement in time, the only indication available to him were visual cues and the subsequent response of the aircraft when the pitch angle increased, however, the captain could no longer intervene and correct the stick input. Following the go around call the first officer commanded thrust, flaps one step, the captain moved the flaps lever from 3 to 2. The SUST stated however, that in case of a bounced landing recovery the flaps reduction should be delayed. In this particular case the flaps retraction to step 2 had no consequences. The SUST annotated in the analysis that the crew was not sure whether a tail strike had occurred or not. The non-consultation of the relevant checklists did not have any consequences in the particular event. Metars: LSGG 091320Z 06003KT 030V110 CAVOK 14/03 Q1027 NOSIG LSGG 091250Z 09004KT 350V120 CAVOK 13/03 Q1028 NOSIG

[boestar]

WOW...Just WOW.  

[UpperDeck]

Question from one of the unwashed masses.....I assume the protocol for a "bounced landing" is a go around. In this case, there was no bounce but...why is that the protocol? Once landed, why not stay there? Wasn't it the go around initiated after premature spoiler deployment and hard landing and wingstrike that resulted in a fatal accident? So long as the aircraft can be brought to a stop within the runway, why would one go around?

Thanks from the bleachers.

[GDR]

It is hard to imagine a company, particularly with the background of Swissair allowing a pilot with a grand total of 140 hours into the right seat of an A320. With that amount of experience she did well to survive without incident as long as she did.

 

[Kip Powick]

35 minutes ago, UpperDeck said:

Question from one of the unwashed masses.....I assume the protocol for a "bounced landing" is a go around. In this case, there was no bounce but...why is that the protocol? Once landed, why not stay there? Wasn't it the go around initiated after premature spoiler deployment and hard landing and wingstrike that resulted in a fatal accident? So long as the aircraft can be brought to a stop within the runway, why would one go around?

Thanks from the bleachers.

Well, it's sort of a judgement call.

The vast majority of pilots know all too well that a bounce can turn into a porpoise and a porpoise is extremely difficult to correct ( a porpoise is when the aircraft bounces on the mains and then the nose and then the mains etc.....it goes against a pilots normal reaction sequence when attempting  to correct it because the pilot will always be behind..(((hits main gear....pushes forward....(its nose gear..pulls back...too late...hits main gear...pushed forward....too late...etc etc ))

Going around rather than attempting to correct the porpoise is the safest thing to do when you "think" you are entering one  and even that procedure is difficult for a pilot to initiate because of normal pilot reaction during "bouncing"

As well, given her limited time on the aircraft, she might have felt that it would be better to Go Around because she perceived, incorrectly, that the aircraft bounced and she would be better off to have another go rather than try to salvage what she thought was a very bad landing and in her mind might have been afraid of finishing the "hard" landing because she was thinking that worse things could happen during the aftermath of the "hard"  landing..

I think it is safe to say that there is not a pilot on this forum that has not had a "firm" landing and whether they went around or not was based on their experience as well as many other circumstances.

The accident you mention (DC8 in YYZ) was a culmination of errors and again, the PF made a judgement call to go around and in hindsight  many would say it was a wrong call but at the moment he was not aware of the damage out on the wing.

[Moon The Loon]

7 hours ago, Malcolm said:

SUST notes that the two side-sticks are not linked and that the captain, as a result, did not receive timely tactile feedback regarding the position of the first officer’s side-stick.

Never having flown Airbus products, it still seems to me that this is a serious flaw not present with traditional control columns.

[bluemic]

1 hour ago, Moon The Loon said:

Never having flown Airbus products, it still seems to me that this is a serious flaw not present with traditional control columns.

 

Aaaw geez Moon, now you've gone and opened The Big Can of worms.  

 

Next someone will post about how 'twould never have happened on a Boeing and before you can add, "I ain't goin' " someone else will reference AF447 and then someone after that will write about design philosophies, the role of pilots, automation, Alternate Law, Trump and our human selfie-stick leader (oops, that's over in the political section) and sundry other opinions. Following that we'll have to slug through post after post listing Boeing vs Airbus accident stats, AoA indicators, CRM, linked control columns and tactile feedback.  

 

Yada, yada, yada....and the thread will go on foh-evah!

 

Just remember, it'll be YOUR fault Moon!  And it all started because a low-time pilot screwed the pooch.    

[blues deville]

The Airbus product is as good as any other aircraft. Just ask any Airbus pilot.  

I have a little bit of time on A319/320 (1000hrs) and after having flown the B757 for many years prior, it was a big adjustment for me. It took a few months to get comfortable but the lack of "feel" on the side stick was a probably the biggest challenge. Although the controls are different (side stick vs. CC) the PFD with command bars and pitch displays are the same.  So it became a matter of really watching the result of your input rather than any feel in your hand if that makes any sense.

Pitch attitudes in all phases of flight need to be monitored by both pilots especially on longer bodied aircraft. 

So while this captain couldn't "see" the input from his low time FO, he would have seen the pitch attitude during the initial phase of the GA.

However, it sounds like it all happened rather quickly. 

[DEFCON]

Just guessing, but I'll bet cadets are trained to a standard that might be called, 'fail safe'? IOW's, because it's understood that they know little to nothing about the complexities of flying and don't possess the 'skill sets' that are normally developed through experience, cadets are taught to go around the moment anything seems abnormal. 

[Moon The Loon]

" Just remember, it'll be YOUR fault Moon!  And it all started because a low-time pilot screwed the pooch. "

Who ya callin' "low time"?

[Moon The Loon]

1 hour ago, DEFCON said:

Just guessing, but I'll bet cadets are trained to a standard that might be called, 'fail safe'? IOW's, because it's understood that they know little to nothing about the complexities of flying and don't possess the 'skill sets' that are normally developed through experience, cadets are taught to go around the moment anything seems abnormal. 

C3000, once released as F/O's, didn't touch the controls until they had 100 hours in the right seat. Pretty good policy, in hindsight.

[Innuendo]

Quote

C3000, once released as F/O's, didn't touch the controls until they had 100 hours in the right seat. Pretty good policy, in hindsight.

 Like this

Not sure I totally agree with that as a policy.  If the aircraft is on your licence, surely  you are expected to be  basically capable in reasonable* circumstances.  

(Better that the Wily Old Commander does not suffer any incapacitation during those hundred hours.)

* Obviously circumstances such as  engine out, Cat II/III, overweight landings, howling cross winds, marginal runways  etc. etc.  I would think  the WOC  would elect to do those himself, (and should IMHO, if things go pear shaped the F/O should not have to carry any can.)

[UpperDeck]

Kip.....just want to say thank you for responding to my question. Simplistically,somewhat like porpoising in a small craft using trim to control.

I understand your comments but still ask why staying put is not the "default".

 

Regards

[JL]

I think the argument for recency would be better than one for total time. A good example for this issue...

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2001/a01w0117/a01w0117.asp

 

[Moon The Loon]

8 hours ago, Innuendo said:

Not sure I totally agree with that as a policy.  If the aircraft is on your licence, surely  you are expected to be  basically capable in reasonable* circumstances.  

(Better that the Wily Old Commander does not suffer any incapacitation during those hundred hours.)

* Obviously circumstances such as  engine out, Cat II/III, overweight landings, howling cross winds, marginal runways  etc. etc.  I would think  the WOC  would elect to do those himself, (and should IMHO, if things go pear shaped the F/O should not have to carry any can.)

The reason for that policy was to ensure you had the PM SOP nailed. C3 had near bullet-proof SOP's and it took time to learn them fully. That 100 hours in reality was maybe 10 or 12 flights. Not a huge loss of stick time, but time to get comfortable in the role.

[blues deville]

8 minutes ago, Moon The Loon said:

The reason for that policy was to ensure you had the PM SOP nailed. C3 had near bullet-proof SOP's and it took time to learn them fully. That 100 hours in reality was maybe 10 or 12 flights. Not a huge loss of stick time, but time to get comfortable in the role.

And the 100 hr. rule was after completion of Line Indoc which averaged 25-50 hours where the trainee did a majority of the flying. 

[Kip Powick]

8 hours ago, UpperDeck said:

Kip.....just want to say thank you for responding to my question. Simplistically,somewhat like porpoising in a small craft using trim to control.

I understand your comments but still ask why staying put is not the "default".

 

Regards

I don't have access to recent manuals but here is some more information I found....and I guess if one always adheres to the "manuals" one is supposed to do as instructed  With respect to the incident....remember the PF thought she had a "hard/high" landing/bounce...

Boeing's Text: 
If the airplane should bounce, hold or re-establish a normal landing attitude and add thrust as necesary to control the rate of descent. Thrust need not be added for a shallow bounce or skip. When a high, hard bounce occurs, initiate a go-around. Apply go-around thrust and use normal go-around procedures. Do not retract the landing gear until a positive rate of climb is established because a second touchdown may occur during the go-around. 

Bounced landings can occur because the higher than idle thrust is maintained through initial touchdown, disabling the automatic speedbrake deployent even when the speedbrakes are armed. During the resultant bounce, if the thrust levers are then retarded to idle, automatic speedbrake deployment can occur resulting in a loss of lift and nose up pitching moment which can result in a tailstrike or hard landing on a subsequent touchdown. 

Airbus' Text: 
In case of light bounce, maintain the pitch attitude and complete the landing, while keeping the thrust at idle. Do not allow the pitch attitude to increase, particularly following a firm touch down with a high pitch rate. 

In case of high bounce, maintain the pitch attitude and initiate a go-around. Do not try to avoid a second touch down during the go-around. Should it happen, it would be soft enough to prevent damage to the aircraft, if pitch attitude is maintained. 

Only when safely established in the go-around, retract flaps one step and the landing gear. A landing should not be attempted immediately after high bounce, as thrust may be required to soften the second touch down and the remaining runway length may be insufficient to stop th

 

[DEFCON]

When an aircraft is bouncing a considerable amount of runway is passing beneath the aircraft.

Landing distance calculations do contain fudge factors which serve to protect everyone & everything involved from pilot handling errors etc., but ...

During a bounce event the pilot has zero real appreciation for the amount of usable runway passing beneath his aircraft, which means he may not have enough runway remaining to stop the aircraft once control of the landing process is re-established, hence the go-around drill.

Overall experience and time on type allows a given pilot to develop an instinctual relationship with an aircraft. For instance, a high time WJ 737 pilot instinctively appreciates how much time he has to fiddle with the aircraft during a not so perfect arrival before it's time to abandon the landing and go around. This practice is an industry norm, but on occasion, an error in judgement does lead to a poor outcome, the AF 340 crash in YYZ for instance.  

Cadets have next to zero experience and lack the 'feel' for the aircraft, which is why I think their training likely focuses on instilling the when in doubt, go around approach to their disciplines. We know that many landing crashes are the consequence of the mind set, or logic that compels us to complete the landing even though things aren't going well, so perhaps the new generation will be more inclined to abandon buggered up approaches throughout their career than their predecessors have been?

Rich commented above with regard to the cadet's disengagement of the auto-throttles. That tidbit caught my eye too. I'm not sure what to make of that sop, but the logic of same is certain to be a topic of discussion during the investigation.

As was the case here, it's now common practice for FO's to call for a go around. Personally, I've never thought that was a particularly good idea and I think this accident supports that belief. I don't mean to be disrespectful, but the completely green 350 hour cadet made what I see as a 'command decision', which led to very serious consequences.

Finally, the policy that places cadets in the FO's seat with the average line pilot should be examined thoroughly too. We should be asking the regulators to justify their apparent belief that the average line Captain is somehow qualified to train and indoctrinate entirely inexperienced airline pilot candidates during line operations.

And what about the guy in the back that expects there will be two 'qualified' people operating the complex machine that is transporting him across the planet at high speeds and altitudes and through all forms of nasty weather? As it is going, the industry and regulators are operating on the cheap and now offer the traveler one individual that may be no more than quasi qualified who they charge with training and supervising another who's already operating way above his experience level and pay grade.

 

 

   

 

 

[Canoehead]

Attitude + Power = Performance 

At 200 or 300 hours, a cadet might understand the "theory" behind this, but there's likely minimal understanding of it in practice.  I mean real understanding.  The real understanding is the stuff that we (the majority of us pilots on here) learned flying in our early years sans autopilot/AT/FBW etc.  I remember my "aha" moment where it all "clicked". And there were moments on each airplane I flew that it clicked and I felt I understood the machine was finally strapped onto me.  I was flying it, and not the other way around.

Sorry, but at 2 or 300 hours of total time, an A320 is still driving.  That we don't see more of this stuff is kind of a miracle. If the tail came to within an inch of contacting the runway, we wouldn't be reading about it though, but still a critical showing of poor flying ability.

You get what you pay for.  

(Just my 2 cents)