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DEFCON last won the day on May 16

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  1. Vsplat I do not have any kind of obsession with the FO. I only identified an anomaly, which several people attempted to rationalize. Did the investigators see the same thing and find answers that were satisfactory to them? Why you, especially you, would feel there's a need to turn said observation into a giant defence exercise escapes me. In the same vein, I don't know where in this thread it was that I questioned anyone's intellect? Perhaps you're too close to the fire this time to be completely objective? And yes, I do feel the report came away a little light on the human factors aspects of the crash, but where otherwise do you think I was finding 'fault' with a report that's based on "a two year investigation by professionals with unfettered access to information none of us have"?
  2. May I be the first to pass on my sincere condolences.
  3. "The report says they had the lights in sight. But they might have been the wrong lights, because they were lower than they should've been, due to factors associated with the flight mode they were in, and their training. And the lighting on that approach was unsufficient for the minimums they were flying to according to international standards, and they weren't even on full strength." What is all that to mean? Is it a defence for pilot error? "In addition to the factors already stated above- medical, leave, layoff (years?), reserve duty (many years?), I'd add that a so called normal AC mainline pilot probably flies 500-700 hrs per year. Which is only about 50 per month. As to why that's so low you'd have to ask the people who make the pairings and schedules." Seems that you're looking for reasons to explain scheduling oddities, which was the point of my question in the first place. Seeing that one of the crew only averaged 35 hours a month over 15 years in the right seat of one type in a fast moving upgauging / upgrading environment is unusual to say the least and worthy of examination. I can appreciate your need to defend the FO's honour ZV.
  4. Do you guys read? The TT on type is not low, but accumulating the time at a rate of 35 hours per month over 15 years is not exactly burning up the sky. You could compare the FO's time on the job to the Captain's; the disparity is more than obvious. I'd bet the average A320 pilot time at AC probably averages somewhere near twice that amount of hard time. Once you get by the need to circle the wagons, I'm sure some of you can at least acknowledge the fact that sitting as an FO on the 320 for 15 years at AC as everyone passes you by, including the subject Captain, would stand out to an observer and is a point worthy of investigative examination. When you boil the entire matter down, although there are other related factors, the crash is a consequence of the crew's decision to allow the aircraft, for whatever the reason, to descend below the MDA without having the necessary visual clues. Blaming Airbus, automation, the airport factors and the weather etc. does not relieve a crew of its fiduciary responsibility.
  5. That's about 35 hours per month over 15 years, which does seem a tad low.
  6. Deicer "At a get together with Muslim friends this weekend, they were the ones that brought up the optics of 45 getting his 'medal'. He bowed before the King. The moderates I was with were horrified that he did that. In their world it shows who is dominant." So you and your muslim friends would have prefered the Saudi King get on a step-stool of some sort to award the medal? Like this
  7. Sooner, or later, the madness will cease.
  8. It's got to be really old if it came with instructions.
  9. "I wonder if controllers know that there is a huge (order of magnitude) increase of workload in flying a non-precision approach. To have this thrown at a crew last minute is a huge disservice to crews." Just a question, but if you brief for a vectored ILS and the GP fails just as you're passing over the FAF, wouldn't you carry on with the LOC only approach? Iow's, are you 'prepared' to continue with the LOC only approach at the time of the failure, or would you miss at the FAF?
  10. No, I do not know who the FO is, nor does it matter; I'm not an insider at AC. I agree, people do bid lifestyles, but I'm sure both of you would agree, that is not always the case. As an outsider I'm left to consider the facts as published in the report. In this case the report indicates the FO had relatively low time on type and all of it had been spent in the right seat. As an experienced large aircraft accident investigator I can tell you that the FO's history is relevant to the investigation. Although I'm certain that any TSB investigator worth his pay would not have left this question open ended, for whatever the reason, the 1IC, or a higher authority decided to not include the details in the report. As these things go, loose threads lead to questions.
  11. Hi Malcolm You're correct, no pilot wants their name released to the public, especially when it's used post-mortem, but no 'Right' to protection exists either.
  12. I thought I'd add a little ps to my 'competency' comments to better clarify my point. In my mind the negative impact on competency due to automation dependency is very alarming; the modern crash record is quite telling in this respect. As the case here may show, the lack of regular hands - on experience may prove to be hugely problematic when a crew, any crew, is eventually called upon to act as a traditional pilot in circumstances they're not not normally exposed or accustomed to and as many of us know, black-hole np approaches are extremely challenging for even the most manually experienced pilots.
  13. Great article Jaydee!
  14. Where does the expectation of privacy come from?