GDR

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GDR last won the day on June 14

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  1. GDR

    737max

    Here's a very interesting piece on Boeing. https://mattstoller.substack.com/p/the-coming-boeing-bailout
  2. With the time that this is asking for what seems like a basic software fix makes me wonder if there isn't something in the overall design of the Max is basically flawed. Is it possible that the instability of the Max with its larger engines is going to preclude the aircraft coming back in service. Frankly, I doubt this is the case but I'm starting to wonder.
  3. Didn't you have Alcock as an instructor at some point or other Kip?
  4. https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/transat-q2-profits-plunge-as-air-canada-takeover-talks-continue-1.1272829 Transat Q2 profits plunge as Air Canada takeover talks continue MONTREAL -- A Quebec developer seeking to outbid Air Canada with a takeover proposal for Transat AT Inc. says he will hand a formal offer to the tour operator before Transat's exclusive talks with Air Canada end on June 26. "We will file one, because they'e asking for one," Group Mach Inc. chief executive Vincent Chiara told The Canadian Press. "We don't have any obligation toward Air Canada to respect an agreement." Transat began exclusive talks with Air Canada on May 27 after the country's largest airline made a bid of $13 per share or about $520 million. Last week Mach announced in a press release a higher offer of $14 per share or $527.6-million, which includes trying to convince the Quebec government to finance nearly one-quarter of the purchase. Transat chief financial officer Denis Petrin said the company has "taken note of the press release" but has not received a formal proposal. "Should any further acquisition proposal be communicated to the company before or after the end of the exclusivity period, it will be addressed by our board of directors in consideration of their duties and obviously the agreement with Air Canada," Petrin said on a conference call with investors Thursday. Under its offer, Mach committed to keep Transat's head office, executive team and decision-making hub in Montreal -- all essential, it said, if the Montreal developer hopes to get the $120 million in financing it seeks from Quebec. Chiara, who told The Canadian Press he aims to continue Transat's current business operations -- with no layoffs or selloffs planned -- said Thursday he spoke with Quebec Economy Minister Pierre Fitzgibbon since his initial expression of interest June 4. Key to the deal would be proposed minority partner TM Grupo Inmobiliario, a Spanish real estate developer that would roll over its three hotels in Mexico to Transat, according to Chiara, who has criticized how Transat is handling its $750-million plan to develop a hotel chain in the Riviera Maya and the Caribbean. TM would contribute about $15 million in cash in exchange for a minority equity stake in Transat after the proposed agreement closed, Mach said. That would cover the $15-million break fee -- built into the Air Canada arrangement -- that Transat would incur by accepting the higher bid. "While the due diligence resulting from the letter of intent signed with Air Canada is also underway, we remain focused on achieving the improvements set out in our strategic plan," Transat chief executive Jean-Marc Eustache said in a statement. The company continues to face fiscal challenges. It said fuel prices and exchange rates contributed to a drop in year-over-year profits last quarter, which nonetheless beat analysts' expectations amid higher revenues.\ Net income attributable to shareholders fell 71 per cent to $2.27 million in the quarter ended April 30, down from $7.94 million in the same quarter last year, the company said. On an adjusted basis, Transat lost $6.31 million or 17 cents per share for the quarter compared with an adjusted loss of $456,000 or one cent per share during the same period in 2018. That beat analysts' expectations of a loss of 23 cents per share, according to Thomson Reuters Eikon. Revenue rose more than three per cent to $897.4 million from $867.2 million. The Montreal-based company said aircraft fuel costs rose nearly 12 per cent year over year last quarter to $118.9 million. Transat offers vacation packages, hotel stays and air travel under the Transat and Air Transat brands to some 60 destinations in more than 25 countries in the Americas and Europe.
  5. AEF is my go to sight to find out information on events concerning aviation. I'm now long retired from a profession which I loved and this site keeps me in touch with that profession. Moderating is a largely thankless job and maybe this thread should be about showing that we are thankful for the job that is being done even if once every few years an inadvertent mistake is made. Greg
  6. Another take on it. It looks like the functionality of the stab switches was altered with the Max. https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-05-11/boeing-dangerously-altered-mcas-toggle-switches-737-max-deadly-crashes Boeing Altered Critical MCAS Toggle Switches On 737 MAX Before Deadly Crashes When Boeing transitioned from the 737 NG model to the 737 MAX, designers altered a toggle switch panel that could have prevented both of the deadly crashes over the last year in Ethiopia and Indonesia, killing a combined 346 people, according to an investigation by the Seattle Times. On the 737 NG, the right switch was labeled "AUTO PILOT" - and allowed pilots to deactivate the plane's automated stabilizer controls, such as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), suspected to be the culprit in both crashes. The left toggle switch on the NG would deactivate the buttons on the yoke which pilots regularly use to control the horizontal stabilizer. On the 737 MAX, however, the two switches were altered to perform the same function, according to internal documents reviewed by the Times, so that they would disable all electronic stabilizer controls - including the MCAS and the thumb buttons on the yoke used to control the stabilizer. (Dimas Ardian / Bloomberg) Former Boeing flight-controls engineer Peter Lemme, a harsh critic of the MAX design, first raised questions over the switch alteration on his blog, and says he doesn't understand why Boeing made the change. Boeing told the Times that they had historically called for pilots to flip both switches to disable a problematic or "runaway" stabilizer, so the button change matched that procedure, adding that the two switches "were retained for commonality of the crew interface." "Boeing strongly disagrees with any speculation or suggestion that pilots should deviate from these long-established and trained safety procedures," the company added. During the October Lion Air flight, pilots were reportedly unaware of the MCAS system - while the day before, an off-duty pilot with knowledge of the stabilizer controls helped pilots disable the system on the same plane. Data from the flight revealed that the repeated commands from the MCAS system sent the flight from Bali to Jakarta plummeting into the sea. After they were able to manually control the stabilizer, the Ethiopian Airlines pilots appear to have flipped the cutoff switches back on, reactivating the MCAS system. Shortly after, it entered a fatal nosedive which killed all 157 people aboard. "When you’re pulling on the column with 80-100 pounds of force trying to save your life, your troubleshooting techniques are very weak," said aviation consultant Doug Moss. "You need some gut-level instinctive things to do to solve the problem." Notably, the FAA did not notify pilots that the functionality of the switches had been altered, simply noting in its documentation the labeling change "Stab Trim cutout switches panel nomenclature."
  7. I'm not so sure in this case Don. Everybody who I run into and knows that I flew ask me about the 737 Max. (Thanks to what you and others have posted on this forum I can fool them into thinking that I know what I'm talking about.) I don't know if there has ever been as much wide spread negativity about a specific aircraft before. I think it's going to take a while before the flying public forgets about this.
  8. Thanks Don I sure admire how you have kept up with the technical aspects of our profession. I did kinda wonder about a soft ware designer,s acumen in all of this. I sure wish we had stuck with, what I understand to be the original plan, the Neo. I guess Boeing made an offer we couldn't refuse. I'm heading over today to your neck of the woods to spend Easter with my son and his family including two new great grand-kids. I'm no longer a relative but an ancestor. Thanks again Don Greg
  9. The things that I found interesting was that, assuming he is correct, I hadn't realized thrust line had changed that much. Also I also thought that some of his comments on Boeing's philosophy were interesting.
  10. Came across this article and found it informative and interesting. https://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/aviation/how-the-boeing-737-max-disaster-looks-to-a-software-developer
  11. Can someone tell me if the the cut out switches are only on the Max or did previous generations of 737's have something similar.
  12. Speaking from a position of ignorance on this subject, (a position in which I have a great deal of experience), is it correct that if this occurs and the pilot knocks off a couple of switches, disarming the MCAS and the problem goes away?
  13. I don't think this has been posted before. Enjoy Greg
  14. A New York Times investigation of the Oct. 29, 2018, Lion Air Boeing 737 MAX crash suggests marketing considerations were at least partly behind Boeing’s and the FAA's joint decision to not specifically train pilots in the maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) that may have played a role in the crash. The Times story quotes various named sources as saying that Boeing wanted to maintain the cross compatibility between the new aircraft and earlier versions of the 737, thus simplifying conversion training and reducing costs for airlines buying the MAX. The difficulty was that the physically larger engines that accomplish the plane’s main selling point—better fuel economy—had to be mounted higher and farther forward than on its predecessors and that significantly changed low-speed flight characteristics. MCAS was designed to compensate for the MAX’s increased tendency to stall in a low-speed turn by adjusting the angle of the horizonal stabilizer. The system takes data from one of two angle of attack indicators (there’s no redundancy or agreement requirement) and was designed to automatically push the nose down if an incipient stall was detected. Boeing convinced the FAA that because the system maintained the basic flight characteristics of earlier versions that pilots did not need specific training on MCAS even though its inclusion was considered necessary for certification of the aircraft. The Times story also notes that other regulators at least initially determined that pilots should be made aware of MCAS. European regulators wanted pilots to be trained on it but eventually accepted the FAA’s and Boeing’s position. Brazil, however, stuck to its guns and required specific training for pilots on MCAS. Boeing didn’t hide the addition of MCAS. It’s described in operation and maintenance manuals and was explained in technical briefings with prospective customers. It also included an emergency checklist covering disabling the system. But because they were not specifically trained in its use, most pilots didn’t know it was there and that it operated fundamentally differently from the speed trim system that operated the stabilizer setting on earlier 737s. Notably, pulling back on the yoke on older aircraft disables the automatic trim. Pulling back does not deactivate MCAS on the MAX. Something the Times couldn’t determine was whether MCAS was tested in a failure mode, either in the simulator or on the aircraft itself. The predominant theory on the root cause of the crash was that faulty AOA data resulted in an erroneous and extreme reaction from the MCAS, pushing the aircraft into a high-speed dive that the pilots could not recover from. Boeing and the FAA are under investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board and Indonesian authorities to determine if the decision to skip pilot training in the new system played a role in what became the worst air crash of 2018. https://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/Boeing-FAA-Probed-In-Lion-Air-Crash-232225-1.html
  15. They have the voice recorder. https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/indonesia-finds-lion-air-jet-cockpit-voice-recorder-1.4252009