Air France A330 Down

[handyman]

Who is this Peter Allen?

UK Telegraph

passengers and crew on board did not even have time to inflate their life jackets.

Since when are you suppose to inside a cabin?

Investigators said the Airbus "descended vertically" and dropped 35,000ft in a matter of seconds, hitting the water in its exact flying position.

Not possible unless the aircraft was traveling faster than the speed of sound which is again not possible. Using a Mach 1 average TAS of 600kts, you would be travelling at 10miles per minute and 35,000' being approx. 6miles high...you do the math. Then they say

It appears to have hit the surface of the water in its flying position with a strong vertical acceleration."

Sure, it didn't break-up in-flight and somehow the tail-fin got 18 miles away from the rest of the debris!

I'm starting to think some investigators are providing damage control for Airbus.

I think serious questions need to be answered!

[J.O.]

Sheesh Handyman, were you hiding behind the grassy knoll in Dallas too?

[Guest rattler]

Complete preliminary report in English:

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601...090601e1.en.pdf

[Don Hudson]

Inchman;

FYI, from the prelim report:

In 2001, following some inconsistent speed problems, it was decided to replace, before the

end of December 2003, the Rosemount probes that then equipped the A330 by Goodrich

0851 HL probes or Thales C16195AA probes.20

Service Bulletins, issued in 2007 then revised in 2008, had recommended the replacement

on A330/A340 airplanes of C16195AA probes by C16195BA probes.

On the date of the accident, Airbus A330 / A340 aircraft were equipped with three standards

of Pitot probe:

• BF Goodrich Aerospace probes, type 0851 HL,

• Thales Avionics probes of types C16195AA(22) and C16195BA.

It should be noted that any improvements that this change of standard could bring to cases

of speed inconsistencies encountered in cruise had not been formally established.

[Guest rattler]

One other point raised on the infamous Pprune: According to those fluent in French (aviation version) the reference to high vertical speed is not meant to say that the aircraft came in nose down but rather that it was descending rapidly (high vertical speed).

Perhaps one of our francophone aircrew can review the en francais version and give their translation of the comment regarding the high vertical speed upon impact?

It can be viewed at: http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601...-cp090601e1.pdf

[Gumbi]

From the report: "leur examen visuel montre que l’avion n’a pas été détruit en vol ; il paraît

avoir heurté la surface de l’eau en ligne de vol, avec une forte accélération

verticale."

My translation: visual examination of the recovered aircraft parts suggests that the aircraft has not been destroyed in flight; it seems like the aircraft hit the surface of the water "in a flight attitude" but with a strong vertical acceleration.

The "en ligne de vol" is hard to translate since it is a typical France french expression, so my best guess is "in a flight attitude".

Gumbi

[handyman]

Sheesh Handyman, were you hiding behind the grassy knoll in Dallas too?

oh come on now...why was the tail so far away? Couldn't the fuselage less tail have hit the water in the near level attitude as they say? We all want to think this aircraft was as whole as the one in the Hudson but what if it wasn't?

[Don Hudson]

gumbi, thanks. Re, "seems like the aircraft hit the surface of the water "in a flight attitude" but with a strong vertical acceleration.", so "super-stalled, so to speak, then, with a very high (neighbourhood of 90deg) AoA, much like we see in the photograph of the BOAC B707 over Fuji. I would have thought that such a high vertical acceleration would have left much smaller bits and pieces but if the 707 wreckage photos on "airdisaster.com", we can see large sections remaining still. Interesting. Thanks again for the translation.

[handyman]

gumbi, thanks. Re, "seems like the aircraft hit the surface of the water "in a flight attitude" but with a strong vertical acceleration.", so "super-stalled, so to speak, then, with a very high (neighbourhood of 90deg) AoA, much like we see in  the photograph of the BOAC B707 over Fuji. I would have thought that such a high vertical acceleration would have left much smaller bits and pieces but if the 707 wreckage photos on "airdisaster.com", we can see large sections remaining still. Interesting. Thanks again for the translation.

Don, just a couple of thoughts on this.

The BOAC accident aircraft shed pieces prior to impact.

The aircraft was then seen to be shedding pieces and then a large puff of vapour came from the aircraft's tail. It pitched up and entered a flat spin, the tail assembly and engines seen to be missing and the starboard outer wing had failed. The forward fuselage then broke off and the aircraft continued in a flat spin until impacting the base of Mt. Fuji

With regards to piece size and flat spins...an accelerated flat spin would generate the highest rate of descents which are typically no higher than 8000FPM but often much lower. Even if it was 20,00FPM, that is only 3.33 miles per minute or about 200kts. Also, terminal velocity of a streamlined object is about 200kts and I'm sure this aircraft was not that streamlined in a spin.

I have seen many military aircraft accidents at different speeds and at 200kts, pieces are very large. It's not until you get well above 400+kts that pieces are small (hand size).

I don't believe the aircraft was entirely together when it struck the ocean. Maybe it was mostly together but I believe there were enough pieces missing to make flying nearly impossible.

Just my opinion but there are some strange facts in this case.

[Don Hudson]

My early assumption of a high altitude breakup was based upon the condition of the large bits - what is cited in the report was not evident in the available photos - evidence of high compression forces. With so little to go on still, while the scenarios are somewhat narrowed, the investigators have concluded that the aircraft was whole when it struck the water. I see some are disputing this conclusion so we'll have to wait a while to see what unfolds.

I still think they'll find the recorders. The scenario the interm report theorizes at least means that the main wreckage would be more concentrated than in a high altitude breakup and, as you point out, probably in much larger chunks than expected which means metal detection will be perhaps more reliable after the pingers exhaust their batteries.

What is it about the pitots, I wonder?

[Dropzone]

I see some are disputing this conclusion so we'll have to wait a while to see what unfolds.

Don

I've always been skeptical about what AirBus says during accident investigations. It seems they always start with a statement that there is nothing wrong with an AirBus... even before they have any facts...not a confidence builder in my book.

[mo32a]

>>>

I have no idea of the validity of this report, I received it as an e-mail.

From a NWA pilot.

>>>

>>> Well, I'm sure you have all heard of the Air France accident. I

>>> fly the same plane, the A330.

>>>

>>>

>>>

>>> Yesterday while coming up from Hong Kong to Tokyo, a 1700nm

>>> 4hr. flight, we experienced the same problems Air France had

>>> while flying thru bad weather.

>>> I have a link to the failures that occurred on AF 447. My list is

>>> almost the same.

>>> http://www.eurocockpit.com/images/acars447.php

>>>

>>> The problem I suspect is the pitot tubes ice over and you

>>> loose your airspeed indication along with the auto pilot, auto

>>> throttles and rudder limit protection. The rudder limit

>>> protection keeps you from over stressing the rudder at high speed.

>>>

>>> Synopsis;

>>> Tuesday 23, 2009 10am enroute HKG to NRT. Entering Nara Japan

>>> airspace.

>>>

>>> FL390 mostly clear with occasional isolated areas of rain,

>>> clouds tops about FL410.

>>> Outside air temperature was -50C TAT -21C (your not supposed to

>>> get liquid water at these temps). We did.

>>>

>>> As we were following other aircraft along our route. We

>>> approached a large area of rain below us. Tilting the weather

>>> radar down we could see the heavy rain below, displayed in red.

>>> At our altitude the radar indicated green or light precipitation,

>>> most likely ice crystals we thought.

>>>

>>> Entering the cloud tops we experienced just light to

>>> moderate turbulence. (The winds were around 30kts at altitude.)

>>> After about 15 sec. we encountered moderate rain. We thought it

>>> odd to have rain streaming up the windshield at this altitude and

>>> the sound of the plane getting pelted like an aluminum garage

>>> door. It got very warm and humid in the cockpit all of a sudden.

>>> Five seconds later the Captains, First Officers, and standby

>>> airspeed indicators rolled back to 60kts. The auto pilot and auto

>>> throttles disengaged. The Master Warning and Master Caution

>>> flashed, and the sounds of chirps and clicks letting us know

>>> these things were happening.

>>> Jerry Staab, the Capt. hand flew the plane on the shortest

>>> vector out of the rain. The airspeed indicators briefly came back

>>> but failed again. The failure lasted for THREE minutes. We flew

>>> the recommended 83%N1 power setting. When the airspeed indicators

>>> came back. we were within 5 knots of our desired speed.

>>> Everything returned to normal except for the computer logic

>>> controlling the plane. (We were in alternate law for the rest of

>>> the flight.)

>>>

>>> We had good conditions for the failure; daylight, we were

>>> rested, relatively small area, and light turbulence. I think it

>>> could have been much worse. Jerry did a great job fly and staying

>>> cool. We did our procedures called dispatch and maintenance on

>>> the SAT COM and landed in Narita. That's it.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>

[Don Hudson]

mo32a;

The report's valid; it's on the NTSB site and was the subject of numerous media articles last week.

Dropzone;

That Airbus is going to spin this is a given and not news; so would Boeing. The spin from McDonnell Douglas's chairman after the Chicago DC10 accident would make you dizzy enough to retch. There was never anything wrong with the cargo door or the cabin floor venting; Windsor and Paris were human errors by the guys who shut the doors. You can read about it in "The DC10 Case; A Study in Applied Ethics, Technology and Society", available from SUNY press.

The key here is the BEA and the NTSB. To my eye there is nothing manufactured, hard-pedaled or soft-pedaled or scented, in the Interim Report and that is what counts. My comment about "some are disputing...etc" refers to the statements about an intact aircraft falling vertically, essentially super-stalled. They may have an argument as we don't have the recorders and we don't have the main wreckage, only bits and pieces demonstrating "very high compression loadings".

There are broader issues afoot than just finding out what happened to this aircraft and why, and Airbus will be keenly aware of this.

[JL]

The damage to the galley shown in the report is reflective of there being heavy objects on the shelves/trays at impact. The closet itself doesn't show a lot of distortion in the vertical as one would expect if it was in a fuselage that impacted at a high g. I would expect compression of the fuselage, as a tube, which would compress, from above and below, the closet structure. It would be nice to see photos of more pieces and ultimately the FDR/CVR, but the latter seems unlikley.

[Guest rattler]

Good summary of the report can ve viewed at: http://www.avherald.com/h?article=41a81ef1/0038&opt=0

[Guest rattler]

DATE:09/07/09

SOURCE:Air Transport Intelligence newsAir France reviewing weather-radar use after AF447 crash: CEO

By David Kaminski-Morrow

Air France is reviewing crew training, use of weather radar and the availability of meteorological information for pilots following the loss of flight AF447 over the South Atlantic last month.

Chief executive Pierre-Henri Gourgeon disclosed the measures a week after investigators divulged details about meteorological conditions at the time of the Airbus A330's disappearance, and the course deviations performed by other aircraft in the vicinity.

In a transcript published by the airline after he spoke to a French newspaper, Gourgeon said there was "never any arbitration" between safety and economy and highlighted operations during weather as an example.

"For example, it's written down in black and white that, when there are storms, you go around them," he says. "There is no question of saving on fuel. Pilots are totally free to choose their route."

One of the aspects of the investigation is the choice of flight track by AF447's crew. Investigators have stated that "several" other flights - ahead of, and trailing, AF447 at about the same altitude - altered course to avoid cloud masses.

These flights included another Air France A330 operating the AF459 service from Sao Paulo to Paris. Gourgeon says this crew crossed a turbulent area that had not been detected on weather radar and, as a result, increased the sensitivity - subsequently avoiding a "much worse" area of turbulence.

"Flight 447 didn't have the good fortune to encounter that first warning and may not have been able to avoid the second very active storm," adds Gourgeon.

France's Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses says the crew of AF459, which had been 37min behind AF447, detected echoes on the weather radar which "differed significantly" depending on the radar setting.

The crew initially chose to deviate 20nm to the west but the radar then showed an extensive squall line which led them to deviate to the east by 70-80nm.

"On the strength of that report, we are going to review the way we use radar," says Gourgeon. "Whether or not that was the cause of the loss of flight 447, we have to examine every factor and improve all of our procedures and rules."

[Don Hudson]

The crew initially chose to deviate 20nm to the west but the radar then showed an extensive squall line which led them to deviate to the east by 70-80nm.

"On the strength of that report, we are going to review the way we use radar," says Gourgeon. "Whether or not that was the cause of the loss of flight 447, we have to examine every factor and improve all of our procedures and rules."

Well, finally somebody has said it.

The use and hopefully even comprehension of airborne radar is now highlighted and no longer a topic to ignore in training. Pilots who wish to know their radar installation and use in-depth must purchase the operating manual from the manufacturer since airlines do not teach or train this aspect of the operation. Consequently, in terms of manufacturer recommendations, non-standard use of the installation occurs and misunderstandings about the various modes arise and are sustained without the benefit of correction. The mythologies surrounding the use of "gain", "Map mode", and the understanding of signal attenutation and blanking and the effective use of tilt to build a full picture of what lies ahead seem to be widespread. Techniques for use of X-band radar seem to be routinely applied to C-band, digital radars. Some advocate the use of "MAP" to paint "dry" buildups, when the Collins manual clearly states that map has a different algorithm for map mode including suppression, (obviously) of ground clutter. The nature and meaning (in terms of turbulence levels) of the signal returned from high-altitude ice crystals is unreliable.

We do not know what is causing the mode of failure being seen in pitot tubes. Even then, failure of pitot tubes alone does not cause loss of control of the aircraft. Ater the Aeroperu and Birgenair B757 accidents, SOPs designed to keep flight safe without speed information were established. Not ALL airlines teach and practise these SOPs in the simulator.

To my understanding, the correct, manufacturer-recommended use of radar is not taught, trained or reviewed either in check rides, simulator sessions or recurrent training. Articles in flight safety publications and AOM procedures have only recently been emerging.

No one who flies transport aircraft does not know the basics about thunderstorm avoidance - the rules are clear and immediately available. Ninety-nine percent of the time it works and does so safely, with wide margins around large, isolated storms. How to best use radar to detect what to avoid is not, however, widely taught which leads to a potpourri of mythologies being sustained by word-of-mouth instead of being based upon either airline-supplied information or the manufacturer's manuals, which can make a difference when navigating a complex zone of large, embedded buildups in the ITCZ.

[Moon The Loon]

Well said, Don, and SPOT ON. I was lucky - years ago I got to sit in on a manufacturer's course. The material learned there stays with me today and has kept me out of a lot of trouble over the years around the world.

[MURRAY]

As an aside Don and M.T.L., never rely on ATC weather radar (I think we've covered this before), particularly the absolute garbage we're saddled with here.

[Don Hudson]

Murray - yessir, thanks - no offense intended but I have never relied upon ATC radar for anything but "keeping the dots apart". Given RNP/FANS closer separation standards, that's sufficient!

MTL, wow, a mfr's course, how lucky is that?! There is NOTHING, not a thing, given to airline pilots by airlines by way of teaching, hard (mfr) data, sim or line checks, not in my experience anyway. I think it's because they don't know either.

When I first bought Dave Gwinn's course and CD on radar years ago, I couldn't even find out what our radar beam width was on the 320 so I could use the mathematics provided in the course to determine altitudes of the cells the radar was painting. Gwinn's notes used the 1-in-60 rule and knowledge of the 320 radar beam width which I now know to be just over 3 degrees. Some basic facts about the beam need to be known. At "0" degrees, the radar was set on the horizon and looking 1.5deg up, and 1.5deg down, roughly. So, if the tilt was set to "1.5DN", you knew you were looking from the horizon to three degrees below the aircraft.

The formula is easy - Beam angle (from straight ahead, or "zero") X distance X 100.

In the above example, if a thunderstorm is just painting at 80nm ahead when the antenna tilt is indicating"0"deg, (pointing right at the horizon), the beam is "looking 1.5deg above and below the horizon. Using the formula, we get:

1.5 x 80 x 100 = 12,000ft below the aircraft.

Using an antenna tilt of 3.0deg UP, means the bottom of the beam is "on the horizon". If something is painting, it's at your altitude, possibly higher... QED.

Anyway, this stuff is available for home study.

[GDR]

No one who flies transport aircraft does not know the basics about thunderstorm avoidance - the rules are clear and immediately available. Ninety-nine percent of the time it works and does so safely, with wide margins around large, isolated storms. How to best use radar to detect what to avoid is not, however, widely taught which leads to a potpourri of mythologies being sustained by word-of-mouth instead of being based upon either airline-supplied information or the manufacturer's manuals, which can make a difference when navigating a complex zone of large, embedded buildups in the ITCZ.

You are spot on Don. Unless I have forgotten, (which is entirely possible), everything I learned about the operation of the radar I learned while flying on the line, from guys who had learned the same way. Even on the one manufacturers course I had, (A320 when we first got them), we didn't get any specific radar instruction.

[MURRAY]

No offense taken Don. It's just sad and tragic that in this age of advanced technology many Canadian controllers feel obligated to issue a disclaimer before dealing with questions regarding active weather.

[Moon The Loon]

Yo Murray. Point taken. About 15 years ago when given then. I've been aware of Canadian equipment deficiencies for a long time.

Thus the reliance on knowledge acquired, by whatever means when not available through an employer, and common sense applied.

[Guest ACSideStick]

Don,

Air Canada did do courses a few years ago. They were taught by Bob Kosteka, who is back at Transport now. He offered them at all bases, I think.

[MURRAY]

Wise man, M.T.L.