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AN-148 Down Just Outside Moscow


Moon The Loon

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Although it's early and the machine may have been shedding pieces as it came down, the media is saying the aircraft went in near vertical and the resulting explosion / impact recoil apparently scattered debris up to a kilometer around the crash.

I've been trying without luck to place the piece of orange and black metal shown two posts above on the aircraft based on online pics. any ideas?

 

  

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10 minutes ago, DEFCON said:

Although it's early and the machine may have been shedding pieces as it came down, the media is saying the aircraft went in near vertical and the resulting explosion / impact recoil apparently scattered debris up to a kilometer around the crash.

I've been trying without luck to place the piece of orange and black metal shown two posts above on the aircraft based on online pics. any ideas?

 

  

Hard to tell, here's a pic of (one of) Saratov Airlines AN-148's.

Saratov_Airlines_an-148.jpg

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Preliminary info says pitot heat wasn't selected on.

http://www.avherald.com/h?article=4b4cb236&opt=0

In the afternoon of Feb 13th 2018 the MAK reported, that decoding of the FDR data has been completed. Preliminary analysis shows, that the pitot heatings for all three pitot probes were off while the pitot heatings had been turned on prior to departure on the previous 15 flights. About 2:30 minutes after becoming airborne a special situation developed at about 1300 meters of height and a speed of 465-470 kph (250 KIAS) when a disagreement between the speed readings #1 and #3 developed with the speed reading #2 not registering, #1 was showing about 30kph (15 knots) more than #3, an according message was issued. No significant altitude deviations between the pitot systems were noticed. At about 2000 meters height speed reading #1 began to reduce while #3 increased, another speed disagree message was issued. The crew disconnected the autopilot and continued in manual control. Speed readings from #3 reached 540-560 kph (290-300 KIAS), #1 speed readings continued to decrease. 50 seconds after the autopilot was disconnected the aircraft experienced vertical loads between 0.5 and 1.5G, the #1 speed reading reached 0, the #3 began to decrease reaching 200 kph (108 KIAS), the aircraft pitched down to about 30-35 degrees below horizont, the vertical load was 0G. Before collision with the ground #3 speed readings began to rapidly increase reaching 800 kph (432 KIAS) just before impact, #1 speed readings remained at 0. The pitch angle remained at 30 degrees below horizont until impact, 5 seconds prior to impact a right bank of 25 degrees developed. The MAK wrote: "A preliminary analysis of the recorded information, as well as an analysis of similar cases that occurred in the past, suggest that the development of a special situation in the flight could be caused by incorrect data on the flight speed on the pilots indicators, which in turn was apparently due to icing of the pitot probes when the heating systems are off."

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Unfortunately......... I have to assume these fellows were never taught "partial panel" flying....

.Remember .....there was also the one down in South America when they lost instrument readings  after taking off at night  over the ocean...painters tape, I believe , over the static vents...can't remember for sure.

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1 hour ago, Kip Powick said:

Unfortunately......... I have to assume these fellows were never taught "partial panel" flying....

.Remember .....there was also the one down in South America when they lost instrument readings  after taking off at night  over the ocean...painters tape, I believe , over the static vents...can't remember for sure.

Or just an airspeed unrealiable memory drill but I think it proabably caught them off guard during takeoff. However, the Air France 330 couldn’t figure out their status in cruise either.

I think the crash you are referring to was a departure from the Dominican (PUJ or POP) on a 757 which had been parked for some time. I believe someone used tape to prevent insects from clogging static ports and pitot tubes. They had stickshaker and overspeed warnings at the same time. 

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4 hours ago, blues deville said:

Or just an airspeed unrealiable memory drill but I think it proabably caught them off guard during takeoff. However, the Air France 330 couldn’t figure out their status in cruise either.

I think the crash you are referring to was a departure from the Dominican (PUJ or POP) on a 757 which had been parked for some time. I believe someone used tape to prevent insects from clogging static ports and pitot tubes. They had stickshaker and overspeed warnings at the same time. 

The accident after departure out of POP was the Birgenair 757. In that case, there was evidence that mud wasps had been nesting in the pitot tube for the captain’s ASI. The tape over static vents case was an Aeroperu 757 that crashed off the coast of South America. 

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Don

((all my pure speculation)))

reading the FDR it looks like there may have been an assumption by the pilots that they felt they might be going into a stall thus the attempt to pick up speed and their failure to monitor altitude coupled with the downward trajectory and their fixation on the erroneous speed problems resulted in  a crash. Perhaps the late angle of bank was an attempt to pull away from the terrain. 

 

Hopefully the CVR tells the complete story

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The 'startle factor' has killed a few for sure , but the historical accident record makes it fairly clear that partial panel flying has never been given the syllabus status it deserves within training programs.

We are aware that an experienced individuals 'full panel' hands on IFR skills erode fairly quickly after he begins to rely on automation. We also know that an ever greater percentage of newly minted aviators never even get a chance to develop a basic skill set before they're transplanted into fully automatic airliners where they become career typists that remain completely dependant' on the keyboard's remaining functional.

Recognizing the fact that full panel IFR skills are becoming a lost art, what should we expect when the rare 'partial panel' situation arises? The growing evidence tells us it's probably safe to expect the aircraft will be lost when such an event takes place in an IFR environment.

So while it's probably fairly safe to attribute the positive improvement in the safety record to automation, the industry shouldn't sit on its laurels prepared to accept the loss of the odd aircraft only because the pilot was called upon to fly it following automation failure.

 

 

 

 

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The procedure is fairly straight forward if one recalls the initial memory actions, but it would help training immensely if the sims could accurately present the indications of an air data problem. I never saw an A320 or A330 simulator that could provide a realistic unreliable airspeed scenario.

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Since AF447, there has been a strong emphasis on the Unreliable Airspeed drill and checklist. Obviously, knowledge of pitch and power numbers for one's aircraft in various flight phases is highlighted, as is cockpit discipline, SOPs and CRM procedures.

What some are calling "partial panel", we might call "failure of the ADCs" these days, and I agree entirely with J.O. regarding his views on simulators. I've tried the AF447 scenario and it's not very good or realistic in current A330 sims.

The fact that Airbus has placed first-order importance on manual flying in the initial sim sessions, (so I am informed), on the introduction of the A350 indicates recognition of the problem of an atrophying of piloting skills including thinking/planning skills.

I think that thorough training in all the above helps alleviate the startle factor, but so does actual experience; the more, the better.

That said, I'm completely out of touch with regard to who is being hired these days and what training regimes actually are. Perhaps someone with current knowledge/experience can offer some information.

From what I have seen and read in the past, MAK is a good organization and does good work. They will be looking at the items mentioned here and on other aviation threads, (Russian, British, American). The UAS problem received extensive discussion on PPRuNe and is still well worth reading almost nine years later.

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