Maverick

Donating Member
  • Content count

    2,548
  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    22

Maverick last won the day on October 27

Maverick had the most liked content!

Community Reputation

196 Excellent

3 Followers

About Maverick

  • Rank
    6

Profile Information

  • Gender
    Male
  • Location
    The great wet coast
  • Interests
    Mechanical stuff and a good game o' golf!

Recent Profile Visitors

3,602 profile views
  1. First AC 777 in New Colours

    Today's environmentally friendly paints are not as durable as the paint of old used to be. Proper prep is much more critical now. Individual results may vary...
  2. Pre-owned F-18’s

    There was the ex-CAIL A-310's but they were better than new. I worked on them!
  3. Pre-owned F-18’s

    Hmm? Other than the British subs and the CH-47's picked up in the early 2000's (since replaced with new) what else have we bought used?
  4. The long arm of the law was in motion at Buenos Aires: Air France crew detained after passenger complains “not receiving her upgrade” By Bart Noëth 13 November, 2017 Part of an Air France crew flying between Paris CDG and Buenos Aires was detained for six hours by the airport police upon arrival in Argentina as the daughter of a former Deputy Minister of Justice in Argentina was “very unhappy about her treatment on board“. French cabin crew union SNPNC explains on Facebook. The passenger was travelling on board Air France flight AF228 to Buenos Aires on 29 October 2017. Apparently, she asked for an upgrade to business class but was denied the upgrade as the business class was fully booked. In-flight the same passenger asked to change her seat again due to the “inappropriate behaviour” of her neighbour. The crew didn’t notice anything particular but complied with the passenger’s request and assigned her a new seat. After landing and following a complaint from the same passenger, part of the crew was forced to go to the airport police station. After staying there for six hours, the crew was released, but at the hotel, an injunction was handed over to the crew to report to the Buenos Aires court the next morning at 8:30. The crew became aware that the passenger was the daughter of a former Deputy Minister of Justice and now a Buenos Aires magistrate. After several hours, he could finally speak to a lawyer to file a complaint about his treatment. The other crew members were heard for many hours, but the purser was interrogated only at 20:00. Next to the judge, the father of the passenger was also present to interrogate the crew members, in Spanish. At the end of the day, everyone was released without charges and without excuses. The shocked crew was repatriated to France. The SNPNC wrote to Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister of Foreign Affairs, asking him to open an investigation. Another letter sent to the Ambassador of Argentina in France explains the circumstances of this case. The union is currently investigating the possibilities of legal recourse to obtain redress for the harm suffered. http://www.aviation24.be/airlines/air-france-klm-group/air-france/the-long-arm-of-the-law-was-in-motion-at-buenos-aires-air-france-crew-detained-after-passenger-complains-not-receiving-her-upgrade/
  5. Emirates and Boeing Reaching $15.1B Deal

    I doubt Boeing cares about the A380. It's dead no matter what. As for the 787's you might be right. They've had a sh!tty couple of weeks! If Airbus does it right with the "C" series then the next airplane on life support will be the 737, arguably a much bigger deal than the A380.
  6. The F-35

    This turd continues to stink. Broken F-35 Parts Take Six Months To Fix, GAO Finds Oct 30, 2017 Lara Seligman | Aerospace Daily & Defense Report Comments 4 An F-35 Lightning II from Hill Air Force Base, Utah, takes off from the Gowen Field runway Oct. 16, 2017, in Boise, Idaho. USAF If a part on one of the U.S. military’s growing fleet of 250 F-35s fails, it takes about six months for the depots to repair it—twice the program’s objective, a key government watchdog has found. The Pentagon does not have enough capacity to repair F-35 parts in a timely manner because the establishment of repair capabilities at the military depots is six years behind schedule, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) writes in a recent report on the controversial fighter. These capabilities were planned to be completed by 2016, but some have now been delayed until 2022, according to the watchdog. Neither the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) nor the military services would take responsibility for the delay, GAO says. Program officials attributed it to the services not providing enough funding for depot requirements, but service officials pointed fingers at the JPO, saying the program office did not clearly identify some depot requirements soon enough for the services to provide adequate funding. In addition, GAO found that a shortage of spare parts in the F-35 supply chain is leading to low readiness levels. From January through August 7, 2017, prime contractor Lockheed Martin reported that F-35s were unable to fly because they were awaiting parts on average about 22% of the time—more than double the Pentagon’s objective of 10%, according to the report. The program office and Lockheed have identified steps needed to increase the availability of spare parts, GAO writes. Still, parts shortages are expected to continue for several years to come and may worsen if the JPO and Lockheed don’t follow through. GAO reported the striking repair limitations and parts shortages as part of a wide-ranging report on F-35 sustainment challenges, even as the Pentagon plans to triple the size of the fleet by the end of 2021. “DOD is taking steps to address some challenges, but without more comprehensive plans and aligned funding, DOD risks being unable to fully leverage the F-35’s capabilities and sustain a rapidly expanding fleet,” GAO writes. The report also notes that initial Marine Corps F-35 deployments on ships in 2018, and potentially initial Navy deployments, will not include the intermediate-level maintenance capabilities that will allow repairs to be done at sea. This likely will lead to degraded readiness, GAO concludes. Meanwhile, GAO also reports delays in planned updates to the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS), the logistics backbone of the fleet that is central to supporting operations and maintenance. These sustainment challenges are leading to lower-than-expected aircraft availability and full-mission-capable rates across the fleet, GAO notes. The F-35 already is the Pentagon’s most costly weapon system, with sustainment costs alone estimated at $1.12 trillion over 60 years, according to GAO. “Without revising sustainment plans to include the key requirements and decision points needed to fully implement the F-35 sustainment strategy, and without aligned funding plans to meet those requirements, DOD is at risk of being unable to leverage the capabilities of the aircraft it has recently purchased,” GAO says. JPO spokesman Joe DellaVedova acknowledged that the report is “factually accurate,” but said due to its origination date it does not account for the work the F-35 sustainment team has done over the past few months to accelerate depot capability and capacity, implement solutions to increase spare parts and reduce overall sustainment costs. GAO conducted the performance audit from October 2016 to October 2017, according to the report. The JPO pointed to several initiatives it has undertaken to improve F-35 logistics and sustainment, including a disciplined reliability and maintainability program, improved maintenance procedures and manuals, continued improvement in ALIS, better forecasting of spares requirements, improved repair turnaround times from suppliers and incorporation of aircraft design improvements. These efforts are having a positive effect, but “at a slower rate than desired,” according to the JPO. Additional actions include: • In fiscal 2017, the JPO moved forward with accelerating depot capability by executing $114 million to fast-track the standup of depots. • In fiscal 2017, the JPO invested $3.4 million in Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) improvement projects, with 28 projects in work to reduce the top maintenance cost drivers. • In fiscal 2017, the JPO spent $1.4 billion to increase spare part purchases, build up repair capacity and improve the speed of repairs. • To increase F-35 intermediate-level maintenance capabilities for shipboard deployments, the JPO has identified select avionics and support equipment for repair and is working with the services to resource requirements. • The JPO has developed a five-year ALIS technical roadmap to address future requirements. • The JPO has jointly developed a Lifecycle Affordability Board with Lockheed Martin Aeronautics and Pratt & Whitney to provide a single location for experts in manufacturing, supply chain management, cost estimating, and acquisition to work jointly on driving down operation and support (O&S) costs. “The F-35 Joint Program Office is moving out on all fronts to accelerate depot capability and capacity; implement solutions to increase spare parts and reduce overall sustainment costs,” DellaVedova said. “We remain focused and fully committed to developing, delivering and sustaining this next-generation stealth fighter for the warfighters.” http://aviationweek.com/defense/broken-f-35-parts-take-six-months-fix-gao-finds?NL=AW-05&Issue=AW-05_20171101_AW-05_821&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_1&utm_rid=CPEN1000002544843&utm_campaign=12361&utm_medium=email&elq2=0b3d623ade264d2a82c5d11d5e1dcd4a
  7. Airbus buys into CSeries

    Airbus/Bombardier C Series Deal Has Broad Implications Airbus’s decision to take control of the Bombardier C Series bodes deep consequences across the civil aerospace industry Oct 27, 2017 Jens Flottau, Graham Warwick and Guy Norris | Aviation Week & Space Technology When John Leahy was given a tour of the C Series at the 2015 Paris Air Show, even the brash Airbus sales chief was fairly complimentary of his competition. “It is a nice little airplane,” Leahy said at the time. Nice and little, as in: “Not bad, but I really could not care less.” Fast forward two years, and the “nice little airplane” is now the catalyst transforming the market for commercial aircraft, both mainline and regional. For years, four manufacturers—Boeing, Airbus, Bombardier and Embraer—have dominated. But following Airbus’s acquisition of a majority stake in the C Series program—for the bargain price of zero—the four have, in effect, become three. Playing out simultaneously, the aircraft has become the subject of a giant trade dispute between the U.S. and Canada that, as a side effect, will lead to the opening of another commercial jet final assembly line in the U.S. Impacts of the Airbus Takeover of C Series Production cost reduction is key for program turnaround Airbus/Bombardier deal keeps China out, slowing down its rise in aerospace C Series has long-term consequences for Boeing, Airbus product strategies U.S. versus Canada trade dispute continues But overlooked by many since the Oct. 16 deal stunned the global aerospace community is the crucial fact that the C Series was not sold to China. This helps to maintain Western aircraft manufacturing dominance for now and to slow China’s rapid ascent in the arena. According to several industry sources with inside information, negotiations between the Chinese aerospace industry and Bombardier were so far advanced that Comac, manufacturer of the C919 and ARJ-21, could have soon taken control of the C Series. One source says China mainly wanted access to engineering know-how and help with certifying aircraft in the West. That some portion of Bombardier was up for sale was one of the worst-kept secrets in the industry, in part because several candidates were approached. In the end, Airbus was able to act swiftly because it had established a path two years earlier, when it first considered buying the program. Suppliers with knowledge of the situation say Boeing was “in shock” when the news broke. Belying the surface calm, there is reportedly serious concern within Boeing that the Airbus-Bombardier link will enable those manufacturers to compete with packaged fleet deals that the U.S. aircraft maker simply cannot match. Senior industry sources say the tie-up is a big problem for Boeing, as the transatlantic alliance will be able to provide “stepping-stone” deals covering everything from regional and single-aisle aircraft up to the A350 and A380. The benefit of a common A320-like sidestick and display flight deck architecture in the C Series—useful for easing pilot training transition between fleets—is huge. “It is hard to imagine Boeing expected it to go this way,” says Ronald Epstein of Bank of America Merrill Lynch, but he urges caution. Bernstein Research describes the deal as “win, win, win, lose?”—with Embraer’s E195-E2 as the possible loser in a tougher competition against an Airbus-backed CS100. Epstein says one potential Boeing response could be a tie-up with Embraer, as the companies already cooperate on the Brazilian manufacturer’s KC-390 military airlifter. But there are distinct differences: Embraer is not in crisis mode, and its largest aircraft is significantly smaller than the CS300, hence it does not compete with any Boeing or Airbus design. It therefore does not aid Boeing’s existing portfolio. Airbus CEO Tom Enders waves to Bombardier employees after touring a C Series test aircraft at Bombardier’s plant in Mirabel, Quebec, on Oct. 20. Credit: Reuters/Christinne Muschi Pundits underscore that the situation could have been a lot worse for Boeing, at least in the long run, if Comac were to have used the C Series as its catalyst and accelerator toward world standards. There is an argument among China aerospace experts that the threat feared by Western players is exaggerated, and the benefits of obtaining the C Series may be overblown. But it certainly was a strong motivator for Airbus. Another fascinating aspect of the deal is that Airbus is moving into a part of the market it had declared to be too small to be significant any longer—100-150 seaters. Its own orderbook would have been an argument for not investing in the segment. Almost half of the narrowbody orders (and soon production) are for the A321, while there are almost no orders for the A319neo; Boeing witnessed a similar trend with few sales for the 737-7. Bombardier has long argued that the A319neo and 737-7 have low orders because they are not optimized for their size. Embraer positioned its E2 in that size segment, but below that of the C Series, and with no expectation of the same volumes. Bombardier’s lack of C Series sales did not support confidence in that market niche’s potential, either. Now that the program’s competitive disadvantages in terms of sales, product support and credibility are history, the aerospace world will soon find out which school of thought prevails. Airbus will bring its sales and marketing muscle to the C Series orderbook and its supplier management clout and negotiating power to procurement and production, while its global product support is expected to boost the confidence of customers wary of committing to the Bombardier aircraft. The deal can also have substantial implications for Airbus’s own future product strategy as it ponders the positioning of an all-new A320neo-family replacement aircraft. Airbus’s ability to cut supplier costs in the C Series program is key to making the takeover a success, one senior industry source says. Enormous sums of money—30-40% of total supplier costs—can be saved, the executive with inside knowledge of the C Series cost base says. JP Morgan believes that decreasing procurement costs by 10% would add six points to the program margin. Why? Because Bombardier had no market power vis-a-vis its industrial partners, and there was no confidence in the program’s success; suppliers wanted the manufacturer to pay for their risk. And it did: “We did not reduce our price by one cent,” says one senior supply chain source, “and Bombardier had to accept it.” Component by component, partners realized enormous profit margins as they maximized their negotiating position. One example is the wing-to-body fairing, an insider notes. He says Bombardier pays four times the amount Airbus does for that piece on the A320neo. The excessive rates Bombardier was forced to pay are a major factor behind its taking of a loss on every aircraft it delivers—with or without launch pricing. “The only risk Airbus has in the deal is execution,” says one executive. He deems the risk manageable but notes it could take three years to turn around the cost structure of the C Series program. Many suppliers have locked in a high number of shipsets at pre-Airbus prices, in some cases as many as 200, and are unlikely to voluntarily give up their nicely profitable business—unless Airbus subtly forewarns of retaliation in other areas. But not every supplier is the same. While the aerostructures sector generally suffers from overcapacity and would therefore be more likely to be willing to accept margin cuts, systems suppliers such as United Technologies Aerospace Systems, Honeywell or Rockwell Collins are in a much stronger position. They either enjoy monopolies for particular systems, or their products could not realistically be replaced by a competing product because it would mean expensive, complex changes to the aircraft. One area of cost concern remains composite wing production at Shorts in Belfast, Northern Ireland, one executive remarks. Airbus Commercial Aircraft President Fabrice Bregier confirms the supply chain is already on notice as far as the C Series turnaround is concerned. He says the expectation is that supply chain costs will be consistent with what Airbus is charged. In some sense, Airbus’s risk goes beyond execution. Although it paid nothing for the program share, this is just a temporary balm. Airbus is stuck with no exit strategy if the deal proves unsuccessful. It is hard to imagine who would buy the C Series if Airbus fails to turn it around. And it is unlikely that Airbus could shut the program down if it falters, given the guarantees it had to make to the Canadian government and the political pressure sure to emerge should that event happen. Epstein offers a sobering reminder, recalling Boeing’s acquisition of McDonnell Douglas and its rebranding of the MD-95 as the 717, only to shut down production barely 10 years after the merger. The Airbus A319neo is the most obvious victim of the C Series arrangement. Already beset by slow demand, the Bombardier-Airbus deal may hasten its demise. Credit: Airbus Bregier expects the deal to close in late 2018, following regulatory approvals. Until then, no structural changes can be implemented or decided. “We bring credibility to the program,” Bregier says. “We bring in confidence that this is a really good aircraft that will be supported and improved in the long run.” The C Series will become a new family of aircraft for Airbus that complements its existing portfolio and allows Airbus to offer aircraft “from 100-600 seats,” Bregier says. He adds that the deal allows us “to increase our international footprint; we started in China and the U.S., now we also have Canada.” And though there are strategic risks, there are potentially huge rewards. “The C Series deal buys Airbus more time for its own NMA,” says one industry source, referring to Boeing’s proposed new midmarket airplane and Airbus’s potential competitive response. With the CS100 and in particular the CS300 now part of its own portfolio, Airbus can afford to ignore the slow death of the A319neo. The option to stretch the C Series further and, at some point, build a CS500 that could move into the A320neo field would allow Airbus to position the A320-family replacement at a higher basic design capacity without risking losing what could be at that point the bottom end of the market. Those customers could then buy CS aircraft. But more important, Airbus plans to assemble aircraft for U.S. customers alongside its A320 family in Mobile, Alabama, circumventing the almost 300% in duties the U.S. government proposes imposing on C Series aircraft imported from Canada in response to Boeing’s anti-dumping charges. Airbus CEO Tom Enders and Bombardier CEO Alain Bellemare stress that the partnership is not driven by the U.S. trade dispute. “This was not motivated by anything the competition was doing,” says Enders. Bellemare agrees, saying: “This is not related to the trade issue; it is a strategic issue.” Boeing Chairman, President and CEO Dennis Muilenburg publicly plays down the importance of the tie-up. He says it does not “change our game plan. Our fundamental strategy is strong. We expect heavy competition in that marketplace, and competition makes us better. But it is important that everyone plays by the same rules.” He adds: “Some of these recent developments are not surprising to us. It is an attractive market with a lot of global competitors.” As for the Airbus-Bombardier plans to circumvent excess import tariffs by completing final assembly of the C Series in Alabama, Muilenburg believes the U.S. Department of Commerce will derail this. Boeing filed its anti-dumping and countervailing duty petitions with the U.S. Commerce Department and International Trade Commission (ITC) in April; the ITC decided in June to proceed with an investigation. Commerce announced its preliminary finding in late September/early October. Boeing’s decision to wage war on Bombardier “has arguably had some unintended negative outcomes,” says Robert Stallard of Vertical Research Partners, including damaging relations with the Canadian and UK governments and driving Bombardier “into the arms of its arch competitor.” Bombardier continues to pin its hopes of resolving the trade dispute on the ITC finding that C Series pricing to win a key 75-aircraft order from Delta Air Lines in 2016 has done no damage to U.S. industry because Boeing did not offer a competing aircraft. The ITC is due to rule in February; if it determines that no damage was done, duties will not be imposed. But if the ITC does find that material damage occurred, and the import duties are imposed, Bellemare believes Delta will be willing to wait until U.S.-assembled aircraft are available, likely in 2019. “Clearly, the Mobile option is on the table,” he says. “We will now engage with them in depth.” “We think aircraft produced at this U.S. site will not be subject to [tariff] duty. But it’s more strategic than that: It is a very good move to bring this aircraft to the U.S. because the U.S. is the single largest market for this segment,” says Enders. Assembly of the first U.S.-made A320 began at Mobile in mid-2015, less than three years after Airbus announced the $600 million development. But given that the Mobile site is now well established, it may be possible to add the C Series in significantly less time. Under the deal, Airbus will acquire a 50.01% interest in the C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership (CSALP), formed in 2015 when the Quebec government invested $1 billion in the program. Bombardier now holds 62% of CSALP, and Quebec 38%. After the deal closes, Bombardier will own 31%, Quebec 19%. No money will change hands on completion of the deal, and no debt will be assumed by CSALP. The joint venture is already investing $2 billion in the C Series from 2015 to 2020, and Airbus’s involvement is expected to at least double the program’s value to $4 billion or more, Bombardier Chief Financial Officer John Di Bert says. The size of Airbus’s stake is based on the expected value to the program of its sales and marketing, procurement management and customer support. In addition to its existing investment plan, Bombardier has agreed to provide up to $350 million in the first year and a combined $350 million over the next two years to cover any shortfall in funding. But Di Bert does not expect this to be required. Although Airbus will pay nothing for its majority stake in the C Series, Bombardier expects to profit from handing over control through the program’s increased strategic value. That value is expected to come from increased orders for the aircraft, supporting a higher combined production rate in both Quebec and Mobile. The $5.4 billion spent developing the C Series—$2 billion more than planned—pushed Bombardier close to a liquidity crisis, from which it was rescued in 2015 by Quebec’s investment in the C Series and another $1.5 billion from the province to buy a stake in Bombardier’s rail business. Bombardier is ramping up C Series production to a planned 120 aircraft per year by 2020, when the program is expected to reach break-even cashflow. While the partnership could accelerate that, Di Bert expects to see “powerful cashflow generation” from the Airbus tie-up starting in 2021-22. http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/airbusbombardier-c-series-deal-has-broad-implications?NL=AW-05&Issue=AW-05_20171030_AW-05_939&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_1&utm_rid=CPEN1000000441429&utm_campaign=12324&utm_medium=email&elq2=d969e09db4344676b67a95fc7d1da36a
  8. Airbus buys into CSeries

    https://www.captiongenerator.com/745852/Boeing-Reacts-to-BombardierAirbus-partnership-
  9. Airbus buys into CSeries

    (My bolding in the 1st paragraph) Boeing Thinks Airbus Is Making A Big Mistake With Bombardier Partnership Loren Thompson, CONTRIBUTOR Oct 24, 2017 12:38 PM 11,096 When Airbus and Bombardier announced last week that they would partner in building the latter company’s CSeries line of single-aisle twinjets, much of the media coverage made the deal sound like a setback for Boeing. Coming only days after the Commerce Department sided with Boeing in a trade complaint against Bombardier, it seemed that America’s biggest exporter had suffered a sudden reversal of fortunes. “Boeing’s Fight With Bombardier Blows Up in Its Face,” proclaimed the Wall Street Journal. “Boeing Trade Action Misfires as Airbus Backs C Series,” said Aviation Week. The coverage has become more muted since then as reporters have thought through the implications of an Airbus-Bombardier tie-up. However, many observers still don’t grasp how unconcerned Boeing is about the pending partnership. Because Boeing is a longtime contributor to my think tank, I have been able to develop a fairly precise picture of how senior management views the proposed transaction. In brief, here’s why Boeing isn’t worried at all. The first thing to understand about Boeing’s reaction is that it could have had the same deal. When Bombardier was skirting insolvency in 2015 due to bad management and soft demand for its products, the company invited a number of suitors to look over the business, including Boeing. Boeing didn’t like what it saw. Neither did Airbus, nor did prospective Chinese investors. That’s why Quebec’s provincial government had to spend a billion dollars bailing out the company to keep the troubled CSeries program going. That capital infusion, combined with additional aid from Ottawa, enabled Bombardier to avoid bankruptcy. But it also led to Boeing’s 2017 trade complaint, and a series of Commerce Department decisions to impose duties on U.S. imports of the CSeries that would effectively quadruple its price. As Bombardier’s own market projections show, the CSeries cannot survive unless it generates big sales in the U.S. But now its prospective lead customer in the U.S., Delta, says it will delay taking delivery since it doesn’t want to pay the pending duties. Boeing execs don’t think this situation will change with or without Airbus, because President Trump’s Commerce Department is determined to prevent Bombardier from repeating the Airbus strategy of leveraging illegal subsidies to destroy U.S. aerospace jobs. They also cite the timeline for the proposed partnership. The deal won’t close until the second half of 2018, and then additional time (probably over a year) will be chewed up building a satellite production site for the CSeries at the Airbus plant in Alabama. Alex Frangos of the Wall Street Journal called that U.S. site “a neat workaround to Bombardier’s tariff problem,” but in fact duties are likely to be in place during the entire time CSeries “production” is being set up in the Cotton State. Some Boeing execs don’t believe the Alabama site can ever be a real production facility, because that would drain hundreds of jobs out of Canada — the concern that led Ottawa and Quebec to bail out the company in the first place. CSeries wings will continue to be built in Northern Ireland no matter where the planes are assembled. If much of the work on the planes continues to be performed in Canada and Northern Ireland, then the moment the Alabama site starts operating, Boeing execs say it will be hit with a complaint alleging illegal circumvention of trade duties. The longstanding legal doctrine of circumvention prevents companies from moving final assembly sites across borders as a way of dodging tariffs. So even with Airbus on board, the CSeries is fatally impaired: it can’t move a lot of jobs out of Canada without generating a political firestorm, but if it doesn’t then tariffs remain in place. So Delta isn’t going to be getting the cut-rate jetliners it thought it was when it signed a deal with Bombardier last year. The company has said it will wait two years to escape the duties Commerce intends to impose, but it would probably have to wait a lot longer. Other U.S. carriers won’t find the price of CSeries planes attractive when they add in the multiplier imposed by countervailing and antidumping duties. Meanwhile, Airbus will be facing its own problems with illegal subsidies. Early next year, the World Trade Organization will issue a final ruling that European governments have not complied with an order to cease illegal launch aid. The trade body long ago ruled that every Airbus plane has been illegally subsidized to the detriment of U.S. workers, but European governments have stubbornly refused to abandon their violation of trade treaties. So next year, the U.S. government will ask the WTO to start imposing costly countermeasures on Europe. Thus Airbus and Bombardier will both be dealing with major challenges imposed by regulators as they move forward. Even if the impending demise of the Airbus A380 superjumbo was not impairing its balance sheet, the European plane maker is facing heavy headwinds. The way Boeing execs see it, Airbus is buying itself further headaches by taking on the CSeries as part of its portfolio. Boeing and Airbus in the past have avoided offering planes with seating capacity barely above that of regional jets. However, saying Airbus is ”buying” trouble may be the wrong term, since it is paying nothing to acquire a majority stake in the CSeries. The fact that Bombardier was willing to give away ownership of its premier product line underscores why Boeing wasn’t interested in doing a deal when it kicked the tires at Bombardier two years ago. There just isn’t much there worth having. And that’s before you get to all the political controversy that will surround Quebec seeing its billion-dollar stake in CSeries shrink from 49% ownership to 19%. No government would accept such a deal unless it had received assurances that local jobs will not go away. CSeries production will continue to occur mainly in Canada, and given all the subsidies, CSeries duties will remain in place in the U.S. — by far the plane’s most important market. So of course Boeing isn’t worried about arch-rival Airbus tying itself to Bombardier. Quite the opposite: some Boeing executives are delighted, believing it has made yet another strategic misstep. https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2017/10/24/why-boeing-isnt-worried-about-an-airbus-bombardier-partnership-on-cseries/amp/
  10. Q400 line sold too?

    Bombardier SOLD The Q400 Division - Fliegerfaust Exclusive Q400 is No More a Bombardier Product 15:45 - October 20, 2017 - Quebec, Montreal by Sylvain Faust According to sources very close the Q400 division, Bombardier Inc. should be announcing very soon the sale of its Q400 business. After the major transaction involving its 50% ownership in the CSeries Holding, Bombardier was left with only the CRJ and Q400 part of its Commercial Aircraft business. Could ATR which is owned 50% by AIRBUS be the buyer? Remember, the Learjet, Challenger and Global aircraft are part of the Bombardier Business Aircraft division, not Bombardier Commercial Aircraft. To help you understand, the commercial aircraft business is selling "buses" to airlines so they can carry large amount of paying passengers, i.e you! Business aircraft are sport cars sold mainly to individuals or corporations for VIP and VVIP. Not the same business, not the same clientele at all. Bombardier Commercial Aircraft covers the CSeries (via ownership in its holding), the CRJ and Q400 aircraft. The CRJ would be the only aircraft left in Bombardier Commercial Aircraft division 100% own by Bombardier. Could it be next in line to be liquidated? Bombardier CEO Bellemare told the CSeries employees during a presentation Tuesday at the Mirabel factory that the company was losing money with each Q400 delivery. Stay tuned to Fliegerfaust for more... Stay in the know and Subscribe to the FREE Fliegerfaust Free Newsletter. Sylvain Faust http://www.fliegerfaust.com http://www.fliegerfaust.com/bombardier-sold-the-q400-division-2499101163.html
  11. Over 129,000 hours....

    Getting a 767 from Air Canada would be like getting a gun from Charlton Heston. WJ would have to pry it out of their cold dead hands!
  12. Over 129,000 hours....

    Thanks
  13. Over 129,000 hours....

    Worked on that girl a lot! What are the cycles?
  14. Airbus buys into CSeries

    I can see a scenario that they do launch the CS500. They know that on a straight up basis the CS300 utterly dominates both the 737-7 and the A319 NEO. The numbers are out there. If they launch the CS500 up to a 190-200 seat size they kill the A320 NEO but more importantly they kill the whole Boeing narrow-body line because the only real seller is the 737-8 which (I think?) is outselling A320 NEO. The A321 NEO is outselling the 737-9 and 737-10 at about a 3-1 ratio or something like that. Game, set, match Airbus. Edit: Did a bit more research. The 737-8 has 2258 orders. The 737-9 and -10 have a backlog of 388 total. (121 of the -9's and 267 of the -10's) The A320 NEO has a backlog of 3529. The A321 NEO has a backlog of 1453. They probably won't kill the A320 NEO then...