Transasia Atr 72 Down In Taiwan

[GTFA]

Wow. Is this ever an interesting discussion.

May I suggest, that the PM still maintains control of the power settings but through commands, "Max Power", "Set MCT" etc. where the PM sets the power commanded and the PF can remain focussed on aviating and navigating.

[Kip Powick]

Wow. Is this ever an interesting discussion.

May I suggest, that the PM still maintains control of the power settings but through commands, "Max Power", "Set MCT" etc. where the PM sets the power commanded and the PF can remain focussed on aviating and navigating.

I think different companies have different procedures and procedures vary on different aircraft types. The proof of varying procedures working, with respect to overall SAFETY, has to be the record of all Canadian Airline companies and I think we, as Canadians, should be very proud of our record..........but never complacent.

[DEFCON]

Kip

Like you, I flew a Cosmopolitan / CV 580 in the early eighties. It was a technological product of a much earlier time.

The aircraft had thrust levers that were connected to 'constant speed' turbo-jet engines that drove ‘constant speed’ fans. When there was any doubt about the health of one of the units, you simply identified and pulled the appropriate handle. An inflight restart only required one to push in the handle and hit the start button. The continued operation of the engine in certain circumstances was also assured by fuel dippers and auto-ignition.

Todays popular PW engines don’t employ any of the older design philosophy / technology. As a result, the operation of PW engines is quite complicated.

[Boney]

Initially, upon engine malfunction indication, be it a failure, fire, limit, surge, stall, its best to confirm what's happening then run the checklist. A windshear event will require the FP to firewall to achieve max thrust with the NFP backing up to ensure it's set. Once the check list is completed and the airplane is stable, the FP controls the thrust levers, thus managing speed and altitude.

Avigate, navigate, automate, communicate.

[Guest]

What I don't understand is this... Since when is thrust/power management not part of "flying the aircraft"?

Not sure if you were referencing my post, or just in general. Only points I'd mention is that in a turboprop like the ATR or Dash, I don't think the 'ergonomics' of power management is like it is in an Airbus or a Boeing. Have a look at a flightdeck photo of these types, and consider the workload involved in doing the appropriate 'drill', quite likely (Dash for sure, don't know about ATR) while hand flying an airplane with an engine that has failed. It's not that simple.

If I understand what you're saying, shutting down a jet engine in flight is easily completed by the PF while he simultaneously flies/monitors the autopilot. That certainly is not the same in these larger turboprops, at least not without sacrificing flight path control.

If you're asking your question with respect to normal operations, then yes it is the PF's management, even if it sometimes has to be delegated.

Not sure if that makes any sense? Perhaps I am misunderstanding your question.

[Kip Powick]

Initially, upon engine malfunction indication, be it a failure, fire, limit, surge, stall, its best to confirm what's happening then run the checklist. A windshear event will require the FP to firewall to achieve max thrust with the NFP backing up to ensure it's set. Once the check list is completed and the airplane is stable, the FP controls the thrust levers, thus managing speed and altitude.

Avigate, navigate, automate, communicate.

How do one do dat :Grin-Nod:

[Boney]

Avigate = Fly the airplane first. Once you are stable, deal with any issues at hand.

Blue side up.

[Kip Powick]

Avigate = Fly the airplane first. Once you are stable, deal with any issues at hand.

Blue side up.

Fair enough... my choice would be ............ "aviate"

a·vi·ate

/ˈāvēˌāt/

pilot or fly in an airplane.

"an aircraft that can be aviated without effort"

[Moon The Loon]

Very interesting side discussion to the matter at hand. Pretty well all the time I was on the Boeing from 1997 on, the various (domestic and overseas contract) companies had the PM/PNF close the thrust lever. Then I went to India and the local Boeing manual (they taylor their manuals to the extent the local authority wants without violating certification) stated the PF would close the thrust levers. I had a discussion with our group and local Chief Pilot and lost the argument. So that was how it was done there - PF closes the thrust lever.

Funny story about India. Chief Pilot was constantly quoting SOP and oft time referred to it as a bible. One issue came up (can't remember what it was) and he wanted it accomplished outside the published guideline. I asked him "Didn't you say this AOM is a bible?" to which he replied "There are many gods in India." Matter closed. True story!

[Boney]

Thanks Kip. English was never my strong point. lol.

Cheers

[vanishing point]

Regardless of what SOP's are used at whatever operator on any airplane, the key here is ; what is TransAsia's SOP's on an inflight engine failure?

I'm not asking for an actual answer as SOP's are not common-knowledge nor for public use but eventually we'll find out what happened and we'll learn from this.....hopefully in time to prevent such an incident from happening again.

[blues deville]

Very interesting side discussion to the matter at hand. Pretty well all the time I was on the Boeing from 1997 on, the various (domestic and overseas contract) companies had the PM/PNF close the thrust lever. Then I went to India and the local Boeing manual (they taylor their manuals to the extent the local authority wants without violating certification) stated the PF would close the thrust levers. I had a discussion with our group and local Chief Pilot and lost the argument. So that was how it was done there - PF closes the thrust lever.

Funny story about India. Chief Pilot was constantly quoting SOP and oft time referred to it as a bible. One issue came up (can't remember what it was) and he wanted it accomplished outside the published guideline. I asked him "Didn't you say this AOM is a bible?" to which he replied "There are many gods in India." Matter closed. True story!

I believe Boeing has now standardized all types to have the PF select the Auto-Throttle Arm Sw and thrust lever at 400' (fire,severe damage) or after flap retraction (failure). The logic being they are considered reversable actions.

[Guest]

http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/10-pilots-for-transasia-airways-fail-proficiency-test-1.2230739

Can't wait to hear how well their sim training/testing goes.

[Guest]

Holly cow, the failure rate was almost 10% (20% is of course correct as has been pointed out) of those tested. You have to wonder "what about" the crews flying their other equipment.

[acsidestick]

Holly cow, the failure rate was almost 10% of those tested. You have to wonder "what about" the crews flying their other equipment.

Umm, The new math says its 20%, not 10.

[DEFCON]

"The 10 were among 49 pilots who underwent an oral exam on handling emergency situations administered after the Feb. 4 crash, and need to be retrained, the Civil Aviation Administration said in a statement. It said 19 other pilots who have not taken the test will also be suspended until they pass."

The failures reported above represent more than 20% of the total if the percentage is based on 49 test participants. If you consider 68 as the total number of participants and add the 10 failures to the 19 that were suspended for not taking the test, the real failure rate goes up to an astonishing 43%.

If the results of oral testing is any kind of an indicator, an honest simulator evaluation program is likely to produce numbers that are considerably worse?

[Guest]

Umm, The new math says its 20%, not 10.

10 out of 49 is indeed 20%..... got to avoid math until I have my morning coffee. But I do have real concerns re the remainder of their flight crews operating their other equipment.

[Tango Niner]

I believe Boeing has now standardized all types to have the PF select the Auto-Throttle Arm Sw and thrust lever at 400' (fire,severe damage) or after flap retraction (failure). The logic being they are considered reversable actions.

Not at WJ. These are PNF actions at our shop, which I like.

[blues deville]

Not at WJ. These are PNF actions at our shop, which I like.

You obviously do not use Boeing SOP's. If you were using pure Boeing SOP's, this is would be your recommended procedure. The term PNF would also be PM.

[Moon The Loon]

You obviously do not use Boeing SOP's. If you were using pure Boeing SOP's, this is would be your recommended procedure. The term PNF would also be PM.

Yeah, I know it's "Boeing Recommended" but so too is autopilot engagement ASAP after liftoff in the first segment during gear retraction. In such cases, the PF is very able to accomplish the "non-reversible" actions. But who is watching the SID? Who is initiating the escape manoueuvre/emergency turn/whatever your company calls it?

With an SOP procedure of the PM/PNF executing the engine out procedure, there are no issues. The PF monitors/executes the SID/escape procedure as required; the PM/PNF pulls levers/T-handles with nothing more than a confirmation by the PF.

This was the heart of my disagreement with the Boeing procedure.

[vanishing point]

I don't know anything about being an aircraft manufacturer's test pilot but I know something about being a pilot for an airline. I would suspect what the test pilots use as their SOP's work well in their environment and with some adjustments to each type, perhaps their SOP's almost cover all their aircraft.

Each airline creates SOP's for their operations and as long as they do not deviate in an unsafe condition away from the AFM and get approval from Transport Canada and the manufacturer (I'm guessing) the SOP's go into effect.

At Jazz on the Dash 8, in the event of an engine failure, the PF flies the airplane and calls for the checklists. The PM (formally known as the "PNF") monitors the aircraft, advises the PF what is happening and moves the power & condition levers AFTER confirming with the PF that is the correct lever to move. The initial checklist items are done by memory until such time as the engine is shut-down and secure. The PF then calls for the "Emergency Checklist" which the PM opens to the appropriate emergency section and goes through it step-by-step.

It's a system that works very well.

[blues deville]

Yeah, I know it's "Boeing Recommended" but so too is autopilot engagement ASAP after liftoff in the first segment during gear retraction. In such cases, the PF is very able to accomplish the "non-reversible" actions. But who is watching the SID? Who is initiating the escape manoueuvre/emergency turn/whatever your company calls it?With an SOP procedure of the PM/PNF executing the engine out procedure, there are no issues. The PF monitors/executes the SID/escape procedure as required; the PM/PNF pulls levers/T-handles with nothing more than a confirmation by the PF.This was the heart of my disagreement with the Boeing procedure.

Good discussion.

When it comes to SOP's, airlines can pretty well do what they want. The manufacturer has its recommend SOP's (and company lawyer with official stamp of approval). Of course, any deviation from this requires approval from the regulator. Boeing has streamlined all of their recent models for improved sales and reduced training costs to transisiton flight crews.

Some complex E/O procedures do require a good CRM plan when it comes to engine fires memory items starting at 400'. And I suppose you can always request runway heading when terrain is not an issue.

My first Boeing course was on 767s and we had to learn TWA's SOP's which I think we're developed when they received their first DC3. After a few months of line flying we slowly returned to more sensible procedures.

[rudder]

The reason that some carriers have migrated to Boeing procedures is that it helps to eliminate the 'bias' that develops within some flight standards departments. In the case of the memory items for engine shutdown, these procedures are supportive of the philosophy that the PF is flying the plane which includes thrust management. In the case of an engine fire with no loss of thrust, the PF can input rudder proportionally as thrust is reduced controlling both actions.

There is no best way to do it so long as the results are consistently satisfactory. The Boeing FCOM is just one particular option.

On the other hand, it is loooking like the procedures followed/actions taken by the Transasia crew resulted in a hull loss. An unacceptable result by any standard and subject to proper review including the content and origin of the SOP's.

[inchman]

On the other hand, it is loooking like the procedures followed/actions taken by the Transasia crew resulted in a hull loss. An unacceptable result by any standard and subject to proper review including the content and origin of the SOP's.

Given the long discussion on who should do what, it will be interesting to know what the SOP was and what process was actually followed. I can only assume that the SOP was not followed because I have NEVER heard of an SOP that wouldn't retard the throttle before shutting down the engine. Had they closed the throttle first, they would have noticed how quiet it got and maybe suspended the process before shutting down the engine.

I remember ... getting an engine fire indication on a DC-8-63 freighter at about 100 ft out of Gander one night. The PNF captain (intentional small c... this guy never really was a captain... at least for the years that I flew with him) immediately reached up for the fire handle and I, being the lowly second officer, swatted his hand out of the air and said "Let's do this by the book". Turns out, during his landing in YQX, that he floated it so long that he had to use full reverse right to the far end of the runway and the resultant compressor stalls had caused a bleed line to come adrift, causing the fire warning.

He probably wasn't going to cause the aircraft to turtle, given that the other 3 were still turning, but it does show that some pilots can follow the procedures in the sim well enough to pass the PPC, but maybe wouldn't actually do it by the book when the same fault happens in real life.

[inchman]

but... now that I look at the FDR data on the Transasia again, it looks like the ITT and fuel flow (and other parameters) on the good engine reduced 15 seconds before the shut-down...