rudder

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rudder last won the day on April 18 2018

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  1. An MCAS failure would never have formed part of a SIM script. However, a demonstration of the MCAS function might have been. Problem would be configuration load for the SIM (could you load the MAX database on to the NG SIM). And Boeing has subsequently modified the memory items for STAB TRIM Runaway to include up to item 5 - CUTOUT SWITCHES. Because the MCAS system was designed to defeat some of the crew actions for the NG (stabilizer brake), MCAS activation in a non-stall scenario could become confusing (that may be the understatement of the century). And AOA information was considered ‘optional’. All in all, the commonality assumption for the 737 will come under a great deal of scrutiny. Hindsight always being 20/20. Engineers had the right idea, but the resulting system design had a fatal flaw (single source trigger). That should have been trapped early on in the MAX certification process (right after they realized that the aircraft lacked inherent stability).
  2. Bottom line - if the crew(s) had AOA indicators and miscompare notification (unfortunately Boeing still refuses to install EICAS on any version of the 737) they may have more effectively diagnosed and responded to the system malfunction as the stick shaker activated and the MCAS system was responding to a single erroneous AOA indication. In hindsight seems surprising in the age of computer generated EFIS PFD displays that this is not a default configuration.
  3. On a modern swept wing commercial airliner, the AOA indication is also a good reference for efficiency. A higher than normal AOA in cruise flight (which would be caused by a higher than optimal pitch attitude in cruise flight) would provide reference to the crew that they are not at the optimal cruise altitude (likely confirmed by the FMS CRZ page information). There are many compelling reasons for AOA indicators to be installed and understood by flight crews.
  4. Once you get used to viewing normal AOA indications for phase of flight, you would quickly recognize an annomally. When accompanied by a miscompare message, diagnosing the problem would be much easier. AOA indications are also available on some HGS modes (if installed).
  5. The eyebrows are a “Pitch Limit Indicator”. It was added by Boeing as part of a package to assist in wind shear escape response. http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_12/attack_story.html The AOA gauge is a separate indication on the PFD. http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_12/attack_fig12.html
  6. Typical Boeing. There was no specific CAB ALT warning annunciation on the 737 until after the Helios accident (the signal was the Take-Off warning horn above 10,000’) Seems it always takes hull losses for Boeing to install equipment on a 737 that is basic or mandatory in any other Boeing aircraft designed after 1965.
  7. I wonder if the experience level of the flight crew on ET302 will raise any red flags in Canada? Probably not.
  8. The ignorance of Boeing to not highlight to operators the MCAS modification on the MAX would be the same as installing the STS system and not bothering to mention it. Having said that, there is no checklist for specific STS annomolies. However, crew awareness of the system helps crews both manage the aircraft in normal operations AND manage system failures, both scripted and unscripted. It is clear that Boeing never anticipated an AOA failure that would trigger an erroneous MCAS automated response. If they had thought it remotely possible, then redundancy would have been part of system design. That discussion will now include the role of the FAA in type certification, and what information Boeing did and did not provide to the FAA in order to receive that certification. Layered on top of this is crew experience level (or lack there of). So many errors. None in isolation is critical. But in aggregate can have tragic consequences.
  9. Not having to do with any North American operator of the MAX - it is certainly looking like this is an example of the holes in the cheese lining up x2. Lots of parties/agencies will have to look at ‘policies’ and ‘practices’ to see how they contributed to one of the holes.
  10. SW is not the only Canadian 705 carrier that uses this type of program. There are others doing it on a much larger scale.
  11. Interesting read. Summary - recommend NO INCREASE to current maximum age 65 limit in multi-pilot commercial operations. I wonder what ICAO will do with this report? They are seriously looking at increase to age 67.....
  12. I would say at the current market valuation that Transat AT is a logical target for an unsolicited offer to take up shares. Best partner? AC. Next best? SWG.
  13. I have flown at mixed configuration operators where the only requirement was to review a fin specific differences card prior to each flight segment. I have also worked where variants on a single type endorsement required alternating semi-annual SIM training on the 2 different variants (SIM could be reconfigured - different panels and performance software). I think that most mixed fleet 737 operators managed the MAX addition via an online information module and perhaps a differences card.
  14. March 13, 2019 Boeing 737 MAX Update ALPA supports the decision by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Transport Canada to ground the Boeing 737 MAX. The FAA reports that it made its decision "as a result of the data-gathering process and new evidence collected at the site and analyzed today." Out of an abundance of caution, North American regulators have acted in the best interests of aviation safety. ALPA continues to monitor the situation and is working alongside aviation authorities in the United States and Canada to uphold the safety and integrity of our air transportation system. We strongly encourage the investigative authorities responsible to expedite the investigation of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and identify any corrective action if necessary in order to return this aircraft to service. ALPA stands ready, through the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations, to assist the international aviation community in every way possible with the shared goal of advancing a safer air transportation system around the globe.
  15. FAA also treats 757 and 767 as single type rating. Other jurisdictions do not although many use CCQ provisions to enable pilots to operate both equipment types.