rudder

Actually, there is more to it than that. Monitoring the automation, verifying the approach path on the ILS, and FMA call outs are all part of conducting a successful auto land. There are potential system faults and threats. That is why the flight crew is an essential component of an auto land.

C-series will be mainline. Pay rate (assuming CS300's are included) should be around 7-9% below the 320/737. No doubt that AC is going to ask to place the 25 190's at Express after 2019. That will be up to ACPA as the scope limit is clear (and closed as a bargaining item absent mutual consent). I wonder what that transfer would be worth to AC?

The pilot shortage in the US is real and the massive retirement exodus of current mainline pilots has barely begun. AA will retire 50% of a 15,000 pilot list over the next 9 years. The latest DL equipment bid awarded an MD80 CA position to a January 2017 DOH. US regionals are offering signing bonuses of $10-20,000 creating effective first year pay rates of $50-60,000. Canada will not see the 'crisis' that seems on the horizon in the US, but on both sides of the border the pilot supply crunch will see the phasing out of smaller guage CPA fleet types as the most valuable commodity will be a pilot block hour. With restricted block hours available due to pilot shortages, airlines will have to maximize ASM's by increasing guage. You will see reduced frequency with larger guage at the regional affiliates, and the use of larger versions of NB aircraft at the mainline. Regional feed will evolve to a 76 seat standard and mainline NB capacity of 160-180 seats will become the norm. The UA CEO is already publicly mulling requests for increased fleet and guage at UA Express. My guess is that the vault will be open for even further increases in UA mainline pay rates in exchange for any relief to CPA restrictions. Second year pay at the majors is already six figures combined with 16% company contributions to retirement vehicles. In this respect, AC/WJ are woefully behind the pay curve. Things will look much different on both sides of the border 5 years from now. And pilots have more leverage than they have had in almost two decades.

2017 = 60 then 70/100/100/95/120/130/120/120 Higher than 150 kicks in 2026 and beyond.

No more B scale. ACPA should not approve any Rouge fleet expansion unless pay scales are harmonized. The reality is that most Rouge flying used to be mainline flying. Unit cost savings can come from hundreds of new-hire FA's and seat configuration densification. Pilot pay should be removed as a tool for cost reductions.

The age 65 attrition rate is actually quite shallow for the next several years. Bigger affect on staffing will be whether AC gets ACPA approval for Rouge expansion and whether additional unannounced 787's (and routes) are revealed. AC may also want to identify a potential reassignment of the 190's as the C-series begin to arrive in late 2019. If I were ACPA I would not start with a 'NO' but the requisite quid should not simply be growth. AC pay scales are in serious need of recalibration.

Rouge would be well suited to go all Airbus. A mix of 320/321/330 would create significant efficiencies. Mainline will eventually be all Boeing (other than c-series).

The cockpit noise level is about right......

Swiss cheese. Stack several together and the randomness of the holes on each slice means no path through. But every once and a while the holes line up.....

No problem. The "holes in the cheese" analogy is one of the most common references in the wake of an accident but the real focus should be on how the cheese got there in the first place. Approach ban visibility rules in Canada are inconsistent with global standards. Not seeing that fact identified in the report and no recommendation for regulatory harmonization from the TSB seems to be a glaring oversight after 2 years of investigation. With the reported visibility there was zero chance of the crew having reliable vertical approach path verification information at MDA given the equipment on board and the positioning of the PAPI array on runway 05. If you are going to fly an SCDA profile then there must be such reference available at the MDA. That would have required the published visibility for the LOC 05 approach or the equipment to perform the RNAV 05 to LPV minimums (250' AGL). AC seems to have acknowledged these issues and has made internal changes to approach ban limitations and is asking the regulator to examine implementing those same changes.

It was a quote from the investigators. Next time for your benefit I will add " ".

The TSB explained that this accident happened due to a confluence of events. Remove one variable, and it is likely the accident would not have occurred. Once again, it would appear that the opportunity was missed to require that Canada harmonize to the ICAO approach ban standard for non-precision approaches - charted visibility only. Also missing seems to be the affect that GPS/EGPWS may have had on providing earlier information or warning to the crew of proximity to terrain short of the runway. The report seems to indicate that AC has been internally proactive in both regards since the accident.

Market not unhappy. AC up 6%

B737NG lease pricing has remained firm but purchase pricing has been all over the map depending on circumstance. Boeing in particular has offered some deep discounts to either secure a new customer or to block an order from an existing customer for a competing product.

WJ adding a ULCC product just makes no sense. Diluted brand. Taking a mostly base level product and degrading it even further. Confusing customers. Logistical inefficiencies. I subscribe to the notion that the mostly vague corporate announcement was meant to poison the well for the other ULCC players trying to attract capital. The WJ 'threat' should give ULCC investors pause for thought.