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Everything posted by rudder

  1. This demonstrates that return to service may vary by certification jurisdiction. Several jurisdictions will not accept the FAA recertification as meeting their own standards.
  2. Can anybody name another vocation or profession that costs $100k+ in training and education where this same question is being posed? I cannot think of one.
  3. I have a better suggestion (although the possibility of larger c-series variants would be intriguing). CR should contact Brad Tilden at Alaska. AS is still working through the operational nightmare of a mixed fleet having inherited the Airbus leases from VA. My guess is that AS might be a motivated partner for an Airbus/Boeing fleet swap with AC. Airbus fleet at AS will be 10/53/10 319/320/*321NEO by June 2019. AS also inherited 30 A320NEO delivery slots (which have been pushed back from 2020-2022 to 2022-2024). Airbus leases start to expire in 2019 and are slowly staggered to expire thereafter. 10 of the 320’s are owned. AS has been aggressively converting MAX8 slots to MAX9 slots. AC has done the opposite. Regardless of the current 737 ‘crisis’, AS will always be a large and loyal 737 customer. Their commitment to the 737 product line is all encompassing and long term. I have no idea what the lease terms are for the Airbuses at AS, but assuming commercially reasonable terms I cannot see why AC would not be interested in assuming some of those leases in exchange for assigning the 24 MAX’s and remaining 737 deliveries to AS. AC could add the 10 AS 321NEO’s to current fleet and use the 320 leases to bridge to the 30 320 NEO deliveries. AC could also talk to Airbus about reverting the delivery schedule back to 2020-2022 and/or converting some of the 320NEO slots to 321NEO slots. Sure seems like a win-win to me for both AC and AS. Also looks like a good deal for Boeing and Airbus as well. I think that through different commercial transactions both airlines ended up with fleets that were sub-optimal. This would correct that anomaly and return the fleets to a more stable and efficient state.
  4. There are even lower experience levels in the flight deck of some Part 705 operators in Canada.
  5. I stand to be corrected but it appears that the thrust levers were never manually moved (?) and the engine speed remained at 94% N1 for the entire event flight. In level flight at low altitude the corresponding airspeed would have been well beyond the barber pole. At the IAS outlined in the report the air loading on all of the control surfaces would have been extreme. No wonder stab trim could not be manually adjusted.
  6. The grounding of the MAX is a reality. AC is significantly affected. CR has an obligation to manage the company through the crisis. The MAX customer perception issue will not likely be fully erased with the return to service, whenever that may be. Planning, contingency planning, and response planning are all part of strategic planning. Nobody wanted an accident or would seek to benefit from one. But the MAX situation will impact different operators in different ways. Each operator will have to formulate its own response.
  7. What I know is that AC first choice was NEO. Airbus would not take any 190’s. Boeing did so reluctantly and only accepted responsibility for 20 of the 45. The numbers for the actual purchase agreement are known (to AC and Boeing). What is not yet known and to be determined is damages. Could be millions. Could be tens of millions. And if the MAX recertification in Canada is delayed beyond July 01st it could be even more. This thread is about CR and the things that he has been able to achieve over the last 10 years that nobody else could. He took lemons and made lemonade. This is just another opportunity. I will watch with interest and nothing would surprise me.
  8. Other carriers are cancelling MAX orders. Yes, it will be litigated. Even customers that stick with Boeing are going to sue for damages resulting from the MAX grounding and delayed deliveries. AC was at best a luke warm MAX customer. With the A220 order, it is unlikely that AC would have ever converted a single MAX option. Now is the chance to reverse a questionable fleet decision. Short term pain. Long term gain.
  9. CR’s goals have not differed materially from many of his predecessors. However, he is a master tactician and strategist which has allowed him to succeed at AC as CEO where others have failed. His next project should be Boeing. Cancel the balance of the MAX deliveries. Re-sell the 24 that are on the property (sort of). Do a deal with Airbus to bridge the required NB fleet with used A320/321 until 55 NEO’s can be delivered.
  10. Yup. ”Significant” = big number of turns for small amount of stab movement
  11. The ratio of manual trim wheel rotations to actual stab trim movement is significant....
  12. If you were in a normal flight regimen (pitch/thrust/speed) and the stick shaker was activated, you could look at the 2 AOA displays to see if there was a gross disparity which would indicate a fault and a false stick shaker activation. If you were not in a normal flight regimen (unusual attitude as demonstrated in the picture) the AOA indication would confirm what was actually happening. You are headed for an impending stall.
  13. With the NEO having very few teething problems and the addition of the c-series A220 to the product lineup, Airbus are starting to look like geniuses and Boeing are looking like morons for clinging to a 50 year old NB platform. Imagine how much better off AC would have been if it had stuck with the 320 NEO fleet? WJ was screwed no matter what acting like the Alaska Airlines of Canada (Proudly All Boeing).
  14. You can fly from North America to Europe for $99 and that is sustainable.... If it sounds to good to be true, then it probably isn’t. Flair should pay close attention.
  16. Lots of other 737 switches and equipment haven’t changed since 1967 either.....
  17. An MCAS failure would never have formed part of a SIM script. However, a demonstration of the MCAS function might have been. Problem would be configuration load for the SIM (could you load the MAX database on to the NG SIM). And Boeing has subsequently modified the memory items for STAB TRIM Runaway to include up to item 5 - CUTOUT SWITCHES. Because the MCAS system was designed to defeat some of the crew actions for the NG (stabilizer brake), MCAS activation in a non-stall scenario could become confusing (that may be the understatement of the century). And AOA information was considered ‘optional’. All in all, the commonality assumption for the 737 will come under a great deal of scrutiny. Hindsight always being 20/20. Engineers had the right idea, but the resulting system design had a fatal flaw (single source trigger). That should have been trapped early on in the MAX certification process (right after they realized that the aircraft lacked inherent stability).
  18. Bottom line - if the crew(s) had AOA indicators and miscompare notification (unfortunately Boeing still refuses to install EICAS on any version of the 737) they may have more effectively diagnosed and responded to the system malfunction as the stick shaker activated and the MCAS system was responding to a single erroneous AOA indication. In hindsight seems surprising in the age of computer generated EFIS PFD displays that this is not a default configuration.
  19. On a modern swept wing commercial airliner, the AOA indication is also a good reference for efficiency. A higher than normal AOA in cruise flight (which would be caused by a higher than optimal pitch attitude in cruise flight) would provide reference to the crew that they are not at the optimal cruise altitude (likely confirmed by the FMS CRZ page information). There are many compelling reasons for AOA indicators to be installed and understood by flight crews.
  20. Once you get used to viewing normal AOA indications for phase of flight, you would quickly recognize an annomally. When accompanied by a miscompare message, diagnosing the problem would be much easier. AOA indications are also available on some HGS modes (if installed).
  21. The eyebrows are a “Pitch Limit Indicator”. It was added by Boeing as part of a package to assist in wind shear escape response. The AOA gauge is a separate indication on the PFD.
  22. Typical Boeing. There was no specific CAB ALT warning annunciation on the 737 until after the Helios accident (the signal was the Take-Off warning horn above 10,000’) Seems it always takes hull losses for Boeing to install equipment on a 737 that is basic or mandatory in any other Boeing aircraft designed after 1965.
  23. I wonder if the experience level of the flight crew on ET302 will raise any red flags in Canada? Probably not.
  24. The ignorance of Boeing to not highlight to operators the MCAS modification on the MAX would be the same as installing the STS system and not bothering to mention it. Having said that, there is no checklist for specific STS annomolies. However, crew awareness of the system helps crews both manage the aircraft in normal operations AND manage system failures, both scripted and unscripted. It is clear that Boeing never anticipated an AOA failure that would trigger an erroneous MCAS automated response. If they had thought it remotely possible, then redundancy would have been part of system design. That discussion will now include the role of the FAA in type certification, and what information Boeing did and did not provide to the FAA in order to receive that certification. Layered on top of this is crew experience level (or lack there of). So many errors. None in isolation is critical. But in aggregate can have tragic consequences.
  25. Not having to do with any North American operator of the MAX - it is certainly looking like this is an example of the holes in the cheese lining up x2. Lots of parties/agencies will have to look at ‘policies’ and ‘practices’ to see how they contributed to one of the holes.