Airasia Plane Missing?

[Don Hudson]

This is being circulated on Twitter...I think it is a calculation derived from ADS-B data - it certainly isn't from the FDR. There are two versions, one of which was shown in an NTSC briefing.

That said, it looks similar to all LOC events shown in the MAK presentation and eerily similar to AF447's descent path...generally, a low-forward-speed spiral dive, likely nose-up, fully stalled. What will be interesting to find out from the data is what was working at the time and what the crew did to try to unstall the aircraft. I believe that unlike the A330, the A320 will stop the THS from further trimming if the stall warning is sounding/The recent EASA AD is still in mind regarding the icing of the AoA probes, (procedure is to turn off two ADRs to get the airplane into Alternate law). With so much known by those who fly Airbus about the ability to have recovered AF447 one wonders, "Why another?" It just has to be different...

Obviously we would take these altitudes and headings as a schematic of what likely happened rather than an accurate representation of parameters; I can't recall if the various "flight aware/flight tracker" programs have headings - ADS-B does of course but who knows where this is from.

[Woody Pusher]

This appears to be the AirNav Indonesia created version. Note that it is page #8 of a report they appear to have prepared.

EDIT:: This version has been straightened up a little, and I've tracked its source to an animation prepared for the Indonesian Minister of Transport. The aircraft depicted (with its gear down!) moves along the track at its relative speed, and slowing dramatically as it approaches the Top of Climb.

BTW, the Latitude scale is far in excess of the Longitude, and the track of 310°T is actually drawn as 320°T. At 3°S the Lat / Long scale is effectively 1:1.

The aircraft is also flying nearly parallel to M635 and 7NM left of the track. I had originally assumed that its FP route was Surabaya to RAMPY and onto M635, but the FR24 records indicate that subsequent to getting airborne they appear to have been routed to the NNW and crossed the low level airways before being cleared to join M635 at TAVIP on the Ujung Pandang / Jakarta FIR boundary. If that was the case, I suspect they requested the deviation for WX at 23:13:18z on calling Jakarta at TAVIP. Indications based on where they were at 23:16:12z, suggests they made a HDG change to 285°T at TAVIP and then to 310°T (to be back on track by RAFIS) after 2 minutes.

Regarding FlightRadar24 ADS-B data; the data from departure Surabaya to TAVIP appears to be reliable, but indications are that the track portrayed post TAVIP was obsfucated shortly after FR24 became aware the aircraft was missing.

[moeman]

First attempt at raising the fuselage unsuccessful:

http://news.yahoo.com/indonesia-search-team-float-airasia-fuselage-060008226.html

[Don Hudson]

From MacLeans:

“Flying an airplane manually at those altitudes is like trying to balance a ruler on your fingertip,” says Sunjoo Advani, a Netherlands-based expert in flight simulation, who spent the past six years heading an international team that rewrote the rulebook on training pilots to deal with stall emergencies.

http://www.macleans.ca/news/world/deadly-stalls-haunt-airlines-as-airasia-investigation-unfolds/

Hmmm.

[Woody Pusher]

Don,

Food for further thought!

Ultimately this is the message that we all thought the AF447 accident had delivered. It now seems that some, if not many, have missed the implications of how and when a high altitude stall can occur.

More importantly, it's probably high time the Regulators took some enforcement action, as without doing so, there will always be some airlines that will persist with their perceived cost benefit methods of balancing the books.

[J.O.]

I don't mean to sound glib but which regulation would they be enforcing? Last time I checked, there was no such regulation as "don't fly into thunderstorms and stall your airplane."

Regulators can only enforce rules that are on the books. Unless they can prove that Air Asia didn't provide required training, or failed to maintain the aircraft properly, there isn't much the regulator can do after the fact. In any case, this isn't an issue of regulation, or at least it shouldn't be. If pilots need better training or if aircraft need better design, it should be the industry (airlines, manufacturers and their insurers) that drive that change. Recent history should be enough to convince them that they need to take their eye off the balance sheet for a while and get back to the business of providing safe carriage for their customers. If it isn't enough, then I don't know what it will take.

To paraphrase Bill Voss, if a rule could fix it, we'd only need one - don't crash.

[Don Hudson]

Woody;

From a flight safety p.o.v. the subject of how to respond has many facets and regulatory reform and action is one. However, I think J.O. has hit the nail on the head on this one. We don't know what would be the target and reasons for regulatory actions. Were you thinking for example, of levels of training and standards, or levels of oversight of the daily operation, (dispatch) or the balance between the drive for profit and the management of risk? Other than organizational factors we can't consider the crew as we obviously don't know yet what went on in the cockpit or how the accident sequence went and we don't know about the airline yet. And, unless there is gross negligence which would be obvious and recognizable to any seasoned airman, singling out a crew is almost always a serious mistake in accident prevention because if one crew is doing something that is high risk, so is another and that is an organizational problem that will continue until the organization changes.

Sometimes regulatory action is part of that change - in fact in some cases it is the only action that may result in meaningful, permanent change, and perhaps this is what you mean?

The fact that nothing unusual or "new" has been released very likely means that there is nothing in the data concerning the airplane, particularly whether the AD recently released by EASA concerning frozen AoA probes is a factor. There may very well be a basis for regulatory action against the air carrier in terms of responsibilities, or dispatch pressures, training, oversight, use of SMS principles, etc - we don't know yet. Nor do we know their history or their safety plan - do they have a robust reporting culture or do they punish crews for "mistakes"? Do they have an active flight data monitoring program and use it appropriately, as opposed to how some Asian carriers use flight data? Have they had incidents in the past that are not widely known but are part of the carrier's actual record? We don't know. Beyond the one carrier, will the NTSC conduct an open process and report all findings in a timely manner and make all documents public? There may be a basis for enforcement action but the larger question is, for this part of the world, By whom?

In fact, Airbus had provided users with the basis for appropriate use of the UAS drill and checklist as early as 2006. So there were disconnects in training and checking against a background of numerous pitot/airspeed failures prior to the accident. On stalling, the notion of "unloading the wing" isn't new but airline crews were never taught how to unstall a transport aircraft, they were taught what to do in the "approach to the stall", (prior to the full stall). In one regulatory environment, the "approach to stall" is not even a training requirement in fly-by-wire aircraft...what FBW has to do with it I"m not sure!

AF447 was a human performance accident in which the airline, in my view, does not entirely escape - loss of airspeed information isn't an emergency but AF447 was turned into one by lack of SOPs and discipline and obvious lack of training; we don't know what the AirAsia accident is yet. It is difficult to comprehend the notion that a 20,000hr captain with a background, we are told, like his, would make the same fundamental mistakes, (failure to use SOPs, absence of cockpit discipline) as the crew on AF447. I envision instead a competent crew fighting to save the aircraft all the way down with everything in their experience and training to unstall the aircraft and were overwhelmed despite doing all the right things. Of course that is the hope...

edit to add link to the following story regarding the CEO of AirAsia calling for a common regulator

http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/airasia-ceo-calls-for-single-aviation-authorityasean_1283680.html

Tony Fernandes, the Indian-origin founder and CEO of the AirAsia group, has called for a single aviation authority to approve licences to operate in 10 Southeast Asian nations, an issue that assumed significance after the deadly crash of the group's Flight QZ8501. He, however, dismissed any lack of harmony that could have led to the accident on December 28 that killed all 162 people on board. "I don't think the non-harmonisation led to the accident. But I think having one aviation authority improves standards for everybody and makes it easier for businesses to operate. And I think that goes across not just aviation, (but) across everything. "If ASEAN is to be a common market, investors have to see us as a common market, which means one approving authority - you get one license to operate inten countries.

[Mitch Cronin]

I'm inclined to think that regulatory oversight, even in this rather gentle "western world" country, is laughably less than Joe Public believes it to be. ....and I mean, oversight of all aspects of the operation... Nothing has changed over the years I've seen things, in terms of where the rot could creep in. I think we've all seen the holes.

So imagine how it must be in countries where corruption is one of the cards to be dealt with?

[DEFCON]

Don makes the observation; “AF447 was turned into one by lack of SOPs and discipline and obvious lack of training”.

In that respect, I have a question; why is that sentiment expressed following most crashes; why aren’t training curriculums keeping up with the times?

The CEO of the Air Asia group is calling for an amalgamation of the regions aviation authority. No doubt a great idea, but then; why only in that part of the world? Aircraft from virtually every Country with an international air carrier operate around the globe routinely. Perhaps it’s time to consider a mandatory global standard for all that’s enforced through one administrative body? Flight safety would be well served I think if ‘standards were removed from the list of items available to be manipulated to gain commercial advantage

[Don Hudson]

DEFCON;

Complicated question on both the micro, (individual or small group) and macro (air carriers, regulators) levels and also on the "meta" level, ("meta" meaning "all-encompassing something about something"...metadata would be data about data or better still, "What is the understanding that understands?")

We intuitively know that competency varies within groups, and systems within which people must work usually accomodate and respond to such variations. It is only recently (since about 1984, with Charles Perrow, "Normal Accidents"), that organizations figured in the causal pathway to accidents, changing the meaning of the notion, "accident" along the way.

The notions of organizational safety & risk management grew out of the need to defend the corporate personna, (the corporation-as-private-citizen, not the actual managers or CEOs), against both the regulator's hand and the courts. Individuals are usually indemnified unless there are clear signs of extraordinary and/or intentional negligence.

The aviation system, using the three-legged stool model, (regulator, management, employees), is spectacularly successful in managing all these levels of threat. Engineering, medicine and other transportation systems would gladly take aviation's "failure" numbers. So "ordinary" is such sucess that passengers actually still have the b@lls to complain about the price of an airline ticket. Another thread.

Part of the difficulty in coming to terms with a trend is that hindsight bias hobbles progress through focussing too narrowly on why certain actions weren't taken, actions that are now in the spotlight due to several accidents with common threads.

Notwithstanding the above descriptive paragraphs, I think the industry, economically-challenged though it has been since de-regulation and particularly air carriers, has been and still is, extremely lethargic in picking up on what pilots and much later, academics, have been saying since the late 80's/early 90's regarding aircraft flight (vs. system) automation and human interactions. We may attempt to pinpoint the causes but the dissolution of basic thinking and skills is the result of a focus on technology rather than people, the former being less expensive to operate...

In response to your specific point DEFCON, I think curriculae are keeping up. Most air carriers, (but not all, I know) have "done AF447" and are re-emphasizing stall recovery, (not just "approach-to"). But the "meta-dialog" might be put thus, "What, how and why is the automation that automates?" What else lurks? Approach and landing accidents, runway incursions and CFIT accidents vie for #1 spot in any one year. Accidents define where we turn our heads, sometimes with good reason, but always requiring an examination of the dispensing of limited resources.

Stalls & LOC accidents occur because they are the remaining challenges, since we have all but innoculated the aviation system against mid-air collision, weather accidents, navigation error, communication error, mechanical & structural failures and so on. The introduction of two-pilot aircraft permitted by technology & automation served two masters, the greatest being the financial one as demanded by the air carriers, then, as a sidebar, an attempt at innoculation against "human error" and a very successful one I think. However, I think the largest mistake of all was in expecting that such systems would eliminate this last challenge and the system "relaxed" to the point where the fundamentals of aviation are set aside in favour of the "third pilot" syndrome and shinier, sexier tools, skewed recurrent training schedules, increased demands in time-compressed sim schedules such that the basics are given short-shrift, etc.

Sometimes even data-driven solutions like flight data work cannot point where the risks are...how many actual "stalls" or even stick-shaker events are there in any one carrier's flight data? None, that I know of. What about LOC or CFIT events?...practically none. the focus of such programs is almost exclusively the approach & landing phase, followed by the takeoff, with very few events monitoring the climb/cruise/descent phases. Yet here we are; can we extrapolate "competency" data (how's the daily flying?), to effectively discern risk of these #1 occurrences? I don't think so, but perhaps some paper somewhere discusses this.

Regarding commercial advantage, more power to it, providing managers of good will and intentions do their level best to ensure the application of all possible safety systems available while minding the bottom line. There are the more politically-minded ambitious types with high profiles, (which add nothing and aren't needed in aviation anymore) and then there are "the grunts", who put in daily toil that really does ensure that the system performs well.

Since Vaughan's book on Challenger I've changed my mind regarding the notion of "amoral calculation" - the sense that people intentionally cut corners for picayune advantage. What that does to our perceptions of how actual safety is achieved is to turn these familiar/typical notions and "explanations" on their heads, because if such an explanation doesn't actually apply, (as I'm almost certain it doesn't in most cases), then the problems are much more complex and deeper in an organization that is exhibiting "stress" (through incidents and even accidents - Air France was such an organization in my view and in the view of many). The challenge is to keep the broad picture while managing the daily priorities and to convey that to everyone, who are all likely just trying to do their best, and how the "shock" of falling short despite such lauditory personal and corporate goals is handled and fixed.

some rambling thoughts, anyway...good question.

[Don Hudson]

video of the rope-break while raising a section of the aircraft...https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=MMoF_YBImNU&x-yt-cl=84503534&x-yt-ts=1421914688#t=32

[inchman]

Speechless. They're lifting tens of tonnes with fabric ropes..... twice now. Tried to yank it over the stern of a fishing boat with brute force just like they did the tail. The NTSB and EASA must be just spinning.

(that link didn't work that well, Don...started part way through... might be better to try this one ).

[DEFCON]

I wonder if the information presented at the planed Wednesday news conference will be a compilation of noise created in a manner consistent with the investigative work being demonstrated over the back end of the tug-boat?

[DEFCON]

I wonder if the approach undertaken by recovery crews had more to do with the absence of bodies in the fuselage than anything else? From what little could be seen during the last failed attempt to raise the wreckage, it was obvious they had somehow lost the structure forward of the wing and probably everything aft too? It also appears that the floor / belly structure was missing as well.

Two bodies were recovered earlier today approximately 600 miles from the scene of the crash.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30997992

[Don Hudson]

There's "news" of a problem with the FACs, (Flight Augmentation Computer (1/2), and also "news" that the military has packed their bags and gone home. Thus far, Airbus has still not said anything regarding the A320 so we can expect that there aren't problems with the airplane. However, there are hints regarding "sensors".

The way things have gone so far I wouldn't expect the NTSC to release the flight data in the preliminary report due today or tomorrow, (the CVR will take some time to transcribe). However, I would expect it to be in the final report.

[moeman]

http://www.smh.com.au/world/airasia-disaster-pilots-disabled-computers-moments-before-crash-20150129-131qq4.html

"The pilots of AirAsia flight 8501 cut power to a critical computer system that normally prevents planes from going out of control shortly before it plunged into the Java Sea, two people with knowledge of the investigation said."

[Woody Pusher]

There's "news" of a problem with the FACs, (Flight Augmentation Computer (1/2), and also "news" that the military has packed their bags and gone home. Thus far, Airbus has still not said anything regarding the A320 so we can expect that there aren't problems with the airplane. However, there are hints regarding "sensors".

The way things have gone so far I wouldn't expect the NTSC to release the flight data in the preliminary report due today or tomorrow, (the CVR will take some time to transcribe). However, I would expect it to be in the final report.

Don,

If there appeared to be a fault with FAC-1, resetting it would allow FAC-2 to take over. Well that's my interpretation.

Trying to reset both at the same time, I would suspect is not possible, as I suspect the intention is to have a "no break" service provided by the FACs.

What is your take on this "leaked" scenario?

[Don Hudson]

Woody - my take is only the possiblity that they were trying to get the airplane into Alternate Law using the recently-issued AD. That means turning off two ADRs. So far, I'm uncertain as to whether they turned the FACs off or not. IIRC, the AF447 crew tried turning the the PRIMs off at some point in the descent, trying to reset them. These are only hints so far...the data will tell us what they actually tried.

FWIW, it was known fairly early that it was almost certainly the F/O who was flying...it was mentioned early on that the captain's voice was mentioned as being recognized in ATC communications some time ago. The rest is best left I suppose, as the left seat had great experience in general and on the airplane, specifically and we don't yet know who did what, when, and what the results were. I'm not at all convinced that a problem with the FACs, in and of itself, would result in a loss of control/stall, etc.

[Woody Pusher]

Don,

Thanks. I am aware of the recent AD, and some talk of the a/c concerned having problems with what was described as Rudder Trim.

What I have seen doesn't equate to loss of lateral control, with the initial primary change to the FP being an apparent pitch up. The slow turn to the left, may be no different to what happened to AF447, where it slowly did a 200 degree turn to the right (being in the northern hemisphere). There is a lot more to this story, and I'm disappointed the NTSC hasn't been a little more forthcoming into what they currently believe may have led to the instigation of this LOC.

On the other-hand, Airbus must be confident that the cause is not due to an unexpected glitch in their design philosophy. Though as an invited party to the investigation, they are obliged to respect the wishes of the NTSC, which could ultimately be embarasing.

[DEFCON]

The short story...the people in charge are just repackaging the same material in different wrappers and handing it to a hungry for information media.

[Don Hudson]

Woody;

There is the inevitable conspiracy-contingent which claim that the "flaws" in the rudder that caused the A300 at New York also exist in the A320, and "proof" of this sometimes extends to citing the in-flight delamination of an Airbus A310 rudder. There is no "runaway rudder issue" for the A320, (nor for the A330/A340, for that matter).

As far as I can determine the actual rudder-trim "issue" grew out of a normal if very small rudder deflection that results from contraction of dissimilar metals in the yaw damper structure. That's an old explanation but is the best one offered. From an FCOM:

TRIM TOLERANCE
The rudder trim should stay between 1° right and 2.3° left when the aircraft is :
– in normal cruise range (around M.77),
– in straight flight,
– with autopilot engaged,
– with symmetrical engine thrust, and
– with fuel in the wing tanks distributed symmetrically,
Note: This indication corresponds to a true rudder deflection within ± 1.5°, taking into account the
permanent offset of rudder trim indication when aircraft is in cruise conditions. (average 0.5° right,
0.8° left).
An indicated rudder trim above 1° right or 2.3° left is acceptable if the maintenance personnel
establishes that the corresponding real rudder position is within 1.5° left and 1.5° right.

The FACs compute minimum speeds, manoeuvering speeds and so on. They retain control over the flight envelope even if turned off using the overhead switches, (providing of course that the FACs are functioning normally).

One hopes that the propensity to save face on the part of some is set aside in favour of providing information on what happened to bring this aircraft down.

[Don Hudson]

Further details to the above post:

AirAsia captain left seat to fix computer problem before jet lost control – reports

• Pilot had left seat to try to reset flight control system, Reuters reports
• Co-pilot then lost control but the captain was unable to save the plane

The captain of the AirAsia jet that crashed into the sea in December was out of his seat conducting an unorthodox procedure when his co-pilot apparently lost control, two people familiar with the investigation said.

Details emerging of the final moments of Flight QZ8501 are likely to focus attention partly on maintenance, procedures and training, though Indonesian officials have said that it is too early to draw any firm conclusions.

The Airbus A320 jet plunged into the Java Sea while en route from Surabaya, Indonesia, to Singapore on 28 December, killing all 162 people on board.

It had been suffering maintenance faults with a flight control computer for more than a week, and one person familiar with the matter said the captain had flown the same faulty aircraft just days before the crash.

Cont'd

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/31/airasia-captain-left-seat-to-fix-computer-problem-before-jet-lost-control-reports

Ed. to add, regarding the FACs:

The FACs (Flight Augmentation Computers) can be turned off in the air using the two pb's on the overhead panel.

The FACs cannot be reset in the air using the four CBs, (two on the overhead for FAC 1, two on the rear cockpit bulkhead for FAC 2). There is no telling what the aircraft would do without the FACs, especially if they were disabled simultaneously. The airplane would certainly be in Alternate Law and alpha-prot, (stall protect) would not be available - same as the A330 / AF447.

So...why would a pilot of this captain's background and experience pull FAC CBs in-flight when that is clearly warned against? Why did the aircraft pitch up - was it the F/O, as stated in the article, or an untoward result of pulling the FAC CBs in flight? or a combination of such? The FACs compute all Minimum speeds, Vs, VFE, Manoeuvering speeds, etc...as a result of the loss of the FAC(s), did the F/O see a speed that made him pull up? Why would he do so while the captain is standing up?

From the A320 QRH, first this caution:

– In flight, as a general rule, the crew must restrict computer resets to those listed
in the table, or to those in applicable TRs or OEBs. Before taking any action on
other computer the flight crew must consider and fully understand the
consequences.

Then from the CB-pull guidance:

FAC Flight Augmentation Computer
Note 1 : ON GROUND ONLY - If the AUTO FLT YAW DAMPER 1(2) FAULT ECAM Warning
is displayed, refer to MEL ITEM NO. 22-63-01 before proceeding with reset
procedure.

PROCEDURE : ON GROUND ONLY - BRAKES SET. Engines shutdown and hydraulics on.

Note 2 : With hydraulic systems pressurized the yaw damper output is also
tested. DO NOT alter hydraulic configuration during self test.

Pull and reset the following C/Bs:
– AUTO FLT/FAC1/28VDC ....................................................B4 on 49 VU
– AUTO FLT/FAC2/28VDC ....................................................M19 on 121 VU
RESET C/B AFTER: 10s POWER UP TEST DURATION: 95s

[DEFCON]

Interesting media 'stories', but what purpose is being served with the release of information like this? Why can't they just give us the data in one piece when they're ready and stop the games?

[Woody Pusher]

Don Hudson said:-

The FACs cannot be reset in the air using the four CBs, (two on the overhead for FAC 1, two on the rear cockpit bulkhead for FAC 2). There is no telling what the aircraft would do without the FACs, especially if they were disabled simultaneously. The airplane would certainly be in Alternate Law and alpha-prot, (stall protect) would not be available - same as the A330 / AF447.

So...why would a pilot of this captain's background and experience pull FAC CBs in-flight when that is clearly warned against? Why did the aircraft pitch up - was it the F/O, as stated in the article, or an untoward result of pulling the FAC CBs in flight? or a combination of such? The FACs compute all Minimum speeds, Vs, VFE, Manoeuvering speeds, etc...as a result of the loss of the FAC(s), did the F/O see a speed that made him pull up? Why would he do so while the captain is standing up?

The answer to the above will most likely depend on a "chicken or egg" scenario, i.e. did the resetting of the FACs cause the climb, or was it because of an unexpected pitch up.

If it was due to the unexpected Zoom climb, then the action "may" be excussed, though why would you deliberately consider doing this when you should know that each of the FACs are completely independant, and designed to supplement each other when a detected fault occurs. Loss of Air Data shouldn't result in the preceding actions, as I thought most would have become more aware of following the AF447 accident.

[conehead]

Generally speaking, there's a reason why some CBs aren't within reach when strapped in. There's definitely more to this story!

That's why in some aircraft, none of the c/b's are within the pilots reach, they are in the e/e compartment.