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Spaceshiptwo Has 'anomaly'


Kip Powick

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The pieces are large and "intact" - so it wasn't a (high-energy) crash but a mid-air break-up likely very high up, which occurred, according to some sources, some time after engine ignition.

I'm sure the telemetry is thorough and preserved. Very sad day all around and a huge set-back, from which they'll eventually recover - as always, the toughest part is the loss of life and injuries.

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It's an incredibly dangerous venture. I hope they keep it going.

As you say Don, the toughest part is the loss of life.

Does anyone know if that those craft have ejection seats?

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It's an incredibly dangerous venture. I hope they keep it going.

As you say Don, the toughest part is the loss of life.

Does anyone know if that those craft have ejection seats?

SpaceShipTwo does not have ejection seats but is equipped with an escape hatch. The fuselage is fully pressurized for the pilots and planned paying customers. It is not yet determined if the test pilots escaped from the hatch or were thrown from the vehicle after its mid-air breakup.

It is standard practice for any test pilot in an experimental vehicle to be wearing a parachute. SpaceShipTwo would be no exception. Furthermore, being aware of the flight conditions and escaping from a vehicle at high altitude, the chutes very likely had automatic mechanisms to deploy, assuming unconsciousness.

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Twitter feed from @spacecom, (read from the bottom up)

https://twitter.com/spacecom

Experts' Discussion thread

http://www.parabolicarc.com/2014/10/31/spaceshiptwo-explodes-crashes-1-dead-1-injured/#disqus_thread

What we read in the two threads above is a rare, unfiltered discussion between those directly involved or close to the accident, onsite.

Other links:

NTSB B-Roll of the Spaceshiptwo crash scene, Mojave

https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=cZnQcMpzunM#t=0

For relief, showing the other side of commercial space exploration, this is just a great video made by the Centers for Applied Competitive Technologies (CACT): http://www.makingitincalifornia.com

https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=ldoCqrQ1A00#t=0

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Uh oh.... doesn't look good:

A number of senior aerospace engineers repeatedly voiced fears over the design of Sir Richard’s SpaceShipTwo and the safety protocols surrounding its testing.

The Sunday Telegraph has seen emails and other documents in the public domain — dating back several years, and as recently as last year — in which the engineers warned of the dangers of Virgin Galactic’s rocket engine system.

It also emerged that three senior Virgin Galactic executives — the vice-president in charge of propulsion, the vice-president in charge of safety, and the chief aerodynamics engineer — had all quit the company in recent months.

Article too long to post, follow link

http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/11/02/richard-bransons-virgin-galactic-accused-of-ignoring-warning-signs-ahead-of-deadly-spaceshiptwo-crash/

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Virgin Galactic crash: Descent system 'deployed early'


Mon Nov 03, 2014 - BBC News

A safety device on the Virgin Galactic spacecraft that crashed on Friday killing a test pilot had been deployed early, US investigators say.

Air safety chief Christopher Hart said the "feathering" device, designed to slow the craft on re-entry, activated without a command from the pilots.

But he said it was too soon to confirm any possible cause of the crash.

Media reports had focused on the fuel tanks and the engine, but Mr Hart said both were found intact.

Virgin boss Sir Richard Branson accused a "handful of British newspapers" of publishing "wild accusations" over the crash.

He said initial findings from US investigators had shown reports that suggested problems with the fuel or engine had caused an explosion were "garbage".

"Rumours and innuendo from self-proclaimed experts can be put back in their box," he told the BBC.

"Shortly after the feathering occurred, the telemetry data terminated and the video data terminated,"

.

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Thanks for posting that Seeker...great find.

From the video/CVR:

Release occurs @ 00:18; from crew comments on the CVR, unlocking the "feathers" is done @ 00:39, 17" shortly after initial engine light-off @ 00:22. Actual release of the feathers, ("feather up" comment), near/at apogee for the descent occurs @ 01:18, or 49" after initial unlocking, so early unlocking does not seem unusual according to this video.

Perhaps something in the interlocks, (unlocked, not released) permitted the "feathers" to move; their relatively small structure seems (intuitively...not an engineer!), that they would not tolerate lateral loads well. Once such a failure mode started it would swiftly progress in the same manner as any airplane that had lost its rudder.

But we'll see. Already a lot has been learned. I don't blame Branson for venting his anger at the media for "concluding" that it was an engine explosion..."in advance of the facts...".

Don

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Hi Don, A link to that video was in the twitter feed you posted so I can't really take credit for "finding" it.

I was having some trouble understanding the description of the sequence of events - someone seemed to be saying that the feathering was done at too slow of a speed - that didn't make sense to me until I realized that perhaps at a higher speed the craft would be at a higher altitude and probably a lower dynamic pressure. That seems to make sense.

Regarding the quick leap to a conclusion by the media - they obviously talked to someone and it seems that the operation is not considered to be safe by many outside observers. This accident may not be atributable to a rocket problem but that certainly doesn't mean that the rockets have no problems.

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"This accident may not be atributable to a rocket problem but that certainly doesn't mean that the rockets have no problems."

There certainly does seem to be a lot of background noise in some parts of the engineering community in that regard. Way back when, the anti crowd assuredly claimed that NASA could never successfully develop the space shuttle's adjustable throttle liquid fuel engines.

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Notwithstanding the inevitable heroic statements regarding the high risk and accompanying price of "progress" in such endeavours I had thought earlier when I first began reading through that background noise that we are seeing a private-enterprise version of the Challenger and Columbia accidents*. In fact, what is disappointing in the things we are beginning to hear, (beyond statements that might come from the disgruntled or angry), very much resemble some of the same sentiments that may be found in these two valuable books on high risk enterprises, which I think (obviously) bear re-reading. The difference of course is these two accidents occurred within the public sphere, (government, and government agencies) at a time when private enterprise was fulfilling sub-contractor roles only.

The Spaceshiptwo accident is purely within the private sphere with stated goals being entertainment & profit not research and advancement of knowledge like previous, similar projects by NASA or the Airforce, and while subject to FAA regulations and OSHA's requirements and audits, the reading regarding organizational accidents may not have reached the top echelons of the two companies partnered in this courageous endeavour even as they believed they had done everything right over the past ten years.

The argument is, basically, setting aside the notions of heroism for one moment, with all that is known regarding high risk endeavours in terms of both the technologies and, more critically, the organizational factors behind "accidents", are there such factors at work here, or was this truly an unanticipated event which was possibly envisioned through "what-if" sessions but considered sufficiently implausible, and were there sufficient safety valves for people with concerns out of which dissention and disagreement were welcomed as a part of a larger "team" effort? Certainly, concensus is no way to run high-risk work but at the same time decisions must be made so that designs, processes and procedures may at some point be "frozen" and next steps taken.

I think this is where the investigation will go because I think they've already solved what happened - we just don't know why yet. We'll see in about a year.

*The Challenger Launch Decision; Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA, and Organization at the Limit

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Another spectacular video - dark morning, sunrise, driving on the tarmac to the ship, doing a walk-around on Spaceshiptwo, early-morning takeoff, release, zoom-climb, re-entry...absolutely beautiful, fascinating; it certainly captures the imagination.

Imagine doing a walkaround on Spaceshiptwo...!

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"This accident may not be atributable to a rocket problem but that certainly doesn't mean that the rockets have no problems."There certainly does seem to be a lot of background noise in some parts of the engineering community in that regard. Way back when, the anti crowd assuredly claimed that NASA could never successfully develop the space shuttle's adjustable throttle liquid fuel engines.

My observation is that highly intelligent people are usually extremely competitive. Aerospace engineers fall into this category, particularly when working on new technology. Everyone wants to be first to invent the newest new thing, to solve the hardest problem. NASA types looking down at Scaled Composites types is the same as Boeing v Airbus. Both produce valid solutions to engineering problems, often elegantly. When you get beat or in the case of NASA taken out of the game before you were done playing I think that's a natural reaction. On the other hand, they may have valid concerns but it's not like NASA has a perfect record either.

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I am wondering why we see more concern here for a flight test accident that we would for some of the accidents that have occurred with civil aircraft from private companies like Canadair, Bombardier, Boeing, Airbus etc. Every flight test is a risk, thats why its called flight TESTING.

In the flight tests I have been involved in there was always a briefing and all concerns were addressed in thos briefings. The Flight Test Procedures were also spelled out in a comprehensive checklist. The pilots knew they were risking their lives in conducting the test because they were in fact pushing the limits to test the envelope. Without that test data it would be impossible to predict the behaviour of the aircraft when pushed to the limits. In order for someone to know the stall characteristics of an A380, someone had to stall it. There is inherent risk there and these guys were willing to accept that risk be it for money or glory. Many have perished pushing the envelope and they did so willingly.

just because this was a private venture and a spaceship makes it no different from a small single engine aircraft on it initial test flights.

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Trivia..............

The first B747 had sort of a "fire-pole" mounted between the flight deck and the cabin. During test flights, if there was an emergency they were to slide down the pole, put on a chute, blow the door and bail out !!!

Test pilots are pretty gutsy...............

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The Global Express had a setup that basically ripped the belly access door off and the pilots jumped through the hole.

It takes a special kind of person to strap several tonnes of untested aluminium to his ass and hurtle through the air at 500 Mph. But man what a rush.

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