Will Generation Y Be Pilots?

[CanadaEH]

I have only followed the "pilot shortage" threads from a distance but I'm curious - where is the shortage coming from? North America? Europe? Asia?

[CanadaEH]

If there is a pilot shortage, is there not two scenarios that would play out:

1. Supply and demand. Low pilots = high demand and therefore higher pay to attract pilots?

2. Outsourcing to those willing to earn less? There are over 2 billion people in China/India. You can't tell me a couple hundred thousand of them wouldn't want high(er) paying jobs flying aircraft.

[dagger]

To the initial thread starting question I think that there will always be a supply of people who want to be pilots. Like the aircraft being flown, the profession has evolved however people will still go where there are jobs. If there is a glut of airline flying jobs you can bet that people will gravitate towards them.

I disagree with the assertion that firefighting and police are walk in off the street jobs. Because these careers are generally sought after there is usually some form of prerequesite whether it is a degree, working with youth, a trade or some good life/job experience. There are not too many people walking in to fire and police at 20 years old unless they have some experience to impress the recruiters.

Nor can you even file an application in Toronto to be a firefighter without meeting a number of these pre-requisites, which means you have to go out and take a course just to have the piece of paper that entitles you to make an application.

[boestar]

Interesting that I have been in the airline business for 24 years. I know personally one pilot that has died at the controls of an aircraft. I have been to 3 police funerals in the last 5 years. Flying at a large flying club in Ontario I can only recall 3 fatal accidents since I started flying in 1992 at that club. I may have missed some after I stopped flying there but still no where near 5 in 5.

On Sunday I witnessed firefighters heading into a burning house on the corner of my street. I can honestly say it never took that much courage to sit my butt in the seat of a clapped out 172 and head into the wild blue.

[bluemic]

..... have been in the airline business for 24 years. I know personally one pilot that has died at the controls of an aircraft.

Not to encourage thread drift but...

24 years of flying and you only know ONE pilot who died in the seat?

Count yourself (and your acquaintances) lucky then. I’m sure there are many of us here who think “5-in-5” is a fairly conservative number.

mic

[planett]

I've known seven in the first eight years, but fortunately another decade has passed with no new victims. 7 in 18 now.

[Don Hudson]

Personal experience is too small a data set to establish a meaningful idea of risk and reward. The key I think is in the data....in general aviation, (single & twin ab initio, single & twin experienced, single/twin IFR, small commercial (freight, medivac), regional, major (passenger, freight), helicopter, etc. The data shows that the risks of pilots dying in an accident reduce as one approaches the major carriers. The higher levels of fatalities through accident are highest in general aviation. Perhaps one difference between the cited professions' apprenticeship and training regimes is that one rarely dies "on the way up" while in aviation those are the times of highest personal risk.

Focussing on relative risks to one's life as a metric for remuneration leaves out a host of other factors which attend aviation but which do not attend the usual career comparisons such as those being made here.

Competency is a contextual notion whether it is formalized in regulation, SOPs and the mildly-elusive concept of "airmanship" informally recognized by peers, or against standards established within individual organizations. As with the two professions cited here, competency in aviation protects life, property and liability but the price and risk of individual incompetency is far higher in aviation.

An accident at a major carrier is sometimes estimated these days at around $10b and that is almost always under the control of just two, sometimes 3 individuals over very short periods of time in a dynamic operating environment. That doesn't take into account the potential loss of prestige and reliability factors and therefore loss of business or as has occurred in the past, entire loss of the company, particularly these days. While losses due to fire can approach tens of millions including (temporary) loss of the business, widespread fatalities from such events are, by comparison, rare.

In terms of the meaning of "rare", deaths through crime and/or fire may be equal to or even higher than aviation fatalities but such fatalities are far more amenable to avoidance and protection through the actions of taking personal responsibility. Putting in smoke detectors is for example fundamental to personal protection even as many still don't do it and lose their lives in home fires. Most are familiar with ways to reduce one's exposure to being a victim of violent crime.

In aviation, passengers must place their trust in the entire aviation system and have only limited means by which to reduce risk, (not among such means is using the internet to "research" an airline's incident/accident record). Wearing suitable clothing and leaving footwear (not flip-flops or sandles!) on attends to the risk of evacuation in a Canadian winter or having to walk over possibly hot and sharp metal - small action, smaller risk...until it isn't. Passenger trust is nevertheless rewarded 99.99% of the time through the actions of others.

With levels of automation being what they are, pilots are seen by non-aviators as possibly redundant and certainly still "too expensive for what they do". Judged by ordinary standards of "putting in one's eight-hour day in an office" which is the not-unexpected usual standard, they are, until they aren't ! The standard reply to the question, "How much to you make?" is, "A hundred thousand dollars a minute, but the company will never know which one." It's the only profession where "normal" can turn to disaster in minutes, usually when there is no time for recovery, or backup help from one's team.

The industry is full of examples where a trained, experienced, veteran crew has dealt with serious mid-air events and brought the aircraft down with all passengers safe. Such examples are almost always found at carriers which have established a healthy and beneficial culture which sustains their flight crews and attracts good candidates.

But there are increasing examples of where even minor events (such as a loss of airspeed information, loss of a takeoff configuration warning, loss of the autothrottle, loss of cockpit discipline...texting while taxiing, yakking on approach..., and loss of energy awareness), have resulted in loss of the aircraft and in every case I cited, substantial loss of life in serviceable, flyable aircraft.

As I described earlier, "competency" and "qualified" are two different standards. AF447 is a prime example of this fact - from unreliable airspeed event to impact with the ocean was four minutes. In my view that accident was entirely a crew performance accident. The airplane had nothing to do with it until they stalled the airplane, taking it into theoretical test-pilot territory where no one has been before and system behaviours could not reasonably be anticipated by the designers, causing a complete loss of situational awareness. Training, standards, regulatory oversight and both organizational and individual competency are all now issues in this accident. There are other examples, like Colgan, (which is going out of business).

Don

[boestar]

I would hesitate to say that accidents in the "formative" years as a pilot are strictly caused by a lack of experience. Those early years of flying are usually done on high time aircraft where maintenance may not be a "priority" or they are just rattle traps. Smaller operators have smaller budgets and corners get cut. It a generalization but its not all that uncommon. some operators are great at keeping the rattle traps flying. I know in my early flying days I would see the same defect time and time again on the aircraft with no rectification until I spoke to the maintenance director in person as an AME not as a pilot. Some aircraft out there are outright scary. So while inexperience on the part of the aviator is part of the equation it is not the full story. As the pilot grows in time and skill so does his progression to larger, younger and better maintained aircraft so stating that experience is the be all end all is not the real story.

Flying a state of the art Embraer or 787 or whatever that is maintained by professional AMEs with 20+ years of experience is a far cry from operating a 35 year old (or more) Navajo maintained by recent graduates of AME school.

Basically the odds are against a young pilot just starting to fly those odds get better over time with many factors playing a role.

[Guest rozar s'macco]

I flew a black C-172 (forget the reg) at Buttonville for Skywords Aerial Advertising for a few bleak months 13 years ago. Traffic patrol and banner towing. I distinctly remember one day arriving at work to find no attitude indicator in the aircraft. Not broken, not "MEL"'d (although no MEL exists, obviously)...removed! "ahh but it's VFR flying Daniel-san, all that you need is a turn and bank and altimeter"

Ahh, OK technically true but, at an airfield with 900 other resident c-172's, is there not a loaner to be had while you get ours overhauled? Nevermind, I knew the drill with those scumbags. Find another job ASAP.

A few years prior, a young pilot dead-sticked that aircraft into Sunnybrook park successfully. Several years after I left, that airplane crashed off the departure end of RWY34 at YKZ, fatally injuring the young recently graduated pilot. Pilot error, I believe.

[boestar]

RM... Was it pilot error? You spelled out a history there that may tell a different story. Perhaps the only error that pilot made was accepting a sub standard aircraft in order to appease the bossman.

As with many pilots I have a problem with "Pilot Error" as a probable cause. Perhaps the pilot did make an mistake in reacting to the ROOT CAUSE of the incident at hand. If something mechanical or electrical happens to the aircraft and the pilots action is either in error or insufficient to successfully land was he in fact the "probable Cause" of the accident IMHO, NO. He was a contributing factor to the accident at best. Any failure of the aircraft is the starting point of the chain and the pilot is but a link in said chain.

In my "formative" years as a pilot I had but one close call which was ALL ON ME. I had planned a cross country trip with an aircraft with long range tanks and fuel etc was planned accordingly. Shortly before the planned excursion I was forced to swap with another 172 in the fleet that was only equipped with standard range tanks. The replanning was not carried out and a fuel stop en route would have been required. As it stood I made the field with a popcorn fart in the tank and some pucker marks on the seat cover. Fortunately the area in which I was flying afforded several grass strips that could have been used in an emergency. It turned out to be a great lesson in fuel management as well as to pay attention to planning.

[Don Hudson]

I was browsing around looking for data and stats on the question of "pilot error" vs "mechanical failure" - found the following on "PubMed", (publications from the Medical field on all subjects):

Aviat Space Environ Med. 2001 May;72(5):447-52.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11346011

Characteristics of general aviation crashes involving mature male and female pilots.

Baker SP, Lamb MW, Grabowski JG, Rebok G, Li G.

Source

Department of Health Policy and Management, Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, Center for Injury Research and Policy, Baltimore, MD 21205, USA. sbaker@jhsph.edu

Abstract

BACKGROUND:

General aviation crashes in the United States were analyzed to identify differences between male and female pilots in the circumstances of their crashes and the types of pilot errors involved.

METHODS:

All 144 female pilots who were born between 1933 and 1942 and who were involved in general aviation crashes between 1983 and 1997 were matched 1:2 with 287 male pilots by age within 2 yr, medical certificate and pilot certificate, state or region of crash, and year of crash.

RESULTS:

Mechanical failure, gear up landings, improper IFR approaches, and collisions with wires or poles were more common in crashes of male pilots. Loss of control on landing/takeoff was more common in crashes of female pilots. Mishandling aircraft kinetics was the most common error of pilots of both genders and was noted more often in female pilots' crashes (81% vs. 48%) (p < 0.001). Males' crashes were more likely to involve flawed decisions (29% vs. 19% of females' crashes) (p = 0.027) or inattention (32% vs. 19%) (p = 0.004). Older pilots made fewer errors: among males age 55-63, 26% of crashes were without obvious pilot error compared with only 7% at age 40-49 (p = 0.003).

CONCLUSION:

There are large gender differences in the types of pilot error involved in general aviation crashes. Mishandling aircraft kinetics, poor decision making, and inattention are the most common pilot errors and merit increased attention in pilot training.

PMID: 11346011 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]

[Seeker]

Six of one or a half-dozen of another - the male G/A pilot will kill you by trying to do something stupid and the female pilot will kill you by not being able to handle the cross-wind.

[DEFCON]

Thanks for the interesting breakdown. I wonder if those stats could be directly cross applied to automobile crashes as well? Other studies may follow, but I wonder if anything practical can be done with the information gleaned?

[boestar]

Yeah... Let women be cruise pilots and let the men handle it on the ground.

[Don Hudson]

Here's a view from the Flight Safety Foundation that is partially contrary to my own view in terms of "who will come to aviation?" I think the article is encouraging even though it doesn't discuss the current conditions in which those coming into the industry will find themselves. Nevertheless, the article is timely and well-written.

Don

====================================

From Aerosafety World, the Flight Safety Foundation's primary magazine:

http://flightsafety.org/aerosafety-world-magazine/august-2012/positive-space-for-Gen-Y

Positive Space for Gen Y

Engaging young aviation professionals without stereotyping strengthens multi-generational safety culture.

By Wayne Rosenkrans | From Orlando

Fascination with generational differences among today’s working aviation professionals has moved beyond specialists in recruiting and training to others with direct responsibilities for operational safety. A recent indicator was the number of presentations and discussions during the World Aviation Training Conference and Tradeshow (WATS 2012) in Orlando, Florida, U.S., in April about integrating Generation Y (Gen Y) into the industry. Gen Y — one of several popular terms, such as millennials — refers to people born between 1982 and 2004 by some definitions.

People who train pilots, maintenance technicians and flight attendants for regional and major airlines raised a few concerns relevant to safety, but also pointed to advantageous attributes based on their experiences with this generation (see “Cabin Crew Adaptations”). Several Gen Y college students acknowledged the concerns and encouraged collaborative solutions free of stereotyping. They also shared their personal ambitions and adaptation to industry safety culture. Maintenance technology students said that most Gen Y classmates have had lifelong mechanical interests and hands-on experiences, quickly adapt to the most advanced instructional/reference technology and now expect to earn international certifications.

“As a group, Millennials are unlike any other youth generation in living memory,” Neil Howe and William Strauss, specialists in generational issues in the United States, wrote 12 years ago in one of their series of books.1 “They are more numerous, more affluent, better educated and more ethnically diverse. More important, they are beginning to manifest a wide array of social habits … including a new focus on teamwork, achievement, modesty and good conduct. Only a few years from now, this can-do youth revolution will overwhelm the cynics and pessimists.”

They predicted that Gen Y would be differentiated from older coworkers in the degree to which they are special, that is, raised with the sense that they are collectively “vital to the nation and to their parents’ sense of purpose”; sheltered, that is, partly “the focus of the most sweeping youth safety movement in American history”; confident, with high levels of trust, optimism and a sense of their generation’s power and potential but, individually, relatively fearful of failure and prone to pursue “less risky career goals”; team-oriented with “strong team instincts and tight peer bonds”; achieving in relation to standardized testing with a “mindset of planning ahead for an orderly future”; pressured in terms of expectations “to study hard, avoid personal risks [and] excel”; and conventional, that is “comfortable with their parents’ values” and supportive of social mores.

Shelby Beauregard, ambassador for recruitment and outreach for the College of Aviation at Western Michigan University (WMU), spoke on behalf of about 30 WMU students who consider many Gen Y attributes valid, though not necessarily applicable outside the United States or to specific individuals. Overall, this group is concerned that aviation employers will prejudge them as members of Gen Y without knowing them as individuals, she said.

“When I [attended] last year, I learned that some aviation professionals were afraid to retire because they were afraid of what my generation was going to do,” Beauregard said. “So how do we bridge this generation gap we all feel? … There are many stereotypes that have been placed on Generation Y, and many of these stereotypes are seen as weaknesses. But I think that these weaknesses are often misunderstood and misinterpreted, and that they can actually become strengths for companies.”

The assertion that this generation sees itself as “entitled” is the most common stereotype she has heard, but she said that “achievement-oriented” is a truer descriptor. However, their lifestyle aspirations often are seen by older aviation professionals as out of synch with aviation workplace demands. Citing a few tragic, news-making events that have shaped their ideas about spending time with family since 2001, Beauregard said, “All of the [life] events that have happened to us constantly remind us that life is short, so we enjoy flexibility in our schedules … a work[-life] balance. … Generation Y is ambitious; we are not afraid to take on the big tasks. And we appreciate when our creativity and our input are accepted into the workplace.”

Craig Bentley, a captain and vice president of operations, Cape Air/Nantucket Airlines, also mentioned these professional/lifestyle aspirations. “What has that translated to for those of us in the hiring community at the regional airlines?” he said. “We see new-hire pilots who request vacation time prior to serving the customary one year … at the airline, [the point] where most [airlines] would begin to offer that benefit. We also see numerous requests for time off and restrictions on the days that they can work, which was unheard-of years ago. But they have busy social calendars, their families are important. … We definitely see that at our airline.”

Some of the Gen Y attributes that ring true to the students also are relevant to aviation safety. “We like clear instructions,” Beauregard said. “We work in groups. … I have been taught from a young age that working in a group and working as a team is the way to get things done.”

At the same time, this generation’s penchant for high-stimulation digital environments — such as habitually texting, accessing social networks and listening to music during study, work and leisure activities — and its reputation for leaving employers after one or two years are among topics worth cross-generational dialogue in aviation environments, she suggested.

“We have to remember that we are four generations working in this industry together, and we all have one dream,” Beauregard said. “[Gen Y] wants to learn from you, so talk with us, not to us. … We also we need mentorship, [so] connect with us … and share your passion.”

Gen Y First Officers

John Colquitt, describing his preparations before being hired by American Eagle Airlines, recalled that he had spent an unexpectedly long, and sometimes discouraging, period as a flight instructor. He applied to four air carriers and two cargo operators, and received interview invitations from two. Colquitt said that his interview preparation was a team effort by a study group, and included Internet-based research on current questions that other applicants to airlines had posted after actual interviews.

Members of the study group role-played to practice answering expected interview questions, then “took it a step further” by imagining how interviewers might ask more probing questions and rehearsing how they would buttress answers. They also practiced attitude instrument flying and conducting instrument flight procedures on personal computers equipped with Microsoft Flight Simulator, a control yoke, rudder pedals and a throttle quadrant, he said.

Flight time as a certificated instrument flight instructor and familiarity with analog instrumentation proved to be advantages after being hired in August 2010, recalled Colquitt, who described his training experience on two aircraft types. “[if the simulator] instructor says, ‘Hey, we are going to shoot NDB [nondirectional beacon] approaches’ … [i’m] like ‘OK, I can do this because taught that,’” he said. Sometimes, however, his simulator partner would struggle to recall how to conduct that type of approach “because he was raised on GPSs [global positioning system avionics] and GPS approaches,” he said.

Colquitt fielded a question about how disconcerting economic news affects his outlook about his new airline career. “I bring myself to the airline and to the situation [with] the sense that I am not entitled to anything; this is an incredible opportunity,” he said. “[i think,] ‘You’re going to let me fly this $30 million airplane? Awesome, let’s go — this is fun!’ … That is what drives my positive attitude a lot of the time. … Now, I do see the signs … and I am trying to be smart with my decisions professionally.”

Surprising Failures

Areas of failure by Gen Y and other pilot applicants in regional airlines’ pilot hiring processes also were highlighted. “We have found in our own syllabus that if somebody is not getting through the simulator training program … either they can’t keep up with the pace of the program, or they are far behind on instrument skills and procedures,” said Paul Preidecker, a captain and chief instructor, Air Wisconsin Airlines. “I am not talking about [instrument] scanning, although that is certainly part of it. I am talking about fundamental knowledge of instrument procedures. This, of course, is a surprise to us. … Maybe we are taking an ‘old school approach’ and trying to apply it to the ‘new school,’ but I don’t think so.”

During the technical portion of face-to-face interviews by the airline, “we put a METAR [aviation routine weather report] in front of them and just say, ‘Read this to us,’” he said. “There are people coming to us who cannot do that. In moments of exasperation, when I say, ‘What’s the problem?’ [their] common comment is, ‘Well, I don’t get it in raw format. I pull out my iPhone and read the decoded version.’ [Then I tell them,] ‘That’s great, except we don’t do that in our airplanes. We hand [flight crews] raw data and say, ‘You need to know the weather.’ So that’s a weakness.

“We give them [the type of instrument approach chart] that they are used to using and say, ‘Alright, the glideslope is out of service on this runway. What is the missed approach point on a non-precision approach?’ We hear a variety of disappointing answers. … We make an assumption that a commercial–instrument-rated pilot knows those things. If we discover [such weaknesses] in an interview, the chance that they will get hired is not so good.”

Research by Air Wisconsin into the underlying causes of such applicant failures suggested that some Gen Y pilots may be unfamiliar with piloting fundamentals associated with legacy systems because of their sometimes-exclusive experience with advanced avionics and flight systems.

When asked the question about the missed approach point, one applicant erroneously “said very confidently, ‘It’s at the end of the runway,’” Preidecker recalled. “We said … ‘Suppose you are in the clouds, and you can’t really see? He said, ‘I don’t know, I just look on my [Garmin] G1000.’2 Has there become an over-reliance on automation? Perhaps. … A lot of the people we are hiring right now … only know the new way. Somewhere in between [the old way and only having automation experience] is probably what we are looking for.”

A counter-impression of recently hired Gen Y pilots came from Cape Air’s Bentley. He noted that pilot applicants trained by professional academies or flight programs accredited by the Aviation Accreditation Board International have experienced a washout rate of less than 5 percent in company training. As a result, the airline’s hiring process for these applicants omits simulator checks and written exams, he said.

“The most important thing that we look for … is a safety mindset,” Bentley said. “Where do they get that? Early in their training, hopefully, where they understand what a just culture is and the value of open, non-punitive reporting programs. … Some of the key things we look for are fundamental stick and rudder skills … good communication skills, leadership qualities, the ability to be a lifelong learner [and] to change to the demands in the industry, whether they be regulatory or economic. … So I would put it to … the industry that [given Gen Y technical prowess], we will spend a lot less time training the new aviators on the gadgets that we have in our airplanes, and a lot more time teaching them the fundamentals of flying an airplane.”

Chief pilot offices and airline training departments swap anecdotes about Gen Y pilot behavior that falls outside company expectations, and companies’ corrective responses. “Stories from my colleagues … sort of let me know that what I experience at Cape Air and our group is not unique in the industry,” Bentley said. “There is the story of a first officer at a [major air] carrier who was skateboarding across the ramp on his way to preflight his airplane for the first flight of the day. … There is the story of the [commuter air carrier] captain who was jumpseating home and thought it would be a great idea if she used the [skate shoe wheels] in her sneakers to get down the jetway to ask for [a] ride home. In the past, those indiscretions might have been met with stiff consequences.” He advised mentoring and leadership to “help steer [young aviators] in the right direction so that we have what the public demands.”

Contextual Issues

“Any way you cut it, this is a difficult business … the last 10 years since 9/11 have been extremely difficult,” said Paul Railsback, a captain and director of operations, Airlines for America (formerly the Air Transport Association of America). “Anybody who comes into this industry needs to realize — and needs to be emotionally prepared for the fact — that this is … probably going to remain a tough business for some time, although I think that the consolidation that is taking place is probably going to be good for the industry and good for the employees. … We may end up hiring entry-level [airline] pilots for their first airline to be a major airline, which we have never done before. This would be a major paradigm shift for us if it happens.”

Gen Y’s professional/lifestyle aspirations have been reiterated in two surveys, including one with responses from 206 University of North Dakota (UND) aviation students, primarily concerning the proposed rulemaking to implement a 2010 U.S. law mandating airline transport pilot (ATP) certificates and 1,500 hours of flight time for airline first officers (see, “Counting the Hours”), said Kent Lovelace, chairman, UND Department of Aviation.

“It goes back to those generational priorities that some of these young people have,” Lovelace said. “Time away from family and friends is a big concern, and it is a priority. … We all maybe have those feelings.” He suggested industry consideration of explicitly setting up schedules and other practices to make aviation careers more attractive to Gen Y.

“Another [theme in the UND survey] was the kind of flying they want to do, which is more hands-on flying as opposed to autopilot-FMS [flight management system], which obviously for an airline career isn’t necessarily realistic,” he said.

Other responses reflected firm commitments to stay the course to airline flight decks, however. “So, we still have a lot of determined young people out there that want this career,” Lovelace said, quoting a student who wrote, “I’ve had the dream to fly for an airline forever, since I was three or four years old. I won’t let anything stand in my way.” 

Notes

1.Howe, Neil; Strauss, William. Millennials Rising: The Next Great Generation. Cartoons by Matson, R.J. New York: Vintage Books, 2000.

2.The Garmin G1000 is an all-glass, integrated avionics suite designed for installation by original equipment manufacturers.

© Copyright 2012 Flight Safety Foundation

[Don Hudson]

From Flightglobal's David Learmount

http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/learmount/2012/10/was-af447-enough-to-force-chan.html?cp=NLC-FGTSE20121116&attr=editorial

Was AF447 enough to cause a reaction at airline level?

By David Learmount

on October 10, 2012 3:17 PM

Flightglobal has posted a study of the airline safety issues raised by the investigation into the loss-of-control crash of Air France flight 447 in June 2009. The review examines whether the serious systemic inadequacies the accident revealed will trigger industry action to correct them.

As the review demonstrates, the human factors issues associated with loss-of-control in flight (LOC-I) accidents were well known before AF447, but nothing was done. The question is, does the Air France A330 crash have the shock-value to produce action where previous LOC-I events have only produced industry hand-wringing?

The February 2009 Colgan Air crash at Buffalo, because it happened in America, looked as if it might have the potential to move the regulators. It demonstrated that there are legally licensed pilots flying fare paying passengers without having the knowledge or skills to cope even in unexceptional circumstances.

ICAO, EASA and the FAA all know that radical change to the way in which airline pilots receive their airline type and recurrent training is required and, working with several specialist industry groups, they are slowly trying to define what those changes should be.

But the FAA will not have the mandate to change - especially to add - training requirements because, to produce a new regulation it has to demonstrate a cost-benefit based on the US value of a human life, and in statistical terms LOC-I accidents involving US carriers are too rare to enable them to make a case.

EASA, meanwhile, is drawing up new training requirements, and will eventually publish proposed regulation for comment and consultation.

The consultation phase will be interesting. More training on top of what already exists would be very costly. Different training that replaces some of what exists will almost certainly add to present training costs. And the European carriers will bridle at being presented with potentially higher recurrent training costs than their US competitors, or indeed all non-European competitors.

ICAO is the only hope for creating a global level playing field in pilot training and licensing standards. But of course ICAO has to cajole and persuade, it does not have legislative power. This takes time.

So the two questions about the AF447 safety legacy are: will anything happen? And if it does, how long will it take?

[Don Hudson]

Hi Malcolm;

"I suspect as long as the cost of the fix is perceived to be greater than the risk I suspect nothing will be done unless aircrew as a group make large waves."

A number of comments could be made...I'll stick to two!

First, re "cost vs risk", yes, that's what Learmount's article seems to be saying. The statement that there are too few LOC-I accidents in the US shows first, that LOC isn't a significant flight safety issue but given the number of times professional flight crews have stalled their aircraft with fatal results an argument could be made worldwide. The key point in Learmount's statement is uniformity - the reference to ICAO as setting the standard. For worldwide acceptance and cost rationalisation, it would have be below many standards already voluntarily achieved by North American, Australian and European carriers for example, and above carriers say, in India, Pakistan, most African nations, (Nigeria & South Africa a possible exception) and Russia to cite a few. Not sure how effective that would be. Obtaining agreement would clearly be problematic.

Second, though more philosophical in nature the reality is that the ethical aspect and the cost-vs-risk discourses do not match. We might put it this way: A set number, be it percentage or trend etc, divides the issue into not-acceptable and acceptable losses; - A decision based upon instrumental thinking has been made that beyond a number, loss of life, loss of equipment, loss of prestige and possible loss of the business is acceptable.

This doesn't in any way argue that such "set-point" is not economically defensible. We all know that the "perfectly safe enterprise doesn't get out of bed in the morning", so to speak and that life itself is accompanied by risk every moment and, aware or not, we accept such risks without thought, expecting that those who run complex systems have done their level best to "do no harm." Sometimes that standard is found wanting, and that is where the discussion is important.

In this, the argument just recognizes that such set-point exists between acceptable and not-acceptable losses, even of people. What IS meant by the observation are two things: One, that the question is more than just an instrumental one, it is an ethical one, and two, all reasonable and realistic risk-mitigation processes and strategies must be in place, accepting the limitations of human beings to perform flawlessly 100% of the time.

Thus, the recent actions towards BP for example, especially the criminal actions and manslaughter charges, are entirely appropriate if not quite tepid by comparison to BPs yearly balance sheet. There will be many ethical individuals with high integrity within organizations but I suspect for BPs executive leadership it was the "price of doing business" and BPs offensive CEO "has his life back."

It's complicated.

Don

[Don Hudson]

Well, that's already underway, the programs and the substantial costs taken on, voluntarily, because they're not required/mandated (nor protected) in Canada. I think these issues are tackled daily, in the thousands of tiny processes that, in one way or another, intervene and prevent an incident or an accident. Sometimes stuff gets through all but the last barrier and, far more rarely, sometimes a series of factors breach all barriers and it turns into an accident. The industry has dozens of "incidents" daily, but here, the process works.

[boestar]

I had an interesting conversation with one of our training captains the other day with regards to the Cadet Program and the Training there of. An Analysis of the failure rates in the Sim show what I found to be interesting results. It seems that Experience is not necessarily the prime factor with regards to emergency response in the Flight Deck. The younger pilots from 1500-3000 hours have the lowest failure rates among the pilot group in the Sim. With the higher time pilots having higher failure rates. Based on discussions that have been had on here over the years my expectation was that experience is king but the data seems to point in the opposite direction to something more along the lines of complacency is the enemy.

[Don Hudson]

boestar;

Interesting observations.

I think the recently-introduced "startle" notion that has made it into some final accident reports, notably the BEAs Report on AF447, is related to various mentalities (alertness, preparedness, boredom, ego, etc) that we gather under the concept, "complacency".

I think one can be startled, but it should never...well, given human differences, almost never, lead to loss of, for lack of a better word, "composure" and certainly not loss of control and loss of the aircraft. That's what thorough training is for, and trying to manufacture "surprise" in simulator sessions is just a road too far. Rather, train out surprise with preparedness...an old principle.

Frankly, I think (and experienced it) there's too much emphasis on teaching to, and passing the ride. That assumes the ride is an appropriate testing vehicle and sometimes it isn't even though the box gets ticked.

Don

[boestar]

I agree Don. It just seems that even though "teaching to the ride" is done for all groups, the Group touted as being "more experienced" still gets the higher failure rate for the ride. I have no other explanation for it other than "complacency" and frankly I am not sure the instructor did either.

The amount data we gather from the pilot groups training is immense and leads to some interesting stats indeed. I would love to look at it more closely sometime but I am too tied up with maintenance to get anywhere near it.

[DEFCON]

There are dozens of reasons for failure and believe it or not, I've been told a good many are the result of the ever less 'experienced' newbee screwing up his part of the 'ride' which automatically causes the failure of the more senior. Training is a good thing, but just like the current pilot medical program, the entire 'ride' concept is very out of date & step with the modern time.

[Don Hudson]

DEFCON, I agree.

The notion that a 4hr looksee every six to eight months is as outdated as doing SSFDR and SSCVR checks once per year to satisfy the CARS. In both cases, on any one day, within the candidate's particular history, (a history of doing well almost always indicates a ride will go well but everyone can have an off-day helmet fire), a ride can end in failure no matter who it is. Given the complexity of aircraft and operating conditions and the subtleties of system problems, threats and procedures, (the Emerg Electrical Config or a two-system hydraulic failure or twin failures of the RA in the A320 can take up to 45 minutes to complete), and today's very complex ATC environment a sim examination has its increasing limitations. Further limitations have been discovered through the inability to simulate acceleration forces and the absence of actual data to verify/validate aircraft behaviour in extreme flight conditions as well as crew responses to same. In fact, these two areas could become a simulator's most valuable application when such capabilities are available.

Don

[DEFCON]

Thanks Don.

With respect to 'acceleration forces'; during the AF 447 incident, the Captain had to return to the cockpit from another location in the ac. This was accomplished as the aircraft fell at very high vertical rate with almost zero forward velocity, and with the aircraft body angle being what it was, I remain curious as to the 'forces' the Captain experienced and of the related nature & degree of difficulty associated with regaining access to the cockpit?

[Don Hudson]

DEFCON;

For easy reference, the BEA Final Report on AF447 is here. The three Interim Reports can also be found there. The SSFDR and SSCVR data can be found in the Appendices and may help in answering your question more thoroughly.

The graphic below is made up from various sources. The captain entered the cockpit right at the start of the blue "bracket" at 02:11:42.

The UAS event occurred at 02:10:05UTC. The PF pulled up within 2 seconds of the airspeed loss, with an acceleration of between 1.2g and 1.55g over a 13-second period with slight roll up to 8deg and very little lateral acceleration.

From the Final Report, Appendix 2:

• The aural autopilot disconnection warning (cavalry-charge) was heard at 2 h 10 min 04.6;
  
• A first cabin crew or flight rest facility call (high-low chime) was heard at 2 h 10 min 53.5;
  
• Vibration noises were heard in the cockpit from 2 h 10 min 54 until 2 h 12 min 57;
  
• Five call signals were transmitted to the crew rest facility between 2 h 11 min 09.8 and 2 h 11 min 27;
  
• The Captain returned to the cockpit at 2 h 11 min 42.5.
  

The captain would have had to walk uphill against a 10 - 15deg NU pitch angle. He entered the cockpit when the aircraft was at a 17deg NU pitch, just as the aircraft was also descending through FL350, fully stalled - the pitch reduced to about 13deg NU in the descent, the IVSI was about 10,500fpm down. The stall warning stopped just as the captain entered the cockpit as the indicated airspeed parameter had dropped below 60kts, the minimum at which the SW system was designed to function. As we know, the SW restarted just as the PF reduced the pitch and the airspeed parameter began indicating again.

While in the Crew Rest Facility the captain would have felt the positive acceleration in the pitch-up, (1.55g) but the Nz (vertical) and Nx (lateral) accelerations were not large after the initial pitch up. Nz was <1 during the change in trajector/FPA after the peak of the "ballistic" course as the aircraft lost energy. Shortly after the captain entered the cockpit several rolls to 40deg occurred.

Aside walking uphill a bit, (something like the L1011 always was!), and from gaining entry after the door was unlocked and pushing the door open against the NU attitude, I don't think there would have been too much difficulty in reaching the cockpit...no more so than light-occasional moderate turbulence would present a difficulty.

Don