75 killed, 6 survivors after plane carrying Brazilian soccer team crashes

[Say Again, Over!]

21 hours ago, Don Hudson said:

I recall, a long time ago now, a number of times being vectored "below the MSA" but at a "safe radar vectoring altitude" which made no sense as the controller was the only one in possession of that information

Don,

Interesting point you make.  It's a fairly common thing in mountainous areas to have vectoring altitudes that are way below the 100nm MSA or even the approach quadrantal MSA .  In CYQB, for example, the lowest MSA is 4500 for the RNAV06 while we can vector as low as 2200 to the south west of the airport.

While we will often go down to that altitude, it will almost always be for vectors to final.  We teach our students that if given the approach using one of the base leg fixes, the pilot would probably, climb to the MSA or at least the next segment altitude, or at the very least ask.  I did it once for icing reasons with a light single and I was specific in the approach clearance that the altitude he was at, although below MSA, satisfied obstacle clearance requirements.

You are right that, at this point, we are the only ones aware of this information.  If ever anything didn't work or didn't feel right from your end, I would expect you to discontinue the approach.

[Don Hudson]

Thanks for your response, S.A.O. I believe that MVA charts aren't part of the navigation charts, (CAP, Jeppesen, etc.), although I have seen them on occasion. Skybrary has a reference on the subject at http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Minimum_Vectoring_Altitude_(MVA)

Their inclusion in the charts remains an ongoing discussion among pilots, the regulator and the chart companies. My personal view as an "ex-" now, is that one just defaults to the safest altitude, which is on all the charts already - saves one looking up yet another chart to determine the vectoring altitudes.

The historical accident on the subject was TWA 514, a B727 CFIT into Mt. Weather in December, 1974:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TWA_Flight_514

If one is unsure, (as the crew of TWA 514 was), or for comm failure, one climbs to the MSA if not on a published route, (which TWA was not on), but in the case of a comm failure, some time would elapse before such loss is determined and a decision to climb is executed.

In the present aviation world with robust map displays in the cockpit and EGPWS equipment, the risk is lower. However, situational awareness is never passé even with all the toys.The following is from my Australian friend, (old, experienced instructor/pilot type), on S.A.:

Quote

A simple but effective test of a pilot's situational awareness can be conducted during type rating training or proficiency training involving various manoeuvres within (say) 25 miles from the departure airport. At an appropriate time, simply freeze the simulator and pointing to the instrument approach chart clipped on the pilot's control column, request the current position of the aircraft with reference only to the RMI needles and DME and not to the MAP mode. It gives considerable food for thought to see the number of pilots who are unable to instantly pin-point their position correctly without the availibility of the MAP mode. Once the aircraft position is ascertained (correct or otherwise) ask the pilot to compare present altitude with MSA for that quadrant and ask if it is safe. It is my experience 30% of pilots tested got confused with sorting out which radial or bearing the aircraft was on.

[Kip Powick]

There are a few countries in the world that when I was tasked to fly into them, we used the Jepps but also I had the route marked out on a Topo chart....In DND we always had access to Topo Charts...

I have done the approach into Cali  a few times and the Topo charts were always on the clip board...under the Jepps..

[blues deville]

Page 5 of this report states no approach briefing for Cali was completed. Lazy or complacent?

https://flightsafety.org/fsd/fsd_may-june98.pdf

 

[Kip Powick]

Remember Avianca Flt 52 in 1990 ??

 

http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/05/nyregion/avianca-flight-52-the-delays-that-ended-in-disaster.html?pagewanted=all

[Don Hudson]

blues, I recall reading today somewhere that it was the "PF's first time into Cali" but can't remember what site/what page I read it at.

If I were to interpret the report (and the fsd paper) for lessons it would be non-adherence to SOPs. I'm hesitant to use terms like complacent and lazy because we can all be put into that category at one time or another - it's too broad and so can't offer "the lesson".

What happened here that was different from hundreds of thousands of other descents & approaches that never made headlines? How close were some of those to headlines but just resulted in nightmares and bar-stories?

I remember the early days on the B767 when the FMC list a bunch of navaids that weren't in alphabetical order or in order of distance from the aircraft. And that was the case here - selecting the top "R" took them left. At that point I think most pilots would stop the descent, having built a mental picture of the area that was to the east of Cali. We all can probably remember at least something similar...I recall being in a B727 at 3000ft heading east from LAX for the Sierras in the proverbial dark-and-dirty, a very long way from the airport, on vectors, (no published routing) and querying the controller as to when we were going to turn; etc., etc. We got the turn, and we'll never know.

But what we surmise should have happened and perhaps would have with any one of us that night, does not explain what happened and so perhaps doesn't offer the lesson. What does it mean to say, "Don't be lazy", or "Don't be complacent?"

The report is descriptive regarding crew errors but we cannot know why they occurred.

Why did the UPS A310-600 descend well below the 3-deg descent path and strike trees and crash short of the runway at Birmingham? The report says they were too rushed and late to program the VNAV approach for the NPA - but what about the PAPI? What picture had the crew built and what led to the mistake thinking they were closer and had to get down? Fatigue is partly cited in the report, but distance and rate-of-descent is something fundamental to us all who've done this work for a long time. And they both had map displays.

[moeman]

https://airwaysmag.com/industry/pilots-can-be-heroes-but-also-murderers/

[Johnboy]

Interesting Op-Ed piece from @Enrique77W on LMI2933.  Perhaps a bit simplified for this audience but well worth the read.....

https://airwaysmag.com/industry/pilots-can-be-heroes-but-also-murderers/

 

Edit...apologies I did not read moeman's previous posting....

[Don Hudson]

An analysis of the LaMia Medellin fuel-starvation accident by a "Peter Lemme" is fascinating. The engineering work is superb. It can be found here.

I see the officer, Celia Castelo if I recall, who received the flight plan from LaMia and who disagreed strongly with the LaMia dispatcher regarding the planned fuel, (alleged flight plan posted here earlier), has been arrested and indicted. I wonder if this is just a witch-hunt for the culpable or if there is more to the story.

 

[Don Hudson]

Preliminary Report:

http://www.aerocivil.gov.co/autoridad-de-la-aviacion-civil/investigacion/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/autoridad-de-la-aviacion-civil/investigacion/2016/English - Preliminary Report CP2933 V01 - STATES REVISION.pdf&action=default

[DEFCON]

It'll be interesting to see if the Bolivian authorities publish the results of the audit they're almost certain to conduct on the 'new', now defunct carrier's operations.