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Johnboy last won the day on November 9 2015

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  1. And it's Deja Vu all over again....again....
  2. It's Deja Vu all over a gain. Only thing missing is Nigel Wright....official ONEX presser....
  3. From what I have seen on social media from Sully, Boeing will not be hiring him any time soon. The majority of the flying public probably have no idea what aircraft type they are flying in, let alone what model of the 737 their butts are in. What will be interesting to see for AC and WJ specifically is how passengers will react tactically when a/c swaps are performed on a daily/hourly basis. You board your flight, take a seat and suddenly realize you are on a MAX. Are you standing up and getting off the airplane (with or without your bag). Some properly placed PR will help but I have a feeling the $99 fare will fade peoples memories quickly.
  4. Judging from the reactions of everyone on the ground the flight path looked erratic except for the two guys in the "pointy end".
  5. Interesting analysis from former NTSB investigator Greg Feith from his FB page...... "The Report is published and provides a lot of detail about the flight including the fact that the crew experienced errant AOA and airspeed issues immediately after takeoff. This corroborates the scenario in my previous post, but more importantly supports the fact that the AOA fault initially experienced by the crew did not activate the MCAS because the flaps and slats were deployed. The report identifies a very good timeline of events, especially the flap retraction cycle, the operation of the stab trim and actions/inactions of the crew. In addition, the pilot engaged the autopilot which again would inhibit the MCAS. At least the story is becoming clearer and contradicts some of the “conclusions” presented in the Ethiopian report. Here are their conclusions: 2 INITIAL FINDINGS On the basis of the initial information gathered during the course of the investigation, the following facts have been determined: * The Aircraft possessed a valid certificate of airworthiness; *. The crew obtained the license and qualifications to conduct the flight; *. The takeoff roll appeared normal, including normal values of left and right angle-of-attack (AOA). *. Shortly after liftoff, the value of the left angle of attack sensor deviated from the right one and reached 74.5 degrees while the right angle of attack sensor value was 15.3 degrees; then after; the stick shaker activated and remained active until near the end of the flight. [GAF: MCAS INHIBITED] * After autopilot engagement, [GAF: MCAS INHIBITED] there were small amplitude roll oscillations accompanied by lateral acceleration, rudder oscillations and slight heading changes; these oscillations also continued after the autopilot disengaged. * After the autopilot disengaged, the DFDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose down (AND)trim command four times without pilot’s input. As a result, three motions of the stabilizer trim were recorded. The FDR data also indicated that the crew utilized the electric manual trim to counter the automatic AND input. [GAF: ELECTRIC MANUAL INPUT WOULD ONLY INTERRUPT THE MCAS TRIM COMMAND FOR 5 SECONDS] * The crew performed runaway stabilizer checklist and put the stab trim cutout switch to cutout position and confirmed that the manual trim operation was not working. [GAF: PROCEDURES DO NOT INSTRUCT REACTIVATING THE STAB TRIM] There are many questions yet to be answered but the primary question is what caused the fault with the AOA immediately after liftoff. This is key because it caused other issues during various phases of the climb including improperly activating the MCAS. Also the report does not address information about unreliable airspeed procedures which should be considered because they had erratic airspeed; and there is no information about the Autothrottle status - the FDR data appears to show the engines remained at a high power setting. More to come."
  6. Here is a link to the preliminary report on ET302
  7. A colleague and myself actually mused the other day of the idea of moving Sunwing passengers from a brand new, sophisticated, state of the art Boeing 737MAX to a bunch of clapped out B767 operators out of Miami all in the abundance of safety. In my humble opinion....
  8. Air Canada standing down with B737MAX until July 1,2019.......Yikes. Sounds like any return to flying would probably be after the planned software upgrade. IMHO.
  9. I guess a definitive statement of the F/O "flying" experience from Ethiopian Airlines.
  10. Quote from Greg Feith's FB page last evening. Sorry cannot post link....Greg is a former Senior Air Safety Investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board Also the with regards to the 200 HR F/O aboard ET302 surely the total time "on type" and not total time.
  11. A question for Don Hudson et al with regards to something that I keep coming back to on ET302. HAAB is 7331 FT ASL and new SAT based data was made available yesterday. According to Aviation Herald they quote the Canadian TSB yesterday as saying.... This tells me the flight profile barely made it to a few thousand ft (1,700 ft) above terrain (9000 ft MSL) before impact. My understanding is that MCAS would only become active with FLPS UP. Is it possible that the aircraft would have been in that configuration so soon after departure? Could the airport elevation factor into the way MCAS behaved if it did at all (Below 10,000FT)?
  12. YQG currently being used as temporary storage facility for Sunwing and some AC B737MAX. Currently 6 on the ground.
  13. For what it's worth. Granular ADS-B data from FlightRadar24....
  14. Air Transat TS942 diversion to Newark reported fire. Newark presently closed UFN.
  15. Johnboy


    Partial explanation here........