Interesting analysis from former NTSB investigator Greg Feith from his FB page......
"The Report is published and provides a lot of detail about the flight including the fact that the crew experienced errant AOA and airspeed issues immediately after takeoff. This corroborates the scenario in my previous post, but more importantly supports the fact that the AOA fault initially experienced by the crew did not activate the MCAS because the flaps and slats were deployed.
The report identifies a very good timeline of events, especially the flap retraction cycle, the operation of the stab trim and actions/inactions of the crew. In addition, the pilot engaged the autopilot which again would inhibit the MCAS.
At least the story is becoming clearer and contradicts some of the “conclusions” presented in the Ethiopian report. Here are their conclusions:
2 INITIAL FINDINGS
On the basis of the initial information gathered during the course of the investigation, the following facts have been determined:
* The Aircraft possessed a valid certificate of airworthiness;
*. The crew obtained the license and qualifications to conduct the flight;
*. The takeoff roll appeared normal, including normal values of left and right angle-of-attack
*. Shortly after liftoff, the value of the left angle of attack sensor deviated from the right one and reached 74.5 degrees while the right angle of attack sensor value was 15.3 degrees; then after; the stick shaker activated and remained active until near the end of the flight. [GAF: MCAS INHIBITED]
* After autopilot engagement, [GAF: MCAS INHIBITED] there were small amplitude roll oscillations accompanied by lateral acceleration, rudder oscillations and slight heading changes; these oscillations also
continued after the autopilot disengaged.
* After the autopilot disengaged, the DFDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose down (AND)trim command four times without pilot’s input. As a result, three motions of the stabilizer trim were recorded. The FDR data also indicated that the crew utilized the electric manual trim to counter the automatic AND input. [GAF: ELECTRIC MANUAL INPUT WOULD ONLY INTERRUPT THE MCAS TRIM COMMAND FOR 5 SECONDS]
* The crew performed runaway stabilizer checklist and put the stab trim cutout switch to cutout position and confirmed that the manual trim operation was not working. [GAF: PROCEDURES DO NOT INSTRUCT REACTIVATING THE STAB TRIM]
There are many questions yet to be answered but the primary question is what caused the fault with the AOA immediately after liftoff. This is key because it caused other issues during various phases of the climb including improperly activating the MCAS.
Also the report does not address information about unreliable airspeed procedures which should be considered because they had erratic airspeed; and there is no information about the Autothrottle status - the FDR data appears to show the engines remained at a high power setting.
More to come."