Passed to me..one explanation ?

[Kip Powick]

Not sure how true this version is....... but it is a bit entertaining...and a bit biased.

The spanking brand new Airbus 340-600 sat in its hangar in Toulouse,France without a single hour of airtime. Enter the Arab maintenance crew of Abu Dhabi Aircraft

Technologies(ADAT) on November 15, 2007 to conduct pre-delivery tests on the

ground, such as engine run-ups, prior to delivery to Etihad Airways in Abu Dhabi..

The ADAT crew taxied the A340-600 to the run-up area. Then they took all four engines to takeoff power with a virtually empty aircraft.

Not having read the run-up manuals, they had no clue just how light an empty A340-600 really is.

The takeoff warning horn was blaring away in the cockpit because they had all 4 engines at full power.

The aircraft computers thought they were trying to takeoff but it had not been configured properly (flaps/slats, etc.)

Then one of the ADAT crew decided to pull the circuit breaker on the Ground Proximity Sensor to silence the alarm.

This fools the aircraft into thinking it is in the air. The computers automatically released all the brakes and set the aircraft rocketing forward. The ADAT crew had no idea that this is a safety feature so that pilots can't land with the brakes on.

Not one member of the seven-man Arab crew was smart enough to throttle back the engines from their max power setting, so the $200 million brand-new aircraft crashed into a blast barrier, totaling it.

The extent of injuries to the crew is unknown, for there has been a news blackout in the major media in France and elsewhere.

Coverage of the story was deemed insulting to Moslem Arabs

[dagger]

Not sure how true this version is....... but it is a bit entertaining...and a bit biased.

The spanking brand new Airbus 340-600 sat in its hangar in Toulouse,France without a single hour of airtime. Enter the Arab maintenance crew of Abu Dhabi Aircraft

Technologies(ADAT) on November 15, 2007 to conduct pre-delivery tests on the

ground, such as engine run-ups, prior to delivery to Etihad Airways in Abu Dhabi..

The ADAT crew taxied the A340-600 to the run-up area. Then they took all four engines to takeoff power with a virtually empty aircraft.

Not having read the run-up manuals, they had no clue just how light an empty A340-600 really is.

The takeoff warning horn was blaring away in the cockpit because they had all 4 engines at full power.

The aircraft computers thought they were trying to takeoff but it had not been configured properly (flaps/slats, etc.)

Then one of the ADAT crew decided to pull the circuit breaker on the Ground Proximity Sensor to silence the alarm.

This fools the aircraft into thinking it is in the air. The computers automatically released all the brakes and set the aircraft rocketing forward. The ADAT crew had no idea that this is a safety feature so that pilots can't land with the brakes on.

Not one member of the seven-man Arab crew was smart enough to throttle back the engines from their max power setting, so the $200 million brand-new aircraft crashed into a blast barrier, totaling it.

The extent of injuries to the crew is unknown, for there has been a news blackout in the major media in France and elsewhere.

Coverage of the story was deemed insulting to Moslem Arabs

Actually, there was lots of news coverage in France. Nothing gets past the a.nutters, so it had fairly widespread exposure.

But I agree that some news outlets gave it a pass...

More pictures

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/1928708/posts

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/1928708/posts

[Don Hudson]

Kip;

Then one of the ADAT crew decided to pull the circuit breaker on the Ground Proximity Sensor to silence the alarm.

Seems to me I recall this being done before...an A310 or something?....

Not sure the story is corrrect though, (the one about the Etihad 340-600, I mean), ...I'm pretty sure that the A340 doesn't have a "ground sensor circuit breaker". Air/Ground sensing is done through the #1 or #2 LGCIU and is quite complex in sensing oleo extension, cargo and passenger door position and a few other items. You can't just "shut off" the LGCIUs, at least not without going down into the EE Compartment below the cockpit, and that would be so contrary to SOPs, (it is prohibited territory for flight crews) as to be as stupid as the rest of the accident. Clearly nobody was down there because they'd have been "first to go" when the airplane hit the wall, (there's no way they'd be able to climb up out of the belly into the cockpit in the 13 seconds the airplane was racing (30kts I understand) to the wall).

The DC9 had that one ground-prox cb as probably does the MD80. In fact, it is looking more and more like the Spanair accident was related to this and may bear a relationship too, to the Northwest MD80 accident at Detroit - slats/flaps not extended, take-off warning horn disabled through pulled cb's.

[Guest woxof]

I wonder if it is SOP for engine runs at this company or mentioned in the Airbus procedure to do runs on the A-340 with symmetrical engines only? The French BEA has a press Release on the incident on their website, so I am expecting a final report.

It seems to me that when possible and if allowable, engine runs should be done in a location where there are no obstacles in front of the aircraft for a significant distance. Unfortunately, this is not always possible.

Some people seem quite comfortable doing a high power run with buildings, etc in front of them. Chocks are not necessarily a guarantee of no movement. On a runway threshold or long taxiway is preferable if not always realistic. It is quite easy for all crew to end up being heads down watching engine guages with no one in the flight deck monitoring outside to confirm no aircraft movement especially at night.

Pulling CB's at the same time can increase the risk. Sometimes they control more than we realize. I believe that these were some of the issues related to the A-310 incident in Vancouver which if I remember correctly was militay owned with maintenance being done by Canadian Airlines. Any further details would be appreciated.

As for the Northwest MD-80, there was no confirmation in the investigation on why the warning system did not work. Intentionally pulled CB is one of several possibilities. Perhaps in anticipation perhaps of a single engine taxi? Or maybe popped yet not noticed during a walkaround. I have seen a system not work with a CB in, yet recycling the CB corrected the malfunction.

Personally, I recommend a final check of all critical items appropriate to your aircraft prior to takeoff. Flaps, trims, and speed brakes are all potential killers.

[Don Hudson]

woxof;

You're absolutely right - the known killer items:

Slats & Flaps

Trim

Spoilers

Runway (clear, right one)

It seems through discussion here and on other aviation forums that many crews have adopted this informal check as they turn on the lights and strobes, take the runway and all checks are done. Not sure it should be an SOP because of other issues...heads-down taxiing onto an active runway, etc, but there are at least four major accidents to perfectly serviceable airplanes that such a check could have prevented.

Here's the link to the report on one of them currently in discussion appropos the Spanair MD82 accident at Madrid.

Northwest Airlines MD82 Accident at Detroit

[Kip Powick]

Don....re your killer list

You forgot ..........when the "other" guy says "Hey, watch this !"

[J.O.]

Don....re your killer list

You forgot ..........when the "other" guy says "Hey, watch this !"

Followed in a close second by, "I wonder what this does?"

[Don Hudson]

...and of course, 'what's it doing now?'.... Lotta that went on in 1992-93...

"Watch this" = Ferry flight. We've all seen it.

"Watch this" was the two Pinnacle guys ferrying an RJ trying for 430 or something, wasn't it? The theory was core-lock I think?

[Mitch Cronin]

I believe that these were some of the issues related to the A-310 incident in Vancouver which if I remember correctly was militay owned with maintenance being done by Canadian Airlines. Any further details would be appreciated.

I can offer only a few... I knew the guy in the left seat pretty well. He and I were hired in Toronto by Wardair on the same day. He was one of the best mechanics I've ever seen - with his hands... His mind, however... He had a bit of a problem with ummm (as politely as I can) ..over-confidence... one might have thought that could get him in trouble one day...

He pulled circuit breakers to put the aircraft in air mode because the tests being done were such that viewing the cruise page (which FTWDK, would display a greater variety of information than was available on single system pages one could view on the ground) on ECAM, was best, or more efficient, or perhaps more expedient, I can't remember which.... The bird has to think it's in the air to give you the cruise page... and it doesn't like the brakes set in the air...

I'll betcha that man is an even better mechanic now, if he stuck with it. Last time I saw him was shortly before C3 went down and he'd just gotten into management there.

That's all I... think... I know. I also think there's someone here who knows some more detail... (probably more accurate too, I make things up sometimes )

[Mitch Cronin]

...and of course, 'what's it doing now?'.... Lotta that went on in 1992-93...

"Watch this" = Ferry flight. We've all seen it.

"Watch this" was the two Pinnacle guys ferrying an RJ trying for 430 or something, wasn't it? The theory was core-lock I think?

Some of the funniest things you'll ever see in R/C model flying come right after those words too.

[Don Hudson]

Mitch!!! , shhhhhhh, you'll have Airbus getting more strange ideas from those guys who stay at home but still have a joystick. First thing you know, IATA will be touting the new licence modelled after the Multi-Crew-Pilot-Licence, called the "RC.NNCPL"* verrry, special licence, and keep costs down for beans and what-not by keeping those expensive, demanding, difficult-to-get-along-with resources out of the cockpit altogether .

*RC.NNCPL - Radio Controlled. No Need for a Commercial Pilot Licence

[boestar]

Mitch:

He is still in the game but driving a desk.

[Say Altitude]

...and of course, 'what's it doing now?'....    Lotta that went on in 1992-93...

"Watch this" = Ferry flight. We've all seen it.

"Watch this" was the two Pinnacle guys ferrying an RJ trying for 430 or something, wasn't it? The theory was core-lock I think?

Climbing to 430 in VS mode (without watching airspeed), high altitude stall, flamed both engines, core locked one, didn't do the relight procedure from the checklist correctly - and above all else, the F/O and the Capt had switched seats = two dead kids.

[Guest woxof]

AVIATION OCCURRENCE REPORT

COLLISION WITH BUILDING

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A310 AIRBUS CC15005

VANCOUVER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, BRITISH COLUMBIA

26 OCTOBER 1995

REPORT NUMBER A95P0246

Summary

The military A310 Airbus had been ferried from the Trenton,

Ontario, military base to the Canadian Airlines International

Limited (CAI) maintenance facility at the Vancouver International

Airport to undergo scheduled maintenance. After the maintenance,

which included the removal and re-installation of both engines and

both engine pylons, the aircraft was towed to the run-up area

outside the CAI hangar for engine run-ups. While performing the

pre-start checks, the technician-in-charge noted that the number

two engine fuel flow gauge was reading high. Suspecting a gauge

problem, after the engines were started and run up to about 40

percent power, he requested an observer to pull the landing gear

proximity and relay control systems flight/ground circuit breakers

(CBs). He believed that this action would allow him to retrieve

the "Cruise" page on the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring

(ECAM) system so that he might record the correct fuel flow value

from the computer screen. The observer stood up, pulled the two

CBs and then sat down. Three seconds after the CBs were pulled the

aircraft began to move forward and it rolled over the chocks. Both

technicians occupying the pilots' seats immediately attempted to

apply more brake pressure, but to no avail. The technician-incharge

first selected idle engine thrust and then reverse engine

thrust, and attempted to steer the aircraft onto a taxiway to avoid

the buildings ahead; however, the engines remained in forward

thrust and the aircraft did not respond to the nosewheel steering

inputs. The aircraft continued to roll straight ahead for about

720 feet until the left wing collided into a service building

adjacent to the CAI maintenance hangar. The technician-in-charge

shut down the engines and all occupants exited the aircraft through

the cockpit floor escape hatch. The aircraft was substantially

damaged; there were no injuries.

Other Factual Information

Two A310 aircraft qualified CAI technicians (techs), who were

based at CAI Trenton military aircraft maintenance detachment,

were tasked to occupy the pilot stations to perform the engine

run-up. Two other CAI techs, based at CAI's Vancouver

maintenance facility, were tasked to occupy seats in the cockpit

to observe and assist as required. However, unknown to the runup

crew, a number of other maintenance personnel were performing

maintenance tasks in the passenger cabin. These technicians

deplaned when they made their presence known, prior to engine

start.

When the aircraft was moved out from the hangar, it snagged on a

servicing hose which had been unintentionally left in the

aircraft's path, and the push-back was delayed. After the

aircraft was freed, it was towed to the run-up area on the CAI

maintenance ramp. The tech-in-charge of the run-up initiated the

appropriate pre-start checks; however, he did not, as required by

the check list, deplane and perform an aircraft "walk-around" nor

did he, also as required by the check list, ensure that a fire

extinguisher was positioned near the aircraft. He later

explained that he believed the aircraft's fire extinguishing

system to be more capable in dealing with an engine fire than a

portable extinguisher. CAI maintenance supervisors' views are

inconsistent as to the utility of an external fire extinguisher.

During the pre run-up check, and in response to the action item,

"main wheels - chocked (large chocks)", the ground person

responded that there were no chocks present. The check list was

delayed until chocks were delivered to the aircraft and placed in

front of the main wheels. During this delay, the tech-in-charge

and the run-up crew commented on the unavailability of "huge"

run-up chocks, and the tendency of the A310 to slide during runups,

even with run-up chocks in place. Although not required by

the run-up check list, all cockpit occupants were wearing seat

belts, on the direction of the tech-in-charge.

The Canadian military purchased only one set of large run-up

chocks for the A310 aircraft fleet and this set was normally kept

in Trenton. These chocks are 60 inches long, 24 inches wide, and

16 inches high. In contrast, the chocks used for the run-up were

about 15.5 inches long, 6 inches wide, and 6 inches high, and

were triangular in cross section. CAI also uses these smaller

chocks for their Boeing 747 and DC-10 aircraft.

By design, pulling the landing gear proximity and relay control

systems flight/ground CBs will inhibit both the A310 aircraft's

nose wheel steering and the engine thrust reverser systems.

Further, this action causes the brake selector control unit

(BSCU) to send an electronic signal to the anti-skid system to

release all eight wheel brakes. Pulling these CBs, however, will

not retrieve the "Cruise" page on the ECAM. The aircraft's

Automatic Communication and Reporting System (ACARS) would

normally be used to retrieve engine performance information;

however, on this occasion the system did not function. The

cockpit voice recorder did not reveal any discussion between the

two techs regarding the effects of pulling the CBs. The tech-incharge

reported that he had pulled CBs during other maintenance

procedures to "fool the aircraft", and that he had seen other

techs pull the CBs. Although the Aircraft Maintenance Manual

(AMM) does contain procedures that require these CBs to be pulled

during some maintenance procedures, none of these procedures are

performed with the engines running. The run-up check list does

not require the flight/ground CBs to be pulled.

In 1991, the flight/ground CBs were pulled by mistake during a

similar run-up on a CAI A310, and resulted in the aircraft

travelling about 100 feet before the CBs were reset.

Additionally, in 1992, the aircraft manufacturer, Airbus

Industrie, issued an amendment to an A310 aircraft trouble

shooting manual (TSM) after it was discovered that an A310

aircraft, equipped with Pratt and Whitney engines, had

experienced brake failure during a run-up with the flight/ground

CBs pulled. Because Canadian military A310 aircraft are equipped

with General Electric engines, this information was not widely

disseminated to maintenance staff by the CAI maintenance

organization.

The training syllabus, training records, and testimony revealed

that "break-away" procedures training, which would have provided

the tech with knowledge on how to stop the aircraft, was not

included in the A310 engine run-up course. The syllabus for the

taxi training course included break-away procedures; however,

neither tech performing the run-up had this training. Braking

action would have been restored by completing any of the

following actions:

a. resetting the CBs;

b. selecting the Brake/Anti-skid selector switch to the

"ALT/OFF" position; or

c. applying the parking brakes.

While present regulations allow commercial airlines to train

appropriate maintenance personnel to taxi aircraft, Department of

Defence (DND) regulations allow only pilots to taxi their

aircraft.

The Manager of Operational Safety, who reports to the Director of

Operational Safety, heads the CAI flight and ground (ramp) safety

management system. This safety program has a management

structure, a reporting program and a data collection/storage

system. It is well resourced, and able to respond to safety

issues. However, no one in the maintenance organization reports

to the Director of Safety and, as a result, it cannot be said

that a proactive safety management system, similar to that found

in flight and ramp operations, exists in the maintenance

organization.

Analysis

The aircraft had been towed from the hangar to the run-up area

outside the hangar, the walk-around check should have been

completed at that time to ensure, as the check list requires,

that the area was suitable, clear of debris and equipment, and

that the aircraft was properly configured for the run-up after

being towed. Had the tech-in-charge completed this exterior

inspection, it is likely that he would have noted that the chocks

in front of the wheels were not only the incorrect chocks for the

run-up, but were too small to be effective in the event of brake

failure. The omission of the exterior inspection, in conjunction

with the decision not to position the required fire extinguisher,

indicate a disregard for the direction provided by the pre run-up

check list.

Other examples of safety deficiencies within the maintenance

organization included the placement of the hose that snagged on

the aircraft during the push-back out of the hangar; the cockpit

crew not being aware of other maintenance personnel being on

board; and, the unavailability of the proper run-up chocks.

Furthermore, the CAI maintenance organization did not record or

disseminate to employees any information about the two previous

break-away occurrences during A310 engine run-ups.

Several CAI maintenance personnel knew of the A310 aircraft

sliding during run-ups; however, the A310 engine run-up training

provided by CAI did not include any instructions on break-away

recovery. Had the tech-in-charge been provided this training, it

is likely that he would have been able to stop the aircraft

before it ran into the building.

Individual techs are unlikely to possess sufficient knowledge of

all aircraft systems to understand the implications of

improvising maintenance procedures, such as pulling CBs. This

occurrence demonstrates the risk of extemporaneous troubleshooting

procedures.

Findings

1. The aircraft was serviceable for the purpose of conducting

an engine run-up.

2. The technicians occupying the left and right pilot seats

were qualified and certified to perform the engine run-up.

3. The run-up check list required that the main wheels be

blocked with large chocks.

4. The only set of A310 run-up chocks was at Trenton and not

available.

5. The flight/ground CBs were pulled without discussion as to

the effects of that action.

6. All eight wheel-brakes, the nose steering, and both engine

thrust reversers were disabled when the flight/ground CBs

were pulled.

7. The small chocks did not prevent the aircraft from rolling

ahead when the aircraft's brakes were disabled.

8. "Break-away" procedures were not taught by CAI as part of

the engine run-up course.

9. Neither the engine run-up check list nor run-up procedures

required the flight/ground CBs to be pulled.

10. The CAI maintenance organization did not record or

disseminate to employees any information about two previous

break-away occurrences during A310 aircraft run-ups.

11. The maintenance organization's safety program did not

identify safety deficiencies within the organization.

Causes and Contributing Factors

The technician-in-charge of the run-up deviated from the run-up

check list by requiring CBs to be pulled without knowing the

effects of that action.

Contributing to the occurrence was that the technician was not

trained in break-away procedures. Also contributing was that the

maintenance organization's safety program did not identify safety

deficiencies within the organization.

Safety Action

As a result of the occurrence involving the military A310

aircraft, Airbus Industrie will revise the A310 aircraft

maintenance manual to include a warning that pulling the

flight/ground CBs will interrupt the normal operation of the

brake pedals.

Canadian Airlines International will provide break-away training

to all CAI employees involved in engine run-ups of A310 aircraft.