The Fifth Estate Tonight

[J.O.]

Watching tonight's story on The Fifth Estate just makes me want to go to Ottawa and pop someone in the nose. Some things are more important than budget cuts, and SAR is one of them. I wonder how much money would be found if some cabinet minister lost a loved one?

[Kip Powick]

What was the story about? I only see listings for the fifth estate on the 29th, didn't know it played on Fridays.

Did it talk about this

^{or was it perhaps about future cuts?}

Originally aired March 23rd....LOST ON THE ICE

Full video here..

http://www.cbc.ca/fifth/2011-2012/lostontheice/

[CD]

Actually, the episode that aired last night was originally shown on September 30th, 2011, and highlighted the abysmal response times associated with SAR on the east coast:

Mayday

Originally broadcast on September 30, 2011

After a decade of disasters at sea, the fifth estate investigates Canada's troubled Search and Rescue fleet and hears from the survivors who lived to tell, and the insiders who tried to save what was once a organization admired around the world.

[Kip Powick]

Ah..OK..sorry..wrong link..but both good "stories".....

[Mitch Cronin]

Wow. What a sickening story. Rear Admiral Dick Prickless sits there with three Cormorants saying he couldn't spare one because that would leave him short IF a call came for a water rescue? Good grief, how does he sleep at night?

That **bleep** ought to have his uniform stripped off him and be booted onto the unemployment line.

[Kip Powick]

Well I watched both videos and will agree that mistakes were made.

I was in charge of the HFX RCC for 4 years and we also had problems but I will say that it would take hours and tons of bandwidth to explain what actually happens during an actual rescue attempt.

Two things do stick out in both videos................the video entitle MAYDAY goes to prove that many boaters, especially fishing vessels and their crew , are ill prepared for the unthinkable and the video entitled LOST ON ICE also shows that many people, unfortunately a young fellow, go out , again, ill prepared for the unexpected.

The bottom line is ..................there would be no loss of life if we put a chopper over every fishing vessel and every person who, went tempting mother nature, failed to have the training or take heed of the present situation....

But as I wrote, and told, my superiors, that will never happen due to financial constraints." We do the best we can with what we have"....It seems nothing has changed.

[J.O.]

I understand the complexities Kip and nothing can be taken away from the SAR crews, who are true heroes, IMHO. I guess I'm just a little choked at the fact that your chance of a speedy rescue can be affected by the time of day or which day of the week that it happens. It didn't seem to affect our defence minister when he needed rescuing from his fishing trip on a Sunday.

[CD]

That is what I took away from that episode as well: make certain that you require assistance only on a weekday between 0800 and 1600, as long as that weekday isn't a statutory holiday. As was suggested, I'm sure that it is all about managing the available financial resources... This is likely one of the reasons that the Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry examined response times and made some specific recommendations as well:

First Response

1. In my letter of February 8, 2010, to C-NLOPB, I recommended a dedicated first-response helicopter, fully equipped, with an improved wheels-up time of 15-20 minutes. That recommendation was accepted and is being acted upon.

2. It is recommended that the Regulator begin work and consultations to establish performance-based goals for first response and that, when goals have been established, operators’ stakeholders, including workers. The final statement of goals and how they are to be achieved should be made public.

3. It is recommended that the Regulator require the helicopter operator(s) to develop, in consultation with the oil operators and worker representatives, a protocol to cover the following situation: when a passenger transport helicopter is in flight, and there is an indication of a malfunction of the helicopter which does not constitute an immediate emergency but which the pilot considers to be potentially serious, the first-response helicopter should be dispatched to meet the transport helicopter and accompany it to its chosen destination. The purpose of the accompanying helicopter is to be present and available to assist, should an emergency be declared. The final decision to deploy

the first-response helicopter should be made by (a) the helicopter operator’s dispatcher on duty, (b the chief pilot or a designate, and c) the pilot of the first-response helicopter.

Explanatory Note for Recommendation 4:

The Department of National Defence (SAR services) and the helicopter transport operator have understandings as to what should happen in the case of a declared emergency, but have not entered into a formal protocol.

4. It is recommended that, with the agreement of DND, a formal protocol be entered into between DND and the helicopter operator(s) so that each will know what the other’s aviation resources are, know how response efforts will be deployed and in what circumstances, and clarify their respective roles. The Regulator, the oil operators, the helicopter operator(s), and worker representatives should be informed of the protocol.

[Kip Powick]

That is what I took away from that episode as well: make certain that you require assistance only on a weekday between 0800 and 1600, as long as that weekday isn't a statutory holiday. As was suggested, I'm sure that it is all about managing the available financial resources... :

Yes, if there were no financial concerns, we would have crews sleeping in their aircraft. SAR resources and SAR response times mean nothing to the public.....unless.............. it happens to someone you know. The only reason that we had SAREC St John's was to appease John Crosby and garner Federal votes.Statistically it was a black hole that consumed mega-millions every year.

What is needed, especially with the fishermen, is a better water safety education and a deeper respect for the sea vs the feeling of "if anything happens SAR will look after us." I own a 42 foot boat and when it gets rough, all onboard don on life jackets.

In MAYDAY, the boat was only 23 feet longer than mine, was in seas I would not venture out in and only one guy got his survival suit on...after the boat floundered, some had no life jackets on.......why? Did you notice at the end of the video the surviving brother had his little child playing with the wheel...and the child had a life jacket on??

What was not said in both videos is that the 2 hour response time, (weekends/after normal hours /etc), is most often met in a much shorter time. The guys and gals that are the dedicated SAR pilots/RS know they are needed when they get the call and are often airborne within an hour.

The 5th estate is known for sensationalizing their stories and if you really listen to the reporters they dwell on the grief more than the facts..LOST ON ICE.."What do you think he was thinking about when he sat down after walking 19 hours, just before he died out on the ice?.." A stupid, senseless question garnering sympathy from the audience. There is no answer, pure speculation to "grip" the audience.

According to science the ending of a life due to exposure is supposedly pretty calm...just like going to sleep.

In LOST ON ICE, there was the controversy about the "call back" procedure and the fellow they talked to said he had never heard about it......someone dropped the ball there, either the guy being interviewed, (CYA), or whomever briefed him about missing person cases. In a "missing person" search there is/was a "Call Back" procedure in effect, (at least when I was there), and the reason was pretty simple.

If someone called in and needed assistance and there were no resources available due weather or another major search or aircraft serviceablity, it was the responsibility of the requesting party to Call Back frequentlyto see if any resources were now free. Believe me, the Search Masters and the personnel in RCC can only juggle so many plates at once and if engaged in an all out major SAR effort, no one is probably going to remember that some one called for a missing person search. RCC seldom get tasked for missing persons, it is normally all aircraft or ships at sea SAR.

The Rear Admiral really shot himself in the foot with his answer on keeping resources in the back pocket just incase....I wonder who briefed him cause he would be in the MARCOM HQ in HFX and like most "boat" people did not know that much about SAR and was kept in the loop by his , Chief of Staff, Air OPs, normally an Air Force Colonel.

(mine was a good guy..even though he was a Navigator !!)

Rant over...back to the bunker ..hard - hat in place.!

[conehead]

If someone called in and needed assistance and there were no resources available due weather or another major search or aircraft serviceablity, it was the responsibility of the requesting party to Call Back frequentlyto see if any resources were now free.

The "requesting party" being a family member looking for a lost soul? Are they made aware of this need to call back? I'm sure they would be made aware...

Not criticizing Kip, just trying to understand the procedure...

[Kip Powick]

The individual organizing the search on site "should" know enough to Call Back and in most cases it is the local police.

In most cases I am sure that the NOK would not know of the requirement

In this case it was an individual who was the RCC's 'source' for any ops in that specific area....why did he not know??? That answer is open to speculation.

[CD]

What is needed, especially with the fishermen, is a better water safety education and a deeper respect for the sea vs the feeling of "if anything happens SAR will look after us." I own a 42 foot boat and when it gets rough, all onboard don on life jackets.

There is no doubt that these simple acts would go a long way to mitigating some of the risks associated with living and working at sea. Reading through the safety board report on the capsizing (M05N0072) really does highlight the hazards that this captain and crew faced - many of which had no mitigation at all.

My personal exposure to SAR had been through volunteering with a local CASARA unit from about 1991 to 1996 (base radio operator/spotter/navigator). During my involvement, we received quite a few taskings for what turned out to be false ELT activations, meaning that the unit in Trenton did not have to make the trip and remained available for actual taskings. As I recall, we also participated in three air SAR-actuals, one of which occured during an excercise so we had an aircraft over the scene very quickly. This is to say that I was aware of the resources available for an air/land search that is remote from a dedicated SAR unit. I was unaware of the resources available for maritime SAR.

As to the subject of maritime SAR, the TSB report does identify some areas of concern:

Search and Rescue

At the time of the occurrence, there was only one SAR coordinator on duty. Additional support was requested once it was apparent that this was a real emergency. In the absence of accurate information available from the Canadian Beacon Registry, valuable time was lost in ensuring that the emergency was real.

One potential aid for SAR coordinators is the VMS. In this occurrence, the SAR coordinator did not check the positional data for the Melina & Keith II until just before obtaining a composite satellite position. Although SAR coordinators had previously used the VMS to identify fishing vessels in the vicinity of a distressed vessel, and by another coordinator to verify the location of a distressed vessel, the system had never been used by this duty SAR coordinator as a primary means to identify a distressed vessel's location.

The quality of information required by the Canadian Beacon Registry, in conjunction with the VMS not being used to advantage at an early stage, resulted in the loss of valuable time to validate the distress.

Search and Rescue Response

Although the vessel capsized a half hour before the end of regular Department of National Defence (DND) working hours, for which DND has a 30-minute response standard, tasking of SAR air resources occurred after working hours. As such, the primary SAR air resources at Canadian Forces Base Gander were operating on the quiet hour standard of a two-hour (maximum) response time. The response helicopter (R908) departed for the scene 80 minutes after being tasked and it is not possible to determine the impact of this on the eventual outcome.

In 1992, the Auditor General of Canada, after conducting a review of the national SAR program, noted that neither the CCG nor DND had established service standards covering all time elements of SAR response. The Auditor General also noted that, although service standards need to be developed, response times may have to be longer for less-populated areas in which there are few incidents and where resources may be located some distance away.

The Auditor General's 1994 follow-up on action taken in response to the 1992 observations and recommendations noted that the CCG and DND have "neither established nor used time-based search and rescue service standards to plan for resources and indicate to the public the expected response standards for search and rescue resources. They continue to believe that time-based service standards would not be beneficial or practical because they do not provide a true indication of the effectiveness of the search and rescue program."

In 1999, the NSS conducted a review of SAR response services,noting that, although the DND prescribes 30-minute and two-hour response capabilities for working hours and quiet hours respectively, the CCG nonetheless maintains a maximum 30-minute response standard 24/7 for primary SAR vessels. The report also noted that resource availability determines DND's SAR standby position and that the 30-minute standard during working hours does not always coincide with the days or time of peak SAR activity.

This issue was reviewed again after 1999 as part of the Strategic Transition Initiative Project, which was completed by the NSS in 2002. In December 2004, the Interdepartmental Committee on Search and Rescue approved the objectives and principles to be used in the development of specific levels of service for each federal department in the SAR program with the understanding that each SAR partner would further refine the level of service relative to their operations.

A TSB review of reported marine occurrences involving SAR air response between 1995 and 2005 indicates that at least 60 per cent of occurrences took place during working hours.

The NSS report concluded that "a lack of strategic management within the SAR program has resulted in each department developing standby postures in isolation, without consultation with other SAR departments. As a result, there is no common rationale driving standby postures."

The report recommended that ''the standby postures of primary SAR resources should be determined primarily through an analysis of demand for services."

No further review of SAR readiness and standby position has been conducted by the NSS since 1999. Although local DND SAR commanders have the discretion to realign SAR standby periods to coincide with periods of greatest SAR activity, DND policy limits the 30-minute standby position to 40 hours per week, indicating that resource availability continues to be the primary factor in determining SAR response standards.