AC A330 Fuel Leak Pics (YVR)

[Guest neo]

To the crew of this flight: thanks for bringing our passengers, flight attendants, aircraft and yourselves home safely.

Have a wonderful Christmas with your families, and a Happy New Year.

Best wishes,

neo

[Guest dhc6boy]

I would tend to disagree with a decision to shut down an engine in this circumstance for the following reasons:

1. No clear internal indication of a dire emergency - external "eyewitness" reports tend to be sketchy. Once the decision was made to make an immediate return, there was obviously not enough time to do a visual check from inside the cabin.

2. Good VFR allowed a quick circuit and return, removing some of the urgency from a possible wing fire.

3. Quote - 'If they had shut it down and landed safely...there is not one individual that could say.."Hey..you screwed up."' Can you imagine if they had shut the engine down and subsequently lost the second engine to a multiple bird strike? For a fuel leak? Most individuals would have said, "Hey..you screwed up!" Eliminating half of your available thrust without a very compelling reason is a very big deal - depite the non-chalance that may have developed in us from years of successful simulator sessions.

Of course this is all only one pilot's opinion and ultimately I don't think that there is a definitive right or wrong answer to this debate.

Merry Christmas everyone!

[HHI]

Hello Kip,

Many of us appreciate your input today as much as we did in your "pre-dot" days, and I'm one of them. Keep it up.

I wasn't in the cockpit of the 330, but from what I understand of the situation, my gut feeling is still that I would have needed more positive confirmation of what and where the problem was prior to shutting down an engine at this point in the flight, especially if getting more information could have delayed with an immediate landing.

This of course, with perfect hindsight and having the benefit of discussing it with experienced pilots who have differing opinions.

There are often many solutions to the problem, some better than others, and some far worse than others.

The crew of this flight got the airplane on the ground, the passengers unharmed, and the airplane in no worse condition that they received it.

Excellent work on their part.

I've learned from what they've encountered. Just hope I never ever have to use that knowledge. :>)

Cheers,

Henry

[Don Hudson]

Kip;

Re if you flew the 320...Tx...I was wondering specifically about the A320 generation of aircraft because the autoflight/FMCS/flight director systems and the ECAM system is substantially different than previous Airbus products.

The reason I ask this is, training for ECAM discipline is very different than training for engine failures/shutdowns via memorized drills or QRH (for others..Quick Reference Handbook).

One is taught very early in such training that cockpit ECAM discipline is to be strictly adhered to and that "making it up" or guessing is to be reduced to a minimum (ideally, altogether eliminated...but read further please). In the simulator, training emphasizes assessing any engine failure via the engine instruments. A simple failure (flame-out, engine damage, loss of oil pressure) on the Trent is difficult to assess solely via the engine instruments. For most significant failures where a landing may be required, one relies completely on the ECAM (for others, Electronically-Centralized Aircraft Monitoring - a CRT with instruments and, in an abnormality, procedures to follow on it) to accomplish crew response. No other published basis for action is provided, indicated, or expected of the crew, nor is it encouraged.

Now I know this flies in the face of all we may have learnt since time began. And as airline crews, we are required to do everything in our power to safeguard passengers, aircraft and property.

But for a number of interesting as well as good reasons (perhaps disputable), one doesn't begin "making it up" on the Airbus. One stays with procedures.

I know you know this, but for the benefit of others reading the thread, at the same time, when trouble really hits, no professional airline pilot "quits" flying his/her aircraft. (Witness the heroic efforts of the Alaska 261 MD88 crew west of Los Angeles to save their aircraft). Until there is clearly no alternatives and even past that, an airline crew flies their aircraft.

But in a relatively benign engine "issue", not annunciated by the ECAM (and this was definitely one of those incidents, according to Airbus), and not immediately apparent via any warning systems in the cockpit and not apparent through any immediate fuel imbalance, (which the crew would not initially be expecting or looking for), any "alternate" (non-ECAM, non-QRH, non-FOM) crew actions would have to have a strong basis before execution. That's what cockpit discipline is all about, (and I do not mean to sound as if I preach here...but the 320/330/340 etc class of airliner is different.) Unless its indicated, one doesn't launch on a path not clearly indicated in such aircraft, and no such path of action was indicated.

You have observed, quite correctly, that it is a good thing this did not occur at night. I wholeheartedly agree. The first significant indication of trouble would have been a fuel imbalance, likely around Princeton or earlier. That is one of those, "what-if's" and we can paint scenarios forever. The exercise however, is without point, except to observe that the fuel imbalance procedure would have been actioned, (and swiftly I might add, as we regularly train the scenario).

On "just shutting an engine down", I wholeheartedly agree with Henry's view. This incident had significant Human Factors aspects, with causes now known to be technical in nature. Kegworth held important lessons for airline crews and I believe the situation faced by this crew bore great resemblance to Kegworth but without the distraction of high vibrations. This crew (the AC 330 crew) remained undistracted and flew the airplane first, and, absent any/all information about the aircraft's condition short of "smoke from the 'right' engine", quickly got it back on the ground.

All Airbus pilots (who took the time to look it up) now know (from examining the FOM Fuel chapter), that setting the Engine Master to OFF would have shut both low (wing valve) and high (engine valve) valves off, stopping the fuel loss, and the potential for fire. But it is quite clear in training, in expected cockpit discipline and in the QRH, Kip, that such a procedure is not indicated until a fuel imbalance occurs. Its right back to cockpit discipline and Airbus procedures.

I would submit that a two man crew, likely with contact clearance fuel to Calgary would have precious little time to assess the problem, (as per CRM techniques), and then decide upon a course of action. Almost certainly, the engine would have continued to run, although probably at reduced available power, (the fuel delivery system would have likely attempted to compensate for the flow rate via the leak, but I don't know that). In the light of the information available to them at the time, including daylight, the decision to turn around and land was a good one in the face of an unknown problem with the aircraft.

Your view however, opens a crucial aspect of this philosophy which, in my view, is increasingly being ignored in favour of "engineer-designed" cockpit procedures. Airmanship and a thorough knowledge of one's aircraft used to be de rigueur. No longer. Its too complex. One does not know of the secondary or tertiary etc consequences of self-initiated primary actions.

The Airbus ECAM is a beautifully designed emergency/abnormality tool which very rarely falls short of safeguarding the aircraft in the best possible way. But in the end, a human crew, with intuition, experience, history and a very strong will to survive a potentially crippling incident and with discipline to do so, bring a quality to the emergency response which engineers or designers can never do. With reference to my comment regarding never quitting in the face of unknown and rapidly degrading circumstances, that is the aspect with which I might depart a slavish following of the Airbus ECAM procedures. In the end, that is my right and duty as a Captain.

But in my experience on the Airbus...almost twelve years on 319/320/330/340 now, I would assess it as superbly designed and any shortcomings do not appear to have led to untoward results.

I hope this opens the dialogue a bit.

Don

[Don Hudson]

Mitch...rather than repeat a lot, please see my response to Kip below.

Cheers,

Don

[Kip Powick]

Thanks Henry...I guess some just feel that when an opinion is put forth that one is advocating that everyone else is wrong and that the stated opinion should be considered as gospel.

An opinion is just like an a.....everyone has one..... but then you knew that didn't you :>

All the best Henry and I hope it all works out for the "troops".

[Kip Powick]

Hi Don,

First, thank you for your informative post. Secondly I would like to clarify my position with regard to the incident in question. I have no quarrel with what the crew did, nor should anyone, as the final outcome was what we all hoped for. My comments concerning what I would have done stand, and are based upon my experience and thought process and hopefully I can explain that further on.

I went on the A310 in ’88 and at that time it was the most technologically advanced aircraft in the world and it was my introduction to the ECAM, FMCS.Flight Director and voodoo magic. It was said, in jest, that if we pulled 27 CBs it would lower the 310 to the 767 !!! As well my last aircraft prior to going commercial was the C130E/H and in those days not one C130 had “glass”. Needless to say my stay in Toulouse was a shock to the system

You can imagine the blow to my mental system when I was confronted with the VACBI training methodology as well as the new way of actioning a fault via the ECAM, after having been trained for over 2 ½ decades in the Military Mod of training. For those that have not had Military flight training, suffice to say, back when I was in, “if you could build the aircraft, you would be permitted to fly it”.

I agree that in today’s electronic aircraft there is little room for improvising when it comes to emergency procedures and, true, one is supposed to follow the ECAM, not go out on their own in an attempt to devise a solution to a problem…but herein lies the problem.

I think that the fact we are now trained to follow the “rules” without question may leave us open to error when confronted with a situation that one has never encountered. Certainly the ECAM procedures will work for every “normal” emergency that the designers have anticipated but what about those that arise because of circumstances not anticipated….what do we do then??? (It’s not in the book therefore it can’t happen?)

So what do we do??? In the vast majority of cases it will depend upon the pilot’s experience and I think the more experienced pilot will certainly react differently than a less experienced pilot. ( Less experienced can apply to a Captain as well as a F/O, especially when either or both are new to any particular aircraft type) Let me give you an example and we’ll use the T-Rex.

Ask a less experienced pilot what he would do if after liftoff on RW 23R in YYZ, he has an engine fire. The normal response would be the emergency procedure as taught in the SIM, and a S/E return to RW 23R. OK…but what if the fire does not go out, even after the second bottle is blown??? The less experienced pilot would probably state that he would get the aircraft on the ground ASAP BUT would he have thought about the fact that even with the first indication of a fire that the most expedient way of getting back to the airport would have been a RH 270 degree loop around for a landing on RW 15??? I use this example not to advocate moving away from established procedures but to demonstrate the thought process that may evolve from individuals, who seem to see a bigger picture, based on their experience.

In the case above the measuring stick is the success of the procedure. If the pilot is successful in getting back to RW 23R he is deemed as doing well. If he does not make it back and ends up as a fireball turning base, there will be those that say he should have gone for RW15. Now if he lands on RW15 and there was no real requirement to do so…can he be faulted for abbreviating the full procedure??

My point is this….. there are times when the rule book may have to be thrown out and experience has to take precedence with regard to the reaction to the situation.

Now back to the 330 incident and as you have stated we can do the “what if” scenarios forever….. but I want to throw out one. Let us say that a fuel line did come undone and the line did catch fire and a “probable” fire was reported from another source, yet there was no indications in the cockpit. Now what does the crew do ??? I know the above is a bit wishy-washy but it is merely a discussion point and food for thought.

All Airbus pilots (who took the time to look it up) now know (from examining the FOM Fuel chapter), that setting the Engine Master to OFF would have shut both low (wing valve) and high (engine valve) valves off, stopping the fuel loss, and the potential for fire

I find this statement a bit frightening in that you have indicated that perhaps many Airbus pilots are not aware of what happens when the Engine Master switch is put to OFF. For me, (Military training kicks in , I guess), it is critical to know what happens when extremely important switches are moved in the cockpit, especially those that are critical to maintaining power to the motors. Perhaps I have taken your comment out of context but standing alone it seems to indicate that there are some pilots out there that are not well versed in the mechanics of the fuel system in an Airbus. Let us hope that it is not so.

Your view however, opens a crucial aspect of this philosophy which, in my view, is increasingly being ignored in favour of "engineer-designed" cockpit procedures. Airmanship and a thorough knowledge of one's aircraft used to be de rigueur. No longer. Its too complex. One does not know of the secondary or tertiary etc consequences of self-initiated primary actions.

Here, I agree with you, except for one of your short statements. I do not believe that the basic functions of any aircraft are “too complex” to understand. An aircraft fuel system is one of the proprietary systems that should be understood by the pilots flying the machine. While it is true that with the advent of multi function computer systems, the movement of electrons, neutrons, and homotrons are extremely difficult to fathom, there are still basic systems that every pilot should have a firm grasp of, fuel and hydraulics to mention just a couple.

I was extremely fortunate to have flown the A310, and marvel at the new age electronics but more importantly a few of us were blessed in that we had a middle-aged French Airbus Instructor Pilot accompany us on trips for close to 3 weeks when we returned to WD. This gentleman had his own handwritten “Coles notes” and made a point of discussing systems while we droned across the puddle. He taught many of us that the more one knew about the airframe we were flying the more comfortable we became.

Airplanes are becoming easier to fly, less stress on the job, easier cross checks, more info on the PFDs and at times the job may actually seem boring…..but are we becoming too complacent, do we think that the manufactures have done it all, do we become slaves to automation or do we sit down and discuss “what-ifs” and initiate discussions that will enlighten and cause others to say…”yu’know, I never thought of that”

“In the field of aviation the thirst for knowledge shall never be quenched”

Have a Safe Holiday season

Kip

[Guest Stone]

Times change. Have a nice retirement.

[Mitch Cronin]

test

[Mitch Cronin]

test

[deicer]

Make sure the "Dog" stays fed.....

Cheers Kip and Don

Iceman

[Mitch Cronin]

Hi Don, thanks for your input.

I want to point out that at no time did I intend to be second guessing anything that crew did. Like others, I congratulate them on keeping their machine and it's contents safe.

I did want to know why the fuel was still pouring, and thanks to you and others, I now understand. ...though I don't understand why the stove was still lit, but for that I'll have to wait 'til I get to work tonight so I can sort that one out.

As regards Kip's comments: In a different, hypothetical scenario, with time to visually verify that there was indeed lots of fuel streaming from the cowls of a running engine, I believe it would then have been prudent to shut off the fuel. I feel certain that Airbus engineers, ECAM designers and programmers alike would agree with that. As wonderfully thorough and advanced in systems and designs as these machines are, they don't/can't know everything and that's one of the reasons we still need you guys up there... even without a dog to feed. There are no sensors outside of the cowls to tell ECAM you've got the makings of a brilliant torch. And once an engine is shut down, ECAM will continue to tell you what to do now to look after those secondary and tertiary etc. concerns.

Unfortunately, I think that may be one potential side effect to this incident and the AT one... That both of these things continued to motor on without any other difficulties may lull someone into a false mindset that the greatest consequence to such cases is a loss of fuel. In reality of course, there is a distinct possibility that the loss of fuel could be somewhat of distant, secondary concern, should the fuel happen to do exactly what it's there for, and burn. That it didn't do so in either of these cases which had huge amounts of raw fuel pouring over a running engine is, I think, quite remarkable. I'm sure there are cases where that kind of luck has been absent.

Again, and as always, thanks for sharing your wisdom and your views.

Cheers, and Merry Christmas! ( <--- that's a bit more rum than I'd normally use, and this time of year I'd add a bit of egg-nog, but at least the colour is right.

Mitch

[Guest manwest]

Ah Wardair, that why I like ya. many a good pilot was at Wardair.

[Don Hudson]

Kip;

And thank you for yours...an engaging conversation and a good one for pilots.

I know you're not second-guessing...I am of the view always, that informed discussion on what-if's by professionals who have BTDT is one of the

ways we learn.

On the 310, oh, ok...I wasn't aware that the 310 had ECAM and electronic checklists/emergency/abnormal procedures to follow...good stuff.

Re If you could build it, you can fly it...that's just about the way it was when I first flew the DC8 in 1973. Changed a lot since then of

course. Also, when transitioning to the DC9 we were required to draw from memory, the entire area charts of New York (Kennedy) and Chicago.

Frequencies, airways, tracks, runways etc. Not a bad idea...

Re, "there are times when the rule book may have to be thrown out and experience has to take precedence with regard to the reaction to the

situation."

You and I agree on "improvising" vs. following ECAM checklists etc. Its what pilots do. We can call it using our wits, experience etc, and we do

it all the time. Knowing when and how soon and to what extent to do it is where the experience comes in. (Take that!, and

that!, those who think airplanes will - or should - fly themselves someday!).

On my phrase, "those who took the time..." etc, no, not out of context at all...I just didn't provide sufficient context!, and thank you for

picking up that interpretation...I hadn't seen that way of looking at the sentence, and of course what you say is true about systems knowledge.

The groundschool and the recurrent/annual training sessions emphasize system knowledge as do sim sessions and checkrides. My meaning was to

emphasize that regardless of the thoroughness of systems knowledge, one cannot know all the downstream effects of actions taken outside the ECAM

drills or QRH procedures and may create situations more hazardous than the one which is being solved. The fault-tree analysis done by Airbus

reflects in the airplane a very thorough process and I suspect even the heavy fuel leak-from-the-engine one, (catered to in the QRH). However,

secondary failures (fire resulting from the fuel leak) aren't catered to but would be handled under a different response. In the case of engine

fire, which almost certainly would have been picked up by the A or B fire loops within the cowling, the engine fire drill would have been

accomplished, shutting off the fuel as the first step. Now, we can reasonably ask, why not shut the fuel off immediately and stop the potential

for fire? Well, "Kegworth factors" come in again. How would the crew (on the 330) know for certain (and when would they know it?...send

the F/O back?...rely on secondary reports? to shut down an engine with no clear abnormal indications?...hmmm), whether the "smoke" was fuel or a

fire?

In the end, Airbus caters to both, although the latter failure (fuel line) takes time because an imbalance triggers the QRH action.

Now, further...we may ask, is there something wrong with this response, (waiting for the imbalance while draining fuel and creating a fire

hazard)? Perhaps. Some would say bloody likely. The manufacturer may argue however, that the expectation of high fuel flow from the engine due

to detached or worn-through plumbing isn't a reasonable scenario to be catered to. The Airbus fuel tank design already caters to wing-tank

damage from a disintegrating engine where shrapnel may breach the wing, (like the Concorde) by "splitting" (through valving and barriers) the

larger inner tank. This won't stop fuel from pouring out any hole in the wing caused by shrapnel, but it will stop complete loss of fuel.

Re, . . . "but are we becoming too complacent, do we think that the manufactures have done it all, do we become slaves to automation or do we

sit down and discuss “what-ifs” and initiate discussions that will enlighten and cause others to say…”yu’know, I never thought of that” "

Many have been arguing for years that hand-flying heavily automated aircraft is important to retain hands-feet-thinking skills. In a similar

way, reliance upon good design can breed a comfort which may be inappropriate under some circumstances. I don't think too many pilots share the

view that the manufacturer's have done it all and the discussions of what-if's go on as ever, (witness this one!). At the same time however, it

has to be appreciated that the relationship of crew-to-aircraft, manufacturer-to-crew and designer-to-aircraft/and crew has changed dramatically

with the introduction of computers and that the manufacturer, the designer of procedures and the airline crew are in (necessarily) much closer partnership.

Great discussion.

A very Merry Christmas to you and your family, Kip.

kind regards,

Don

[Don Hudson]

Chico;

Re your comment to Mitch, "You are a true pro Mitch! In this age when ducking responsibility is running rampant your comments are refreshing and I salute you."

Second that.

Great discussion.

[Don Hudson]

Kip;

And thank you for yours...an engaging conversation and a good one for pilots.

I know you're not second-guessing...I am of the view always, that informed discussion on what-if's by professionals who have BTDT is one of the ways we learn.

On the 310, oh, ok...I wasn't aware that the 310 had ECAM and electronic checklists/emergency/abnormal procedures to follow...good stuff.

Re If you could build it, you can fly it...that's just about the way it was when I first flew the DC8 in 1973. Changed a lot since then of course. Also, when transitioning to the DC9 we were required to draw from memory, the entire area charts of New York (Kennedy) and Chicago. Frequencies, airways, tracks, runways etc. Not a bad idea...

Re, "there are times when the rule book may have to be thrown out and experience has to take precedence with regard to the reaction to the situation."

You and I agree on "improvising" vs. following ECAM checklists etc. Its what pilots do. We can call it using our wits, experience etc, and we do it all the time. Knowing when and how soon and to what extent to do it is where the experience comes in. (Take that!, and that!, those who think airplanes will - or should - fly themselves someday!).

On my phrase, "those who took the time..." etc, no, not out of context at all...I just didn't provide sufficient context!, and thank you for picking up that interpretation...I hadn't seen that way of looking at the sentence, and of course what you say is true about systems knowledge. The groundschool and the recurrent/annual training sessions emphasize system knowledge as do sim sessions and checkrides. My meaning was to emphasize that regardless of the thoroughness of systems knowledge, one cannot know all the downstream effects of actions taken outside the ECAM drills or QRH procedures and may create situations more hazardous than the one which is being solved. The fault-tree analysis done by Airbus reflects in the airplane a very thorough process and I suspect even the heavy fuel leak-from-the-engine one, (catered to in the QRH). However, secondary failures (fire resulting from the fuel leak) aren't catered to but would be handled under a different response. In the case of engine fire, which almost certainly would have been picked up by the A or B fire loops within the cowling, the engine fire drill would have been accomplished, shutting off the fuel as the first step. Now, we can reasonably ask, why not shut the fuel off immediately and stop the potential for fire? Well, "Kegworth factors" come in again. How would the crew (on the 330) know for certain (and when would they know it?...send the F/O back?...rely on secondary reports? to shut down an engine with no clear abnormal indications?...hmmm), whether the "smoke" was fuel or a fire?

In the end, Airbus caters to both, although the latter failure (fuel line) takes time because an imbalance triggers the QRH action.

Now, further...we may ask, is there something wrong with this response, (waiting for the imbalance while draining fuel and creating a fire hazard)? Perhaps. Some would say bloody likely. The manufacturer may argue however, that the expectation of high fuel flow from the engine due to detached or worn-through plumbing isn't a reasonable scenario to be catered to. The Airbus fuel tank design already caters to wing-tank damage from a disintegrating engine where shrapnel may breach the wing, (like the Concorde) by "splitting" (through valving and barriers) the larger inner tank. This won't stop fuel from pouring out any hole in the wing caused by shrapnel, but it will stop complete loss of fuel.

Re, . . . "but are we becoming too complacent, do we think that the manufactures have done it all, do we become slaves to automation or do we sit down and discuss “what-ifs” and initiate discussions that will enlighten and cause others to say…”yu’know, I never thought of that” "

Many have been arguing for years that hand-flying heavily automated aircraft is important to retain hands-feet-thinking skills. In a similar way, reliance upon good design can breed a comfort which may be inappropriate under some circumstances. I don't think too many pilots share the view that the manufacturer's have done it all and the discussions of what-if's go on as ever, (witness this one!). At the same time however, it has to be appreciated that the relationship of crew-to-aircraft, manufacturer-to-crew and designer-to-aircraft/and crew has changed dramatically with the introduction of computers and that the manufacturer, the designer of procedures and the airline crew are in (necessarily) much closer partnership.

Great discussion.

A very Merry Christmas to you and yours, Kip.

Kind regards,

Don

[Don Hudson]

Mitch;

Re ". . . though I don't understand why the stove was still lit, but for that I'll have to wait 'til I get to work tonight so I can sort that one out."

No, I don't either..whether it was at idle thrust, or somewhere in between...dunno. I don't know what the compensating aspects of the high-press fuel pump would be and what the FADEC signals would be in such a situation. (its one reason why I have expressed the view I have to Kip...we may know even more than the "basics", but no FCOM discusses the workings and the input/outputs of FADEC for example...nor, in my opinion, should it).

Re ". . . In a different, hypothetical scenario, with time to visually verify that there was indeed lots of fuel streaming from the cowls of a running engine, I believe it would then have been prudent to shut off the fuel. I feel certain that Airbus engineers, ECAM designers and programmers alike would agree with that."

I agree with that as well.

Re, "That it didn't do so in either of these cases which had huge amounts of raw fuel pouring over a running engine is, I think, quite remarkable."

Agree as well, but with albeit academic qualifications. The flash-point of JetA is quite high...obviously higher than even the outside of the hot-section and the exhaust gasses. Know that I don't take comfort in that knowledge...

Purchased 3 litres of egg-nog and some Appleton's Extra...the finest sipping rum known to man. I love Christmas...

Very finest to you and yours Mitch.

Don

[Kip Powick]

Yeh, it was a great company and I worked with a great group of people. I still say that if Max had stuck to Charter work he would be the premier Charter company in Canada, if not the world.......but hey, If some one offers to put 75 Mil in your pocket????what'ya gonna do :>

Have a Happy and Safe Holiday Season.

[Guest Boeing Pilot]

"just because you see an imbalance does not mean the "engine" is where the leak is."

You're absolutely correct, but there is a pretty good chance that is where the leak is coming from. Once again I am not judging the AC crew, I wasn't there. I am thinking more of the AT scenario over the middle of the ocean with a fuel leak.

Leading Edge,

"The exact scenario that you referencing to re: shutting down the engine on the low tank is exactly what got Air Transat into trouble on a 330."

Correct me if I'm wrong but I don't think they followed the procedure I am referring to. If they had left the aircraft in the tank to engine configuration, figured out why they lost so much fuel. They would have determined one engine was burning (or leaking) a large amount of fuel. They could have shutdown the engine and the fuel leak would have stopped.

Confirming an engine fuel leak by a LARGE imbalance is a procedure many types use. ie. 67,57,from what I recall the older ones like the 27 and 37 use the same procedure.