Guest Rob Assaf Posted August 31, 2003 Share Posted August 31, 2003 The telemetry on my a/c is 30 minutes voice and 25 hours FDR. If nothing happens the data stays with the a/c and loops around and is erased. If there is an incident and it is not noticed by ATC the data will be erased in 30 minutes in the case of voice and 25 hours in the case of FDR. The only reason they normally pull the FDR or CVR is the case of an accident. The best accident prevention system is a system whereby pilots can indentify faults in their procedures or faults in human procedures that COULD BE CORRECTED if they are indentified. Bring in a system where you are f##ked if you report it or you MIGHT be f##ked it they find out will lead to people leaving preventable errors in the system to bite the next guy or many people as the case may be if there is a chance that they can hide it and save their career. This is a draconian thought process only, I HOPE, but if it represents the "New Way" of management at the flight ops level it will lead to a huge step backwards in uncovering and PREVENTING accidents BEFORE they happen. At Jazz, we will often joke about seeing a sim instructor on line for a day. Clever quips like, "has there been a notam issued?" etc. I have never seen two sim instructors out on the same a/c at the same time at Jazz, they are usually out with experienced line pilots. When you are in a sim enviroment there are never agents screaming about getting out as soon as possible due to connections, slot times, etc. IT IS a different envirovment in the sim and while our sim instructors are top notch they admit that they can learn a lot from us line guys which they can pass on, but only if the system allows FEAR free passage of information. Perhaps AC has to look at the procedure of allowing two training pilots out together? This is certainly not the fault of the two pilots who were either sent out or chose to go out under current company policy. Again, NOT a firing offence. Losing Two excellent and experienced sim instructors who would now have much to pass on not only to their student but their colleagues is a huge loss for the pilots of AC and pilots in general. Sure, I may read about it in the aviation safety letter but how many more incidents am I going to be able to read about if the Fear Factor is thrown in? I've never flown an airbus, I've ridden jump several times thanks to the generosity of AC mainline pilots (been refused once too but that is outweighed by the many OK's) and that frigging plane talks about everything else, why not V1 and Rotate? The a/c knows where it is, what the temp is, what rwy is in use, what the weight is, why not have it compute a V1, Vr, and V2 speed and if the pilot punches anything in that is in conflict, it could give that annoying "BEEP" that my windowsXP does when I try to get it to execute something non standard. If Airbus can't get it together to make the Box pilot friendly maybe they could subcontract Bill Gates? At least they would download a patch for it sometime reasonably soon. My home computer relays faults automatically to Richmond which get "fixed" and sent out again to my computer automatically. No profession in the world is subject to more scrutiny than aviation, Doctors or lawyers don't do operations or try cases with a "black box" or boxs plural watching their every move, they don't get medicaled twice a year, sim'd and ppc'd twice a year, line checked, route checked, surprise MOT line checked, ground schooled, examinations; open and closed book, all which can have a sudden and final end to your career. Ours is the ONLY profession with such scrutiny placed upon it and I'm sorry but bad doctors kill more patients than bad pilots in a year, they just don't do them all at the same time. I'm not against our system of improvement as long as that is what it is for, IMPROVEMENT! If the system becomes nothing more than a witchhunt then it will all be lost and the profession and the industry will slide back 50 years overnight. If I am in the investment game and screw thousands if not millions of people out of billions of dollars, and I get caught before I flee to a non extradition country with my multi millions, I might do a few years of time before I'm released to enjoy the money I've salted away tax free and off shore. Some frigging system where a guy just trying to do his job to the best of his ability loses it all at the drop of a hat to pacify the system. Nobody said these guys didn't make mistakes, the question is, do we want to foster a system where they will be indetified and corrected before or after a tragedy? Professionally, Rob Assaf, airline pilot Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Rob Assaf Posted August 31, 2003 Share Posted August 31, 2003 Question? I'm not in the "I know who dagger is club" and could really care less, but in your profession, whatever that may be, when was the last time you were examined for competency and did it mean the difference between continuing in your chosen profession or retirement? Rob Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest AME Posted August 31, 2003 Share Posted August 31, 2003 "No one starts out the day thinking they're going to make a bone-headed cock-up" Actually Neo, I assume that I'm going to screw up everything I touch, and have done so for a long time, I use this approach to ensure that everything gets looked at a minimum of two times, and keeps me from becoming complacant Brett Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest AME Posted August 31, 2003 Share Posted August 31, 2003 "No one starts out the day thinking they're going to make a bone-headed cock-up" Actually Neo, I assume that I'm going to screw up everything I touch, and have done so for a long time, I use this approach to ensure that everything gets looked at a minimum of two times, and to keep me from becoming complacent Brett Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest M. McRae Posted August 31, 2003 Share Posted August 31, 2003 That is also why "carpenters" measure twice and cut once. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
DEFCON Posted August 31, 2003 Author Share Posted August 31, 2003 Wouldn't this be an unusual situation. Wouldn't there be a briefing. Good God man...are you a defence lawyer? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
DEFCON Posted August 31, 2003 Author Share Posted August 31, 2003 The ATC event you describe is not uncommon at Pearson. I've always had a distaste for late runway changes, even when VFR. Everyone starts accepting the change in spite of the fact that SOP's are likely to be violated and if anything goes wrong the PIC is left holding the bag. The first guy accepting the change sets in motion the "I must go along to get along" syndrome. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Gino Under Posted August 31, 2003 Share Posted August 31, 2003 So what happend to the YFC CRJ crew? Or was that a minor incident for AC compared to this? And what is the relationship between "a few days to retirement" and a large number of days to retirement? Your 'pretzel logic' is still a little vague to simpletons like myself. Shoot the puck! Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest neo Posted August 31, 2003 Share Posted August 31, 2003 Actually Brett, did you stop reading once you hit the passage you quoted? You just had to go a sentence or two farther to see the context: "You need only ask yourself, what attitude would you prefer in your fellow crewmembers? The attitude that, 'no way that could ever happen to me' or the attitude that, 'on any given day, I could be the guy that screws it up, and I'm going to watch for it and make damn sure I don't let it happen'." Our philosophies are similar, not at odds. Unlike you, I prefer not to assume that I'm going to screw things up, because I need confidence in my ability, and because that assumption flies in the face of my day-to-day experience. On the other hand, I refuse to go to work in the belief that I'm exempt from making a stupid mistake. I'm a human being so if there's a possibility for human error to influence a task I do, then however remote the possibility, it could happen. Part of my task is to reflect carefully on the things I do and choices I make, to catch errors before they can influence any outcome, and to repeatedly check those items which carry that sort of risk. While we don't all think of it this way, a huge portion of a pilot's responsibilities is Error Management: prevent their occurence, and recognize and correct them in a timely fashion when they do. But what is the mind-set, the attitude that permits you to recognize and correct an error in a timely fashion? Is it an ironclad belief that you could never make the mistake that has caused the anomoly you're seeing? No, it most certainly is not. People who believe they could never make a particular error will very likely be faced with it one day and go into denial that it even exists. "I couldn't have made that mistake, therefore the problem doesn't exist, or some other reason is the cause." Either way, you lose the opportunity to fix the problem in a timely fashion. It's time for a lot more thought to be devoted to this issue because we have now pretty muched reached the limit of mechanical reliability vis-a-vis safety. Now it's human factors which make for the majority of tragic outcomes in aviation. If we're professionals, then we will leave no stone unturned in providing our passengers with the safest journey possible. That means that we have to turn our thoughts to ourselves and our own human mistakes, far more than to many other aspects of our jobs which currently occupy our time. neo Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest neo Posted August 31, 2003 Share Posted August 31, 2003 Actually Brett, did you stop reading once you hit the passage you quoted? You just had to go a sentence or two farther to see the context: "You need only ask yourself, what attitude would you prefer in your fellow crewmembers? The attitude that, 'no way that could ever happen to me' or the attitude that, 'on any given day, I could be the guy that screws it up, and I'm going to watch for it and make damn sure I don't let it happen'." Our philosophies are similar, not at odds. Unlike you, I prefer not to assume that I'm going to screw things up, because I need confidence in my ability, and because that assumption flies in the face of my day-to-day experience. On the other hand, I refuse to go to work in the belief that I'm exempt from making a stupid mistake. I'm a human being so if there's a possibility for human error to influence a task I do, then however remote the possibility, it could happen. Part of my task is to reflect carefully on the things I do and choices I make, to catch errors before they can influence any outcome, and to repeatedly check those items which carry that sort of risk. While we don't all think of it this way, a huge portion of a pilot's responsibilities is Error Management: prevent their occurence, and recognize and correct them in a timely fashion when they do. But what is the mind-set, the attitude that permits you to recognize and correct an error in a timely fashion? Is it an ironclad belief that you could never make the mistake that has caused the anomoly you're seeing? No, it most certainly is not. People who believe they could never make a particular error will very likely be faced with it one day and go into denial that it even exists. "I couldn't have made that mistake, therefore the problem doesn't exist, or some other reason is the cause." Either way, you lose the opportunity to fix the problem in a timely fashion. It's time for a lot more thought to be devoted to this issue because we have now pretty muched reached the limit of mechanical reliability vis-a-vis safety. Now it's human factors which make for the majority of tragic outcomes in aviation. If we're professionals, then we will leave no stone unturned in providing our passengers with the safest journey possible. That means that we have to turn our thoughts to ourselves and our own human mistakes, far more than to many other aspects of our jobs which currently occupy our time. neo Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Gino Under Posted August 31, 2003 Share Posted August 31, 2003 Artic Ice Not tryin' to be a jerk here because I totally agree with you and you've illustrated a very realistic and valid 'real world' scenario. Depending on how late in the arrival phase our average crew gets reassigned a new approach, why not forget about re-programming the FMS STAR and get on with the vectors while your PNF digs out the applicable chart. Brief the high points, brief the low points, set minimums, and just do it. KISS principle. Works for some. It amazes me in the sim to watch a crew trying to strictly adhere to SOPs when abnormal circumstances pop up. SOPs are for standard ops. The old slam dunk is not standard so you're forced to either slow down and strictly adhere to those SOPs or you have to abbreviate and execute the change. IMHO. OR... If you really must get the FMS STAR re-inserted in your "Blunderbus Wonderjet", you could always request a PPOS HOLD and give yourself some time to scratch your eyebrow and sort things out? Especially after an overnight Atlantic crossing. Those last minute contortions on the flight deck can land you in a sh*tload of heartache. It can get annoying at times, because we (pilots) will always try to comply with ATC requests as best we can and the occasional (except YYZ) runway change. Due mostly to our CAN DO natures and attitudes. When was the last time you said no to ATC? These scenarios (like the one you've illustrated) can and do cause mayhem on the flight deck and IF you are really, really proficient (and I mean both of you) with your Blunderbus Wonderjet, you're (sometimes) playing a fools game by going with the flow. But, from time to time, you just have to say "what the **ck!". NO! I don't have the runway visual. Yes I'd like an extended vector. OR Sorry, too late for us Arrival, request PPOS HOLD or Option 1, 2 or 3. Over. There are so many ways we can hang ourselves in a two-man Glass airplane it isn't funny. AND, we don't always have the soft option of early retirement. Gino Under Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Gino Under Posted August 31, 2003 Share Posted August 31, 2003 DEFCON You're so right my friend. Despite previous warnings and lessons about Glass Airplanes, a substitution error ruined an otherwise normal op. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Gino Under Posted August 31, 2003 Share Posted August 31, 2003 neo Very, very well said. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Gino Under Posted August 31, 2003 Share Posted August 31, 2003 There but for the grace of God, eh? Oh well, there are those who have, those who will, and those who say never are full of poop. I just hope you don't end up with poopy pants dude. I've got my fingers crossed for you and that 777 is some sweet machine. Cheers Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest PortTack Posted August 31, 2003 Share Posted August 31, 2003 "PIC is left holding the bag" Lets not forget those FO's! Even without a final say in the big mishaps, they seem to get fired too. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Don Hudson Posted August 31, 2003 Share Posted August 31, 2003 Richard; Again, I agree wholeheartedly with your post and the approach you take. It is exactly this kind of discipline that will continue to reduce the incident/accident rate in a system which, as you point out, has largely solved the mechanical/technical/navigational/weather issues which used to attend incidents of the past. Part of what FOQA attempts to do is become part of the error-management system by monitoring the fleet on an ongoing basis and addressing minor deviations in a de-identified, generic manner, and where the deviation may be of a higher order but still isn't a reportable incident, having the Association representative (only!) call the crew to find out some more details of what went on. Anecdotal work is as valuable as the data in many cases, adding to the knowledge of how deviations unfold. The intention is to create as many error-trapping behaviours for crews as possible using real data. Like the ASR system, FOQA data is entirely confidential and only available to Flight Safety departments. If an airline uses any such data in any other way than learning, (discipline/enforcement etc), then that confidential safety reporting system is finished as a safety tool. Fascinating discussion on this thread. Very glad its cooled down for you in the Okanagan. Don Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
MURRAY Posted August 31, 2003 Share Posted August 31, 2003 Unless there is a pressing operational requirement or a circumstance beyond the control of ATC, you would only be offered another runway if it was to your advantage. If you feel this is too risky, simply decline the offer. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest flyersclub Posted September 1, 2003 Share Posted September 1, 2003 not sure what presentation you were at with Capt. Haines ... his brilliant work ... and the other two pilots saved those who did live ... plus Sioux City had just had an emergency 'practice' which helped. I saw his presentation more than once as a part of my job on the emergency response team at cdn. He was for sure devastated that those pax died but the odds against them even landing were enormous. IMO. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
MURRAY Posted September 1, 2003 Share Posted September 1, 2003 And of course, the remainder of your post is a load of crap. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Gino Under Posted September 1, 2003 Share Posted September 1, 2003 res ipsa loquitor Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest shibui Posted September 1, 2003 Share Posted September 1, 2003 liber scriptus profertur, in quo totum continetur, unde mundus judicetur.... Quid sum miser tunc dicturus ? Quem patronum rogaturus, cum vix justus sit securus? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
DEFCON Posted September 1, 2003 Author Share Posted September 1, 2003 Murray I think you're taking things kind of personal. I intended no slight to ATC. IMO the users (ATC & pilots) do whatever is necessary to make the system work. You guys are trying to do your best in spite of the system limitations and pilots do likewise. While all this is taking place the number crunchers tell the public the system is running fine. When someone finally screws up the authorities will hang the individual out to dry claiming the system's now been fixed. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
hollywud Posted September 2, 2003 Share Posted September 2, 2003 The problem isn't the V1 (decision speed) speed being in error. You can have a very low V1 speed on wet runways for instance even at high TO weights. The problem lies with the fact that they simply rotated too early, with the correct VR inserted in the box. This is a really sad senario which could happen to anyone, on any given day. Mistakes happen on every flight and thankfully they are usuallly small and insignificant ones, but nevertheless they do happen. There is a reason why there are two of us in the cockpit - for redundancy. Cheers, Colin Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
MURRAY Posted September 2, 2003 Share Posted September 2, 2003 I took no personal offence, nor did I infer a slight toward ATC. If the runway change is offered (usually for your benefit) and you feel there is a safety issue involved, then decline. If the runway change is an operational requirement, then nobody really has a choice, and in this regard Pearson is no different than any other facility. What, in your opinion, constitutes a late runway change? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
DEFCON Posted September 2, 2003 Author Share Posted September 2, 2003 We do a "top of desent" type of checklist that finishes with "approach briefing". Shortly thereafter the navaids become "set" (tuned & identified) based on the anticipated or cleared to...approach. From this point on, a change requiring retuning, briefing etc becomes more rushed with each passing mile. In other words, 20 out and straight in or downwind, generally, there is no problem. 10 out or less and straight in, the more problematic SOP adherence etc becomes. I do realize it's my option at all times and I hope that my explanation above brings greater clarity to what you described as my "full of crap" post. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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