Can someone help me get it?

[Mitch Cronin]

If the company, who just set me back many, many years in terms of contract language and benefits, in what was supposed to be a "needs only" set of emergency style contract negots., ... came to me again, and said "hey, we can provide you with some shiney new access stands and all kinds of proper equipment to do your job with, if you'll only agree to do it for a little less than we've already agreed to?" I'd tell 'em to get stuffed.

What gives? What have I missed? Am I to believe ACPA managed somehow to hang onto more than AC can afford? Is there no end to the, "we'd like to tempt you to make a better deal" offers? What happened to the "we've got the concessions we need and we'll be fine now." stuff?

Sez Captain Bart Simpson, VP of Canada Airways Flight Management to Captain Bob McKenzie, chief hot dog of CAPA: Hey Bob, these are slick new airplanes, and if you'll only agree to let us ignore your contract, we'll let ya fly 'em, whaddya say?

I don't get it... How come I'm not hearing "No flippin' way!"? They must be some reeeeally special airplanes. Geez, give 'em an inch and there's millions of miles for the taking.

[dagger]

The more big planes an airline flies, the more pilots it needs, the more opportunity current pilots have to move up the seniority ladder, the more opportunities first officers have to become captains, the more interesting places they can bid to fly, etc. If the A330/340 family becomes the biggest sized aircraft in the AC fleet (upon retirement of the 747 combis this fall), then it stands to reason that AC pilots would want to have as many A330/340s as possible because it would be in their self interest, career wise and monetarily, to do so. Adding A330/340s would have a ripple effect right down to the junior-most (currently laid off) pilots. Whether ACPA believes the price is worth it is not for me to say, but that's probably why you see the reaction you see, which is muted (at least for now).

Let's put it this way, Mitch. What if ACTS came to you and said they could put in some kind of high tech gizmo that would enable it to attract more third party contract work, and that it needed the right contract conditions to use the gizmo, but when the training period was over hundreds of night shift guys would be able to move into Monday-Friday day jobs running the gizmo and that the operators of the gizmo would be bumped up to the highest pay category. Even the more junior guys might like the idea that there would be more high-paying day jobs in the company to look forward to. Again, I can't guess what the IAM would do - I guess it would depend if they could extract something for the ramp by lowering the pay scale for the gizmo, but I digress.

[Mitch Cronin]

Thanks Dagger... It's that "mute"ness that has me puzzled. It means something, but I'm not sure what.

I'm all for the notion of working with management to find new methods and more efficient and mutually beneficial practices... Our "HPWO" system was supposed to be all about just that (though, with the IAM involved, it proved to be about something else entirely), and in principal, it's a fine approach to employee/employer relations...

But it occurs to me that in a time such as this, where some very hard hits have been taken, and trust is at an all time low, as are relations in general.... it becomes rather important to build some trust and win back some confidence in the employers willingness to stick to the deals they made.

Continuously hammering at that confidence won't improve a darned thing.... sez me. It'll more than likely produce a backlash that won't help anyone. ...

Now I'm assuming the comment below, that "there's a formula in the contract" does indeed mean these -500's are entitled to more.... which would certainly mean the company's asking for concessions, yet again...

Lines need to be drawn in the sand, and they need to be seen to be drawn, and they need to be seen to be respected.... otherwise all hope of trust is lost and employer/employee relations continue to flop, which spells doomalloveragain in my book.

Then again, maybe they're not seeing it that way at all... I don't know, 'cause they are mute.

[dagger]

Well, there are a number of ways to look at it. These planes are not in the fleet now. By next week, they could very well be heading to Emirates. I don't believe that's a threat. I think it's a fact. I had already assumed that these planes were going to Emirates. If AC doesn't take -500s now, it may never take them. You talk about building trust where there is none. What if it came out six months from now that AC could have had those planes but chose not to try to negotiate workable terms. If you were a pilot would you NOT be &%$@! off that you didn't have a chance on those -500s? I don't think this issue will build trust, but I'm not sure it's going to destroy it either. The issue is out there on the table. Maybe they can make a deal, maybe they can't, but it will be an ADULT decision, and considering all the cloak and dagger actions (no pun intended) which have helped build mistrust on both sides, I think this is healthy. Were there ever 747s on the table. We the new RJs "sold" to both ALPA and ACPA in contract talks? In contrast, here's an issue where the stakes are known, and the decision, whatever it is, will hopefully be made for good reasons as opposed to emotions or agendas or the desire for revenge.

[Guest neo]

Mitch,

There is no end to the "we'd like to tempt you to make a better deal offers" under the way AC and its employees currently do business.

And what's changed since last summer, really? At that time you were willing to agree to concessions and encouraged your fellow employees to do the same. Why is your outlook on concessions so firm now?

All we did last summer was keep the creditors from closing the doors. We won't be out of CCAA for some time yet and for as long as we're in CCAA the employees negotiate from a weakened position. CCAA is just one long negotiation... between creditors, the company, employees, equity investors, pension regulators, the courts... it isn't over yet, no way.

neo

[dagger]

I'd also point out, Mitch, that as Kenny Rogers sings, Know when to hold, know when to fold em. Today's concession can become tomorrow's leverage. Let's say you negotiate a special deal for the -500s and they are a big success on the routes they fly. The -500 would give AC a big advantage over CX on Toronto-Hong Kong. So management goes out looking for more -500s. Come the next round of contract talks, or perhaps sooner, the profitability of the -500s becomes leverage for ACPA. For example, I have no doubt AC will walk away from those airplanes next week absent a deal by Feb 24. But if a few years down the road those aircraft are part of AC's core profitability, no way management or Victor Li will give up those aircraft, cancel the routes they fly, etc. So today's lemon becomes tomorrow's gourmet lemonade. You have to be really smart about where to draw that line because the pendulum can swing... AC can become very profitable and if you are the pilots at AC you would want to maxx that out, both for personal gain and for future collective advantage.

[Mitch Cronin]

What's changed since last summer?

A heck of a lot! You've heard the list of losses from our side enought times, surely. That's what's changed. Too much change in wrong directions, without much change in right directions, in my view, though I still remain hopeful that some large changes are on the horizon... In the mean time, I'd sure like to see some indications that there's some appreciation for what we've given up, and some respect for current deals.

[Mitch Cronin]

Hmmmmm.... I'm left without the knoweldge of what kind of coin difference is involved between the deals as they are, and what the company is asking for to make acquiring the 500's attractive enough to the powers that be... I reckon AC thought they were worth having under the old deals prior to concessions... they ordered them. Now it's a time issue. ...and others are doing the deciding... So are they worth having or not? Do the decisions made by these others only get made in favour of what's immediately good? Or do they also look to the future?

You're right though... Above board, open and frank discussion beats the back room sleazy deals any day. Still, my own lack of trust has me smelling something...

[dagger]

I can't remember when these planes were ordered, but it probably goes back 2-3 years. Airbus was first supposed to deliver them in November 2002 and had production delays at its end. A lot of water under the bridge.

[LongTimer V]

Id Air Canada really needs these 2 a340-500 then ACPA should make a deal,but for only these 2 aircraft.If and when more arrive then the issue can be re-visisted.Management seems to be in a hurry on these two,soo make a deal and it would be a sign of good faith.But if they all of a sudden put something else unrelated to these aircraft,walk away.IMHO

[Don Hudson]

Dagger;

Lost in all this is the 19:45hr duty day and crew fatigue levels.

The Canadian Aviation Regulations are the laxest in the free world. They permit a scheduled service of 20hrs on duty with only one extra pilot, (mandatory 12:40hrs in the seat each), and if the operation is irregular, (mechanical, weather etc) the crew can go to 23hrs.

Ever try to stay up straight for 20 hours and then drive a car? Crew rest is helpful but its a long way from a good sleep.

I have no idea what Singapore does on their recent introduction of the world's longest leg (can't recall...South America to Singapore? not sure) and I don't know what their crewing or rest facilities are like.

With the coming introduction of the A380, ultra-long haul crewing issues will have to be solved in a way that keeps crew fatigue at acceptable levels. The literature is full of examples of what happens when these issues are not dealt with properly.

And the "mute" response?...

ACPA doesn't negotiate in public. To put it diplomatically, this is another in a long series of challenges, but in this case they're real airplanes that are in our colors and close to the property.

The 500, like the 600, is a pilot's airplane and the routes and growth are said to be there. We'll see. A clinical assessment of all aspects of the plan and the demands will have to be made. Gut reactions still serve well, but in these times have become marginalized by the current process.

Don

[dagger]

I presume your reference to "crew rest" means the onboard bunks... If so, it begs the question whether any ultra-longhaul flying is really feasible on any airline because neither the main crew nor any relief pilots are going to get any quality sleep on board. If you start a relief guy in the bunk, when his time comes to take over, by that definition, he's going to be almost as tired as the guy he relieves.

I never sleep on aircraft - I'm not the type, and I don't have any experience with First Class on those airlines now offering flat beds. And I don't know what crew rest facilities look like on the A340-500. I remember Airbus once said it could put a full crew cabin into the lower level of the 340-500s, but I guess that never went anywhere with the airlines.

[Guest bcpilot]

Hope this link works, its of the crew bunks in Singapore's 340-500.

http://www.airliners.net/open.file/497045/M/

[Guest bcpilot]

Apparently the captains get their own space!!! LOL

http://www.airliners.net/open.file/503851/M/

[Guest M. McRae]

Due to security concerns that would make sense. If as depicted, I would be surprised if someone could get a "real" sleep in one...even fully reclined.

[MCDU]

The AC facilities are not up to those standards, the company ordered the cheapest option Airbus provided.

The walls are paper-thin, but even worse- one of the F/A's jumpseats is on the other side of the .5" wall.

When the F/A gets out of the seat- it snaps into the stowed position- whapping the wall and the pilot trying some sleep on the other side of it. It's not the noise- it's the thump that gets you.

The bunks themselves are small for anyone over 6'. My toes touched one wall, my head the other. With my right side scrunched up against the F/A jumpseat wall, my left arm would hang over the leading edge of the bunk unless I kept both arms folded across my chest with my fingers inter-locked.

All in all, a token effort. I hope the 500 bunks are better.

[Mitch Cronin]

Don,

Re "Lost in all this..." Obviously only to those of us who don't count. Glad you reminded us.

Those regs you quote, and the rules you work by didn't come about as a result of laziness or just getting-as-much-as-you-can... They're there for safety reasons that don't disappear the instant the company runs into financial difficulties. Obviously you know that, but it's evidently necessary to remind others sometimes.

Cheers,

Mitch

[Don Hudson]

Hi Mitch;

I don't want to convey the impression that things are bad, because, frankly, they're not. At one time, major employers would consider "augmentation" as mere union feather-bedding and they fought it tooth and nail.

Its only when accidents began to happen where the crew simply did apparently stupid things in perfectly serviceable airplanes that the matter began to get more attention.

The watershed report, aside from the Guantanamo Bay DC8 accident is the American Airlines 1462 MD88 accident at Little Rock, Ark. The crew had been on duty over 13hrs, through several weather systems. Cockpit dynamics also played a role, but the main factor was mistakes made due to fatigue.

Fatigue factors are well documented as are countermeasures. How effective each measure is and how it is employed is up to the airline and the pilots' association to determine.

After any accident, these days, and for a number of obvious and not-so-obvious reasons, investigatory bodies as well as the law enforcement people make very pointed and perceptive inquiries into airline safety systems. They seek who is responsible for them and determine how the airline treats and nourishes its safety culture. They look at how effective self-reporting and immunity policies are and what priorities the CEO places on flight safety. The Luxair Fokker 50 accident in Luxembourg (Nov 2002) is instructive in this regard.

[Don Hudson]

Hi Mitch;

I don't want to convey the impression that things are bad, because, frankly, they're not nearly as bad as they were. At one time, major employers would consider "augmentation" as mere union feather-bedding and they fought it tooth and nail.

Its only when accidents began to happen where the crew simply did apparently stupid things in perfectly serviceable airplanes that the matter began to get more attention.

The watershed report, aside from the Guantanamo Bay DC8 accident is the American Airlines 1462 MD88 accident at Little Rock, Ark. The crew had been on duty over 13hrs, through several weather systems. Cockpit dynamics also played a role, but the main factor was mistakes made due to fatigue.

Fatigue factors are well documented as are countermeasures. How effective each measure is and how it is employed is up to the airline and the pilots' association to determine.

After any accident, these days, and for a number of obvious and not-so-obvious reasons, investigatory bodies as well as the law enforcement people make very pointed and perceptive inquiries into airline safety systems. They seek who is responsible for them and determine how the airline treats and nourishes its safety culture. They look at how effective self-reporting and immunity policies are and what priorities the CEO places on flight safety. The Luxair Fokker 50 accident in Luxembourg (Nov 2002) is instructive in this regard.

Flight safety is a difficult sell to management and the bean counters because it holds back/diverts a lot of revenue and there's "nothing" (hopefully!!) to show for the "investment". But a solid flight safety culture is like an insurance policy but with the added feature of active interventions through safety programs, training and SOPs.

This is a general discussion and doesn't relate to any specific company or issue. Every airline and every pilot must deal with these issues. How they're come to terms with however, is different for each, and eventually shows up in the statistics.

[Dork]

How many guys are going to be announced as redundant next week at the mainline?

How many other side deals are in the works. After 30 years at this job the tricks are not new. A shiny new toy doesn't take the stink out of this place.

Want to make money. Try working with employees. "From Worst To First" is a great place to start. Of course, one CEO sent the book back to his employees and told them to get lost 4 years ago.

[Guest Sawbones]

Don,

So why wouldn't ACPA use its resources to immediately start lobbying Transport Canada to implement more stringent CARs regarding long-haul operations? I'm quite sure ALPA would be all over this ... perhaps just too many fires burning.

[Don Hudson]

Sawbones;

No, there's not too many fires burning. Representation is what the Association does.

CALPA, ACPA and ALPA have been all over this for decades. The last flurry of lobbying began during the first CARAC process when the rules were first begin changed from the Aeronautics Act to the CARs. The ATA and ATAC lobby in the US and Canada is enormously powerful and fought against reasonable duty days. Also, Canada's northern flying demanded "realistic" duty days for that unique operation. Trouble is, major carriers are under the same lax duty-day regulation and the so-called "long haul" augmentation rules were designed for military patrols, not airline operations.

These regulations need to change to recognize the substantial work done on fatigue, duty hours, circadian rythms and past industry experience with incidents.

Perhaps the flying public should begin asking questions of their MPs, because neither Parliament nor Transport listen(ed) to the professionals or the experts.

Even truckers and train engineers are more strictly regulated.

[Guest lupin]

For anyone involved with crew duty days,

About CARAC

The Canadian Aviation Regulation Advisory Council (CARAC) was established to renew Transport Canada, Civil Aviation's approach to consultation and rulemaking, and to improve our regulatory system. CARAC is a joint undertaking of government and the aviation community, with participation from a large number of organizations outside Transport Canada representing the overall viewpoint of the aviation community. These include management and labour organizations , representing operators and manufacturers, and professional associations.

CARAC's prime objective is to assess and recommend potential regulatory changes through cooperative rulemaking activities.

Now...with that already said....

Carac seems to be composed of mostly management types.Have a look at this discussion on duty days for maintenance.The main preocupation seems to have a system that will not cost more money to operators.AMEs,(the people who fix your Airplanes) are not limited by duty days We can work for as long as our employer wants!These discussions to get AME duty days have been going on for a few years now with the only present action being a "human factors course" that makes you recognise you are tired,but doesn't address the what to do if you are too tired.(the proof of that is that even if you are tired beyond safety limits Air Canada can still FORCE you (as an ame)to work overtime)

Have a look

http://www.tc.gc.ca/civilaviation/Regserv/Affairs/carac/Technical/MM/DR/25sep02.htm

[Mitch Cronin]

"Brian Jenner (HAC and AQTA) stressed that the answers to the questions "How tired are AMEs?" and "How tired is too tired?", as posed in Dr. Drew Dawson’s presentation, required quantifiable evidence. He stated that all of the evidence presented to date is anecdotal and that it only indicates that there is fatigue but not that there is too much fatigue. He stated that the fact that fatigue exists doesn’t justify putting in place a policy decision of this nature. He concluded that this committee needs to determine if AME fatigue is in fact a problem."

Where does someone have to go to get that thick?

I wish I could ralate to you, in detail, a problem I recently encountered, but corporate security policy wouldn't permit it... Of course fatigue is a problem! I'd suggest if Brian Jenner wants to find out if it's real or not he should work our 4-4 night shift rotation for a few weeks and see how he's doing at the end of it.

Transport Canada is on record as saying that fatigue is very much a part of an AME's "fitness for duty"... I know beyond certainty that's absolute truth! I also know that showing up for work when fatigued is to invite mistakes.... as in spite of all the lip service people will pay, as long as you're present, they'll count on you to do all they know you're normally capable of doing. You can't just show up hoping to take on the role of a wanker for the night. ...when they know you're not, they'll lean on you anyway. The answer?... stay home and take the hit on your paycheque. (which means of course that lot's of people won't stay home... but never mind, this is "all anecdotal"... we don't really know "if AME fatigue is in fact a problem"... good grief!)

[Don Hudson]

Mitch;

From The Fallible Engineer, November, 1991 (at http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/sbeder/fallible.html )

"Engineer Barry McMahon has found his clients believe that a factor of safety implies certainty plus a bit more and they are far more concerned with the risk of conservative design than they are with other sources of risk. Conservative design tends to be more expensive and so there is always pressure to reduce factors of safety.

"The factor of safety is itself a heuristic which changes with time and circumstance. For a factor of safety to be effective the means of failure must be known and the cause of the failure determinable by experiment. All engineering structures incorporate factors of safety and yet some still fail. When this happens the factor of safety might be increased. However when a particular type of structure has been used often and without failure there is a tendency for engineers to suspect that these structures are overdesigned and that the factor of safety can be reduced. Petroski comments The dynamics of raising the factor of safety in the wake of accidents and lowering it in the absense of accidents can clearly lead to cyclic occurrences of structural failures. He points out that this cyclic behaviour occurred with suspension bridges following the failure of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge.

"This process of fine-tuning or cutting safety margins to reduce costs in the face of success is not confined to structural engineering and is present across all engineering disciplines. William Starbuck and Frances Milliken, researchers at New York University, have studied the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster and concluded that the same phenomenon was present there."

The Starbuck paper on Challenger is worth reading. It can be found at:

http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~wstarbuc/mob/challenge.html

You've already been exposed to Vaughn's book. The above was written long before, but adds to the notions expressed about risk managment and safety in technologically based enterprises. Airline work is certainly nothing close to Shuttle work, but that doesn't mean the principles aren't the same in terms of mindful behaviours. NASA too, was totally driven by economic concerns until 1986. They're currently having to "re-visit" some experiences and re-learn some lessons.

I would like to introduce the concept of "stochastic" as well. I found this concept in some reading in Gregory Bateson, (Mind and Nature) in reference to biological models. But I thought the notion was useful in other areas as well.

It comes from the root word, "stocha" which means "to shoot", usually with an arrow. It refers specifically to how the arrow finds its target and what the results are.

The concept is neither obscure or complex, (I've seen it used in economic and political arenas..not sure why). A quick example can show this:

An outcome may be termed "stochastic" when it tends towards or favours a certain outcome, but there is a large element of unpredictability involved.

So. A kid is running across a freeway. He succeeds on the first try and many tries after. Sooner or later however, we know what's going to occur.

The outcome is quite certain, but we don't know how it will get there except we know some factors are in place which almost assure that outcome.

There are variations on that theme and I'm sure others here can add to our knowledge.

You ask, How can someone be that thick?

Easy. They don't have to pay attention to the stochastic-ness of the process because most of the time, the result is "nothing".

What's more, because we live in an exclusively quantitative (business-run) world, quantifying stochastic processes is impossible, by definition and by fact. Thus it is exceedingly difficult to demonstrate that a series of actions/causes/events etc etc is leading somewhere. So for someone looking to spend a lot of money for "nothing" is like spending a lot of money on insurance. One questions what one can get away with, (or cut out) after a while.

When "success" is the result, (See? Nothing happened.), a new level of "normalcy" is established. When others come along who don't know the history of why something is the way it is, they go about making people more senior to them happy by finding ways to cut budgets, and when the result is, nothing happens, they're work is justified.

By the time something does happen, the "patterns which connect" have gone.

This is simplified of course and perhaps open to mild challenge, but the essential processes are there and they're true. The NASA report on Columbia is already confirming it.

That's how people making such decisions "get thick". And in that apparent "thickness", seemingly very intelligent and dedicated people who are doing their level best, do these things. Its all in the literature of risk management in high technologies and how to counter this very phenomena. It is not easy by any stretch, especially these days when organizations are claiming they can hardly make ends meet.