Sign in to follow this  
328

Halifax report coming May 18,2017

Recommended Posts

8 minutes ago, Vsplat said:

The weeds are starting to get pretty thick.

The crew applied the SOP.  They clearly thought they had the required visual reference as set out in the SOP .  They discussed it. 

To suggest that a personal standard of visibility would then be applied is really opening the pandora's box of intentional non-compliance with SOP. 

The causal factors are set out in the report and the network laid out the way it is, likely on purpose.  The 'lights only' SOP is gone, the minimum visibility requirements have been improved, other changes have been put in place so, hopefully, another crew does not arrive to see a compelling, but incorrect, visual reference.  Those are all good solutions.  Applying a personal standard to an SOP operation, well, not so much.

Vs

This is discussion is  going nowhere.......No matter what the SOPs say, no matter what seat I occupy,  if I am NOT happy with the approach, (perhaps a portion of the approach does not meet "my" standard) it is a "go-around". I'll do it and answer the questions later. To insinuate that I can not apply my personal standards to an approach is ludicrous.. SOPs are a guide, they are not cast in concrete and the interpretation can vary from pilot to pilot and thankfully most interpret them the same way, but discretion is permitted if the rationale is solid.

I am sure you will rest easy because if you don't know it now, you will... I no longer fly, I am retired but I have 29,760 hours under my a$$ and I have done a few go-arounds when, perhaps if I pushed it, I could have made it but after the go-arounds....... no one questioned my judgement.

I have flown with fellows who decided to go-around when according to SOPs,  I think we could have made it.....BUT...that was his decision. 

Never seen an aircraft back into a mountain and whether anyone will admit it, when the whole scene turns to puppy-poo, the pilot better have a plan because if he dogmatic about an SOP he might just box himself, and others, into a corner....Believe me, I have seen it.

Vs, I said it earlier before in a post...I am outta here and I am sure you know that as long as there are aircraft flying there will be accidents  and post accident discussions, however unfettered defence of what could  be considered as a "breach in the dyke" accomplishes nothing. I guess it is not politically acceptable  to use the term "pilot-error"  in accidents originating in Canada...........there always has to be some other factor that dilutes the responsibility......

  • Like 1

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Pilots are paid to exercise judgement, Kip.  Just not of others.

You started down this dead end when you tried to forge a link that the TSB had weighed and discounted - and answered questions as to why that was the case in their briefing.  That has been explained to you.  Yet you elected to persist with the autopilot as though it was a causal factor, despite the TSB clearly saying otherwise. 

Your further comments distancing yourself from the decision of that crew, suggesting you would have avoided the threat that got them, your personal standard for the decision to land, is frankly whistling past the graveyard.  None of us were there or  saw what they saw. We know they were convinced carrying on was the safe thing to do.  Which of us would have been equally comfortable?  I see absolutely no sign that they pushed limits.  The entire thread of speculation is wrong.

I am perhaps not as experienced as you.  I've only been trying to learn this trade for 40 years or so,  But I look at this accident and say, 'there but for the grace go I'. We all see it our own way, but when I look at the accident record, some of the greatest out there have been involved.  Tenerife comes to mind as I write this. 

I honestly don't think there is such a thing as immunity from accidents, so perhaps on that point we will agree.

These were two professional pilots, the TSB did not hang the accident on them, and we should at the very least not try to do so here.  Pilot error is still a term.  Just not a very accurate one, and not really reflective of the findings in this case. 

Nuff said.

Vs

Edited by Vsplat
  • Like 4

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Seeker; unlike you, I prefer to search out facts, guesses at answers that serve a defensive perspective don't work for me.

 

I'm going to be really bold and go out on a limb to point out a factoid that no one has mentioned.

."The aircraft started to descend about 0.2 nm from the FAF. The aircraft crossed the FAF at 2170 feet indicated altitude (Figure 1)."

Surely it's not SOP to begin a descent to the MDA prior to crossing the FAF?

 

And then the report claims; "As the aircraft descended, the actual flight path diverged from the desired profile as a result of wind variations."

How can they say that when their own production shows the descent started and ended early (the aircraft crossed the calculated MDA at 1.2 nm from the threshold.") exactly as one would expect in a zero wind situation?

 

 

 
 

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

DEFCON, that descent is, unfortunately, exactly per Airbus SOP.  FPA is activated 0.3 NM prior to the expected descent point.  No adjustment is offered for headwind or tailwind.  And yes, a large portion of the flight path offset started right at the FAF.

Vs

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Thanks VS.

I did see the FOM SOP information in the report. My concern is directed at procedures that lead pilots to 'believe' magic tools are invincible. In this case use of the FPA system attempts to turn a sows ear, the NP approach, into a silk purse, precision approach path guidance,

I think I'd feel a whole lot more comfortable as a pax to know the pilot is following VASI in the last few seconds of an np approach than relying on any of the modern electronic tricks.

As we all know, pilots are left to comply with crazy and sometimes dangerous situations because there's no money to buy light bars, but the terminals are looking great.    

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

I certainly agree, the efforts that go into making a cloud breaking procedure feel more precise than it is,  can feed loss of situational awareness, or perhaps more accurately, reduce the crew's level of caution regarding threats to that awareness.

I think had the PAPI been visible it might have been a game changer.  Had the lights been the next order of magnitude brighter as promised, perhaps the crew would have adjusted intuitively and not this flight, but another one would have spawned, what I think was an inevitable look at the lighting and approach ban limits.  All that to say that, IMO, this accident, or one like it, was going to happen, it was just a question of where or when.

The TSB report does seem to indicate that the crew continued to process visual inputs as they became available, right up the point they realised that they were dangerously low and commenced a go around.  So I don't think they would argue with your logic, or even necessarily found their approach at odds with it.

FWIW

Vs

 

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

One comment regarding lights. I always found strength 5 was useful when it came to locating the TDZ in the murk, but more often than not that setting blurred the environment, which necessitated a reduction to strength 3 from that point on in.

 

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!

Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.

Sign In Now
Sign in to follow this