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Vsplat last won the day on March 22 2019

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  1. Honestly, unless you are a military communications or drone specialist, I don't think you or I have any idea of the true capacity and risks of military grade datalink, what challenges they face in terms of outage and how they mitigate. There is also no requirement to report drone incidents publically so we can trade opinions on what the military does but that's about it. I'd also be a bit more careful when assessing the limits of another's thoughts. You really have no idea what my background is. As for when my time runs out, I'll be long retired before anything close to this makes it to commercial operations. There will be progress and I for one would welcome increased AI in aviation, but as we are living with the MAX, automation is only as good as the model it's built on. This is noting to ultimately be decided by what can be done, but what should be done and why. Vs
  2. That's an impossible question to answer. Most in flight health events are unreported, as it's often solved with a simple conversation along the lines of 'why don't you take this leg'. Depending on the air operator's safety reporting culture, there might be good reporting of in-flight hand over, but still nothing close to a full statement of risk.
  3. Remote datalink control has a lot of public appeal but is not really an option for this kind of operation. Recent jamming, spoofing and outages of GPS affecting RNP are just one reminder that any worldwide datalink or satellite based solution relies, in the end, on good will from the US and Russia. That is increasingly fragile. Then, of course, there is hacking. Current encryption techniques will be solvable by commercially available computers within a decade. What then? Drone operations are, but their nature, expendable. High cost and undesired, but the reason drones are used often has as much to do with risk as cost. There are also many restrictions on autonomous drone flight over 'populated areas' (where the population are comprised of allies). To be clear, this is not about the capability of the technology when it works. SpaceX, through their recoveries at sea, has demonstrated far more than is needed for a commercial operation. The kicker is what happens to a planeload of passengers, or the subdivision they are flying over, on the bad day when a few things go wrong and the assumptions behind the autonomy aren't met. Vs
  4. certainly understand the proof of concept approach taken here deicer. My primary issue is with the underlying assumption. Whereas the industry was able to design more capable and reliable engines and critical systems such as pressurization and fire suppression, such that extended range on two engines could be clearly proven as safe, short of genetic engineering, there is no similar way to improve human reliability or failure prediction. Put another way - using the same case of engines vs pilots, reducing the number of engines reduced the number of critical failure points - something that could be designed around by improving the remaining systems. Reducing the number of pilots also reduces the number of critical failure points - but without the attendant improvement of the remaining unit. I suspect what will be ultimately be offered is some sort of AI enhanced autopilot that can take over in the event of single pilot incapacitation and Piper has introduced this concept already. On that front, I see promise, as AI can be trained much as humans are. It might serve to have an AI 'training' on flight decks around the world for a few years to see what the crew sees, make decisions independently and compare those decisions to what the humans did. That exercise would, in my view, produce a very capable non-human option, but the training process and data review would be a massive undertaking, as sometimes humans get it wrong and the AI would be just as prone to picking up bad habits during training as we are. That review project would be like FOQA/FDM on crack - it would require a worldwide amnesty agreement on the use of data the likes of which do not exist today. Vs
  5. Well, take a single pilot operation, toss in some food poisoning from that sandwich grabbed in the terminal and viola. Hopefully not something that would affect a takeoff, but could affect the rest of the trip. Vs
  6. Well, I think the optics of operating a Boeing at this stage of things might be difficult for the PMO. I have to wonder why it hasn't gone to a commercial operator. I know there will be numerous mods, but how expensive would it be to return to a commercial standard? Surely this fire sale would make up for it. Vs
  7. Not to say that there aren't SOME legitimate exposure claims, but the 'physics' of who and (the increasing number of) how many have less to do with aviation and more to do with the court system. Cue the class action lawsuit. Edited to add:, I sure hope none of those affected are ever on the bridge the next time a fueller comes up to give us our fuel slip. I can't imagine how they would fare in that collateral fume environment - oh the humanity.... (rant off) Vs
  8. Kip, your heart was in the right place and there is plenty of reason for that young lady to pay attention - least of which is simple decency not to talk over the flight attendants. That said, we are in the age of entitlement. You are lucky she did not have you punted off the aircraft for touching her iPad. I can think of a few very special personal celebrities whose dim light would have created an equally dim view of the whole situation. Glad it all worked out. Vs
  9. Iran has claimed responsibility. https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/iran-says-it-unintentionally-shot-down-ukrainian-jetliner-1.4762972 Sad. But at least now the families won't have politics drag their horror on even longer. With thoughts for those who have lost so much. Vs
  10. Just a note here, the nav canada charts are not ground vehicle operations charts and are often lacking at many airports when it comes to fine ramp details. For the record though, 13 as depicted in the nav charts and on google earth (attached) appears to be east of what shows on the jeppesen chart attached in the thread above. I don't know what the ramp crew in question would have referenced. Vs
  11. I'd just like to add that I personally thrilled at the prospect of not having to pay someone else's coffee or dinner so they can let me talk about flying.... That aside, I'd suggest you note what city you are in or close to, that might limit responses to those in your area. And Kip's advice is good. If you ask two pilots for their opinion, you'll get 4 or 5 opinions in return. We are very productive that way ? Best of luck. Vs
  12. I don't believe the wording is new, but its application is. AFAIK that provision was intended to allow assistance to a coroner's inquest or other enquiry (as Dubbin or Dryden) to have full access to information they may need in the pursuit of public interest. In this case, it appears to me there is a much narrower application, that being civil litigation. Put another way, I sincerely doubt that the lawyers seeking this release would give a second's consideration to a collateral finding that improved safety but did not get their clients a nickel. I could, of course, be wrong. Vs
  13. Don, you will know that I agree with you. How many times of late have we seen the progress of ignorance and rank over expertise and reason? It almost has the appearance of ageism in law. If a law or standard is too old, it must be obsolete. A court presumes to sight read the situation and upend a safeguard. I wonder how long it will be before an enquiry into this mistake is triggered by its payload. Vs
  14. To be specific, the warning system will notify the crew if the sensor site(s) do not report what is expected for a given condition. If the flap is deformed, twisted or damaged, there is no guarantee that the damaged area(s) will be near the sensors. This was the issue with the CRJ 100 and 200 early on, there was an ability for flap twist on extension to go undetected by the aircraft's own monitoring system, so they had to be set at the gate before pushback and visually verified with external witness marks. A chunk of ice could easily cause this kind of issue I think. My guess is the FAA doesn't believe the sensor coverage is adequate to detect the problem. Vs
  15. Actually, this used to be SOP for many aircraft with leading edge devices after landing where reverse or deep contamination could result in stuff being thrown up into the flap or slat internals. The problem is that the warning systems are all modeled on known or expected failure modes, not high power actuators trying to compress un-compressible ice with a poor innocent slat in the middle. Vs