Vsplat

Donating Member
  • Content count

    1,332
  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    37

Vsplat last won the day on July 13

Vsplat had the most liked content!

Community Reputation

280 Excellent

1 Follower

About Vsplat

  • Rank
    5

Recent Profile Visitors

2,436 profile views
  1. Roger that. The Loss of separation part happens when the crew decides to concentrate on the go around procedure and climb on runway track until it's done, which is the default guidance in my aircraft. I've often wondered why there is not a 'visual approach' page for airports like YYZ. Have the folks in the head shed figure out a standard missed approach heading (so for 23, maybe a 290 heading or so) and keep the published altitude. Once we are cleared the visual, then we know that a missed approach will be on that heading, which some aircraft can preset. While no panacea, that would cut down the chatter considerably and we all part friends... Vs
  2. mo32a mo32a, that may seem simple to you, but IMO it is anything but when you are fully configured short final in a high bypass turbofan programmed to fly something different. There are a number of things that have to happen in a very specific sequence and short time span. The aircraft energy state during that initial pitch up has to be watched pretty closely,, even in an Airbus (the 321 is a particular sweetheart for alpha floor events during the go around), so there is not a lot of capacity for chit-chat. Getting a go around, then trying to comprehend a new clearance, contrary to what you are expecting, issued at the very time the crew is trying to talk to one another is just a bad situation. Easy to miss the flaps, gear, mode selection, or the clearance itself, you name it. So, not simple. Apart from the basic aircraft handling, a go around is ridiculously expensive, low level fuel burn, busted connections, , etc, etc. With respect to the criteria above, I have been in the flare (so past the threshold) in YYZ with another aircraft lifting off. That is the low energy regime. If for whatever reason the aircraft ahead rejects, a low energy go around is no joke and can involve ground contact. I'm sure the controller did not intend things to get that tight, but stuff happens, the tighter you approach the limit, the more often something will infringe on it. So, while I understand there is no minimum separation currently in visual conditions, maybe there should be. Vs
  3. SFO Incident

    Good advice anonymous. Thanks Vs
  4. I think the comment about no parallel taxiway between parallel runways is a good one. It does a couple of things, including providing some deceleration space. One of my pet peeves in YYZ is their tendency to yap out clearing instructions as you are slowing down, possibly transferring control. I've had it where I was told to expedite clearing, then a late clearance to ground who wanted me to make a sharp right turn at the first parallel taxiway, while I was still at 30 knots. I wouldn't want to try that in my car, let alone an aircraft. Of course, everything is HIRO, max speed until the turn off. That doesn't leave a lot of room between the 24's to get things stopped. Another little gem is the tendency to give a complex clearance involving multiple runway and taxiway crossings, then create a conflict with a subsequent clearance to another aircraft, then try to untangle the resultant situation. If the crew of the first aircraft does not get the amended clerance on time (and it is pretty frequent that the flight number is clipped from the transmission, or the transmission gets stepped on), then they simply execute their initial clearance and viola! They are assessed an incursion. How about a clearance short of the intersection if there is active traffic in that vicinity, or not clearing a subsequent aircraft into a conflict until the first aircraft is given and reads back the new hold short? Rant over.... Vs
  5. gator, I recently saw one of our 320's go around on 23, the issue was a loss of situational awareness in the tower controller. The 320 came on frequency at the FAF, the controller immediately told them back to final approach speed, he was going to launch one ahead of them. He then cleared an asian carrier widebody to position, so full length. The widebody started moving past the hold line maybe 30 seconds later, with the crew querying if they were, in fact, cleared for takeoff. Needing the full length is not surprising for a fully loaded widebody, but it should not be surprising that taxi is very slow for aircraft needing that extra length. the controller called the go around and in the same transmission issued a new missed approach clearance based on heading and a new missed approach altitude. I wish there was more opportunity to have ATC in the flight deck to witness what a controller does to crew communications when they issue a customised missed approach clearance while the crew is trying to hear each other's calls and get the configuration done. It is several kinds of ugly. The crew ends up having to override the very automation that was designed to make the maneuver as safe as possible, so opens up the threat of an altitude bust, tracking error, flap or gear overspeed, or all of the above. I will say, it looks to me like the controllers are being pressured to shoehorn as many aircraft as they can fit into the pattern, leave no excess space or holes, but they don't have the right tools to do it smoothly. It ends up coming down to the gut of the controller. If they have the right picture, it is all good. Shave it too tight and you have a go around, which starts a domino of an unplanned aircraft now needing to get fit in to the approach stream, or on the other end, aircraft in the flare while an aircraft is rotating off the far end. This second case is more of a concern than the first. Mark my words, One of these days, we are going to have a lander and departure on the same runway at the same time. Vs
  6. SFO Incident

    Much of the information that would allow an objective look at this event is lost or otherwise unavailable to us. That said, it seems to be that perception is a common element in all of the unanswered questions. Why did the crew believe their approach was correct for so long? When did the ground traffic perceive the threat? What did the tower controller see and when? What level of threat was perceived at the time of the event, when was the current level of concern reached and how? (this last question speaks directly to the timing of the report) We can debate the various technical limitations of the navigation systems, but this was supposed to be a visual approach. While it is easy to say, it is helpful to me to keep in mind that, at one time, ALL approaches were visual, until we as an industry learned that visual cues were sometimes absent, insufficient or misleading. Misleading visual cues have been biting us a lot lately. Bottom line, this crew perceived their approach as safe for quite a while. Why was that, and what ultimately changed their mind? Was it the call from the ground traffic, or did they see something on their own? Understanding what they saw and processed is going to be the key to mitigating a future occurrence. FWIW Vs
  7. A rather witty colleague once advised me that GTAA is an acronym for 'Go To Another Airport'..... Vs
  8. SFO Incident

    Rich, WRT RNP, the answer is, 'it depends'. There are a number of approaches in North America that can be flown with DME/DME/IRS, others, of course, that require GPS. Of interest, even an RNP 0.3 approach would have had enough error to span the difference between the runway and taxiway. That said, this was a visual approach so that aspect should not normally have been a factor. I am sure the NTSB will be looking at all of that. Vs
  9. SFO Incident

    I think the ILS is there to back up the side step so you don't crowd 28L traffic. RNAV approaches are great, but on a non GPS aircraft, the amount of error is enough that we lost the ability to identify the FAF solely based on FMS position. So the centreline displayed and tracked might be a long way off from the runway itself. In terms of effort, if the ILS is hard tuned, bringing up the ILS at the end of the LNAV segment is a one button 'LS" selection, but you lose the LNAV/VNAV deviation display when you do that and get some other messages. The secondary flight plan option would work, but it's a heads down task at at point when I would prefer to have both of us less loaded. I'd have to look to see if the missed approach is the same for the visual and ILS as well. Interesting options though. Vs
  10. SFO Incident

    Thanks Rich. Rats. I read your post and thought, man that would be an elegant solution to these hybrid situations.. If it's not a thing, maybe it should be. Cheers Vs
  11. SFO Incident

    Rich, just confirming something. AFAIK the FMS Bridge Visual is a full RNAV approach, flown in FINAL APP with its own minima on PERF. I haven't (yet) seen anyone string the ILS onto the back of the RNAV to facilitate an automatic transition from managed/managed RNAV to fully coupled. At present, the ILS can be hard tuned for a manual transition close in, but selecting LS display gets you a warning on APP guidance. Is there a specific technique to doing what you describe? Thanks Vs
  12. Interesting re Life Choices

    Well, political correctness has cropped up elsewhere, why not double down? In my view, we seem to have come into this age of collision between fair and functional - individual beliefs that they should have unlimited freedom to do as they please while taking no ownership for the attendant and expected side effects. it's not just in the workplace, but it most certainly IS there. I see the problem as more fundamental than race or gender. It is like some sort of societal pandemic of narcissism. Where can I find leverage to get my way? Non-workplace, but related - I think of the passenger sitting beside me, wanting to delay door closing, because he wanted an update from the flight deck on arrival time, BEFORE PUSHBACK, to see if it was really worth his time to travel (transborder flight with checked bags, pushing ON SKED). Choosing a career and workplace - well, one should choose wisely. Want to work as a bomb disposal expert? give 'take your kids to work day' a pass. I know, it hurts. Child in the flight deck, well, not too likely at the moment, but DEFCON I would echo your sentiment. There are legitimate instances where discrimination is a problem. Protections exist for some very good reasons. But to chose a career, and an employer, whose network and scheduling practices are known and integral to their business, then insert your own timing needs strikes me as stretching the intent of the protections. Likewise, choose a high risk occupation, the money is not for nothing. A jump seat rider requiring extensive supervision is a safety problem. Put another way. As I get older and greyer, I find I get off to a better start when I wake up slowly, have a coffee or two, find a nice spot for breakfast, go for a walk or maybe read a paper. I wonder how it would go with crew sked if I delayed my pickup time for a couple of hours and claimed discrimination based on age when they rightly hammer me for it. Actually, that's a lie. I'm pretty certain how it would go.. Vs
  13. Are Pilotless Planes in Our Future?

    The biggest issue I see with proposals like this is that the proponents omit critical components of the safety process. Sure, the AP will precisely fly a track, altitude, and profile. But should it fly that track? I have lost count of the number of times our crew has had to refuse a minimum time or fuel routing because of weather or CAT. Dispatch has its criteria, normally aligned with ours, but perspectives differ. It is why we have a 'most conservative vote rules' policy. Ditto, while enroute, how many times have we received recommendations to optimise our route, only to refuse because the recommendation took us right through weather or reported turbulence that was not showing on radar. While pilots are fine individuals [said without a hint of bias ;-)] , the simple element of being onboard to experience what the passenger experiences leads to better decisions on behalf of everyone. Having a digital readout in a control centre on the ground that the aircraft is taking G in turbulence is pretty much useless. As always, just my opinion. Vs
  14. SFO

    For the record, I am not admin. I don't delete threads. UD, I have no idea what 'other thread' you are talking about. I suggest going forward, you consider commenting on topics instead of personal invective and innuendo. But that is your choice. Vs
  15. SFO Incident

    UD, I offered my comments in good faith. Your response is, well, unfortunate. You clearly have no idea what I think, and your comments reflect zero insight into the function of the crew of 759. You seem to have a strong need to attack, filter and reframe comments into an invalid context. Finally, you seem to want the freedom to slander Air Canada employees and spread innuendo at will, up to and including your implication of violation of federal statues and destruction of evidence. Your reply when reminded of the law, shown it in fact is that you'll take your chances and want to see who else has been convicted. If you want to act like a troll you will be disregarded as one. Vs