Vsplat

Donating Member
  • Content count

    1,262
  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    31

Vsplat last won the day on March 13

Vsplat had the most liked content!

Community Reputation

232 Excellent

1 Follower

About Vsplat

  • Rank
    5

Recent Profile Visitors

2,038 profile views
  1. I have to ask when is this densification going to hit its limit? There are very real health effects already. The trouble is, the passenger population chases price point. So when this launches, passengers will demand the same price on carriers that don't use the same seating. On this trend line, at some point (and not saying this is it), an airline is going to have to make a decision between something known to be harmful to its passengers and meeting their price expectations. Vs
  2. That's severity as measured by the lab. The threshold for pilot disqualification is much lower, I had the score in a document at some point. We had to reference it as we had a fellow caught in the gap. Not serious enough for the pilot to get priority or to claim the cost of the device, but serious enough for TC to park them. Was not a good situation and it took a while to resolve. Of course, response time for a lab also varies by centre. You are right to identify sleep apnea as an under-factored safety issue, not only for the immediate hazards you correctly identify, but also for the longer term risk of cardiac events. The only catch for pilots is how to go about the investigation in order to avoid unintended and unnecessary hardship. Vs
  3. Sleep apnea (above a certain threshold) is a disqualifying condition for pilots unless CPAP or adequate alternative mitigation is shown to be effective.There is a grading scale. The cutoff for a pilot medical is clearly noted in the US, less widely known here. Alternate mitigation can be postural or something less than a full device. That is important as travelling with a CPAP creates other issues, especially if the pilot is on an augmented crew where onboard sleep is part of the deal. A friend who works in a sleep study lab tells me that the vast majority of people she sees have some degree of sleep apnea. Sleep studies are being prescribed so frequently now (due to the increasing BMI of our population) that booking initial studies can be difficult, and follow up studies require specific conditions to be met or, in many cases, a lab won't take the booking. If a pilot gets grounded and needs follow up to show that their mitigation works, that follow up study goes into the general population queue. Depending on the centre, we can be talking months. So while exploring the threat is worthwhile, for pilots at least, it is a step that must be taken in concert with their company medical staff (or HR) as the pilot may find themselves grounded on the spot and for a long time. Some companies react rather badly to this happening mid month. The Canadian aeromedical approach needs some work to avoid unnecessarily grounding a lot of pilots. IMO Vs
  4. I don't think the wheel's departure would have necessarily affected the brake assembly. Vs
  5. It would have been better had you taken your own advice. You don't know what anyone else does or does not read. This is just getting silly.. You don't agree, fine. But to portray the reason as some sort of defect on the other person's part is, well, odd. Vs
  6. We can be done any time you want. But you did not ask a question just about pilots and fatigue. You linked an acute incapacitation event to something else and I objected. The reason my point hasn't changed, is because it IS my point. If you want to talk about fatigue, you can. What I object to is leveraging an incapacitation event to talk about it, when we have nothing to suggest a relationship. I can read. There is no need to be condescending or repeat a post 'just for' me. But for the record, you will know that your original post is not all you said on the matter. I quoted you as you continued to add context that simply was not in the report. I won't insult you by repeating the quotes, I am sure you can read, too. The report is not secret. It is also not (yet at least) about fatigue. It should come as no surprise to you, reading and all, that I think speculation like this has to be done carefully as it is so often wrong. But certainly, done is as good as this is going to get. Vs
  7. Or we could just stick to the facts - Oh yes, that is where this all started. There are none released except what was in the report. Nothing about fatigue, the status of kids in the home, or whether in fact the Rouge FO was' young', or for that matter who was flying. We don't even know if the sufferer of the medical event was the younger or older of the crew. Instead of this ever expanding circle of assumption to try and justify a completely unsupported theory, why not just back up and let the crew work with their support team, and let the investigators do their thing? That strikes me as the minimum professional respect we can offer this crew, one of which may, for all we know, still be ill. Vs
  8. I don't think we are on the same page. Unless you are privy to something not stated in the report, there is no indication as to cause. All we know is that there was a loss of consciousness short final. Clearly unexpected. I don't know anyone in their right mind who would commence an approach if they did not feel up to it. There would have been a transfer of control in that case. If you want to start a generic discussion about fatigue, fill your boots. But speculating and connecting dots that aren't there in this case is not helpful IMO. Vs
  9. The title of the thread says 'asleep at the wheel' and your first statement is about 'this sort of thing' when referencing the event. Maybe not your intent, but it sure looks to me as if you have assumed this was a fatigue event. My 'assumption' is just the opposite. This has the hall marks of something acute. Vs
  10. Deicer, there may be a future for that technology,( but I can't say I welcome the inevitable evolution of rolling OLED billboard messages) In the short term, adhesion, wear and static affect the existing films and coatings. Before we see OLED film I would like to see ice phobic film that stays put and doesn't pit or peel back. But we will get there eventually. When you see your first HSBC ad scrawled in lights along the fuselage of an A380, remember where you read it first..;-) Vs
  11. Let's be clear: We don't know, with any precision, the level of situational awareness in the flight deck, how it evolved or why. It's easy to say the crew did not know they were in trouble until it was too late, but such a statement can too easily be construed as suggesting that they missed something. Sometimes it's not a question of missing something vital, but including something vital that should be accurate and trustworthy but for whatever reason is not. Put another way: Any crew operating at this level, in these conditions, having already faced the decisions this one had, would be updating constantly. High data flow is a double edged sword - Correct data leads to higher precision. Incorrect data the opposite. The faster you upload new data, the faster you correct obsolete information, - or propagate the effects of a bad data source. There are methods to test and verify navigational and positional accuracy, but most of these are intended for use prior to final approach. if a data source goes from accurate to inaccurate inside the FAF, depending on what it is, how it degrades and when, the deterioration may be next to impossible to detect. Remember this was not an ILS, so no glidepath flag, no vertical dots, just the aircraft seeming to fly the flight path it was told to fly. There is no comparator within the instruments that will tell the crew if the aircraft is vertically displaced from a selected flight path angle by turbulence/ shear. There is nothing to warn if the aircraft enters a region of unusual pressure affecting altimeter or vertical speed. The environment, as we all know, was difficult, but did something in there result in the crew getting wrong or misleading information? Only the TSB and whoever they consult with knows at this point. All we, as public onlookers have, are opinion and theory. All that to say, I have looked at as much of this file as anyone I know outside of the investigators. I have not yet seen anything to put a finger on the crew. FWIW Vs
  12. Bear in mind that radio altitude is not provided on charts except for CAT III and CAT II that uses RA for Decision Height. Not available for non precision approaches or CAT I ILS. Interpreting Radio Altitude in a dynamic environment would be confusing, especially for non-localizer approaches, as even minor deviations and bank angles would mess with it, Barometric cross checks are the norm of course, but even for enhanced charts like some of the Jeppesen products, the cross check values inside the FAF are ISA. Not much use once cold corrections are applied unless the crew corrects the whole strip. I don't know of an operator that does that. Then there is the FPA correction for cold. From what I can see the result of this correction is not a consistent flight path, but one whose arc is intended to intersect with MDA at about the right spot. The exact shape of that arc changes for every approach. Cross checks would be approximate. Maybe effective mitigation, too early to know for sure. So many moving parts to this, it will really take the whole report to understand what got a hold of this flight. Vs
  13. 4 pages worth. Hmmm. Maybe we can establish/reset some basics. In the old days, Non precision descents used a target vertical speed tied to an expected groundspeed. If groundspeed was different, the vertical profile would be different than planned and the aircraft would arrive at MDA too early or too late. SELECTED FPA on the narrow body Airbus is intended to do nothing more than augment vertical speed with accurate compensation for groundspeed, so fly a consistent, expected vertical profile regardless of groundspeed. Seemed to be a good fix for 'the old way". But, while those using vertical speed intuitively understood that it was not anchored anywhere, that understanding did not seem to transfer to selected FPA. I believe the biggest reason for this confusion is that, on the Airbus, there is both SELECTED FPA, described above, and MANAGED FPA. MANAGED FPA IS anchored. It will join two points at the indicated altitudes stated in the FMS. MANAGED FPA is known to be dependent on barometric values (HDG/VS), so when it is cold and FAF crossing altitude in the box is wrong, managed can't be used. For a time, Airbus advertised that, while MANAGED FPA used HDG/VS mode and so was barometric, SELECTED FPA used TRK/FPA mode, at the time considered to include only inertial data and so would keep the aircraft on the selected path no matter the termperature, wind, whatever. The path was still unanchored, so where that path ended was entirely dependent on when it started, but at least it was going to be predictable. Well, that got challenged right around 2000 and the discussion of barometric influence on selected FPA started to emerge. What has happened since has been a confusing debate between operators of countries that correct altimeters for cold, those that don;t, and Airbus. The thread here is a good reflection of most of that debate. Some of us on this forum fly the bus, and you can see the many ways this is understood. Does it need to be so complex? Maybe the answer to that question will come out of all this. FWIW Vs
  14. Maybe a different thread at this point. Our approval required two things: temperature correction for the target vertical speed and verification that the pitch down technique resulted in the aircraft capturing the expected flight path close to where the crew thought they were. Like the Airbus selected FPA, vertical speed is unanchored. Start in the wrong place or at the wrong height and you are not going to end up where you need to... Vs
  15. Blues, I wouldn't either, on that we agree. The sad fact is that there is a certain sub-class of humanity that will draw inspiration for financially motivated assault from anywhere they can. Outrageous claims get their start somewhere. I'll leave it there, I think we have handily thumped this aspect of things. Of course, we would not have to have such a discussion if the TSB released its report in a timely manner, then we could at least talk about what actually happened. Vs