Vsplat

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Vsplat last won the day on March 22

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About Vsplat

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  1. To be specific, the warning system will notify the crew if the sensor site(s) do not report what is expected for a given condition. If the flap is deformed, twisted or damaged, there is no guarantee that the damaged area(s) will be near the sensors. This was the issue with the CRJ 100 and 200 early on, there was an ability for flap twist on extension to go undetected by the aircraft's own monitoring system, so they had to be set at the gate before pushback and visually verified with external witness marks. A chunk of ice could easily cause this kind of issue I think. My guess is the FAA doesn't believe the sensor coverage is adequate to detect the problem. Vs
  2. Actually, this used to be SOP for many aircraft with leading edge devices after landing where reverse or deep contamination could result in stuff being thrown up into the flap or slat internals. The problem is that the warning systems are all modeled on known or expected failure modes, not high power actuators trying to compress un-compressible ice with a poor innocent slat in the middle. Vs
  3. The exit sign thing is complete nonsense. A good chunk of the word does not speak french but does understand EXIT. Is this individual really so bereft of world knowledge that they think all aircraft stay within Canada? I can't think of a single mainline type that does that. Vs
  4. Not this guy again. It's like he's made a cottage industry out of suing AC. I have to ask. Is this really about being the saviour of la francophonie, or is it just about the money or whatever need is met by this conflict? I believe he is bilingual, is he not? Lives in Ontario, works in Ottawa, is he federal civil service? Things that make you go 'Hmmmm'. Vs
  5. The issue with all of these 'hard stop' rules is that the application for exemption is examined by people who sit at a desk and go to the food court for coffee breaks. Even if they once worked in industry, the memories of waking up tired and going to work because the alternative was too hard on their families are long gone. Just like we all get that having the pilots onboard the same aircraft as their passengers yields safer decisions, the corollary is also true. A regulator who is not living with the reason for a protective rule is far more likely to grant an exemption from it. The numbers give an appearance of objectivity and it is too easy to dismiss the union complaints as featherbedding. All just my opinion. Vs
  6. Hmmm. The few times I have had passengers removed from a flight I was operating, it was an ordeal for the flight attendants and they double checked with me before doing it, as they were worried whether they would be supported. It's neither easy on them, nor pleasant and not something I have ever seen done without a lot having gone wrong. Indeed, there have been several cases where I had to trust the in-charge, when a passenger was already acting up with the door open, they felt it would settle down and we could push back with them. I've been in the cabin for a couple of passenger 'behaviour' moments, and in neither case did the passenger have any insight into how offside they were. It doesn't surprise me in these cases to read the passenger's 'I am a completely innocent victim' statement and complete assignment of blame to the staff. Disruptive passengers are a threat. I feel for the in flight crew here. How do you accurately forecast the behaviour of someone you have never met, giving you grief before the door is closed? Will they ultimately trigger a diversion in the middle of a long flight? Will another passenger be harmed because you decided to give this one person the benefit of the doubt? Finally, it's not like it is a secret that bad behaviour is not tolerated. If someone really can't keep their act together during boarding, it should come as no surprise to them that they are given a time out and possibly grounded until they can explain their actions. My $0.02. Vs
  7. I've been asked to remove my uniform hat when deadheading by the gate agent. It's a requirement and so I comply. There's no story here. Vs
  8. I love this. 'without knowing the specifics...this area is known for turbulence'. So, without knowing anything, this is what is known. BS. These people who cannot wait to get their face in front of a camera are an embarrassment. Without knowing the specifics, the message should be, wait for the facts, thoughts for the passengers and crew. Full stop. Vs
  9. Well, I don't think there is any clause in the law that says the victim of a fraud has to trap it immediately or give the fraudster what they want. I don't know why Gabor Lukacs thinks a business can't suspend travel privileges for someone connected to a fraud. How else can they stop the loss? Photo ops make people say just about anything it seems. Vs
  10. I saw the article. Too bad this woman was taken by a fraudster. She seems to think that she should be made whole because she couldn't detect the fraud. Then in the same article, there is this claim that Air Canada should not have any claim on its costs, because it couldn't detect the same fraud. In her own words, she claimed to be buying 'employee discount tickets'. Well, even if real, those would be for employees, right? Hmmmm. I think this is only a story because it's Air Canada and CBC. All just my opinion Vs
  11. Another perspective view
  12. De-icing is gonna be a bear. I guess no question about fuselage anti-icing, but that is gonna be a lot of fluid going into those engines. I would imagine the 'cold dry snow' case wouldn't matter, can't risk shedding a sheet of ice that big. Maybe in-wing sensors would be the answer. Vs
  13. Kip, do you really want to see that bet called?
  14. Agreed. Saved my Dad. 'But', he said with a smile, 'this really is a pain in the ...' Sorry, could not resist Vs
  15. A minor point here. The 737MAX still holds a valid type certificate in most parts of the world. The aircraft is not technically grounded - it is restricted from commercial service. Many have flown since the restrictions came into force, ferry flights to storage for example. Re-certification would require an additional step of revoking the existing certification. Given how much time has passed, I think that still possible, but remote. Reading some of the other threads on this, there does appear to be some smoke to the story about refurbished AOA sensors. Whether that turns into something more, we'll see. That might attract a lot of lightning and split the focus somewhat. None of this takes away from the obvious - serious errors were made in the certification of this design and the prioritization of getting the common type rating seems to have resulted in the introduction of a fatally flawed MCAS system. What I would like to know is, for operators who own only the MAX and for whom a common type rating is unimportant, why have MCAS at all? Can it be disabled at this point? Vs