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Alt 2 (A / B)


rokky

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Well simply Bonin wasn't supposed to be on the F/D at all.

In 2008, 30 F/As were fast-tracked due to pressure by Unions onto the RH-seat .

The fast-tracked F/As were exempted from standard tests.

This is why Dubois asks Bonin prior to handing over controls "T'as le PL, toi?" ("You got the licence, right?").

He asked this because he doubted that Bonin only had what the French call the "Theorotical Licence" i.e. sim-time only.

Dubois remember had failed his A332 recency in 2007 and had always been a reluctant Captain and only became one very late in his career.

When they were frantically buzzing him, he wasn't in the Crew Rest Area but was chatting with his mistress and other F/As.

He rushed back only because he sensed that the plane was rocking and rolling.

What was the first he said one he entered back on the F/D? "Qu'est-ce que vous foutez, là?" ("WTF, are you guys doing?").

Now, going back on how and why this mess initially started: Bonin had pulled on his S/S because he used it as an handle whilst adjusting his seat.

This caused the plane to climb aggresively and only then did things start going wrong.

Remember that neither Bonin nor Robert were never strapped to their seats .

This was the first time that all 3 had ever flown together.

The inbound AF445 never debriefed the outbound AF447.

The standards at AF are so bad that all their Airbus instructors have been undergoing re-education and re-habilitation under the aegis of military A342 instructors of Estérel Squadron (F-RAJA & F-RAJB).

http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Escadron_de_transport_3/60_Est%C3%A9rel

http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/505178-french-licences.html

http://blogs.mediapart.fr/blog/herve-labarthe/081212/pierre-cedric-bonin-le-pilote-du-rio-paris-possedait-il-ou-non-la-li

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Guest rozar s'macco

Now, going back on how and why this mess initially started: Bonin had pulled on his S/S because he used it as an handle whilst adjusting his seat.

sure buddy, go home
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Kinda disjointed posts, lots of assumptions, many quite bizarre, and a fixation on two tragic events......

Rich...love illogical statements...Bazinnnnnnga !!! :Grin-Nod:

Rokky.... If you post a link, such as you did in Post # 3 in this thread,....make sure it works

...............Both incidents you have referred to have been discussed to death on this forum as well as PPrune...you just have to find the threads as both sad accidents are really "old" news

...............Perhaps you would get more appropriate responses if you explained what your goal is at the beginning of each thread or perhaps just a "little" background information about your role in life

...............Have a nice week

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>>Bonin wasn't supposed to be on the F/D at all....He doubted that Bonin only had what the French call the "Theorotical Licence" i.e. sim-time only.<<

At the time of the accident, Bonnin had over 800 hours in type.

His training record indicates he had received "Additional A330 type rating and line training in December 2008"

>>Now, going back on how and why this mess initially started: Bonin had pulled on his S/S because he used it as an handle whilst adjusting his seat.<<

There is no evidence what-so-ever to support that statement. The seats are primarily moved with an electric switch on in the inboard side of the seat, and there is no need for a hand hold. Bonon's movement on the sidestick began right after the AP disconnected. The aft movement of the sidestick began coincident with his struggling to control the airplane latterally.

>>Remember that neither Bonin nor Robert were never strapped to their seats .<<

Final report (english) pg 110:

"The left side seat was in the “storage” position on impact. The pilot (PNF) was attached

via the lap belt.
The right side seat was positioned 5.5 cm from the most forward position with a right
side armrest bearing the indication of A3 adjustment. This adjustment is consistent
with the piloting position of a pilot with the morphology of the PF. The pilot (PF) was
attached via lap and crotch belts.
>>This was the first time that all 3 had ever flown together.<<
They flew together on the way down.
Final report,page 24:
"The crew had left Paris on Thursday 28 May 2009 in the morning and arrived in
Rio de Janeiro in the evening of the same day."
>>The inbound AF445 never debriefed the outbound AF447.<<
So what. This isn't 1945
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@ wfpalmer: gr8 stuff and tx for having cleared up all the doubts and hype.

There are far too many purveyors of crap on AF447 driven by twisted sensationalist agendas that pervert the discourse of safety.

What a coincidence that you posted @ 04:47 PM!

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Now back to the original question:

Is the autopilot available in alternate law?

The answer is 'sometimes' - depending on what failed.

As soon as I figure out how to paste an image from my computer I'll post the reconfiguration table that lists the failures for each situation. (anyone?)

In the case of these loss of airspeed events, typically, depending on how long the airspeeds were lost for, the autopilot remains unavailable for the remainder of the flight. The triggers for this are explained in my book "Understanding Air France 447" (hey, can't give it all away)

The investigation was unable to determine if any attempts were made to reengage the AP. I doubt they tried though, Bonin was too busy trying to fly the airplane, struggling with the roll axis, and possibly unaware of what to do with pitch without the trusty flight director (which when it did come back on (except for the first few seconds) gave inappropriate guidance to continue the climb.

It should be noted that it takes very little effort to pull back on the SS and pitch the airplane up, and unlike positively stable conventionally controlled aircraft, the airplane will then maintain that pitch up with absolutely no input from the pilot. This would be an un-certifiable behavior were it not for the built-in protections , which of course were not working. This is why the ECAM says "Alternate law, maneuver with care."

Bonin did pitch down some, at the bequest of Robert (who should have simply taken over), but only enough to stop the climb, not return to the original cruise altitude and regain the 90+ knots lost in the climb (thus making it impossible to maintain altitude).

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New book just out by Bill Palmer, (an A330 Captain & author), Understanding AF447 (kindle version, & book version), and companion website which has numerous links to related sites.

Edit - I've just received a positive endorsement of this book from a friend who, in many ways, was quite close to this event - it's a 'buy' as far as he is concerned.

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