boestar

Ladies and Gentlemen, welcome to Marana.  Please remain seated until the aircraft comes to a complete stop in this gaggle of parked aluminium tubes.

Beautiful plane in any colour

they could be used to create artificial coral reefs.  That would be a good use

why do they make it sound like the airlines fault?  They have no control over placing it back into service.

When the Regulators and Boeing drop the puck, you can bet it won't be long before they are in the air.

On 1/18/2020 at 11:46 AM, Turbofan said:

It is my understanding that even the 737 Max simulator does not currently simulate MCAS.  Remember MCAS was something no one knew about.  Why would it be simulated? The current sim training in the Max tries to mimic MCAS with multiple trim runaways. The NG sim can do this.  The problem I’m told with this workaround is that MCAS trims much quicker.  

I am presuming here that new sim/Max software is part of Max recertification and training program. If this is the case it would also make sense to me that Boeing produce an MCAS module for the NG simulators.  Flip a switch in an NG sim and simulate Max MCAS.

I find it hard to believe that Boeing would not have a plan for the lack of Max sims.

One would think that all of the flight control software would have been provided to CAE to simulate the function as expected on the aircraft.  Likely that functionality is simulated but the failure mode is not.

If the simulator behaviour deviates from tha tof the actual aircraft, how can Cat D be supported?

Thats what a contract is for.  When I leave, No matter how crappy a job I did, I get $X,000,000 on departure.

This is the problem today.  Over compensated incompetence.

25 minutes ago, deicer said:

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51058929

 

"This airplane is designed by clowns who in turn are supervised by monkeys."

The Basic aircraft and systems design is very old.  Although the aircraft has gone through an evolution, A LOT of the original still remains.

As the aircraft has been revised, instead of redesigning systems to a more current standard, they were patch worked over old systems.  This continued through 3 major evolutions of the aircraft.  The MAX, as I have said before, is just makeup on a pig.  Its just like an old Mainframe computer with a flashy new GUI interface.  Pretty on the outside but still the same old clunky machine on the inside.

Boeing was short sighted when they decided new engines would help it compete with the 320 NEO. 

Boeing needs a clean slate design to compete with the airbus.  They also need to get the bean counters out of the head shed and get some engineers back in there.  Build a well engineered machine and by default the bean counters will be made happy.  NOT the other way around.

20 hours ago, Homerun said:

The Max sim does not replicate the MCAS scenario.  They are training for it by having one pilot trim nose down to approximate the MCAS firing but the trim change is much slower.

That is an issue.  The CAT D certification should be lifted as it does not replicate the aircraft in its entirety.

I would think that, in light of the high profile nature of the issue, they are training some of these scenarios.

Theoretically (and I do not know for sure) if you introduce a failure of the AOA in the sim, it should reproduce the fault.  Simulators are "Supposed" to mimic the aircraft systems exactly.  I would hope this was not overlooked when the specifications were given to the sim manufacturers.

On 1/7/2020 at 2:14 PM, dagger said:

According to  aerospace blogger Jon Ostrower, Boeing is going to recommend full simulator training for all MAX pilots as part of the re-launch. FAA has the final call.

 

From the NY Times

Boeing’s decision stems from its analysis of flight simulator tests of the Max it conducted with airline pilots from United, Aeromexico, American Airlines and Southwest last month, according to a person familiar with the matter. 

In the tests, which were part of the work involved in evaluating the software update, many of the pilots did not use the correct procedures to handle emergencies, instead relying on their flying skills. Those results raised questions about whether simply informing pilots of which procedures to use would be sufficient to prepare them to fly the plane. 

There are currently 34 certified Max flight simulators worldwide, according to a person familiar with the matter. Getting pilots trained in the machines, which are designed to replicate emergency scenarios, will add another hurdle for airlines, who have struggled with mounting losses throughout the Max crisis. 

Airlines may also be able to use the more than 200 737 NG simulators to conduct the training, though it isn’t clear yet whether that is possible.

From what I hear the idle MAX guys at AC are doing Simulator rides while waiting for the plane to return

Its easier to rescue them from a ditched aircraft than to upgrade the airport landing aids and such.  probably cheaper too

2 hours ago, Don Hudson said:

From the WSJ, 2020.01.02

Boeing’s Commitment To Automation Grows

BY ANDY PASZTOR AND ANDREW TANGEL

Boeing Co. is increasingly committed to transferring more control of aircraft from pilots to computers after two crashes exposed flaws in an automated system on its 737 MAX that overpowered aviators in the disasters.

Executives at Boeing and other makers of planes and cockpit-automation systems for some time have believed more-sophisticated systems are necessary to serve as backstops for pilots, help them assimilate information and, in some cases, provide immediate responses to imminent hazards.

Now, such changes seek to address the fact that pilots might not react to problems— including those tied to automation— as quickly or proficiently as designers assumed, according to former and current Boeing officials and industry exec- utives. The view took hold after a flight-control system known as MCAS put two MAX jets into fatal nosedives within the past 14 months that together killed 346 people.

“We are going to have to ultimately almost—almost— make these planes fly on their own,” then-Boeing Chairman Dave Calhoun said in a CNBC interview in November. Mr. Calhoun is to become the plane maker’s chief executive Jan. 13.

While the MAX’s problems stemmed from a misguided design of automation, many engineers and airline executives remain confident that properly devised computerized features have proven extremely reliable and will prevent accidents. They cite the safety benefits of everything from automated engine adjustments to computer-controlled landing maneuvers that are more precise and predictable than any pilot commands.

Over the years, Boeing rival Airbus SE has tended to devise systems in which pilots are trained to let automated systems handle emergencies, and company executives have said that approach will continue.

Executives at Boeing and Airbus have said they are also designing flight-control systems tailored for younger pilots, who generally have less flying time in their logbooks and a more innate familiarity with technology than aviators of years past.

Airbus recently unveiled touch screens designed by France’s Thales SA for its A350 wide-body aircraft. Airbus is pursuing additional automation for single-pilot aircraft and enhanced computer-controlled responses to midair collision warnings, according to officials at the company and in the industry.

Boeing also plans to tailor its design and training to better serve the more globally diverse group of pilots now flying its planes, said former and current company officials familiar with the plans.

Engineers predict an expansion of automated safeguards including, possibly, artificial intelligence to assist pilots. “Such features are certainly going to have a greater role in air carrier cockpits,” said Alan Diehl, a former military and civilian accident investigator who was one of the first automation specialists for the Federal Aviation Administration.

Some of the new systems Boeing and other companies are working on are designed to maintain stable flight while pilots troubleshoot in moments— like those during both MAX crashes—when crews face cascades of emergency alerts and warnings that can be confusing or contradictory.

“Automation can help by verifying that pilots are doing the right things, and then helping them all the way through” an incident, said Kevin Hiatt, a former airline captain and industry safety executive.

While manufacturers said automation fosters safety, some aviation experts harbor concerns. Studies have shown that undue

reliance on automation can degrade manual flying skills, or make pilots less decisive in emergencies. The MAX tragedies also show how automated features can backfire if they malfunction, said Mica Endsley, an industry consultant and former chief scientist for the Air Force.

“Engineers get very enamored with their automation,” Ms. Endsley said. “When we assume it’s perfect, then we don’t design” necessary defenses for pilots. Under most circumstances, she added, it is essential for pilots to recognize when specific automation kicks in and to have some training dealing with it.

Boeing and Airbus have been automating some aspects of flight for decades, innovations that have helped make aviation the safest mode of transportation. From early versions of autopilots to the introduction of automated landing systems and cockpit layouts dominated by video screens, computers have steadily gained control of commercial flight.

Beginning in the 1980s, Airbus devised what is called flyby- wire automation to prevent accidents. No matter what commands pilots give, under normal circumstances, computers on board won’t let them turn a plane too sharply or raise the nose to too steep an angle. Boeing,

by contrast, traditionally designed automated systems that could be overruled by crew commands.

That distinction started blurring long before automation- gone-haywire overpowered two MAX crews. Boeing has crafted extensive fly-by-wire applications, some beyond the control of pilots.

Now Boeing is rethinking how to tailor more-sophisticated automation without forsaking its pilot-centric design approach, said the current and former company officials.

“We’re also going to take a look at the pilot-machine interface on our airplanes in designing that for the next generation, as technology is rapidly evolving,” then-CEO Dennis Muilenburg told a congressional hearing in October.

Boeing’s automation projects include an electrically powered cargo plane that would fly without any aviators on board. Before the second MAX crashed in March, it said it had completed the initial test flight of a totally autonomous prototype vehicle that can take off and land vertically.

 

In the past, I have always like the Boeing Model of "break the airplane to save the passengers" mentality.  Self preservation is a powerful tool that cannot be perfectly implemented in computer logic.

Yes it has failed us in the past but I am still a firm believer that I and the pilot and the computer is here to assist me, NOT the other way around.

In order to achieve a fully automated, or even mostly automated, aircraft.  One should definitely NOT start with the 737.  A clean slate design would be needed and is long overdue.

Many moons ago when the A320 made its debut and had its issues (teething problems) I though "no way would I let a computer be in charge" Now 30 odd years later I think the Airbus methodology was very well implemented.  Far better that the multitude of re-hashes of the 737.

It's time Boeing got back to being an engineering company and stop being a finance company

I get that that is the way you see it but in reality it is within the control of the airline.  that is why we pay hotels and meals for delays caused by mechanicals.  Always have always will.

That would normally affect the first flight of the day.  A Hydraulic system failure on turn for example would be within the airlines control and require restitution as this was no "scheduled" maintenance activity.

We fight these daily 

16 hours ago, conehead said:

And mechanical faults are also beyond airline control.

nope mechanical faults rest on the airline.  Thats why we fight them

either way.  poorly handled or there is more to the story

What am I missing here?  The flight diverted to "YUL due to weather at the destination.  I get that.  Why not just have the passengers informed that the flight will continue when the conditions improve and make arrangements as such.  Freezing rain in eastern and central Ontario is no laughing matter.  there is no way in hell I would take a bus down that stretch of the 401 in freezing rain.  How does this equate to 11 days wait?

These LCC guys need to learn how to handle IROPS.  The response is pathetic.

Weather is the one thing that is beyond airline control and does not demand compensation.  However the handling of the situation by the airline should get something for the passengers.

On 11/10/2019 at 7:49 PM, Marshall said:

 We are def. not (LATELEY) CONSIDERED TO BE relevant on the world stage.  As far as being an Aerospace Leader, that is not dependent on us buying new toys for our own use, it is however dependent on us producing aircraft and powerplants that the rest of the world admires and purchases. 

Which they do and their governments use them to move their leaders.

When you think about it.  For all the money the government gave to Bombardier / Canadair over the years, They should be giving the government 2 brand new aircraft.

Quote

"First of all, they are not very comfortable," he said. "Secondly, this plane, because of the old aeronautical system, had to fly under 10,000 feet all the way across the Atlantic, burned a lot more fuel in the process and required more stops."

UMM...NOT RVSM?  The 601 or the 604 should both be certified RVSM.  If there was a FL restriction to 10,000 feet then they probably should have taken another plane

As I stated before.  Boeing says its just a "feel" thing.  In practicality it is a stall protection thing.  

They parked firmly in a grey area that is becoming less and less grey as the light shines upon it.

Homerun.  I agree completely that is the 737 MAX was a clean slate design with FBW, We, Boeing and the FAA would not be having this discussion.

Yep thats the Boeing description.

However the dynamics of it tell a different story.  Left unchecked certain Thrust vectors on the engine installation will cause a pitch up of the airframe, increasing the AOA of the aircraft. (That sounds like the description of an impending stall no?)  Left unchecked the aircraft will eventually stall.

This is something that the NG did not do.  

So to make it behave more like the NG and NOT stall they added MCAS.  Boeing can spin it any way they want to as can others but in the end, no matter what you call it, the end purpose was to prevent the aircraft from reaching a high enough AOA to stall.

I have seen a long in the tooth Boeing 727 refit with modern avionics and systems simply because the aircraft was still viable and the modifications were cheaper than buing a new aircraft, spares, training etc. etc.

Canada manufactures some of the best Business aircraft on the market.  I have see many delivered to different governments around the world.  I personally think the executive fleet should represent the best Canada has to offer.  Perhaps a Global 7000 or the like.  Long range, large aircraft, Canadian Made.

The Challenger is still a good aircraft but to represent Canada is something cutting edge would be better.

I think it is semantics.  The system is designed to make the plane behave like an NG by preventing a stall which is defined as a stall prevention system.  Call it anything that makes you feel good but in the most base description, the MCAS is there to prevent a Stall.

It is an excuse.  the Challenger 601 is still a viable airframe.  Take them oout of service and contract one of the Big MRO companies to redo the aircraft and upgrade the systems.  It would cost a couple of million but thats cheap compared to 50M + for a new airframe.