Fings ain't wot they seem to be

[Mitch Cronin]

Ground crews take security shortcuts

Investigation shows serious breakdown in preflight checks promised by Ottawa

By MICHAEL DEN TANDT AND TIMOTHY APPLEBY

The Globe and Mail

Saturday, December 20, 2003 - Page A20

Transport Canada is scrambling to shore up enforcement of preflight security checks of United-States-bound aircraft after a Globe and Mail investigation found serious lapses in such searches by Air Canada ground crews at Toronto's Pearson International Airport.

Air Canada crews at Pearson have routinely failed to carry out the thorough security checks on U.S.-bound aircraft that Ottawa promised U.S. authorities immediately after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, The Globe has found.

Following staff cutbacks by Air Canada, and under pressure from supervisors to avoid delays in takeoff times, maintenance and cleaning crews have frequently rushed through cabin checks that should take as long as 45 minutes in only a few minutes, and sometimes make none at all, sources say.

Told earlier this month of the security breakdown, Jean Barrette, Transport Canada's director of security, promised to investigate.

Later that same day, Mr. Barrette's office issued a national directive instructing security inspectors to increase monitoring and inspection of the preflight checks across the country. The directive stipulates that the airlines log and document the checks.

"Transport Canada is going to be very closely monitoring for compliance of these and all other directives," Bernard Pilon said on behalf of the department. "Should any carrier fail to comply with them, the department . . . will vigorously follow up and take all necessary steps to rectify the situation."

Nevertheless, the news is likely to cause concern among members of Congress and officials at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, given long-standing suspicion in the United States that Canada is the weak link in North American anti-terrorist efforts.

Senator Colin Kenny, who last year headed an exhaustive inquiry into air security in Canada, said accounts of shoddy preflight security checks corroborate sworn testimony heard by his committee. "We're told it [a proper search] happens occasionally; it's a function of how quickly they've got to turn around a plane."

Paul Lefebvre, local president of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, which represents Air Canada maintenance staff, said it's no surprise shortcuts have been taken. "They've cut the staff to the bone. You know human nature: Let it slide. This isn't 2001 any more."

Security lapses extend beyond preflight checks, sources say. According to dozens of interviews with police, airport ground staff, airline employees and security experts, Air Canada and its host, the Greater Toronto Airports Authority, have given security short shrift across the board.

Airport perimeter pass checks are unevenly enforced. Ground staff are rarely searched as they enter or leave restricted areas. Core areas of the airport are unguarded and easily accessible from public roads. Anti-terrorist training for flight crews was late in coming and, sources say, inadequate.

In the near hysteria that swamped the airline industry after the Sept. 11 attacks, Air Canada faced a serious problem: to convince the Americans their aircraft would not be easy prey for terrorists bent on flying south to attack U.S. targets.

Talks with Transport Canada yielded a partial remedy. First flights of the day originating in Canada and bound for the United States would be searched by an Air Canada maintenance crew after the grooming and catering but before the flight crew boarded.

At first the searches were thorough, an Air Canada ground employee who carried out many such checks recalls. The crews, usually in groups of three, hunted painstakingly for knives, box cutters or any other weapons. They looked for any sign of tampering with life vests and other safety equipment.

"We'd check all the overhead bins, under all the seats. We'd check all the compartments," said the employee, who asked to remain anonymous.

Once the search was complete, one member of the team would remain in place until the flight crew arrived. The team leader would sign a log stipulating what areas had been searched. Occasionally, an official from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security showed up to do an additional spot check.

But that was in the beginning.

In the months that followed, airline employees say, severe staff cuts combined with relentless pressure to keep the planes on schedule resulted in many Air Canada crews drastically reducing the time spent on the searches, except for flights to Washington's Ronald Reagan Airport.

Mr. Barrette said he takes reports of lax preflight checks extremely seriously. He has heard and investigated similar complaints before, he said. He urged any airline employee with knowledge of shoddy checks to report them, in confidence, to the Transportation Safety Board.

"The last thing we want is for an employee to feel they may be put in an awkward situation if they report a security shortcoming."

Both the airline and the airports authority strenuously insist their security system is excellent.

"I'm confident that the checks are being done completely and thoroughly and are meeting the requirements of the regulations in every way," said Rob Giguere, Air Canada's vice-president of operations.

GTAA security director Jim Bertram claims his airport's security procedures are among the best in the world. "Quite frankly we have the most stringent system of pass control [for airport perimeter access] in Canada, or anywhere in North America."

Many, however, disagree.

Between 130 and 135 U.S.-bound Air Canada flights leave Pearson Airport each day, bound for 30 destinations. And until last spring, the airline's post-9/11 system of preflight searches worked relatively smoothly, the Air Canada employee said.

But mid-level supervisors began growing impatient with the number of delays caused by the searches, which take anywhere from 30 to 45 minutes, depending on the size of aircraft.

A copy of Air Canada's internal cabin-search check sheet, obtained by The Globe and Mail, states that a full search should include overhead bins, washrooms, trash cans, seats backs and pockets, life vest packages, closets, trolleys, storage bins, seat cushions and the flight deck.

"In the airline industry, the worst thing you can do is create a delay," the employee said. "Whenever there is a delay, they fine the department of whoever is responsible."

Currently insolvent and struggling to emerge from bankruptcy protection, Air Canada was in the throes of brutal cost-cutting at the time.

"They laid off people and started asking us to do grooming and security at the same time," the employee said.

Supervisors began pressing crews to complete the checks more quickly, and sometimes there simply wasn't time to do a proper job. "The plane's on the ground for an hour. It has to be cleaned, fuelled and secured. But the security check alone [if done properly] would take half an hour in an Airbus," for example.

The upshot is that Air Canada grooming crews began rushing through U.S.-bound aircraft, combining grooming with only a partial security check or none at all, sources say. If Homeland Security officials were spotted, one ground employee said, word went out and the searches were more thorough. Otherwise, it was catch as catch can.

Originally, preflight check sheets were signed by one member of each security team. After the crews began taking shortcuts, they continued to sign them regardless, the employee said, ensuring that on paper at least, the system would appear sound.

If all Air Canada's other operations at Pearson were secure, minimizing the chances of a would-be terrorist getting near a plane with a weapon, the lack of thorough security checks on outgoing craft might not be cause for such concern.

But the opposite is true.

By most estimates, North America's fifth-largest airport and its major tenant, Air Canada, is relatively well served regarding preflight screening of passengers and air crew. Indeed, most of the $1.9-billion allotted to improving air security in the December 2001, federal budget has gone toward upgrading that process. Passenger screeners at Pearson are widely acknowledged to be better trained, better paid and generally more professional than before the Sept. 11 attacks.

But behind the scenes, on the so-called airside of the airport, where thousands of groomers, mechanics, construction workers and other maintenance staff work, it's a radically different story.

If any of Pearson's estimated 45,000 ground workers tried to launch a terror attack, the airport would be virtually unprotected.

"It's the biggest hole in our airport security," said retired University of Manitoba professor Peter St. John, Canada's best-known academic authority on airline safety. "It means all the rest is compromised."

After midnight on a recent week night, three men in a plain-looking sedan, two of them Globe and Mail reporters, toured the heart of Pearson for 45 minutes, passing repeatedly within a stone's throw of runways, near Air Canada hangars and cargo buildings.

They were not challenged or stopped once. Convair Drive, the long, winding road that leads from the Greater Toronto Airport Authority headquarters on the airport's eastern margins, back to the Cara Food and cargo buildings off Britannia Road, was dark and seemingly deserted.

There appeared to be multiple areas in the rolling hinterland of the airport where a lone terrorist with a missile launcher might set up unseen, immediately adjacent to a runway.

A guard shack on Britannia Road sat empty and unused. An opening for the roadway between two fences, just adjacent to Pearson's Peel Regional Police building, was not gated or guarded.

Close to the GTAA headquarters, a row of white Air Canada minivans sat in a parking lot, accessible from the street. Air Canada ground staff use those vehicles to shuttle back and forth to the terminals. According to one Air Canada ground employee, the vans are often left unlocked, keys in the ignition for convenience, and are never searched, coming or going.

Checking of GTAA photo identification cards is erratic at best, the employee said. "Most of the time they [the guards] just wave you through from about 10 feet away."

One security gate near the GTAA building, numbered 315F, leads directly airside to runways and other restricted parts of the airport, the employee said. Passes have been checked only sporadically at this gate, he said.

Another security gate near the Air Canada maintenance hangars off Airport Road is a major conduit for maintenance staff, mechanics and other workers, especially during the shift change between 8:30 and 9 pm. "You just walk right through," the employee said. "I've never had anyone look at my badge."

GTAA spokesman Peter Gregg noted that the cargo area at Pearson's centre is a public space, necessarily accessible by public bus to the thousands of workers who commute to work there. Asked why, in an era when hand-held missiles are capable of attacking passenger aircraft, the cargo area isn't subject to some restrictions, Mr. Gregg said the current system "meets all security regulations as established by Transport Canada."

Senator Kenny says that's precisely the problem. "The [perimeter] standards set by Transport Canada are insufficient. There should be double fencing, and the fences need to be higher."

He added it's simply common sense that access to the interior of the airport should be restricted to employees or others with specific business. "Clearly there should not be gawkers floating around the airport unnecessarily. The closer you are, the better chance there is for someone to take down a plane with a hand-held rocket."

Accounts of Pearson's porous perimeter are familiar. Similar tales were heard repeatedly during testimony to the Kenny committee, which submitted its report, called The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, last January. In many cases, the committee was told, guards didn't bother checking passes. In others, they were fast asleep.

The GTAA's Mr. Bertram insisted in a recent interview that Pearson's perimeter is strictly guarded. "I can't say it [guards sleeping on duty] never happens, but if we find it happens, it's dealt with," he said.

Regarding perimeter security, critics say, the problem is simple: The GTAA's guards work for private security firms and are low-paid and poorly trained compared to RCMP officers who guarded Pearson's perimeter before the non-profit GTAA took over the airport a decade ago.

"You cannot expect rent-a-cops to conduct proper security in airports," Prof. St. John said. "[They] are distracted easily, tired easily, underpaid, and bored, and do not have incentive or training to do a proper job."

If terrorists ever do manage to smuggle weapons aboard an Air Canada plane, the flight crew will be the last line of defence.

But here too, the struggling airline is either cutting corners or dragging its heels, industry insiders say. New federal guidelines requiring flight crews to be trained in handling a suicide-terrorism threat are needlessly vague, the critics say, and months behind schedule.

As for in-flight anti-terrorist training, new federal guidelines are now in place. But training at Air Canada began only in September and, according to interviews with Air Canada crew members, is scanty and inadequate.

Air Canada spokeswoman Laura Cooke vehemently denied that cost cuts have had any bearing on Air Canada's commitment to security.

"It does not deter us in any way, shape or form from our responsibilities," she said.

One veteran flight attendant disagreed.

"It's very costly to do training like this," the attendant said. "They have to pay us to attend. I'm sure it's something Air Canada would rather not worry about."

[Guest CJRT]

Hmmm, me thinks that AC is the wrong target in this story. The media should be focusing on the Feds and their security groups. On a recent flight, some senior members of CATSA(sp?) were over heard by non-uniformed airline staff talking openly about how they are quite well aware of a major airport being underfunded and staff undertrained in areas of security. Hmm, fed security guys talking about security gaps in an unsecure environment. Could this be one of the roots of the problems. AC, WJA and etc. should not be the focus of these stories(can't quite call them news or journalism. Instead the focus should be on David Collenette and his band of imbecils and the way they have paid lip service to this topic and how they have deflected responsibilty at every turn. By the way, has there yet to be any accounting of where the securiy fees have been going to ? Anyone...bueller...anyone

[Guest MDA]

Agreed, does anyone think this wasn't going to happen? I'd also be curious as to what is going on in the US, somehow I doubt that there would be a huge difference between what we see here and what is happening there.

[Request deviations]

And on the same sort of vein we have the Feds not using full time, experienced Customs inspectors at some AOE's after regular business hours because they would have to pay them overtime. Instead the Feds are using casual inspectors (minimally trained university students) to make the determination as to who does and does not enter our country. I'm sure our cousins to the south would be thrilled to know that "border security" is taken so seriously here!

[Guest AME]

"Originally, preflight check sheets were signed by one member of each security team. After the crews began taking shortcuts, they continued to sign them regardless, the employee said, ensuring that on paper at least, the system would appear sound."

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If this is true????

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OTP pressures aside, the reality is that the person making the log book entry (if they still do that) under a QA model is solely responsible to ensure the check is completed prior to signing it, Air Canada policy demands this, and any deviation from this policy leaves one open to disciplinary action, from removal of their ACA to dismissal, as well, it leaves them open to enforcement action from TC.

I've said it before, and I'll say it again, it doesn't matter who, wants what, when, if your the one signing it out it only goes when you're satisfied.

Brett

[Guest AME]

"Originally, preflight check sheets were signed by one member of each security team. After the crews began taking shortcuts, they continued to sign them regardless, the employee said, ensuring that on paper at least, the system would appear sound."

---------------------------------------------

If this is true????

---------------------------------------------

OTP pressures aside, the reality is that the person making the log book entry (if they still do that) under a QA model is solely responsible to ensure the check is completed prior to signing it, Air Canada policy demands this, and any deviation from this policy leaves one open to disciplinary action, from removal of their ACA to dismissal, as well, it leaves them open to enforcement action from TC.

I've said it before, and I'll say it again, it doesn't matter who, wants what, when, if you're the one signing it out it only goes when you're satisfied.

Brett

[Guest MDA]

Except in this case it's not normally an engineer signing the form, therefore no risk of losing ACA/license etc. And the ones most likely to know something is going on, are those low level managers whose primary focus is getting the flight out on time, they're unlikely to come down on someone who cuts corners to get the flight out.

And if you were on an audit team, where do you pick the point at which someone cut corners, 45 min, 30,20?

Not saying it's right, but not too many employee groups have the dedication (wrong word, but can't think of the right one right now) that AME's have. If it get's the boss off their back and there is no foreseeable consequence, then guess what is going to happen.