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737 Max Updates and Cancellations

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So if the FAA, TC and other CAA's around the world all agree to certify the 737 MAX, will CUPE, AAFAU etc. accept that, or do they have some other "higher" expectations?

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Resurgent Boeing 737 MAX could trigger jet surplus, analyst warns

 

4 MIN READ

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HONG KONG (Reuters) - Airlines struggling to cope with the grounding of the 737 MAX could face a markedly different problem when Boeing Co’s (BA.N) best-selling jet is cleared to re-enter service: a switch to concerns about aircraft oversupply, carriers have been warned

The U.S. planemaker has continued to produce the jet since it was grounded in March after two fatal accidents, and is expected to speed deliveries by 40%, to 70 units a month, when its factory doors reopen, in a bid to clear the backlog.

Rob Morris, global head of consultancy at UK-based Ascend by Cirium, said the combination of any rapid rebound in deliveries, economic worries and an accumulation of market pressures dating back before the crashes could make it hard to absorb the jets.

“Next year is the challenge. When the dam breaks and the MAX starts to flow, there are going to be a lot of aircraft,” Morris told financiers at a Hong Kong briefing late on Monday.

“There could potentially be as many as 1,000 surplus aircraft next year.”

The forecast is based on both a rebound in MAX deliveries and a potential glut of second-hand airplanes flooding back onto the market after standing in for the MAX during the grounding.

The crisis has rekindled demand for older and less efficient jets, with airlines using more than 800 planes that are more than 15 years old, compared to conditions four years ago, Morris told the Airline Economics Growth Frontiers conference on Tuesday.

TWO-YEAR LOGJAM

Until now, most concern has focused on whether regulators would permit an orderly return to service by avoiding gaps in approvals by different countries.

But Morris, who has warned a long up-cycle in aviation is nearly over, said there were also risks in opening floodgates too quickly, overwhelming fragile growth in travel demand.

Still, he and other delegates at back-to-back aviation finance gatherings in Hong Kong agreed it would take Boeing 18 months or longer to deliver all the stranded aircraft.

The operation will be one of the industry’s biggest ever logistical challenges and any glitches or delays could further brake supply.

“Getting all those aircraft, that are currently parked, off the ground could take two years,” John Plueger, chief executive of Air Lease Corp (AL.N), told Reuters, adding he did not see fundamental changes as a result of the MAX’s return.

“It is not as if all these MAX could be delivered over a one-, two- or three-month period ... so it is not an open floodgate and 350 planes all coming onto the market tomorrow,” he said on the sidelines of last week’s Airfinance Journal Asia Pacific conference.

Boeing aims to return the 737 MAX to service in the United States by the end of 2019, after making software changes in the wake of the crashes, which killed 346 people.

Europe’s top regulator said on Monday the airliner is likely to return to service in Europe in the first quarter of 2020.

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Analysts say more than 300 MAX aircraft have been produced since March, when commercial flights were banned and deliveries frozen. This could rise to 400 by the time it resumes service.

Boeing is additionally expected to deliver close to 600 jets straight from the production line next year. It has indicated it plans to deliver up to 70 jets a month, equal to a previous record. Of this, analysts say around 20 are expected to be drawn from inventory parked at its factories and the rest newly built.

 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-737max-supply/resurgent-boeing-737-max-could-trigger-jet-surplus-analyst-warns-idUSKBN1XE21P

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46 minutes ago, J.O. said:

So if the FAA, TC and other CAA's around the world all agree to certify the 737 MAX, will CUPE, AAFAU etc. accept that, or do they have some other "higher" expectations?

We'll find out in due course.  Given the flawed process under which the FAA certified the 737 MAX in the first place and given the significant hesitation that both the FAA and TC displayed in grounding the thing there's bound to be some skepticism.  

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With the market for mid sized airplanes split between two manufacturers, the concept of too big to fail is no doubt in play. Think of what is at stake here... The US manufacturing giant is on its knees and commercially needs this airplane to fly again.

It doesn't matter that the entire certification process was given to Boeing and Rubber Stamped by the FAA. It doesn't matter whether this airplane meets or doesn't meet various safety criteria, what matters is that it flies again and as soon as possible.

One has to wonder what would have happened if there were 4 or 5 airplanes types competing in this market sector...  What would have happened if Douglas, Lockheed and company XYZ were producing airplanes? Would this B737 Max have been allowed to fail as other airplanes have when these sort of safety issues have come up?

The consolidation of the various Airplane manufacturers into Oligopolies controlling the entire market isn't serving the market... it is serving the two dominant players. It also isn't serving flight safety, in a way it's forcing this airplane onto the market...

What a sad state of affairs.

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So as expected, it appears everybody will have a say in this matter (including CUPE 🙄).

it was inevitable I guess, once politics got involved.

By no means have I read everything on the subject, but I always figured Boeing was going to the woodshed, and also the crews flying the accident aircraft.

Boeing has had their day, with more to come. Why has there not been much mention of basic flying skills, and the lowest common denominator effect as I like to call it ??? Perhaps I have missed the discussion ???

My understanding of the Ethiopian accident was that had the pilots simply reduced the power and hence the airspeed, that manual trim would have been possible, and an accident potentially averted ??  Is this too simplistic ??? I understand that the "unreliable airspeed" phenomenon is very distracting and can be difficult, and obviously experience of the FO was minimal at best, but where does pilot training come into this equation ??? 

I will ask this also, did the aircraft "need" to be grounded ???  Check pilot friend at WJ, says no.

 

Edited by AIP

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I know a management captain who flew both the Lion Air and Ethiopian scenarios in a simulator and described the experience as "humbling and frightening" and said the other captains who had been a little more strident about the grounding were very quite on their ride back to the hotel.

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image.thumb.png.56a3179a41c4e2fc214088a2b906096e.png

 
Reuters
 
 
 
 
Key Points
  • Regulators have asked Boeing to fill in gaps in the documentation on its proposed 737 MAX software fix, industry sources told Reuters.
  • U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and European Union Aviation Safety Agency officials flagged a number of issues during a documentation audit over the weekend at an FAA facility in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, the people said.
  • The extent of the delays caused by the documentation requirements was not immediately clear.
  • One person briefed on the matter said Boeing’s paperwork was incomplete and substandard and meant regulators could not complete the audit, a crucial step before the plane can be certified to return to service.
 

 

Regulators have asked Boeing to fill in gaps in the documentation on its proposed 737 MAX software fix, industry sources told Reuters, raising new questions over the planemaker’s hopes to return the jet to U.S. service by year-end.

The world’s largest planemaker submitted documentation in a key part of an approval process, already delayed by months, for a 737 MAX software upgrade in the wake of two crashes in Ethiopia and Indonesia that killed 346 people.

U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and European Union Aviation Safety Agency officials flagged a number of issues during a documentation audit over the weekend at an FAA facility in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, the people said.

“We think there is still some work to be done,” EASA Executive Director Patrick Ky told Reuters on Monday. A person with knowledge of his thinking said he was partly referring to the documentation audit.

The extent of the delays caused by the documentation requirements was not immediately clear. There was no indication of any need to revise the software package based on the audit, sources said.

One person briefed on the matter said Boeing’s paperwork was incomplete and substandard and meant regulators could not complete the audit, a crucial step before the plane can be certified to return to service.

The person said it could take “weeks” to satisfy regulators in a worst-case scenario, though Boeing believes it can address the omissions in a matter of days.

Boeing spokesman Gordon Johndrone declined to comment in detail on the audit but said the company was “continuing to work with the regulators to safely return the MAX to service.”

The FAA did not immediately comment but in September, FAA Administrator Steve Dickson told Reuters the agency had conversations with Boeing “about the importance of making sure that we are looking at complete documentation and not piecemeal documentation.”

He added the FAA told Boeing “it’s really better to be very methodical and very detailed rather than try to rush a partially completed product and then say, Well get back to you with the rest of it.

A third person, familiar with FAA documentation audits but who did not participate in the 737 MAX review over the weekend, said such audits frequently uncover inconsistencies or omissions in documentation but rarely lead to changes to the underlying software or system.

Boeing’s fastest-selling jetliner has been grounded worldwide since March, cutting off a key source of cash for Boeing while forcing airlines to cancel thousands of flights. Many carriers have taken the MAX off schedules into 2020.

American Airlines Chief Executive Doug Parker told a conference on Wednesday that American’s plan to put some of its 737 MAX jets back in the air in mid-January would require FAA approval in “the earlier part of December.”

The unrelated comments underscore how quickly Boeing must work to satisfy regulators’ concerns to protect its year-end timeline, which has been repeatedly delayed already as regulators scrutinize Boeing’s proposed fixes.

Documentation requirements are central to the certification process for increasingly complex aircraft software and can become a stubborn source of delays.

For example, in 2008, EASA nearly derailed Europe’s Airbus A400M military transporter over software documentation following a failed audit.

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/06/regulators-find-gaps-in-boeings-737-max-software-documentation.html

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Southwest Airlines will remove all Boeing 737 Max planes from its flight schedule through March 6, while American Airlines will extend its cancellation through March 4. Southwest had previously grounded the plane through Feb. 8, while American Airlines cut the 737 Max from its flight schedule through Jan. 16.3 hours ago

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737 Max expected to resume commercial service in January: Boeing

By David Shepardson Reuters
Posted November 11, 2019 10:40 am

Boeing Co said Monday it now expects its grounded 737 MAX to resume commercial service in January as it works to address questions from regulators over its documentation for revisions to the plane’s software.

Boeing said it is possible that resumption of MAX deliveries to airline customers could begin in December and added it is working towards final validation of the updated training requirements “which must occur before the MAX returns to commercial service, and which we now expect to begin in January.”

American Airlines and Southwest Airlines said Friday they were pushing back the resumption of flights because of the 737 MAX grounding until early March.

Boeing CEO faces tough questions from lawmakers on day 2 of hearing on 737 MAX

Last week, Reuters reported that U.S. and European regulators had not been able to complete a software documentation audit in Cedar Rapids, Iowa of the 737 MAX because of significant gaps and substandard documents. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) must complete that audit before a key certification test flight can be scheduled.

“We are taking the time to answer all of their questions,” Boeing said in a statement Monday, adding that it is aiming for “FAA certification of the MAX flight control software updates during this quarter.”

Boeing also said that it has completed one of five milestones needed before the plane can return to service: a multi-day eCab simulator evaluation with the FAA to ensure the software system performs as intended even if there is a system failure.

On Friday, the FAA told U.S. lawmakers a preliminary review by a blue-ribbon panel has found Boeing’s design changes to a key safety system to be “safe” and compliant with regulations.

The FAA did not immediately comment on Monday but has said it will need 30 days from the time of the certification flight before it could unground the plane.

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New York Times, October 31 2019

Before Deadly Crashes, Boeing Pushed for Law That Undercut Oversight

The government has been handing over more responsibility to manufacturers for years. The new law makes it even harder for regulators to review Boeing’s work.

Months after a second crash of the Boeing Max 737, the plane remains grounded and the company mired in crisis.Credit...Gary He/Reuters

By Natalie Kitroeff and David Gelles

·        Published Oct. 27, 2019 Updated Oct. 31, 2019

With a few short paragraphs tucked into 463 pages of legislation last year, Boeing scored one of its biggest lobbying wins: a law that undercuts the government’s role in approving the design of new airplanes.

For years, the government had been handing over more responsibility to manufacturers as a way to reduce bureaucracy. But those paragraphs cemented the industry’s power, allowing manufacturers to challenge regulators over safety disputes and making it difficult for the government to usurp companies’ authority.

Although the law applies broadly to the industry, Boeing, the nation’s dominant aerospace manufacturer, is the biggest beneficiary. An examination by The New York Times, based on interviews with more than 50 regulators, industry executives, congressional staff members and lobbyists, as well as drafts of the bill and federal documents, found that Boeing and its allies helped craft the legislation to their liking, shaping the language of the law and overcoming criticism from regulators.

In a stark warning as the bill was being written, the Federal Aviation Administration said that it would “not be in the best interest of safety.”

A labor group representing agency inspectors raised concerns that the rules would turn the F.A.A. into a “rubber stamp” that would only be able to intervene after a plane crashed “and people are killed,” according to internal union documents reviewed by The Times.

Weeks after the law was passed, a Boeing 737 Max jet crashed off the coast of Indonesia, killing everyone on board. A second Max crashed in Ethiopia less than five months later, and the plane was grounded.

On both doomed flights, a new automated system on the Max, designed to help avoid stalls, triggered erroneously, sending them into fatal nose-dives. Mired in crisis, Boeing is still trying to fix the plane and get it flying again.

In the aftermath, lawmakers have seized on flaws in a regulatory system that cedes control to industry — an issue that is likely to put Boeing on the defensive this week when the company’s chief executive, Dennis A. Muilenburg, testifies before Congress for the first time since the two crashes.

The F.A.A. never fully analyzed the automated system known as MCAS, while Boeing played down its risks. Late in the plane’s development, Boeing made the system more aggressive, changes that were not submitted in a safety assessment to the agency.

The Max was certified under the old rules. The new law, the F.A.A. Reauthorization Act of 2018, makes it even more difficult for the government to review manufacturers’ work.

President Trump signed the F.A.A. Reauthorization Act of 2018 into law last October. Most of the attention on the legislation had been on a failed Republican effort to privatize the air traffic control system.Credit...Official White House Photo by Joyce N. Boghosia

In the past, agency officials could decide whether to delegate oversight to the company or to maintain control, depending on the importance of a system or concerns about safety. Now, the agency, at the outset of the development process, has to hand over responsibility for certifying almost every aspect of new planes.

If F.A.A. officials decide a system may compromise safety, the new rules dictate that they will need to conduct an investigation or an inspection to make their case before taking back control. If the officials raise concerns, ask for changes or otherwise miss certification deadlines, any disputes are automatically elevated by law to managers at the agency and the company.

The law also creates a committee of mostly aerospace executives to ensure that the regulator is meeting metrics set by the industry, and the law allows companies to make recommendations about the compensation of F.A.A. employees.

“The reauthorization act mandated regulatory capture,” said Doug Anderson, a former attorney in the agency’s office of chief counsel who reviewed the legislation. “It set the F.A.A. up for being totally deferential to the industry.”

A spokesman for Boeing, Gordon Johndroe, said that the certification process is “part of an effective F.A.A. oversight of safety that permits them to focus on the most important issues that are critical to the safety of flight.” He added that “this authority has been a proven way for decades for government regulators across many industries to prioritize resources and rely on technical experts to maintain quality, safety and integrity.”

When the legislation was hashed out, the lobbying effort barely registered in the country’s vast political machine. Boeing’s push, and the use of industry language in the crucial paragraphs, was standard amid the deregulatory drive by many businesses. Most of the attention on the bill was focused on a failed Republican effort to privatize the air traffic control system.

Since the two fatal accidents, the law has set off worries in Washington about whether the rules championed by Boeing make company deadlines a priority over passenger safety.

The manufacturer helped author a report that congressional aides used as a reference while writing the law, borrowing language and ideas that had long been used by Boeing. Its executives pressed Michael Huerta, then the head of the F.A.A., for support, telling him that the regulator’s inefficiency was threatening Boeing’s ability to compete against its chief rival, Airbus of France. They also helped persuade Senator Maria Cantwell, Democrat of Washington State, where Boeing has its manufacturing hub, to introduce language that requires the F.A.A. to relinquish control of many parts of the certification process.

“The method by which the F.A.A. certifies aircraft is in need of repair — I don’t think anyone could argue otherwise at this point,” Representative Rick Larsen, a Democrat from Washington, who voted in favor of the legislation, said in an interview. “No matter what we did last year, we need to be pulling some of that back into the public sphere, and take some of it out of the hands of industry.”

Language of the Law

Dennis Muilenburg, Boeing’s chief executive, is testifying before Congress this week.Credit...Johannes Eisele/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

In closed-door meetings with congressional staff members, in testimony on Capitol Hill, in memos to lawmakers, the talking points were all the same.

Starting in 2014, Boeing and its trade associations explained that streamlining certification would make American aerospace companies more competitive with overseas rivals, by allowing them to develop planes more efficiently.

They argued that F.A.A. employees were interpreting the rules in seemingly arbitrary ways and slowing down the development process, according to seven people involved in the discussions and documents reviewed by The Times.

In a 2015 memo sent to congressional staff members that was reviewed by The Times, the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, which represents the business jet unit of Boeing, urged lawmakers to “fully implement” the so-called system of delegation. If disputes caused delays, the trade group called for “automatic escalation to appropriate F.A.A. and company management” so that issues didn’t languish.

The Aerospace Industries Association, which was headed during part of the lobbying campaign by Mr. Muilenburg of Boeing, echoed those priorities. Richard Efford, a lobbyist for the group, said in an interview that he emphasized the need to “fully utilize” delegation.

Boeing executives made the same pitch to Mr. Huerta at industry events and in meetings at the F.A.A., according to three people with knowledge of the matter. It became a routine discussion, they said.

And they made their case publicly as well, at times citing the company’s safety record.

In a 2015 hearing, Ray Conner, then the head of Boeing’s commercial airplane division, pushed like others for making “full use” of the system. He said it took too long to get approvals for interiors, like seats and bathrooms, that company engineers could assess. He argued that European regulators outsource far more.

The language of their lobbying push was rooted in a 2012 report from an industry-dominated committee run by Christine Thompson, a Boeing executive, and Ali Bahrami, an F.A.A. official at the time who later became a lobbyist.

Ali Bahrami, a Federal Aviation Administration official and former lobbyist, was co-chairman of a committee that in 2012 recommended streamlining certification.Credit...Andrew Harrer/Bloomberg

In aerospace speak, it called for “full utilization of available delegation,” outsourcing as much oversight as possible. It outlined six recommendations that “will result in the reduction of certification delays” and “enhance the global competitiveness of the U.S. aviation industry.”

“There was a consensus that they had good recommendations, and that we ought to put them into writing,” said Matt Bormet, who formerly worked for Mr. Larsen. “I heard no complaints about the report.”

Boeing and its allies found a receptive audience in the head of the House transportation committee, Bill Shuster, a Pennsylvania Republican staunchly in favor of deregulation, and his aide working on the legislation, Holly Woodruff Lyons.

The F.A.A. Reauthorization Act of 2018 was broadly meant to provide agency funding for the coming years. Lawmakers also used it to introduce new rules for drones, airport noise and the certification process.

As Ms. Lyons helped write the law, she was in regular touch with Boeing, according to two people with knowledge of the discussions. The critical paragraphs in the final bill borrowed heavily from industry language, instituting the “full utilization of F.A.A. delegation.”

“The certification reforms in the F.A.A. bill were strongly desired and had bipartisan support,” Mr. Shuster said in an email, noting that delegation “has worked well and safely for over 50 years.”

 

Then-Representative Bill Shuster, the Pennsylvania Republican who headed the transportation committee, in 2015. He recently said, “The certification reforms in the F.A.A. bill were strongly desired and had bipartisan support.”Credit...Bill Clark/CQ Roll Call

The evolution of the bill had the imprint of industry.

An early version that Ms. Lyons sent to lobbyists directed the F.A.A. to measure its own performance, according to a draft reviewed by The Times. In one circulated a month later, staff members had added a clause specifying that the agency would be judged in part by a committee dominated by aerospace executives, which would come up with metrics for the regulator.

As the Senate prepared its own version in early 2016, Boeing was in close contact with the office of Ms. Cantwell.

“Senator Cantwell is responsive to the needs of Washington State businesses,” said Nick Sutter, one of her former staff members. “Boeing people were in and out of the office all the time.”

In conversations with a top aide for the senator, Matt McCarthy, Boeing lobbyists pushed for language that would compel the F.A.A. to rely more on manufacturers, according to two people directly involved in the discussions. Mr. McCarthy took a job as a lobbyist for Boeing in September.

Regulators and companies agreed that the F.A.A.’s resources were best focused on new and high-risk systems, according to Peggy Gilligan, the agency’s head of safety back then, and several other officials.

As the Senate prepared its own version of the bill in early 2016, Boeing was in close contact with the office of Senator Maria Cantwell, Democrat of Washington State.Credit...Sarah Silbiger/The New York Times

Ms. Cantwell submitted an amendment that directed the F.A.A. to automatically give companies the right to approve anything deemed “low and medium risk” on an airplane. It was language that particularly helped Boeing, with its wide range of planes.

“Listening to your constituents is always the first step in legislating, but it’s certainly not the last,” said Ansley Lacitis, deputy chief of staff for Ms. Cantwell. “This concept of risk-based oversight was bipartisan, consensus-based and recommended by experts.”

The amendment passed without any debate. At the hearing, then-Senator Bill Nelson, a Democrat of Florida, cheered the changes. The law, he said, “will boost U.S. manufacturing and exports and — most importantly — create good jobs for Americans.”

Quieting Criticis

A 737 Max plane at the Boeing factory in Renton, Wash., earlier this year.Credit...Lindsey Wasson/Reuters

F.A.A. officials tried to push back, raising concerns to congressional staff members and aerospace executives. But they were constrained in their efforts.

As a federal agency, the F.A.A. is forbidden by law to use government resources to influence and lobby Congress. At most, officials could provide comments and feedback, so-called technical assistance in the legislative process.

“It is true that we were supportive of delegation as a general philosophy,” said Mr. Huerta, the former F.A.A. chief. “It is not true that means the agency supported every proposal to expand delegation and impose limits on the agency’s ability to take back delegations.”

Early on, Ms. Gilligan, the former F.A.A. official, said industry lobbyists suggested that the law should give companies input on performance evaluations of individual F.A.A. employees overseeing the certification of their planes. Two other agency officials confirmed her account.

“It appeared they were looking to influence the individuals’ pay outcome in some way, and for the F.A.A. employees to know that potential pay impact,” Ms. Gilligan said.

The final bill did not completely satisfy her concerns. The law created a panel with industry representatives to help assess “performance incentive policies” for F.A.A. employees, as long as they “do not conflict with the public interest.”

Peggy Gilligan, then an F.A.A. official, testifying to Congress in 2014. She recently said industry lobbyists suggested that the reauthorization law give companies input on performance evaluations of individual F.A.A. employees.Credit...Win Mcnamee/Getty Images

Mostly, top F.A.A. officials worried about the unintended consequences of giving more authority to manufacturers. Boeing employees have described pressures from their managers to meet deadlines while approving systems.

Under the old rules, the F.A.A. could decide to take back oversight authority on a system if they were concerned about safety. The new law would require the agency to conduct an investigation or inspection to prove that there was a problem before stepping in, a potentially lengthy process.

Industry groups told congressional staff members that manufacturers were sometimes subject to the whims of individual F.A.A. employees, who could block approvals and delay production schedules, according to three people with knowledge of the discussions.

“It causes delays and a lot of frustration within the companies,” said Mr. Efford, the lobbyist.

But regulators were concerned that the new law would keep them from effectively doing their job.

In early 2015, Brian Morris, a safety official at the agency, prepared feedback for lawmakers, arguing that the legislation would prevent the regulator from acting until a dangerous system had already been introduced onto an aircraft. “With this language, Congress is asking us to wait till we find a hazard before removing delegation,” he wrote, according to an F.A.A. document reviewed by The Times.

A current and a former F.A.A. official said that Mr. Morris was collecting feedback from multiple departments, so the comments reflected the opinions of other agency staff members. The document notes that the comments were “provided in response to a congressional request.”

The Professional Aviation Safety Specialists union, a small labor group that represents F.A.A. employees, had a similar warning. If the regulator could only intercede after documenting problems, it may not be able to stop manufacturers from installing risky systems.

“That will, as a practical matter, mean after the accident has happened and people are killed,” the union said in comments prepared for Congress in early 2016, which were reviewed by The Times.

Through a spokesman, Ms. Lyons, the congressional aide writing the law, said she did not receive comments from Mr. Morris or the union, but was aware of the F.A.A.’s worries.

“The concerns were discussed and considered in a bipartisan manner,” said the House transportation committee spokesman, Justin Harclerode. “Members did not agree with this interpretation of the language, and were not convinced the language would negatively impact the FAA’s ability to safely oversee the aviation industry.”

He added that the F.A.A., under the law, could set the parameters of the investigation or inspection.

Lawmaker’s Remorse

Demonstrators hold pictures of victims of the crash of the Boeing 737 Max in Ethiopia at a vigil last month outside the Department of Transportation in Washington.Credit...Jose Luis Magana/Associated Press

At a ceremony in the Oval Office last October, President Trump signed the F.A.A. Reauthorization Act into law, while Representative Shuster, who shepherded the legislation, looked over his shoulder.

The agency has already begun to make the required changes.

In August, it announced the formation of the advisory committee charged with setting goals for the regulator. The committee includes two union representatives and 17 industry officials, among them Beth Pasztor, one of Boeing’s top executives. The F.A.A. recently selected managers for an internal office that will help enforce provisions of the law.

As the rules take hold, some lawmakers who originally supported the legislation are backing away.

Mr. Nelson, the former senator who co-sponsored the law, said he did not fully understand the ramifications. “This was never brought to my attention,” he said in an interview. “Had I known about it, I would have tried to put the kibosh on it.”

Representative Peter DeFazio, the Oregon Democrat who is the chairman of the House transportation committee, celebrated the bill’s changes last year, saying it would maintain safety and “will help our manufacturers become much more competitive in the world market and introduce their products more quickly.”

Mr. DeFazio, who is currently leading a congressional investigation into the crashes, said in an interview that he was reconsidering the law and might introduce legislation to restore some of the agency’s oversight authority.

“If the F.A.A. basically deferred on a safety critical system and did not provide proper oversight, then either the individuals involved are going to be at risk, or the whole system itself isn’t working properly,” he said.

A version of this article appears in print on Oct. 28, 2019, Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Before Crashes, Boeing Pushed To Undercut F.A.A. Oversight. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

 

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