737 Max Updates and Cancellations


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I think comparing the model T to an airliner is the wrong analogy. That's like a Wright Flyer...

Maybe something like a 1960 Buick Riviera... or any Detroit automobile from that era would be a more parallel comparison... There are a lot of 40-60 year old cars still on the road. Big steel bumpers and lots of metal... I'd rather take a hit it one of those than a 2019 Kia with an airbag.

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Who cares how Southwest  feels.  They got what they demanded,  they get what they deserve. 

14,000 Words Of "Blame The Pilots" That Whitewash Boeing Of 737 MAX Failure The New York Times Magazine just published a 14,000 words piece about the Boeing 737 MAX accidents. It is headlined:

On a humourous note, maybe Boeing just wants to be more.....'environmentally friendly'???  

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5 hours ago, dagger said:

'll be interested to see how Air Canada settles with Boeing, and how much it gets. Will it negotiate, or sue?

I wonder if going for settlement where you get cash/product in hand might be the more prudent route. I'm thinking of the possibility where Boeing at some point puts itself into Chapter 11 which in turn stays all lawsuits in progress.
This would be similar to the situation with PG&E and the negligence lawsuits related to its role in the California wildfires.

Edited by Lakelad
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5 minutes ago, j.k. said:

I think comparing the model T to an airliner is the wrong analogy. That's like a Wright Flyer...

Maybe something like a 1960 Buick Riviera... or any Detroit automobile from that era would be a more parallel comparison... There are a lot of 40-60 year old cars still on the road. Big steel bumpers and lots of metal... I'd rather take a hit it one of those than a 2019 Kia with an airbag.

Yes they are still on the road.  There are lots of older aircraft flying too.  That wasn’t the point.  

Cool car by the way.

The point was what would happen if Detroit tried to reintroduce a 2020 Buick Riviera as it was made 60 years ago?  

Im not suggesting the 1960’s Riviera should be banned from the road.  I’m not suggesting the 1960’s Riviera is unsafe.  I’m suggesting that the regulator would expect the Riviera be brought up to 2020 specifications or it would not be permitted on the road, even though it’s 1960’s predecessor has grandfather rights.

It forces safety progress with manufacturers.

 

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Boeing, reversing itself, says all 737 MAX pilots will need costly flight simulator training

Jan. 7, 2020 at 11:09 am Updated Jan. 7, 2020 at 5:04 pm

Scores of 737 MAX jets are parked at the Grant County International Airport in Moses Lake. Boeing said Tuesday it will recommend that once the FAA lifts... (Mike Siegel / The Seattle Times) More

By

Dominic Gates

Seattle Times aerospace reporter

Boeing on Tuesday reversed its long-held position that pilots would not need full flight simulator training before flying the 737 MAX after the jet is cleared to return to service.

“Boeing has decided to recommend MAX simulator training combined with computer-based training for all pilots prior to returning the MAX safely to service,” interim Boeing CEO Greg Smith said in a statement.

He added that the change in approach was spurred because “public, customer and stakeholder confidence in the 737 MAX is critically important to us.”

The prospect of extensive simulator training now adds another big logistical hurdle before the MAX can resume commercial flights. There are only 34 full-motion MAX simulators in the world, eight of them in the U.S., and tens of thousands of pilots who will need time on one.

737 MAX CRISIS

COMPLETE COVERAGE »

·        New snags add to uncertainty over Boeing 737 MAX’s return to service

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·        Boeing redeploys workers as 737 MAX production in Renton prepares to shut down

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Boeing’s change in direction was spurred by the results of four days of testing in Seattle last month, when Boeing ran pilots from American Airlines, Southwest, United and Aeromexico through a series of emergency flight scenarios in MAX flight simulators, a person familiar with the matter said. The purpose was to test the “human factors” elements of the updated flight control system, including the crew workload.

All of the pilots managed to eventually maintain control when confronted with various emergencies, including the type of system failure that occurred in the two fatal MAX crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia. However, about half of the pilots in the testing failed to follow the correct emergency procedures.

 “They were using the wrong checklists,” said one person with knowledge of the tests.

In developing the MAX, Boeing sought to avoid the need for simulator training because it’s expensive for airlines. For U.S. airlines to run all their pilots through the limited number of available flight simulators will take thousands of hours — hours when the companies earn no revenue from ticket-buying passengers.

Dennis Tajer, a captain with American Airlines and spokesman for that airline’s union, the Allied Pilots Association, said that when American runs its pilots through their regular training updates, it consists of a two-hour pre-brief in a classroom followed by four hours in the simulator.

He said airlines have been given no information yet as to whether the MAX training would require a full four-hour simulator session or may be more limited.

American has about 4,200 pilots who fly the 737 and would need the MAX simulator training. United has about 4,400 and Southwest has more than 9,000.

As it pitched the MAX to airlines in 2011, Boeing promised the MAX would handle so much like the previous 737 NG model, and its cockpit would be so similar, that minimal training consisting of a short course on an iPad would be all that was needed for a pilot to transition from the earlier 737 to the MAX.

The expected savings from that were so important to airlines that in December 2011, when MAX launch customer Southwest Airlines placed the first order for 150 of the jets, Boeing included in the contract a clause guaranteeing a $1 million per airplane refund if simulator training were required.

Rep. Peter DeFazio, D- Ore., chair of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure that’s investigating the cause of the MAX crashes, in a statement Tuesday lamented that “it took two deadly crashes, numerous investigations and untold public pressure before Boeing arrived at this decision.”

“From its inception, Boeing’s business model for the 737 MAX was premised on Boeing’s unreasonable, cost-saving assurance to airlines that pilots qualified to fly …(the earlier 737 model) should not undergo simulator training to fly the 737 MAX.”

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which will set the regulatory requirement regarding what pilot training is required in the U.S., is likely to follow Boeing’s recommendation.

Later this month, a key part of the process for returning the MAX to commercial service will be the convening of the Joint Operations Evaluation Board (JOEB), a body of about 14 U.S. and foreign air carrier flight crews with diverse training that will evaluate the new systems on the MAX in full-motion simulator tests and come up with recommendations on what pilot training is required.

The FAA will use the data from the JOEB tests to develop official recommendations for pilot training.

“The FAA is following a thorough process, not a set timeline, to ensure that any design modifications to the 737 MAX are integrated with appropriate training and procedures,” the agency said Tuesday, adding that it will consider Boeing’s recommendation during the JOEB process.

Once the training regimen is firmed up and the MAX cleared to fly again, the shortage of MAX flight simulators will pose a problem for airlines.

Airlines operate 26 MAX simulators worldwide while Boeing has another eight at its pilot training sites in Miami, London, Shanghai and Singapore. In the U.S., Boeing has three in Miami; American has one in Fort Worth, Texas; United has one in Denver; and Southwest has three in Dallas.

 “MAX simulators are like unicorns,” said the APA’s Tajer.

It’s unclear if Boeing could add software to the more than 200 simulators designed for the prior 737 NG model so they could be upgraded to simulate the MAX systems.

The limited availability of simulators will likely lead American and Southwest to reassess previous plans to have all their 737 pilots complete the MAX training before they introduce the MAX to passenger service.

When the expected MAX training was to be done on an iPad at any location during the pilot’s downtime, all the pilots could be asked to accomplish the training requirement in matter of a few weeks. Now it will take much longer.

United spokesman Frank Benenati said Tuesday the Chicago-based carrier plans to train its pilots “on a rolling basis,” so the MAX can be introduced with a core group of pilots before all the 737 pilots finishing the training. American and Southwest are now likely to do the same.

That means splitting off the MAXs into a sub-fleet of the 737s and assigning them to fly specific routes with MAX-trained crews assigned for those routes only.

But doing this makes the airline’s aircraft scheduling much less flexible.

If an earlier model 737 has a maintenance problem and can’t take off, the airline won’t be able to switch in a MAX from another location to take its place unless the crew happen to be qualified for the MAX.

Neither the airlines nor the pilot unions had any prior knowledge of Boeing’s decision.

Captain Tajer of the APA and Captain Jon Weaks, who heads the Southwest Airlines Pilots Union, both complained that they had heard no details about what training is contemplated directly from Boeing or the FAA and were not asked for their input regarding Boeing’s decision.

“As the representative of the largest single group of 737NG and MAX pilots, it is vital we are involved in the process, as was promised by both Boeing and the FAA months ago,” Weaks said.

Dominic Gates: 206-464-2963 or dgates@seattletimes.com; on Twitter: @dominicgates.

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2 hours ago, Turbofan said:

 

Cone-head,

I am not familiar with how Walkerton dealt with the aftermath of the water issue. Did they fix the system in place at the time?  Or did they replace and modernize it because better safer technology existed?

 

 

I don’t believe they had to replace any equipment, the problem was the lack of oversight of the testing procedures. Basically, the two brothers responsible for testing and treating the water were drunk all the time, and they fudged the test records. After this came to light, there were much more stringent testing and recording procedures put in place. Municipal potable water standards in Ontario are higher than that of bottled water people buy at the supermarket. And this is why Boeing aircraft should be very safe in the future; there is now a very bright light shining on their procedures.

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1 hour ago, Don Hudson said:

So, the MAX is still a single type-rating to the B737-100 as per Southwest's wishes? . . .

Not sure about the USA - but in Canada there's three separate 737 type ratings:

B73A (-100, -200)

B73B (-300, -400, -500)

B73C (-600, -700, -800, -900, MAX 8, MAX 9)

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Hi Marshall - yes, that's correct, AC has two MAX simulators, in Toronto I believe. I don't believe WJ has a MAX sim. According to the Seattle-Times article there are only 34 MAX simulators around the world.

Thanks, T9! 😉  So there are three separate endorsements on one's licence for these 3 types or just a differences course, I wonder?

When I joined AC in 1973 they had five types of DC8 and added the re-engined type around 1980, but only one type rating endorsement. The differences were handled in a chapter in the aircraft manuals. The Airbus A320 endorsement permitted crews to fly the A319 & A321. The transition to the A330 / A340 was a full course, with sim work & line-indoc. In Europe, there were cross-crew qualifications that permitted A320 type-rated crews to fly the A330 & A340, if I recall correctly.

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10 hours ago, conehead said:

I don’t believe they had to replace any equipment, the problem was the lack of oversight of the testing procedures. Basically, the two brothers responsible for testing and treating the water were drunk all the time, and they fudged the test records. After this came to light, there were much more stringent testing and recording procedures put in place. Municipal potable water standards in Ontario are higher than that of bottled water people buy at the supermarket. And this is why Boeing aircraft should be very safe in the future; there is now a very bright light shining on their procedures.

RE: Walkerton water, the two brothers were not "drunk all the time" It turned out to be a faulty( 1way?) valve close to the well! Lots of blame to go around

including the Provincial government.   

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3 hours ago, Don Hudson said:

Hi Marshall - yes, that's correct, AC has two MAX simulators, in Toronto I believe. I don't believe WJ has a MAX sim. According to the Seattle-Times article there are only 34 MAX simulators around the world.

Thanks, T9! 😉  So there are three separate endorsements on one's licence for these 3 types or just a differences course, I wonder?

When I joined AC in 1973 they had five types of DC8 and added the re-engined type around 1980, but only one type rating endorsement. The differences were handled in a chapter in the aircraft manuals. The Airbus A320 endorsement permitted crews to fly the A319 & A321. The transition to the A330 / A340 was a full course, with sim work & line-indoc. In Europe, there were cross-crew qualifications that permitted A320 type-rated crews to fly the A330 & A340, if I recall correctly.

Re: 737 type ratings in Canada...

They’re separate endorsements on your license Don. Like all ancient WestJetters, I have two of them: B73A and B73C. But, according to Transport, I am utterly unqualified to fly a 737-300, -400 or -500. Different type.

T9

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16 hours ago, j.k. said:

I think comparing the model T to an airliner is the wrong analogy. That's like a Wright Flyer...

Maybe something like a 1960 Buick Riviera... or any Detroit automobile from that era would be a more parallel comparison... There are a lot of 40-60 year old cars still on the road. Big steel bumpers and lots of metal... I'd rather take a hit it one of those than a 2019 Kia with an airbag.

I respectfully disagree. My aunt died in one of those 60's era cars in a relatively low speed head-on collision. Instead of the car taking the brunt of it, she did. She'd still be here if she'd been in my 2012 Infiniti. The crumple zones helped me to walk away with no significant injuries.

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3 hours ago, QFE said:

RE: Walkerton water, the two brothers were not "drunk all the time" It turned out to be a faulty( 1way?) valve close to the well! Lots of blame to go around

including the Provincial government.   

IIRC, instead of taking water samples at all of the required sites, they took them all from the same source. My dad did the same job in the town of Ayr at that time. Before the "Common Sense Revolution" (talk about an oxymoron) cutbacks, he'd get testing results from the lab in a day or two. When Walkerton happened, it was taking a lot longer.

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On 1/7/2020 at 2:14 PM, dagger said:

According to  aerospace blogger Jon Ostrower, Boeing is going to recommend full simulator training for all MAX pilots as part of the re-launch. FAA has the final call.

 

From the NY Times

Boeing’s decision stems from its analysis of flight simulator tests of the Max it conducted with airline pilots from United, Aeromexico, American Airlines and Southwest last month, according to a person familiar with the matter. 

In the tests, which were part of the work involved in evaluating the software update, many of the pilots did not use the correct procedures to handle emergencies, instead relying on their flying skills. Those results raised questions about whether simply informing pilots of which procedures to use would be sufficient to prepare them to fly the plane. 

There are currently 34 certified Max flight simulators worldwide, according to a person familiar with the matter. Getting pilots trained in the machines, which are designed to replicate emergency scenarios, will add another hurdle for airlines, who have struggled with mounting losses throughout the Max crisis. 

Airlines may also be able to use the more than 200 737 NG simulators to conduct the training, though it isn’t clear yet whether that is possible.

From what I hear the idle MAX guys at AC are doing Simulator rides while waiting for the plane to return

 

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5 minutes ago, boestar said:

From what I hear the idle MAX guys at AC are doing Simulator rides while waiting for the plane to return

 

Yes, but I wonder if/when all the the adjustments Boeing is making to software, hardware, even procedures to follow in event of an incident are loaded into the sims whether training will have to start anew. Still, MCAS aside, I imagine those AC pilots will have great familiarity with all known and imaginable events they'd run into.

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I would think that, in light of the high profile nature of the issue, they are training some of these scenarios.

Theoretically (and I do not know for sure) if you introduce a failure of the AOA in the sim, it should reproduce the fault.  Simulators are "Supposed" to mimic the aircraft systems exactly.  I would hope this was not overlooked when the specifications were given to the sim manufacturers.

 

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19 hours ago, J.O. said:

IIRC, instead of taking water samples at all of the required sites, they took them all from the same source. My dad did the same job in the town of Ayr at that time. Before the "Common Sense Revolution" (talk about an oxymoron) cutbacks, he'd get testing results from the lab in a day or two. When Walkerton happened, it was taking a lot longer.

That's what I meant when I included the government. 

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20 hours ago, Homerun said:

The Max sim does not replicate the MCAS scenario.  They are training for it by having one pilot trim nose down to approximate the MCAS firing but the trim change is much slower.

That is an issue.  The CAT D certification should be lifted as it does not replicate the aircraft in its entirety.

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25 minutes ago, deicer said:

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51058929

 

"This airplane is designed by clowns who in turn are supervised by monkeys."

The Basic aircraft and systems design is very old.  Although the aircraft has gone through an evolution, A LOT of the original still remains.

As the aircraft has been revised, instead of redesigning systems to a more current standard, they were patch worked over old systems.  This continued through 3 major evolutions of the aircraft.  The MAX, as I have said before, is just makeup on a pig.  Its just like an old Mainframe computer with a flashy new GUI interface.  Pretty on the outside but still the same old clunky machine on the inside.

Boeing was short sighted when they decided new engines would help it compete with the 320 NEO. 

Boeing needs a clean slate design to compete with the airbus.  They also need to get the bean counters out of the head shed and get some engineers back in there.  Build a well engineered machine and by default the bean counters will be made happy.  NOT the other way around.

 

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Boeing 737 Max supplier Spirit Aerosystems to cut 2,800 jobs

PUBLISHED FRI, JAN 10 202010:31 AM ESTUPDATED 30 MIN AGO
KEY POINTS
  • Spirit Aerosystems makes fuselages for the beleaguered 737 Max.
  • The company plans to lay off 2,800 workers because it’s not clear when the Max will go back in service.
  • Boeing’s 737 Max has been grounded since March after two fatal crashes.
 

GP: Spirit AeroSystems making Boeing 737 fuselage 100311

An employee drills holes for rivets in a frame inside a Boeing 737 fuselage during assembly at Spirit AeroSystems in Wichita, Kansas.
Daniel Acker | Bloomberg | Getty Images

A key Boeing 737 Max supplier said Friday that it is planning to cut about 2,800 jobs as the planes remain grounded far longer than expected after two fatal crashes and the financial impact ripples through its supply chain.

Spirit Aerosystems, which makes fuselages for the beleaguered planes, said it made the decision due to uncertainty around the plane’s return to service. The company’s shares fell after its announcement, trading down 1.2%. Boeing was off 0.5%.

 

“The difficult decision announced today is a necessary step given the uncertainty related to both the timing for resuming 737 Max production and the overall production levels that can be expected following the production suspension,” Spirit’s CEO Tom Gentile said. “We are taking these actions to balance the interests of all of our stakeholders as a result of the grounding of the 737 Max, while also positioning Spirit to meet future demand.”

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‘Damning’ Boeing messages reveal efforts to manipulate regulators of 737 Max

PUBLISHED THU, JAN 9 20208:53 PM ESTUPDATED 3 HOURS AGO
KEY POINTS
  • The 737 Max has been grounded since mid-March after two crashes killed 346 people.
  • Boeing said some of the messages “raise questions about Boeing’s interactions with the FAA in connection with the simulator qualification process.”
  • The “communications do not reflect the company we are and need to be, and they are completely unacceptable,” Boeing said.
106193895-1571686689461rts2s776.jpg?v=1578656890&w=750&h=422
 
 
WATCH NOW
VIDEO07:11
Memos show Boeing workers mocked FAA regulators
 

Boeing employees boasted about bullying regulators to approve the now-grounded 737 Max without requiring pilots to undergo simulator training while others raised safety concerns and complained about lax standards, according to a trove of internal documents the company released on Thursday.

The contents of the more than 100 pages of internal messages present a fresh crisis for Boeing, which is struggling to regain its reputation after two fatal crashes of the 737 Max that killed 346 people and months of revelations that showed how the company designed a flawed airliner and sold thousands of them around the world.

 

Boeing shared the messages with the Federal Aviation Administration and lawmakers, one of whom called them “damning.”

In messages from April 2017, one Boeing employee told another: “This airplane is designed by clowns who in turn are supervised by monkeys.”

Another message showed a Boeing employee hopeful they could “gang up” on regulators and steer them “in the direction we want.”

A Boeing employee asked a colleague in a February 2018 message: “Would you put your family on a MAX simulator-trained aircraft? I wouldn’t.” His co-worker replied: “No.”

In the same exchange, one of the employees says: “Our arrogance is our demise.”

 

“I want to stress the importance of holding firm that there will not be any type of simulator training required to transition from the [older model of the 737] to MAX,” read a message from Boeing’s 737 chief technical pilot in March 2017 to another employee. “Boeing will not allow that to happen. We’ll go face to face with any regulator who tries to make that a requirement.”

Another message from a Boeing employee later that year called an undisclosed party “morons” for ordering a type of cockpit display and said India’s aviation regulator “is apparently even stupider.”

Boeing said the messages “do not reflect the company we are and need to be, and they are completely unacceptable.”

Boeing had told regulators to remove simulator training from requirements before the FAA approved the jets, which became Boeing’s best-selling aircraft, in 2017. The names of the people in the messages were redacted, but included in copies sent to lawmakers.

Some of the documents showed concerns about flight simulators.

The FAA, for its part, said the documents don’t present any safety risks that it already knew about under its own review of the planes. It also backed the safety of the simulators mentioned in the documents.

“While the tone and content of some of the language contained in the documents is disappointing, the FAA remains focused on following a thorough process for returning the Boeing 737 MAX to passenger service,” the agency said.

106301456-1576620723211gettyimages-1189278978.jpeg?v=1576620796&w=750&h=422
 
 
WATCH NOW
VIDEO00:58
Boeing tells 737 Max suppliers to suspend parts shipments mid-January
 

“These newly released emails are incredibly damning,” said Rep. Peter DeFazio, D-Ore., chairman of the House Transportation Committee, which is investigating the Max. “They paint a deeply disturbing picture of the lengths Boeing was apparently willing to go to in order to evade scrutiny from regulators, flight crews, and the flying public, even as its own employees were sounding alarms internally.”

Boeing is in the midst of the biggest crisis in its history, as it scrambles to fix its scarred reputation from the fallout of the crashes. The planes have been grounded for almost 10 months, far longer than Boeing expected. The crisis cost its former CEO, Dennis Muilenburg, his job and prompted Boeing to plan to suspend production of the planes this month while the grounding continues.

On Tuesday, Boeing said it would recommend simulator training for pilots before the 737 Max can return to service, an about-face from its earlier stance and one that promises to drive up costs for Boeing and its airline customers.

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Boeing Fought Lion Air On Proposed MAX Simulator Training Requirement

Sean Broderick January 10, 2020
Boeing 737 MAX 10
Credit: Boeing

Boeing’s efforts to keep 737 Next Generation and MAX training as similar as possible included limiting external discussion of the maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) as early as 2013, as well as an aggressive lobbying effort to dissuade Lion Air from requiring simulator sessions for its pilots, new documents released by the manufacturer reveal.

The documents, comprising external and internal emails and internal instant message exchanges, underscore the priority Boeing placed on positioning the MAX as nearly the same as its predecessor, the 737 Next Generation (NG). They also offer some of the most compelling evidence yet that Boeing consciously chose less costly approaches over safer, more conservative ones during the MAX’s development.

Boeing determined early on that ensuring 737 pilots could transition to the MAX without simulator time would be a huge cost advantage when pitching the model to customers. It also realized that regulators could consider some of the MAX’s new features as too much to cover in computer-based training (CBT). The MCAS, a flight control law that commands automatic stabilizer movements in certain flight profiles, was chief among them.

A version of the MCAS was developed for the 767 tanker program, "but treated as analogous function, as a speed trim-type function,” a Boeing document summarizing a June 2013 MAX program meeting said. "If we emphasize MCAS is a new function there may be a greater certification and training impact.”

Boeing’s solution: refer to the MCAS externally as an addition to the 737 Speed Trim, not by its name. Boeing knew the approach might be questioned, so it sought input from its FAA-designated authorized representative (AR) "to ensure this strategy is acceptable” for certification.

"After speaking with the [AR], concurrence was provided that we can continue to use the MCAS nomenclature internally...while still considering MCAS to be an addition to the Speed Trim function,” the memo said. "This will allow us to maintain the MCAS nomenclature while not driving additional work due to training impacts and maintenance manual expansions."

The plan extended to keeping mention of the MCAS out of MAX pilot training materials. Its erroneous activation played key roles in two MAX accidents—Lion Air Flight 610 in October 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 in March 2019—that led regulators to ground the MAX in mid-March. The fleet remains grounded while Boeing addresses regulators’ concerns, including adding MCAS training and modifying the system’s logic.

Most pilots did not know the MCAS existed until after the Lion Air accident. Boeing has said repeatedly that it kept the MCAS out of manuals to simplify pilot training, and that an erroneous MCAS activation would be quickly diagnosed as a runaway stabilizer. The 2013 memo casts doubt on the former, and the two MAX accident sequences disproved the latter.

Boeing’s efforts to win approval for simulator-free MAX transition training succeeded with FAA approval in August 2016, nine months before Malindo Air become the first customer to take delivery of a MAX. But some MAX customers and regulators were not convinced that CBT, or Level B training, would be sufficient. Among them: Lion Air and Indonesia’s Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA).

Lion Air was the first Asia-Pacific customer to order the MAX, and would be one of the model’s first operators. In June 2017, with its first delivery just days away, the airline was still developing its training curriculum, and simulator sessions were on the table. The airline's early entry-into-service status meant other MAX customers would be monitoring its progress and fleet-related decisions, including training.

"I would like to discuss what if any requirements beyond the Level B CBT the DGCA has required of you, or if your airline has determined any additional training is required,” a Boeing employee asked a Lion Air 737 training captain in early June 2017.

The captain replied that the airline “decided to give the transition pilot one simulator familiarization” in addition to CBT.

"There is absolutely no reason to require your pilots to require a MAX simulator to begin flying the MAX,” the Boeing employee replied. "Once the engines are started, there is only one difference between NG and MAX procedurally, and that is that there is no OFF position of the gear handle. Boeing does not understand what is to be gained by a three-hour simulator session, when the procedures are essentially the same.”

The Boeing employee then listed six regulators that “have all accepted the CBT requirement as the only training required” to transition to the MAX. “I’d be happy to share the operational difference training with you, to help you understand that a MAX simulator is both impractical and unnecessary for your pilots.”

In a subsequent email, the Boeing employee provided presentations on the MAX technical and operational differences for the Lion Air captain and his team. The Boeing employee also urged Lion Air to consider alternatives to simulator time, such as a flight-hour minimum in 737s or ensuring a pilot’s first MAX flight is always done alongside a pilot with MAX experience.

The following day, the Boeing employee followed up, again pitching alternatives to simulator sessions. “I am concerned that if [Lion Air] chooses to require a MAX simulator for its pilots beyond what all other regulators are requiring, that it will be creating a difficult and unnecessary training burden for your airline, as well as potentially establish a precedent in your region for other MAX customers,” the Boeing employee wrote.

Around the same time as the Lion Air exchange, two Boeing employees discussed the airline’s concerns in an instant-message chat.

“Now [Lion Air] might need a sim to fly the MAX, and maybe because of their own stupidity,” one Boeing employee wrote.

"WHAT THE…..!!!! But their sister airline”—Malindo—"is already flying it!” the second responded.

“I know. I’ve asked for a webex so we can [go] thru this with the DGCA. Not sure if this is Lion's fault or DGCA yet,” the first employee replied.

Boeing in a Jan. 9 statement issued a profuse apology for the document’s contents. "The language used in these communications, and some of the sentiments they express, are inconsistent with Boeing values, and the company is taking appropriate action in response,” Boeing said.

"We provided these documents to the FAA and Congress as a reflection of our commitment to transparency and cooperation with the authorities responsible for regulating and overseeing our industry. We welcome, and will fully support, any additional review the FAA believes is appropriate in connection with any of these matters, as well as the continued involvement of the relevant congressional committees with these issues.”

Boeing on Jan. 7 changed its position on the need for MAX simulator training. It is recommending all 737 pilots have simulator sessions before flying a MAX, including those who were flying the model before the 387-aircraft fleet was grounded. Its recommendation is based on simulator trials last month during which some line pilots did not follow checklists during emergency scenarios. Boeing is modifying several checklists as part its MAX changes

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https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-muilenburg-payout-same-time-thousands-layoffs-2020-1

Boeing's fired CEO got his $62 million payout confirmed the same day 2,800 people in the 737 Max supply chain were laid off

  • Dennis Muilenburg, the recently-ousted CEO of Boeing, is leaving with a $62 million payout, the company said Friday.
  • The substantial award comes despite being fired for poor handling of the fatal crashes, aftermath, and continued suspension from service of the 737 Max.
  • Also on Friday other workers lost their jobs because of the 737 Max: 2,800 employees of Boeing supplier Spirit AeroSystems.
  • Spirit said the workers had to go because there was no work for them in light of Boeing suspending production of the 737 Max while it is grounded.
  • Unlike Muilenburg, they did not get large exit packages, and will instead receive 60 days' pay.
  • Visit Business Insider's home page for more stories.

The recently-fired CEO of Boeing is leaving the company with a package worth $62 million, the company said Friday — just hours after 2,800 workers lost their jobs over the 737 Max disaster.

Payout details for Dennis Muilenburg, who was ousted from Boeing in late December, were made public in a filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission.

Muilenburg lost his job over Boeing's disastrous handling of two fatal crashes by the 737 Max in which 346 people died.

The jet was grounded ten months ago, in March 2019. It has no firm date to return to service and Boeing has stopped building new ones.

Boeing 737 Max fuselages
Rows of part-built Boeing 737 Max planes at the Wichita, Kansas, facility of Spirit AeroSystems. Reuters

On his departure, Boeing stripped him of his bonus, any severance pay, and other incentives worth nearly $15 million.

However, that still left him with a parting package of $62 million made up of Boeing stock, pension payments, and other deferred contributions.

Meanwhile, rank-and-file aviation workers in Boeing's supply chain were cut lose without anything like that kind of compensation.

Earlier on Friday, Spirit AeroSystems, a Kansas-based manufacturer, which gets more than half its revenue from the 737 Max, announced layoffs for 2,800 workers at its Wichita facility.

Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg Congress House Transportation October 2019
Muilenburg responds to intense questioning from the US House Transportation Committee at a hearing on the Boeing 737 Max in October 2019. Getty Images

When Boeing froze the 737 Max production line, it promised not to lay off any of its own staff.

But the loss of work proved devastating for suppliers like Spirit, which said in a statement that the grounding and production freeze left them little.

"Spirit is taking this action because of the 737 MAX production suspension and ongoing uncertainty regarding the timing of when production will resume and the level of production when it does resume," the statement said.

Spirit said it plans to lay off an unspecified number of workers at two plants in Oklahoma, and may also have to shed more workers at its Wichita base if 737 Max production does not recommence.

The laid off are due to receive 60 days' pay, Spirit said.

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