Another 737 MAX down.

[Kip Powick]

Yup..and woe be those that do not ensure handles are in the stowed position prior to using the CC electric trim switch......

                                                                    

[Jaydee]

Understanding the 737-Max’s problems in plain English...

 

 

[j.k.]

52 minutes ago, Jaydee said:

Understanding the 737-Max’s problems in plain English...

 

 

 

This is a simplistic narrative that I keep seeing in the media.

It's made here by some data nerds, without any relevant industry or design experience but a flare for making and narrating computer videos from what they read in the news. They are attempting to develop a conspiracy outrage and increase their YouTube views.

Do the pilots "fly" or handle the aircraft significantly different than any other 737?

No. 

Should this plane be a differences course only? ie. a couple i-pad modules.

Yes.

The only issues I see:

- Pilots should have been trained on MCAS, it's potential problems, how they present, and how to handle it. We were made aware after Lion Air.

- The single sensor failure causing such an issue was a bad design decision by Boeing and it needs to be revamped. It sounds like it is: multiple sensor agreement required, less aggressive mcas input, more easily overridden by pilot input.

 

[Don Hudson]

j.k., agree with your comments.

Also, at time 2:56,  the video misleads viewers on the fundamental reason for the existence of MCAS on the MAX. Quote: "Except, moving the engines up on the 737 had a side effect. When the 737 was at full thrust, like during takeoff, the nose tended to point too far upward which can lead to a stall. This was a problem because these planes were supposed to behave like the old ones." end quote.

They show the reason for the engine arrangement on the MAX quite well, but the statement regarding thrust & stalling at takeoff defies physics - moving the thrust line higher and thus closer to the longitudinal center of the fuselage, (or just above the floor-line) reduces, not increases, the effect of thrust line.

The reason for MCAS is, the increased cowling area for the LEAP engine produced sufficient lift so as to render too-light a response when the a/c was nearing entry to the stall, (discovered in early flight tests). The reduced 'feel' of the CC did not conform to design standards under which the type was certified (in 1966). To be certifiable under the same type, it had to be demonstrated that the MAX had the same response as all previous B737s. Keeping same type was crucial to the sale of the aircraft. MCAS, which produced the required "heavier" control feel was Boeing's solution. This is all simplified I know.

The false statement in the video invites an incorrect conclusion regarding the stall warning/stick shaker at takeoff on both accident aircraft, which occur for entirely different reasons to do with the left AoA sensor and possibly the left FCC.

 

[Turbofan]

https://globalnews.ca/news/5174214/boeing-737-max-software-update-faa/?preview_id=5174214

 

Boeing 737 Max’s planned software update is ‘operationally suitable,’ FAA review says

[blues deville]

When this 737 is ready to fly again I think Boeing’s biggest hurdle will be convincing the general public to climb on board. Perhaps the Seattle plane maker needs to hire someone like Sully to help endorse the re-vamped Max and it’s return to the airlines. 

[Johnboy]

9 hours ago, blues deville said:

When this 737 is ready to fly again I think Boeing’s biggest hurdle will be convincing the general public to climb on board. Perhaps the Seattle plane maker needs to hire someone like Sully to help endorse the re-vamped Max and it’s return to the airlines. 

From what I have seen on social media from Sully,  Boeing will not be hiring him any time soon.  The majority of the flying public probably have no idea what aircraft type they are flying in, let alone what model of the 737 their butts are in.  What will be interesting to see for AC and WJ specifically is how passengers will react tactically when a/c swaps are performed on a daily/hourly basis.  You board your flight, take a seat and suddenly realize you are on a MAX.  Are you standing up and getting off the airplane (with or without your bag).  Some properly placed PR will help but I have a feeling the $99 fare will fade peoples memories quickly.

[mrlupin]

I wonder what kind of trouble Boeing will have getting the other countries transport regulators to approve of any fix or solution.

Also, since it appears that Boeing got a fast track approval for this B737 Max, I wonder if some authorities will choose to re-examine the approval process.

[Ex 9A Guy]

Canada will require simulator training before Max can fly in Canada

[moeman]

"Operationally Suitable". Hmmm. That doesn't instill much confidence. Means "good enough", to me.

[rudder]

This demonstrates that return to service may vary by certification jurisdiction. Several jurisdictions will not accept the FAA recertification as meeting their own standards.

 

[dagger]

5 hours ago, Ex 9A Guy said:

Canada will require simulator training before Max can fly in Canada

In comments to Reuters, Canadian Transport Minister Marc Garneau said computer-based training, which some pilots had received to transition from older versions of Boeing's 737 to the latest 737 MAX, would not go far enough to satisfy Canada.

"It's not going to be a question of pulling out an iPad and spending an hour on it," he said in Montreal. "Simulators are the very best way, from a training point of view, to go over exactly what could happen in a real way and to react properly to it."

Garneua's comments came after a draft report from a U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) appointed board recommended additional training without requiring a simulator.

Canada's call for obligatory training time illustrates the challenges faced by the FAA panel, which includes foreign regulators, in securing a common global blueprint for the ungrounding of the 737 MAX.

The FAA declined to comment.

Garneau said the training must include time in a simulator so pilots can rehearse the circumstances of the Lion Air crash in Indonesia last October.

In that crash as well as the Ethiopian Airlines disaster, pilots lost control of the planes soon after taking off. Investigators are focused in part on an anti-stall system called the MCAS, or maneuvering characteristics augmentation system, which can repeatedly push the plane's nose down.

Canada already took measures on pilot training following the Lion Air crash, working with Canadian MAX operators WestJet Airlines, Air Canada and Sunwing to require a five-step memorized pilot checklist for runaway stabilizer.

United Airlines, which owns 14 MAX, said it does not currently plan to add simulator training to its regime, which already requires pilots to memorize steps for runaway stabilizer.

"But obviously, if federal - if the regulatory authorities request that as added training, we will comply with that request," United's Chief Operating Officer Gregory Hart said on a conference call on Wednesday.

 

[dagger]

AC has a MAX simulator because it is an entirely new fleet type for it. Does WS? Sunwing? Or will they have to go elsewhere for sim time? Anyone?

[Ex 9A Guy]

7 minutes ago, dagger said:

AC has a MAX simulator because it is an entirely new fleet type for it. Does WS? Sunwing? Or will they have to go elsewhere for sim time? Anyone?

No MAX sims at WestJet.

[blues deville]

1 minute ago, Ex 9A Guy said:

No MAX sims at WestJet.

Or Sunwing. 

[Kip Powick]

SIM training costs for AC... per pilot.................................................$197.85

SIM training costs utilizing AC Sim for WestJet ... per pilot .....$13, 486.79

SIM training costs utilizing AC for Sunwing,... per pilot.............$ 21,376.89 

                                                                            

 

 

[Don Hudson]

1 hour ago, Rich Pulman said:

I wonder if the new & improved software will still respond to a 74°α. 

Both AoA sensors are used by the FCCs on alternate flight legs. The switch between left & right is accomplished through WoW sensing.

One hopes the change includes some resiliency in a brittle system that breaks quickly and badly and instead fails gracefully, permitting crews time to assess what kind of runaway they're dealing with - continuous, or by 5" intervals which mimicks STS behaviour after lift-off.

Along with comparison software that stops just the MCAS with an AoA disagreement of say, > 5°, one hopes there is clarity for crews on what the cut-off switches actually do. I believe they're both shut off now in the Runaway drill?

[Kip Powick]

. I believe they're both shut off now in the Runaway drill?

 

That is correct.

 

[Don Hudson]

Thanks, Kip.

[moeman]

9 hours ago, Kip Powick said:

. I believe they're both shut off now in the Runaway drill?

 

That is correct.

 

Any chance the shutoff's malfunction and what would the drill dictate at that point?

 

[Don Hudson]

5 hours ago, moeman said:

Any chance the shutoff's malfunction and what would the drill dictate at that point?

 

It's not possible to know/predict the chances of that happening, but the drill is to hold the trim wheel & re-trim to neutral and continue to trim using the manual trim wheels as required.

[Kip Powick]

4 hours ago, Don Hudson said:

  9 hours ago, moeman said:

Any chance the shutoff's malfunction and what would the drill dictate at that point?

 

Don has summed it up well. Check lists and Memory Items are all the pilots can really do and one could possibly insert your comment in any emergency procedure at some point.

Naturally there are circumstances where a pilot may try another procedure should the checklist he is using does not resolve the problem, but in doing so, he may actually exacerbate the problem because deviating from the prescribed check list is a gamble and the consequences are not known.

Armchair quarterbacking is something we all do and some of the thoughts/opinions put forth may be valid but when time is of the essence one has to realize, that in an emergency pilots are wired to follow "known" procedures and check-lists.

 

[GDR]

Came across this article and found it informative and interesting.

https://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/aviation/how-the-boeing-737-max-disaster-looks-to-a-software-developer

 

 

 

[acsidestick]

On 4/17/2019 at 4:21 PM, dagger said:

AC has a MAX simulator because it is an entirely new fleet type for it. Does WS? Sunwing? Or will they have to go elsewhere for sim time? Anyone?

AC has two MAX Sims.

[anonymous]

I read the article....for the most part. He, unfortunately, knows a little about airplanes. Many of his statements are ignorant and wrong. Too bad people with no particular expertise want to contribute to this debate....his descriptions of why MCAS was installed, how pilots don't have real feel in for their flight controls ie computers control the flight controls vice control cables - which ironically the 737 still uses, that MCAS drives the control columns instead of the trim, that MCAS is located in the FMC (it's the FCC)....etc.....lots wrong there.