Lion Air Down

[Guest]

15 minutes ago, conehead said:

The merger was over 20 years ago.  How can anyone say there is any remnant of a previous culture at play?  I don’t buy it...  there is only one Boeing company.

Maybe they are Liberals, you know blame things on the other guy?

[Guest]

Southwest fits all its Boeing 737 MAX planes with new safety device to avoid a repeat of the Lion Air crash that killed 189 people

• Sinéad Baker
•  

• Nov. 30, 2018, 10:41 AM

• Southwest Airlines is activating a new safety feature in its Boeing 737 Max fleet after the Indonesian government identified issues with the Lion Air plane that crashed and killed 189 people.
• The government said there was an issue with the plane's Angle of Attack (AOA) system, which wrongly caused the plane's anti-stall system to kick in and push the plane's nose lower, making it harder to control.
• It is not certain that AOA errors caused the crash, but it is a possibility.
• Southwest is now planning on activating an additional indicator in its Boeing 737 Max planes, which would alert pilots of erroneous readings in the system.

Southwest Airlines is adding a new safety device to its fleet of Boeing 737 Max planes to avoid an incident like the Lion Air crash which killed 189 people in October.

Southwest confirmed to aviation publication The Air Current that it will activate new Angle of Attack (AOA) indicators on its planes which will warn if the sensors are giving incorrect data.

The airline said in a statement that the new measure "will provide a valuable supplemental cross-check in the event there is an erroneous AOA signal present." 

The indicator is an optional additional check on the aircraft's AOA system, which senses the plane's angle and pushes the nose of the aircraft down if it is pointing too high. The system is design to prevent the plane from stalling.

However, if the system malfunctions it can push the nose down too far, forcing it into a dangerous dive which pilots may struggle to reverse.

While Southwest did not mention the fatal Lion Air crash, Indonesian investigators have said that a fault with the AOA system in the brand new Boeing 737 Max 8 may have been why the pilot was left wrestling with the controls as the plane began to speed towards the sea.

They said, however, that it is "too early to conclude" whether this issue with the system contributed to the crash.

According to video and photo footage reviewed by The Current Air, Lion Air's planes do not have the AOA indicators installed.

US aviation groups, including the Federal Aviation Authority, say that Boeing didn't tell them about new sensors in the automated anti-stall system that were added to their 737 MAX aircraft.

Boeing issued a warning for its 737 MAX 8 and 737 MAX 9 airliners after the crash, and the US Government issued an emergency airworthiness directive.

Southwest pilots were informed of the change this week, The Air Current reported. The change will begin with brand new planes from Boeing, which will come with the AOA device already installed, The Air Current said.

Southwest is also expected to fit its existing 737 MAX planes with the device, according to the report.

The Air Current article is interesting and in particular 

and another item on the Boeing Reaction: https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/boeing-ceo-disputes-mcas-details-intentionally-withheld-from-airlines-jt610/

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/what-is-the-boeing-737-max-maneuvering-characteristics-augmentation-system-mcas-jt610/

[blues deville]

9 hours ago, conehead said:

The merger was over 20 years ago.  How can anyone say there is any remnant of a previous culture at play?  I don’t buy it...  there is only one Boeing company.

If you were a 30-35 year old future manager at McD-D in 1997 when Boeing took over you’d 50-55 today and probably now working in some upper level management. Boeing has had a huge retirement of its own veteran pilots, engineers and designers in recent years. And it’s not only merged airline pilot seniority lists which leave employees angry for years having people in places where they shouldn’t be. 

[blues deville]

53 minutes ago, J.O. said:

Do senior managers at Boeing make the decisions on what is - and isn’t - published in the FCOM, or what is covered in the training footprint? I would assume that stuff would come from their Operations group. 

My last visit to Boeing and they’re FCOM group was in 2006. The person in charge we met with was well into their 60’s. The department consisted of a couple of people and nothing like I expected to meet. QRH was one guy. Must keep in mind the merger of McD-D into Boeing included all employee groups.

Someone either dropped the ball on this one or worse. Either way it’s going to cost the plane maker a lot of money.  

[conehead]

49 minutes ago, Malcolm said:

Southwest fits all its Boeing 737 MAX planes with new safety device to avoid a repeat of the Lion Air crash that killed 189 people

• Sinéad Baker
•  

• Nov. 30, 2018, 10:41 AM

• Southwest Airlines is activating a new safety feature in its Boeing 737 Max fleet after the Indonesian government identified issues with the Lion Air plane that crashed and killed 189 people.
• The government said there was an issue with the plane's Angle of Attack (AOA) system, which wrongly caused the plane's anti-stall system to kick in and push the plane's nose lower, making it harder to control.
• It is not certain that AOA errors caused the crash, but it is a possibility.
• Southwest is now planning on activating an additional indicator in its Boeing 737 Max planes, which would alert pilots of erroneous readings in the system.

Southwest Airlines is adding a new safety device to its fleet of Boeing 737 Max planes to avoid an incident like the Lion Air crash which killed 189 people in October.

Southwest confirmed to aviation publication The Air Current that it will activate new Angle of Attack (AOA) indicators on its planes which will warn if the sensors are giving incorrect data.

The airline said in a statement that the new measure "will provide a valuable supplemental cross-check in the event there is an erroneous AOA signal present." 

The indicator is an optional additional check on the aircraft's AOA system, which senses the plane's angle and pushes the nose of the aircraft down if it is pointing too high. The system is design to prevent the plane from stalling.

However, if the system malfunctions it can push the nose down too far, forcing it into a dangerous dive which pilots may struggle to reverse.

While Southwest did not mention the fatal Lion Air crash, Indonesian investigators have said that a fault with the AOA system in the brand new Boeing 737 Max 8 may have been why the pilot was left wrestling with the controls as the plane began to speed towards the sea.

They said, however, that it is "too early to conclude" whether this issue with the system contributed to the crash.

According to video and photo footage reviewed by The Current Air, Lion Air's planes do not have the AOA indicators installed.

US aviation groups, including the Federal Aviation Authority, say that Boeing didn't tell them about new sensors in the automated anti-stall system that were added to their 737 MAX aircraft.

Boeing issued a warning for its 737 MAX 8 and 737 MAX 9 airliners after the crash, and the US Government issued an emergency airworthiness directive.

Southwest pilots were informed of the change this week, The Air Current reported. The change will begin with brand new planes from Boeing, which will come with the AOA device already installed, The Air Current said.

Southwest is also expected to fit its existing 737 MAX planes with the device, according to the report.

The Air Current article is interesting and in particular 

and another item on the Boeing Reaction: https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/boeing-ceo-disputes-mcas-details-intentionally-withheld-from-airlines-jt610/

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/what-is-the-boeing-737-max-maneuvering-characteristics-augmentation-system-mcas-jt610/

Like this?

 

[J.O.]

1 hour ago, Malcolm said:

Maybe they are Liberals, you know blame things on the other guy?

Oh please, don’t insult our intelligence. Blaming the other guys is hardly the domain of only one political side. They all do it. 

[Guest]

1 hour ago, J.O. said:

Oh please, don’t insult our intelligence. Blaming the other guys is hardly the domain of only one political side. They all do it. 

Sorry you feel insulted..... Nah not really. 

[Maverick]

19 hours ago, Malcolm said:

Sorry you feel insulted..... Nah not really. 

Your inner miserable old pr!ck is showing, Malcolm

[conehead]

Can you girls stick to the topic please? (Shakes fist at the sky...) 

[Guest]

1 hour ago, Maverick said:

Your inner miserable old pr!ck is showing, Malcolm

Maverick: what a way to talk about one of your "Guests".   Re what is showing    ……..  Only if you lift my kilt. 

[Maverick]

Lion Air may cancel US$22 billion in Boeing orders, as airline’s co-founder Rusdi Kirana rages over US plane maker’s bid to avoid crash blame

 

• US$22 billion in orders from Boeing hang in the balance in the aftermath of the Lion Air crash that killed 189 people
• Lion Air co-founder Rusdi Kirana believes Boeing has tried to deflect blame away from design changes made to its 737, sources say

 

PUBLISHED : Tuesday, 04 December, 2018, 1:00am

UPDATED : Tuesday, 04 December, 2018, 8:57pm

 

COMMENTS: 12 

 

 

 

 

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Boeing to upgrade software on popular 737 after deadly Lion Air crash

30 Nov 2018

Indonesia’s Lion Air is reviewing aeroplane purchases from Boeing and has not ruled out cancelling US$22 billion in orders as relations worsen over responsibility for a 737 jetliner crash that killed 189 people in late October.

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Co-founder Rusdi Kirana is furious over what he regards as attempts by Boeing to deflect attention from recent design changes and blame Lion Air for the crash, while the airline faces scrutiny over its maintenance record and pilots’ actions.

Kirana is examining the possibility of cancelling remaining orders of Boeing jets “from the next delivery”, according to a person familiar with his thinking. Another source close to the airline said it was looking at cancelling orders.

A former group CEO who now serves as Indonesia’s ambassador to Malaysia, Kirana remains closely involved with Lion Air and hosts a monthly meeting in Kuala Lumpur with the heads of the group’s airlines based in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.

No final decision has been made, but discussion over the fate of billions’ worth of remaining orders highlights the stakes surrounding an investigation involving Boeing’s fastest-ever selling jet, the 737 MAX, which entered service last year.

Doomed Lion Air jet was airworthy, Indonesian crash investigators now say

Lion Air has 190 Boeing jets worth US$22 billion at list prices waiting to be delivered, on top of 197 already taken, making it one of the largest US export customers.

Any request to cancel could be designed to put pressure on Boeing and would likely trigger extensive negotiations. Many airlines defer orders, but industry sources say aerospace suppliers rarely allow much scope for unilateral cancellations.

 

 

Lion Air declined to comment. It was also not immediately clear how much of the airline is owned by Kirana. A Boeing spokesman said: “We are taking every measure to fully understand all aspects of this accident, and are working closely with the investigating team and all regulatory authorities involved. We are also supporting our valued customer through this very tough time.”

Boeing eyes software upgrade for popular 737 as Lion Air flight’s airworthiness comes under scrutiny

Kirana, who co-founded the airline with his brother in 2000, ordered the review of airline purchases in response to a Boeing statement focusing attention on piloting and maintenance, the person said.

Boeing released the statement focusing on maintenance actions spread over four flights in the run-up to the fatal flight on October 29, after investigators issued an interim report that did not give a cause for the crash.

Boeing is also examining software changes in the wake of the crash, while insisting long-standing procedures exist for pilots to cancel automated nose-down movements experienced by the 737 MAX in response to erroneous sensor readings.

It has come under fire from US pilots for not mentioning the MCAS system – a modification of existing anti-stall systems – in the manual for the 737 MAX, which began service last year.

“Why are they changing [software] if there was nothing wrong?” the person familiar with Kirana’s thinking said.

Boeing has said all information needed to fly the 737 safely is available to pilots and that its workhorse model is safe.

The row highlights an unusually polarised dispute over the causes of the crash. Experts say most accidents are caused by a cocktail of factors and parties rarely comment in detail before the final report, which often follows a year of analysis.

In its statement, Boeing recapped the interim report and listed questions on maintenance and pilot behaviour that it said remained unanswered in the 78-page document, but did not mention the MCAS modification covered in an earlier safety bulletin.

It is not the first time an airline has crossed swords with its supplier after a crash.

Lion Air’s rival AirAsia Group Bhd clashed with Airbus SE after its Indonesian subsidiary lost an A320 in 2014. It continued to take deliveries, but relations never fully recovered and it later toyed with buying 787s from Boeing.

 

 

Some financial sources say Lion Air and southeast Asian rivals over-expanded and would be comfortable with fewer orders.

But the row highlights an unusually polarised dispute over the causes of the crash. Experts say most accidents are caused by a cocktail of factors and parties rarely comment in detail before the final report, which often follows a year of analysis.

In its statement, Boeing recapped the interim report and listed questions on maintenance and pilot behaviour that it said remained unanswered in the 78-page document, but did not mention the MCAS modification covered in an earlier safety bulletin.

It is not the first time an airline has crossed swords with its supplier after a crash. Lion Air’s rival AirAsia clashed with Airbus after its Indonesian subsidiary lost an A320 in 2014. It continued to take deliveries, but relations never fully recovered and it later toyed with buying 787s from Boeing.

 

 

 

This article appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition as: Dispute over crash puts US$22b jet deal in doubt

 

https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/2176220/lion-air-may-cancel-billions-boeing-orders-airlines-co?fbclid=IwAR13ITDiATSIdf9_WlAzVRApoAlKvr-

4qtGMCEBfOlIbRBEDSXjqSzS27dY

[Guest]

American pilots get MCAS training before expected software tweak

• 07 December, 2018
• SOURCE: Flight Dashboard
• BY: Jon Hemmerdinger
• Boston

American Airlines has updated some pilot training to include discussion about the automated system suspected of playing a role in the deadly 29 October crash of a Lion Air Boeing 737 Max, according to the company's pilots' union.

The training updates come amid expectation that Boeing is working on a software change to address concerns with the 737 Max's manoeuvring characteristics augmentation system (MCAS).

Boeing added MCAS to the 737 Max because that aircraft has slightly different flight characteristics from the earlier-generation 737NG. MCAS makes the 737 Max behave like the 737NG by trimming the stabiliser so that the aircraft's nose drops if the aircraft approaches stall with flaps up. Airlines say Boeing never informed them of the system.

MCAS is at the focus of the investigation into the Lion Air crash, which killed 189 people. The Lion Air pilots struggled for control as the aircraft's systems repeatedly pushed the nose down, possibly due to faulty angle-of-attack (AOA) indications. Lion Air's founder is now threatening to cancel his airline's remaining 737 Max orders.

Following the crash, the Federal Aviation Administration issued an emergency directive warning that faulty AOA data could trigger a dive, and requiring pilots be made aware of a "runaway stabiliser" checklist.

American is now providing pilots with updated ground school materials that include discussion of MCAS, the FAA's directive and circumstances that may have affected the Lion Air crew, says Dennis Tajer, communications committee chair for APA, which represents American's pilots.

Additionally, American's check airmen "got a really informative brief on MCAS" during American's quarterly meeting with check pilots, he says.

"It's being briefed from top to bottom, and all the information is flowing well," Tajer says.

Tajer says MCAS was also discussed during American's recent simulator training – though the airline has only 737NG simulators, which do not actually simulate the MCAS function.

The union is urging the airline to purchase 737 Max simulators.

"A simulator that would help us understand some of the flying characteristics better," Tajer says.

American did not respond to questions about training or simulators, but says it has been "working collaboratively" with the union since the Lion Air crash.

"We will continue to keep our pilots and maintenance professionals informed of any updates," American says.

Southwest Airlines has three 737 Max simulators on order, with the first expected to arrive in 2019, it says. The company does not say whether it implemented new training since the crash, but early this year Southwest implemented a new training programme aimed at helping pilots recover from aircraft upsets and unreliable cockpit readings.

Tajer says Boeing executives recently told union officials that the company is working with the FAA to issue an MCAS-related software update. Boeing told APA at the end of November that the upgrade would be finished within about eight weeks.

While not confirming software changes are underway, Boeing says it "continues to evaluate the need for software or other changes as we learn more from the ongoing investigation".

"As part of our standard practice following any accident or incident, we examine our aircraft design and operation, and when appropriate, issue bulletins and make recommendations to operators to further enhance safety," Boeing adds in a statement.

The Lion Air crash raised questions about the degree to which pilots need to understand increasingly-complex systems with which few will ever interact.

Some pilots fault Boeing for not divulging the presence of MCAS.

"This is not a… culture that is going to enhance safety," the APA's Tajer says. "Rationing and metering and choosing what not to disclose" is indicative of "diseased aviation".

But Boeing insists the existing "runaway stabiliser" checklist provides all steps needed to recover from a MCAS-induced stabiliser problem. That checklist instructs pilots to switch off stabiliser trim switches and, if needed, hold the stabiliser trim wheel.

But Tajer says that checklist excluded critical information. Specifically, American's runaway stabiliser checklist, written prior to the Lion Air crash, says uncommanded trim will be "interrupted when the control column is displaced in the opposite direction".

However, on 9 November, American Airlines' issued a 737 "fleet bulletin" saying that applying opposing force on the control column "will not stop" MCAS-directed downward pitch if MCAS is receiving incorrect AOA data.

"To us, that's proof that the runaway stabiliser checklist is not integrating this MCAS," Tajer says.

[DEFCON]

Lion makes an obviously sound, but incomplete argument.

Forget the fact the aircraft was a Max with the new system; the cutout switches are a common feature among the types and should have been selected as a memory item regardless, which would have restored control to the pilots.

It's always tough to criticize the guys that were there and lost, but the evidence does seem to suggest the crew didn't respond to the upset in accordance with established procedure.

 

[Kip Powick]

Passed to me , (probably some of this already in the thread)  by a 737 pilot I did a lot of flying with,  and it is an easy read.

 

Subject:	Boeing’s automatic trim for the 737 MAX was not disclosed to the Pilots

 

 

The background to Boeing’s 737 MAX automatic trim

The automatic trim we described last week has a name, MCAS, or Maneuvering Characteristics Automation System.

It’s unique to the MAX because the 737 MAX no longer has the docile pitch characteristics of the 737NG at high Angles Of Attack (AOA). This is caused by the larger engine nacelles covering the higher bypass LEAP-1B engines.

The nacelles for the MAX are larger and placed higher and further forward of the wing, Figure 1.

 

 

Figure 1. Boeing 737NG (left) and MAX (right) nacelles compared. Source: Boeing 737 MAX brochure.

By placing the nacelle further forward of the wing, it could be placed higher. Combined with a higher nose landing gear, which raises the nacelle further, the same ground clearance could be achieved for the nacelle as for the 737NG.

The drawback of a larger nacelle, placed further forward, is it destabilizes the aircraft in pitch. All objects on an aircraft placed ahead of the Center of Gravity (the line in Figure 2, around which the aircraft moves in pitch) will contribute to destabilize the aircraft in pitch.

Figure 2. The 737-800 (yellow) overlaid on the 737 MAX 8 (purple), with the line denoting the CG in pitch. Source: Leeham Co. and 737 ACAP.

The 737 is a classical flight control aircraft. It relies on a naturally stable base aircraft for its flight control design, augmented in selected areas. Once such area is the artificial yaw damping, present on virtually all larger aircraft (to stop passengers getting sick from the aircraft’s natural tendency to Dutch Roll = Wagging its tail).

Until the MAX, there was no need for artificial aids in pitch. Once the aircraft entered a stall, there were several actions described last week which assisted the pilot to exit the stall. But not in normal flight.

The larger nacelles, called for by the higher bypass LEAP-1B engines, changed this. When flying at normal angles of attack (3° at cruise and say 5-8° in a turn) the destabilizing effect of the larger engines are not felt.

The nacelles are designed to not generate lift in normal flight. It would generate unnecessary drag as the aspect ratio of an engine nacelle is lousy. The aircraft designer focuses the lift to the high aspect ratio wings.

But if the pilot for whatever reason manoeuvres the aircraft hard, generating an angle of attack close to the stall angle of around 14°, the previously neutral engine nacelle generates lift. A lift which is felt by the aircraft as a pitch up moment (as its ahead of the CG line), now stronger than on the 737NG. This destabilizes the MAX in pitch at higher Angles Of Attack (AOA). The most difficult situation is when the manoeuvre has a high pitch ratio. The aircraft’s inertia can then provoke an over-swing into stall AOA.

To counter the MAX’s lower stability margins at high AOA, Boeing introduced MCAS. Dependent on AOA value and rate, altitude (air density) and Mach (changed flow conditions) the MCAS, which is a software loop in the Flight Control computer, initiates a nose down trim above a threshold AOA.

It can be stopped by the Pilot counter-trimming on the Yoke or by him hitting the CUTOUT switches on the center pedestal. It’s not stopped by the Pilot pulling the Yoke, which for normal trim from the autopilot or runaway manual trim triggers trim hold sensors. This would negate why MCAS was implemented, the Pilot pulling so hard on the Yoke that the aircraft is flying close to stall.

It’s probably this counterintuitive characteristic, which goes against what has been trained many times in the simulator for unwanted autopilot trim or manual trim runaway, which has confused the pilots of JT610. They learned that holding against the trim stopped the nose down, and then they could take action, like counter-trimming or outright CUTOUT the trim servo. But it didn’t. After a 10 second trim to a 2.5° nose down stabilizer position, the trimming started again despite the Pilots pulling against it. The faulty high AOA signal was still present.

How should they know that pulling on the Yoke didn’t stop the trim? It was described nowhere neither in the aircraft’s manual, the AFM, nor in the Pilot’s manual, the FCOM. This has created strong reactions from airlines with 737 MAX on the flight line and their Pilots. They have learned the NG and the MAX flies the same. They fly them interchangeably during the week.

They do fly the same as long as no fault appears. Then there are differences, and the Pilots should have known this.

 

[DEFCON]

Everyone seems to agree; Boeing messed up.

This leaves one of a couple outstanding questions still to be answered; why didn't the pilots use the cutout switches?

That's not a criticism of the pilots, I think the industry needs to appreciate the reason(s) for the incomplete / appropriate response if something similar is to be avoided going forward.

 

[blues deville]

54 minutes ago, DEFCON said:

Everyone seems to agree; Boeing messed up.

This leaves one of a couple outstanding questions still to be answered; why didn't the pilots use the cutout switches?

Apparently the flight crew on the previous flight with the same fault did. However this critical information wasn’t passed on to the next and final crew.  

[Don Hudson]

Blues - and the poor log-book snag writing led, in my view, to not communicating the entire problem, in turn diagnosing the fault thoroughly enough and permitted release of the airplane without the perceived need for a test flight.

The behaviour of the trim system probably in this accident likely did not resemble anything the crew had experienced in recurrent sim sessions. Normally, you see the trim wheel rotating, (generally at the faster, 'manual' rates than the slower autopilot trim rates). Either way, the rotating wheel with its white marks going round and round without obvious input is an eye-catcher.

Here, the wheel rotated for about 2.5 seconds then stopped. A slight control heaviness would have been felt and manually trimmed out. That scenario repeated itself and was moderately under control, (the confusion & question & likely cockpit conversation would be, "Why does it keep doing that?, or "What's it doing now?"), until a handover of control, (Capt. to F/O) took place. Manual trimming to counter the MCAS "subtle runaway") was not applied and physical control forces got too heavy. Likely they split the control columns (as designed, to cater to an elevator jam), in the last few moments.

If they had known about the MCAS system, and how it behaved and how it was controlled, (apparently single-source, No. 1 pitot), they may have made the leap to using the cut-out switches, but it wasn't "a loud bang", so to speak and there was no attention-getting warning to indicate how serious the problem really was.

The previous crew will be interviewed extensively I should think. We may find out what they thought and why, when they decided to use the cut-out switches. Probably a quiet, insightful moment that was responding to a system that wasn't behaving so they stopped it, probably without going through any checklist.

I've looked in NG & Max FCOMs. Very little information in Boeing manuals generally - even below a minimum NTK level in my view. To that point, there isn't a single mention of how the MCAS system actually works and why it exists, such that a crew could make an informed decision about the system. Their control columns just got heavier and heavier until they couldn't hold them back anymore.

[conehead]

I’m also surprised the system is designed with a single-source sensor.

[Don Hudson]

Hi conehead;

It is difficult to accept that a primary flight-control system would have only one sensor and that a run-on failure mode associated with bad data hadn't been envisioned in the original design of the MCAS. That's fundamental so there has to be more to this than that.

[boestar]

12 hours ago, blues deville said:

Apparently the flight crew on the previous flight with the same fault did. However this critical information wasn’t passed on to the next and final crew.  

For all you pilots on the forum (a lot of you).  This is why maintenance wants a DETAILED write up of a defect on an aircraft.  It is not just for Maintenance but for the next guy that straps that aircraft to his butt.  The devil is in the details.

[Seeker]

4 minutes ago, boestar said:

For all you pilots on the forum (a lot of you).  This is why maintenance wants a DETAILED write up of a defect on an aircraft.  It is not just for Maintenance but for the next guy that straps that aircraft to his butt.  The devil is in the details.

Exactly - enough information so the AME can fix it and enough information for the next guy to know how to prepare for it in case it happens again.

[blues deville]

44 minutes ago, boestar said:

For all you pilots on the forum (a lot of you).  This is why maintenance wants a DETAILED write up of a defect on an aircraft.  It is not just for Maintenance but for the next guy that straps that aircraft to his butt.  The devil is in the details.

Good advice. Has always been my rule as I was raised by a parent who spent his working life in airline maintenance. Conversations around the dinner table were an always education. 

[DEFCON]

"For all you pilots on the forum (a lot of you).  This is why maintenance wants a DETAILED write up of a defect on an aircraft.  It is not just for Maintenance but for the next guy that straps that aircraft to his butt.  The devil is in the details."

I think it's kind of interesting to see that a maintenance man, Boestar, has made what may be the most important 'flight' safety related observation expressed over the course of this thread.

 

[Seeker]

1 hour ago, DEFCON said:

 

I think it's kind of interesting to see that a maintenance man, Boestar, has made what may be the most important 'flight' safety related observation expressed over the course of this thread.

 

Interesting but not surprising.  Aviation is a team sport.

[Don Hudson]

When I joined AC a hundred years ago, we got a day's groundschool, (initial course) on snag-writing. Garth emphasized the importance of clear communication and taking the time. Sometimes hanging around for a conversation with maintenance is a good thing. Here, a thoroughly-written snag almost certainly would have saved lives.