Halifax report coming May 18,2017

[DEFCON]

Where does the expectation of privacy come from?

 

 

[Guest]

1 hour ago, DEFCON said:

Where does the expectation of privacy come from?

 

 

I think everyone has that right. The press is too quick to release names. Has not happened to me but there are lots of cases where someone is accused of a crime, name published and then later found not guilty but readers of the original article remember the name and suspected crime. 

[DEFCON]

I thought I'd add a little ps to my 'competency' comments to better clarify my point.

In my mind the negative impact on competency due to automation dependency is very alarming; the modern crash record is quite telling in this respect.

As the case here may show, the lack of regular hands - on experience may prove to be hugely problematic when a crew, any crew, is eventually called upon to act as a traditional pilot in circumstances they're not not normally exposed or accustomed to and as many of us know, black-hole np approaches are extremely challenging for even the most manually experienced pilots.

   

[DEFCON]

Hi Malcolm

You're correct, no pilot wants their name released to the public, especially when it's used post-mortem, but no 'Right' to protection exists either.

[blues deville]

I have no need to know the names of the pilots involved but I was upset to hear they were both injured during the landing. I did not know or recall reading of this happening. I hope they have both recovered from their injuries. 

What is interesting about the aviation industry is this secrecy about flight crew names. Two recent maritime accidents (South Korea and Italy) had the names of both ferry/ship Captain's in the news before the rescue of each was complete. One of these accidents had the ship's Captain changed out of his uniform and into civilian clothing during the rescue. Guess he wasn't going down with his ship. 

[Kip Powick]

7 hours ago, Vsplat said:

 

kip, the fact that you would post that you received this information from other air canada personnel underscores the problem.  That this information has been released is no longer private, is it?

Vs

I posted that I have received the information I was seeking but really.................underscores what problem???. You seem to be coming on real strong about protecting the anonymity of the pilots involved whereas I merely asked a simple question that had absolutely nothing to do with names, religion, gender etc.of the pilots.  Whether I know the pilots names or not is not even relevant to my question.....I merely asked a procedure question  and I have no idea why you feel a simple question concerning an airline's procedure should be off limits .

However, we have beaten this 'sparring match' to the "nth" degree and I have my answer, which simply satisfies  my curiosity, so lets just move on ...no harm // no foul.  

[Thrust Set]

On May 19, 2017 at 7:34 AM, DEFCON said:

Conehead

Yes, he may just like the position, but the chance that's the reason he's in the seat is as remote a possibility as seeing a spotted tiger.

Do know the FO, it's not a secret who he is. I will say the above comment reflects a lack of understanding. 

Very simple, was not based in YYZ, he did not want to commute at the time and could not hold Capt at his base. Ex military and very very competent. 

[Canoehead]

Dozens, and likely hundreds of folks at 705 carriers sitting in the right seat for any number of reasons that have nothing to do with level of competency.  I know many (and sometimes envy their decisions!)

[DEFCON]

No, I do not know who the FO is, nor does it matter; I'm not an insider at AC.

I agree, people do bid lifestyles, but I'm sure both of you would agree, that is not always the case.

As an outsider I'm left to consider the facts as published in the report. In this case the report indicates the FO had relatively low time on type and all of it had been spent in the right seat.

As an experienced large aircraft accident investigator I can tell you that the FO's history is relevant to the investigation. Although I'm certain that any TSB investigator worth his pay would not have left this question open ended, for whatever the reason, the 1IC, or a higher authority decided to not include the details in the report.

As these things go, loose threads lead to questions.

 

   

[Thrust Set]

"In this case the report indicates the FO had relatively low time on type and all of it had been spent in the right seat."

 

Thought the F/O had under 6500 on type with 11300 total. Is that considered low time on type?...... Just asking.

 

[DEFCON]

That's about 35 hours per month over 15 years, which does seem a tad low.

[Zan Vetter]

6500 hrs on type is not low, its high. The pilots were both very experienced. Can I say that while I also wouldn't want my name in the press, these pilots appeared to have performed very very well. The approach was flown to spec on an absolute crap night. With the exception of the AP being left on too long, there were no mistakes. So, other than no pilot wanting ever to be involved in an accident, these pilots have nothing to be ashamed of. 

The culprit that stands out to me is the approach visibility. They shouldn't have even been there, and in any other country they would've been on the way to their alternate.

[Innuendo]

Quote

They shouldn't have even been there, and in any other country they would've been on the way to their alternate.

I suspect in many other countries they would have had a full front course ILS available.

I can't see why it is necessary to have to be limited to Non Precision approaches to major airports in lousy weather.

As someone else said, ( I paraphrase somewhat),  "enough of art work in the terminal when there are still less than the best  approach systems available to all the runways".

[Vsplat]

Several things that really stand out for me in this report:

1) Halifax's terrible weather has been known forever.  The opposite end of this same runway has a CAT II.

2) The lighting system was weak, and this too has been known forever.  Yet everyone allowed it to continue.  Classic normalization. 

3) Below charted minima.  Canada's shame. Hang this on the lobbyists and the TC mandarins that ceded power to them.

4) NAV CAN's SMS allowed a controller to be multi-tasking in ridiculous weather and workload circumstances such that they forgot to set the lights appropriately

5) The regulator allowed all of this. Ref 3) above, shame.

The autopilot disconnect is inconsequential.  It self cancels at 50' below MDA, which for this airline, is set 50' above published minimum to ensure the aircraft doesn't descend below MDA in the event of a go around.  So, based on my few read throughs,  the AP would have cancelled right at charted MDA.

Ditto the above comments on crew performance.  They flew it as instructed.

WRT this speculation over the FO...  I'm not sure the extrapolation of hours over time is a valid approach.  Things like parental leave, short term disability due to an injury or some rather innocuous medical procedures can chew up months without flying.  Not saying it is the case here, but when pilots are posted to supervisory roles, flight deck hours can often drop below 35 per month on average. 

At AC, hours alone as a measure doesn't really mean much.  A 777 pilot can put in 60 hours a month and get two approaches, both in YYZ. whereas, a 320 pilot can put in 20 hours a month and get 10-15 LGA or ORD arrivals or departures, or play in the fog down east with YHZ-YYT legs and CAT IIs at both ends.

There are pretty strict currency rules in place, tracked automatically.  Those are the better measures IMO. 

Vs

[Kip Powick]

3 hours ago, Vsplat said:

The autopilot disconnect is inconsequential.  It self cancels at 50' below MDA, which for this airline, is set 50' above published minimum to ensure the aircraft doesn't descend below MDA in the event of a go around.  So, based on my few read throughs,  the AP would have cancelled right at charted MDA.

From  the Report....

By this time, the aircraft had crossed the published MDA (740 feet ASL) and was 0.3 nm farther back than the published distance. The autopilot remained engaged as the aircraft continued descending, and there was no reduction in the descent rate.

Have not flown the A320 so I am not fully conversant with the autopilot "rules"...

There seems to be a difference between your explanation and the TSB...appreciate an explanation..Thanks..

[Seeker]

4 hours ago, Vsplat said:

Several things that really stand out for me in this report:

1) Halifax's terrible weather has been known forever.  The opposite end of this same runway has a CAT II.

2) The lighting system was weak, and this too has been known forever.  Yet everyone allowed it to continue.  Classic normalization. 

3) Below charted minima.  Canada's shame. Hang this on the lobbyists and the TC mandarins that ceded power to them.

4) NAV CAN's SMS allowed a controller to be multi-tasking in ridiculous weather and workload circumstances such that they forgot to set the lights appropriately

5) The regulator allowed all of this. Ref 3) above, shame.

 

Bravo Vsplat.  I didn't want to be the guy who posted it but I believe you have correctly identified the true causes.  I might change the order but you got them right.  The "true" cause is Transport Canada allowing itself to be lobbied into submission by ATAC and the airport authorities.  The reason why other countries mandate a minimum visibility for an IFR approach is because, based on the installed lighting, it's the minimum visibility you need to safely do the approach.  ATAC had lobbied hard to get a reduction (50% then, 25% now) because the airport authorities refuse to spend the money on approach aids and lighting and without the reduction many days nothing would land (or even do an approach).

From the report:

These regulations mainly affect commercial operators. A generic approach ban was introduced for commercial operators for all instrument approaches (category I precision, approach procedures with vertical guidance, and non-precision approaches) at a visibility value that is a function of the published Canada Air Pilot visibility for the approach procedure flown. This generic ban takes effect when the RVR, runway visibility, or ground visibility is reported to be below the RVR or visibility value corresponding to approximately 75% of the Canada Air Pilot published visibility specified for the procedure flown. This approach ban does not conform to internationally accepted safety regulations established by ICAO and civil aviation authorities around the world (such as FAA and EASA), which specify that, in order to conduct an instrument approach procedure, the actual visibility must be no less than the visibility specified on the approach.  (bolding mine)

So there you have it.  If the approach ban (minimum visibility to conduct the approach) "does not conform to internationally accepted safety regulations", why is it allowed?  It's perfectly obvious that this is the main cause and should be printed in bold on the front page instead of being buried on page 56.  If the regulator doesn't now change these approach ban limits I would consider it to be pure negligence. In fact, if I was a lawyer for certain law firm in Halifax, I'd be arguing that they were negligent in allowing them in the first place.

[DEFCON]

Do you guys read?

The TT on type is not low, but accumulating the time at a rate of 35 hours per month over 15 years is not exactly burning up the sky. You could compare the FO's time on the job to the Captain's; the disparity is more than obvious.

I'd bet the average A320 pilot time at AC probably averages somewhere near twice that amount of hard time.

Once you get by the need to circle the wagons, I'm sure some of you can at least acknowledge the fact that sitting as an FO on the 320 for 15 years at AC as everyone passes you by, including the subject Captain, would stand out to an observer and is a point worthy of investigative examination.

When you boil the entire matter down, although there are other related factors, the crash is a consequence of the crew's decision to allow the aircraft, for whatever the reason, to descend below the MDA without having the necessary visual clues. Blaming Airbus, automation, the airport factors and the weather etc. does not relieve a crew of its fiduciary responsibility.

 

 

 

 

[Zan Vetter]

So the crash occurred because the airplane hit the ground. Enlightening, DEFCON. 

The report says they had the lights in sight. But they might have been the wrong lights, because they were lower than they should've been, due to factors associated with the flight mode they were in, and their training. And the lighting on that approach was unsufficient for the minimums they were flying to according to international standards, and they weren't even on full strength. 

As for crew experience in total, it stands out as quite high to me, in comparison with many of the other reports I've read. In addition to the factors already stated above- medical, leave, layoff (years?), reserve duty (many years?), I'd add that a so called normal AC mainline pilot probably flies 500-700 hrs per year. Which is only about 50 per month. As to why that's so low you'd have to ask the people who make the pairings and schedules.

[Southshore]

A rare poster but as Popeye said " I can't stands no more".

1- the light setting is a red herring. When you get to mins and don't see the runway - you go around. Even if the lights are off, it doesn't matter. No runway - you go around. Light setting 4,5, or zero is not material. It's called Minimum Descent Altitude for a reason. The ATC controllers had nothing to do with that.

2- the 320's without gps based nav use 3 inertial nav units (INU's). Not valid for vertical nav for approaches. (Correct me if I'm wrong). Hence the need to do the loc app on RW05 in this case. None the less position info is available, and is reasonably accurate. It should let you know pretty closely where the end of the runway is. You can tell that by somebody, anybody looking down and says "we aren't there yet". Regardless, if you do an FPA or stepdown, knowing where the end of the runway is is kind of critical. In either case. if you reach MDA on FPA, or the 'times up" - you go around. (IMO, the stepdown approach properly planned and performed is still a reasonable approach. A bit old school but whatever).

3- The ban. After ending well over 30 years flying in the Maritimes a couple weeks ago, the changes in the ban just reaches to the lowest common denominator. Anyone who flies out here knows how wildly variable the weather can be here. The hourly obs (or even specials) can differ bizarrely from the reality of the moment. I've, literally, done a miss while looking down at a VFR runway because the ob was so out of date. Using the posted limits is fine but undermines the utility of eyeballs and experience. End of day, if you don't like how it's going, then stop going there. If it's too bumpy, folks out here pull up and go on a bright sunny day because there is good reason to.  A nasty night with an underequipped machine - well, I don't know what to tell you.

I still don't understand how this flight ended up on the ground off to the side and BELOW the height of the runway.

[DEFCON]

"The report says they had the lights in sight. But they might have been the wrong lights, because they were lower than they should've been, due to factors associated with the flight mode they were in, and their training. And the lighting on that approach was unsufficient for the minimums they were flying to according to international standards, and they weren't even on full strength."

What is all that to mean? Is it a defence for pilot error? 

 

"In addition to the factors already stated above- medical, leave, layoff (years?), reserve duty (many years?), I'd add that a so called normal AC mainline pilot probably flies 500-700 hrs per year. Which is only about 50 per month. As to why that's so low you'd have to ask the people who make the pairings and schedules."

Seems that you're looking for reasons to explain scheduling oddities, which was the point of my question in the first place. Seeing that one of the crew only averaged 35 hours a month over 15 years in the right seat of one type in a fast moving upgauging / upgrading environment is unusual to say the least and worthy of examination.

I can appreciate your need to defend the FO's honour ZV.  

 

[Homerun]

31 minutes ago, DEFCON said:

"The report says they had the lights in sight. But they might have been the wrong lights, because they were lower than they should've been, due to factors associated with the flight mode they were in, and their training. And the lighting on that approach was unsufficient for the minimums they were flying to according to international standards, and they weren't even on full strength."

What is all that to mean? Is it a defence for pilot error? 

 

"In addition to the factors already stated above- medical, leave, layoff (years?), reserve duty (many years?), I'd add that a so called normal AC mainline pilot probably flies 500-700 hrs per year. Which is only about 50 per month. As to why that's so low you'd have to ask the people who make the pairings and schedules."

Seems that you're looking for reasons to explain scheduling oddities, which was the point of my question in the first place. Seeing that one of the crew only averaged 35 hours a month over 15 years in the right seat of one type in a fast moving upgauging / upgrading environment is unusual to say the least and worthy of examination.

I can appreciate your need to defend the FO's honour ZV.  

 

What fast moving/upguaging environment?  The last 2-3 years perhaps.  2003-2011 was movement backwards.  Then a few years of stagnation, made worse by the change in mandatory retirement age.

The f/o in question is on a base that defines stagnant and I don't believe he could hold a Captain position on his base, as mentioned upthread.

[Seeker]

53 minutes ago, DEFCON said:

Seeing that one of the crew only averaged 35 hours a month over 15 years in the right seat of one type in a fast moving upgauging / upgrading environment is unusual to say the least and worthy of examination.

Man, are you ever barking up the wrong tree.

 

[DEFCON]

Now we have a tree?

 

[Johnny]

Time on type and total time are going to be....way....off.  I look at my own numbers and they are not even close.

The Captain on 624 is one of THE BEST of THE BEST and the F/O's reputation is absolutely equal.  Of interest the F/O is senior to the Captain.  If these two guys can make this mistake......I could make this mistake!

The TSB missed the mark by a country mile.  Turning "Non-Precision Approaches" into " Precision Approaches" by manipulating numbers.....50% of the minimums...times take your socks off....call your lawyer...is bull s*it.  

They are CLOUD BREAK procedures.  

[Vsplat]

On 5/23/2017 at 7:44 AM, Kip Powick said:

From  the Report....

By this time, the aircraft had crossed the published MDA (740 feet ASL) and was 0.3 nm farther back than the published distance. The autopilot remained engaged as the aircraft continued descending, and there was no reduction in the descent rate.

Have not flown the A320 so I am not fully conversant with the autopilot "rules"...

There seems to be a difference between your explanation and the TSB...appreciate an explanation..Thanks..

Kip, the AP disconnect rules I referenced come straight out of the FCOM/AOM.  Can't post them verbatim here. 

The MDA is not pulled from a database, it is a crew entry, so would reflect the additive. (BTW I think the TSB got that wrong, normally it is MDA + 50 feet then correct it all for temp)  I really can't answer for the TSB or what they said about autpilot engagement.  If it remained engaged more than 50 feet below the value set in the MCDU as MDA, that would require some further explanation. 

More likely to me is that this is unclear wording from the TSB.  As far as I can read, they don't reference the actual altitude where the autopilot disconnected, nor would they have that precisely, as there is some lag between data samples on the FDR.  50 feet in descent would be hard to pinpoint unless you got lucky with the sample rate.

FWIW

Vs