Air Canada Flight Number 624 In The News


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My feelings on this thread will come as no surprise to anyone. I believe it is a fundamental professional discourtesy to the operating crew and those close to them to speculate like this. 8 pages no

IFG and Maverick, maybe he can't afford a new keyboard, or maybe he has a disability. Either way, we can be inclusive here. James, please keep posting. Your contributions are welcomed and valued. B

Oy, this "name the accident" debate sure is getting beaten to death. Whatever you call it, and however it happened, I'm sure the pilots are going through hell right now, reliving the nightmare over a

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Well, here's the problem with referring to outdated publications...Navcanada has been slowly decommisioning BC approachs for the last 5 years or so - Halifax was one of the first to be done - no BC approach on 05 or 32 for years and years.

http://www.navcanada.ca/EN/products-and-services/Documents/AIP/Next/part_5_aic/5aic_eng_2014_05.pdf

Only GNSS based approachs on 32 in YHZ.

Post deleted..thanks for the update

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. . .

I believe it is a fundamental professional discourtesy to the operating crew and those close to them to speculate like this. 8 pages now. Was the wind correct, was the approach correct, conclusions drawn on true vs magnetic wind, approach options that no longer exist at this airport, etc. . . .

I don't see it quite the way you do.

​If people were posting comments about the poor pilot skills or lousy instructors that obviously must have allowed such poor pilot skills then I would agree that such would be a "professional discourtesy to the operating crew".

However all the posts I've read have been just stating facts, as we know them, or making guesses about certain aspects of this approach and landing.

If you want to talk about '"professional discourtesy to the operating crew" then discuss Air Canada SOP's for deviations during approaches - what are the calls, what are the responses? Or what are the SOP's for pilot incapacitation?

I will not debate these sort of topics until the report is out but talking about the weather and anything in any photo of the crash site is fair game. In my opinion.

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I think a persons desire to discuss the various aspects of most any crash is fair, natural and expected, especially by industry insiders. At least on this Board and others like it, the tone remains respectful versus some of the moronic commentaries found on different media sites.

Everyone here seems to appreciate the fact that the closer to home an event is, the more sensitive the issues will be to the local audience. By example, when it comes to foreign based carriers, discussions here can easily become far less discerning when it comes to the sensibilities of those that are distant to us, but directly involved in a given incident.

In the absence of fact, discussions that include speculation are certain to take place wherever any interest in the subject exists, regardless. As we know from experience, every so often an off base assumption is innocently made, but is almost instantly corrected. In the pre-internet days, rumours and other equally non-factual certainties etc. could gain considerable traction before the true facts could ever be exposed, which led to long standing beliefs based on conjecture at best.

As long a discussion remains respectful, and under the watchful eye of colleagues in the know, corrections to the story line can be made before the media can run hog wild with their expert interpretations.

Has anyone listened to CNN’s Miles Obrien’s recent commentaries on the declining experience of air carrier pilots? The man presents the facts in a manner that organizations like ALPA and ACPA could only hope to.

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Vsplat

I do not take exception to your post but I know you must realize that 'speculation' along with opinion and the regurgitation of facts, (weather/airport runways/experience of others doing a 05 approach) and more are good discussion points and makes for many, a more in-depth learning experience for those that may someday be faced with similar conditions.

As well, discussion concerning YHZ airport facilities and equipment is food for thought.

I have reread the entire thread and nowhere do I see any poster making accusations that the pilots are at fault, actually I think the vast majority of individuals who have posted concerning the accident have more than gone out of their way to not point fingers at the pilots, the aircraft or operating procedures.

I can understand your concern for the two pilots involved and I do agree ”there but for the grace etc.” however the accident happened, it is over, and we are blessed, as are the pilots, that no one was killed or seriously injured.

Certainly the drivers are probably torn up about the incident and will relive the sequence of events over and over but such is life and something each will have to deal with in their own way no matter what the TSB writes in the final report.

I truly do not believe this thread is pointing fingers, nor do I think it is adding to the stress level of any individuals concerned, it is merely opinions and facts espoused by many who are familiar with the industry, the airport, and airline aircraft operating procedures.

And yes, I erred by posting the availability of the Bac Crs Loc app for RW 32 and have deleted my post...........but I did fly that approach a few decades ago :blush:

Have a nice Easter !!!

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Some have mentioned the need for installing ILS approaches on all runways, while others have pointed out the limitations of topography and certainly budgetary restraints. With the decommissioning of LOC/BC all but complete, and NDBs also well under way, it seems that the industry is moving in the direction of aircraft equipped GPS based approaches requiring WAAS and enabling RNP, LPV or LNAV/VNAV approaches. Are Air Canada aircraft equipped to fly these approaches? It seems that they are not. This has nothing to do with the pilots unless at Air Canada pilots choose their own aircraft equipment!

This is available on new generation aircraft, including B737 MAX, C series, etc. In the meantime though, it may be necessary for Air Canada to invest in GPS based airborne instrumentation to better equip their aircraft. Possibly in this case runway 05 was the better choice, but as pointed before, runway length was not the issue here. Rather the runway surface condition, prevailing winds and the crosswind component which is a function of the selected runway. Prevailing Northwestern winds in Halifax are often found variable from say 270 to 020, which all other conditions being equal, may favor runway 32. Other than runway surface condition, available instrument approaches and their minimums are also big factors in choosing a runway.

Another big factor in such variable winds, is likely the presence of low level wind shear. It most likely was a factor in this case and so close to the ground, unrecoverable. Of course this is speculative and we have to learn from the accident report, however, this, speculative as it may be, is certainly not a judgment on the pilots, quite the opposite. It is a question of what tools were provided, in terms of aircraft equipment and capability, to make all runways available to them at those minimums.

Hopefully, there is good support system in place; certainly this is going to be a difficult process for those involved. God bless.

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MD2

Your post is a clear political statement against the airline that you have every reason to hate. There are thousands of A320s flying around today without GPS and Air Canada is equipping its A320 fleet as part of a modernization plan that includes more than just GPS.

Shame on you for trying to use this accident as an opportunity to gain points, then trying to veil it as speculation on the cause and best wishes for the pilots.

I have not included your post in this message for a reason.

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We, (the royal we), dissect every accident that occurs, posting our thoughts, ideas, procedures, equipment etc. usually in the absence of any hard facts. Once the facts are known we go over it again. Just because these guys are some of our "own" does not make the discussion off limits IMO.

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I am somewhat nervous when it comes to the current move to put so much reliance on one system (GPS), particularly when that system is quite vulnerable on more than one level. I hope we don't come to regret that decision some day in the future, because the potential for bad outcomes could bring the industry to its knees.

Yabutt: NavCan's goal is performance based navigation. Few if any expensive ground aids. Do you remember about 15 years ago Boeing floated a balloon to install GPS in extremities of aircraft in order to provide attitude and heading information? That idea lasted as long as the laughter that accompanied the plan.

What it will do is force all operators to upgrade their avionics to double or triple indemnify the pilots' abilities to use the new approaches successfully.

Just another perspective...

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I was considering Vsplat’s feelings regarding some of the subject matter that’s discussed on public forums etc. prior to the release of an official air accident report.

More often than not, recorders recovered following an air carrier mishap produce very clear data that allows accurate causal conclusions to be reached fairly quickly, but in a few cases, the data recorders are lost altogether, Dryden for example, or the information captured fails to provide a complete picture as was the case with the TWA 800 loss.

In cases such as these, panels are brought together to sift through the available evidence and produce a report that includes probable cause findings. More often than not, conclusions reached in this manner become hotly contested after the fact and in some cases, various interested parties never acknowledge the published result.

In the US, the NTSB goes some distance to avoid this complication by holding public hearings in advance of writing and issuing their final report. Unfortunately, as we know, this practice doesn’t always produce the desired outcome as occurred following the release of the Egypt Air 990 document. Perhaps the hearing process is too tight and doesn’t allow those that aren’t in attendance an appropriate, or convenient opportunity to publically voice their concerns?

The Dryden Enquiry was a first of its kind for this industry and came about largely as a consequence of the acrimony that existed following the release of the report on the Arrow Air 1285 investigation. In the Dryden incident, both new digital data recorders were destroyed by fire, which meant considerable potential existed for conjecture to enter into the equation and result in another international embarrassment for the then current Government of Canada. The Prime Minister disbanded the Federal investigative body and moved to place Mr. Justice Moshansky in charge of the investigation into the causal factors of this accident.

During the investigation phase of the Enquiry, those that weren’t directly involved, the public if you will, had ample opportunity to debate the issues with their peers and colleagues. If appropriately motivated, they had ample opportunity to weigh in and provide their input through one vehicle, or another. For the investigator, it was almost like having a ‘TIPS’ line. As one of those involved, I can say, because of the unique structure of this investigation, the Judge was able to delve far deeper into the world of commercial aviation than any investigator before him and expose the many failings of the entire system; no organization escaped his scrutiny. As a result of this approach to fact finding, I think the public’s interest was much better served than would have been the case had the recorders survived and the expected finding of ‘pilot error’ been the published result.

I’m of the opinion that more discussion is better than less. If current day investigative bodies were to release FDR information in a timely way and well ahead of their own findings and then pay some attention to the respectful and often informed discussions / debates following on forums such as the AEF and others, I think a lot of after the fact friction and criticism might be avoided? IOW’s; knowing four eyes are better than two, in kind, gaining the opinions of industry insiders may assist the investigators in reaching more informed final conclusions than they might otherwise by going it alone and restricting the dissemination of FDR and other data to a small contingent.

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How does it work with group action lawsuits?

Can a passenger sign up to three different firms and be part of three separate actions?

Or does that third firm have to work with any passenger that has not signed onto one of the groups already organized?

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  • 2 months later...

Latest:

une 16, 2015 9:00 AM - General - Surveys - Airlines/Aviation - Transportation/Trucking/Railroads
Ground Contact Prior to Runway Threshold of Air Canada Flight 624 during approach to Halifax Stanfield International Airport (A15H0002)
OTTAWA, June 16, 2015 /CNW/ -
THE OCCURRENCE
On 29 March 2015, an Air Canada Airbus A320-200 aircraft (registration C-FTJP, serial number 233), was being operated as Flight AC624 from Toronto, Ontario, to Halifax, Nova Scotia, with 133 passengers and 5 crew on board.
The aircraft was flying the localizer approach procedure to land on Runway 05 at the Halifax Stanfield International Airport. A localizer approach only provides pilots with lateral guidance to align the aircraft with the runway for landing. During the approach, the engines of the aircraft severed power transmission lines, and then the main landing gear and rear fuselage impacted the snow-covered ground about 225 metres before the runway threshold. The aircraft continued through a localizer antenna, then impacted the ground in a nose down attitude, about 70 metres before the threshold. It then bounced and slid along the runway, coming to rest on the left side of the runway about 570 metres beyond the threshold.
The passengers and crew evacuated the aircraft; 25 people sustained injuries and were taken to local hospitals. The aircraft was substantially damaged. There was no post-crash fire.
INVESTIGATION TEAMWORK
The Investigator-in-charge, Doug McEwen, is assisted in this investigation by TSB investigators with backgrounds in flight operations, aircraft performance, aircraft systems, aircraft engines, human performance, and air traffic control. Representatives from Air Canada, Airbus, NAV CANADA, Transport Canada, France's BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile), the RCMP, Halifax International Airport Authority, and the Halifax Regional Police department are also providing assistance.
WORK TO DATE
A large number of technical and operational documents, weather reports, air traffic control communications, and incident reports have been gathered and are being reviewed by investigation team members. Numerous interviews have been conducted with passengers and individuals from various organizations.
The flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) have been examined. With assistance from external specialists, the TSB has retrieved information from the aircraft's Digital Access Recorder, which records additional flight and aircraft parameters. Further analysis of this recorded data will be conducted.
WHAT WE KNOW
Weather
Prior to landing, the crew received an updated weather report at 12:15 am Atlantic Time which included: windspeed 20 knots gusting to 26 knots from the north north west; 350° true; with a forward visibility of ½ statute mile in snow and drifting snow. The vertical visibility was 300 feet above the ground, temperature of minus 6°C, dewpoint minus 7°C, and altimeter setting of 29.63 inches of mercury.
The aircraft
Preliminary examination of the FDR indicates the aircraft was correctly configured for landing, the airspeed was consistent with a normal approach speed, and the altimeters were set to 29.63 inches of mercury. No mechanical deficiencies were identified with the aircraft's engines, flight controls, landing gear and navigation systems. During the review of the aircraft's maintenance records, no discrepancies were noted. Approximately 4900 litres of fuel was recovered from the aircraft.
Post-impact damage
The forward right and both rear exits were not used during the evacuation. No discrepancies were noted during the initial examination of these exits. Examination of the aircraft revealed that the right side cabin floor in seat rows 31 and 33, and the floor adjacent to the flight attendant fold-down seat near the rear of the cabin were punctured from below by aircraft structure. No pieces of the localizer antenna structure penetrated the cockpit.
NEXT STEPS
Work will include:
Recreating the accident flight profile as closely as possible to add to the understanding of the challenges encountered by the pilots of AC624.
Completing a detailed site survey illustration, examining relevant aircraft components and developing an animation of the aircraft's flight profile.
Evaluating pilot training and experience, human performance aspects, crew resource management, industry standards and company operating procedures.
Reviewing flight attendant training and experience as well as company procedures and regulatory requirements.
Examining survivability issues such as cabin and cockpit crashworthiness, passenger evacuation, and airport emergency response.
Reviewing non-precision localizer approaches utilizing a stabilized constant descent angle.
Conducting additional interviews as required.
Ongoing examination of aircraft structural damage.
APPROACH-AND-LANDING ACCIDENTS
The TSB Watchlist identifes approach-and-landing accidents as one issue which poses the greatest risk to Canada's transportation system. These accidents include runway overruns, runway excursions, landings short of the runway, and tail strikes. The TSB has called on operators, regulators, and air navigation service providers need to take more action to prevent approach-and-landing accidents, and to minimize the risks of adverse consequences if a runway overrun occurs.
COMMUNICATION OF SAFETY DEFICIENCIES
Should the investigation team uncover a safety deficiency that represents an immediate risk to aviation, the Board will communicate without delay so it may be addressed quickly and the aviation system made safer.
The information posted is factual in nature and does not contain any analysis. Analysis of the accident and the Findings of the Board will be part of the final report. The investigation is ongoing.
The TSB is an independent agency that investigates marine, pipeline, railway and aviation transportation occurrences. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.
The TSB is online at www.tsb.gc.ca. Keep up to date through RSS, Twitter (@TSBCanada), YouTube, Flickr and our blog.
SOURCE Transportation Safety Board of Canada
For further information: TSB Media Relations, 819 994-8053, media@tsb.gc.ca
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