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Airasia Plane Missing?


CanadaEH

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I'd say weather is a definite issue. However, growth, expansion and experience of their crews probably not.

Coordinating weather deviations in this part of the world sometimes requires additional time for a response and clearance. Leave it too late and you're in trouble.

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Terrible news, especially at this time of year (for many).

So much twitter and patter...hard to separate the facts from commentary when everyone who can type does so, ...so hope remains alive.

A course-change is a complete non-event - it's done all the time yet news media grabs onto these occurrences as though they explain something. However, it's an altitude change that would be of interest if in the area of thunderstorms. One can't outclimb these things. In the early days after AF447 went missing, that's all that was discussed and as it turned out thunderstorms had nothing to do with the loss of control.

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Rich...so true!

The absolute authority of the captain to do what is necessary to maintain the safety of the flight has apparently been lost in another "automated" world, a bureaucratic one - that of "standardized behaviour and automaton response", where there is no reward and great risk in stepping outside such a behavioural box. I wonder how that differs if at all, between western and eastern, (North American/European/Australian vs. Asian/Indian) cultures?

When one is over the ocean and the HF is entirely useless and one has a "wall" of weather in front, one exercises the authority of the captain and deviates, period. There is TCAS and the structure of oceanic routes that mitigate risk in such an urgently-required decision.

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Rich...so true!

The absolute authority of the captain to do what is necessary to maintain the safety of the flight has apparently been lost in another "automated" world, a bureaucratic one - that of "standardized behaviour and automaton response", where there is no reward and great risk in stepping outside such a behavioural box. I wonder how that differs if at all, between western and eastern, (North American/European/Australian vs. Asian/Indian) cultures?

When one is over the ocean and the HF is entirely useless and one has a "wall" of weather in front, one exercises the authority of the captain and deviates, period. There is TCAS and the structure of oceanic routes that mitigate risk in such an urgently-required decision.

Whether I like it or not, I'm in this the part of the world at least once a month. Extra fuel is the norm for me. This airspace involved is quite different from anything oceanic with generally poor HF compared to SFO or YQX/SNN. Crowded altitudes and airways with everyone wanting to deviate around the same weather. ITCZ weather. And if you're going to wander off an airway under radar coverage you'd better request/advise your intentions well in advance. Failing that assistance....do what you need to do. And perhaps I am lucky but the Asian FO's I work with are fully aware of what needs to be done when it comes to severe weather avoidance.
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blues, Re, "And if you're going to wander off an airway under radar coverage you'd better request/advise your intentions well in advance. Failing that assistance....do what you need to do."

Oh, absolutely...clearances first! But if needs must, one must weigh the risks and act, as you say.

It is the fear of acting outside of SOPs, (meaning that if there are no SOPs there is no action), that I believe Rich may have been referring to.

The LKP apparently is 3°36'31.0"S 109°41'46.0"E. The ocean is indicated in G.E. as quite shallow in that area...80-90ft.

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Setting aside MH-17, which we can assume was targeted in a military action, Asian airlines have been part of a number of crashes. Asiana at SFO, MH-370 and now this. Coincidence, or something more fundamental?

Perhaps we should consult a Senior Captain for the answer.

Absent that, would it be crass to assume your question was rhetorical? These days it seems 5000 hrs qualifies you in Asia as a high time pilot.

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(Off-topic...)

ZV, re, "These days it seems 5000 hrs qualifies you in Asia as a high time pilot.", there was a time when actual time-in was a legitimate and acceptable measure of experience. The notion of "high time" began between 10,000 and 15,000hrs, and while that was never a measure of competency by itself, it was at least a measure of survivability, meaning one knew a thing or two and kept oneself and one's passengers safe. I doubt if anyone who's done the job for decades would actually consider 5000hrs "high time", even though one can perform the tasks reliably, accurately and with safety while one is gaining experience on the job. One can fly a transport aircraft with just 500hrs time-in, as 9/11 demonstrated, for manipulating the controls of an airliner to keep it right-side up is not difficult after some basic training. Anyone here who flies professionally has lost a number of friends on the way...the plumber is never paid for actually fixing a simple leak... ;-)

The "socially-constructed" notion of "high time" here is a re-jigging of the concept of actual, long experience into a sort of marketing tool. It may be emerging from the growing need for pilots, particularly to occupy the left seat where one needs a certain level of experience (along with the obvious training many airlines give to their commanders), to understand and "wear" the responsibilities of the captain. The expression, "high time" here is just flim-flam talk. I strongly suspect that none currently hired, especially for the left seat, will have real "high time" in the sense described above.

Generally it works and is safe because the aviation system has many, many layers of defences at all stages of flight operation - aviation is not a "brittle" system - it accomodates individual shortcomings (and even corporate shortcomings for a short period), and reduced competencies of individuals until they have actual "high time".

I know you know all this...just offering some opinions while we wait for more, likely sad, news.

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(Off-topic...)

ZV, re, "These days it seems 5000 hrs qualifies you in Asia as a high time pilot.", there was a time when actual time-in was a legitimate and acceptable measure of experience. The notion of "high time" began between 10,000 and 15,000hrs, and while that was never a measure of competency by itself, it was at least a measure of survivability, meaning one knew a thing or two and kept oneself and one's passengers safe. I doubt if anyone who's done the job for decades would actually consider 5000hrs "high time", even though one can perform the tasks reliably, accurately and with safety while one is gaining experience on the job. One can fly a transport aircraft with just 500hrs time-in, as 9/11 demonstrated, for manipulating the controls of an airliner to keep it right-side up is not difficult after some basic training. Anyone here who flies professionally has lost a number of friends on the way...the plumber is never paid for actually fixing a simple leak... ;-)

The "socially-constructed" notion of "high time" here is a re-jigging of the concept of actual, long experience into a sort of marketing tool. It may be emerging from the growing need for pilots, particularly to occupy the left seat where one needs a certain level of experience (along with the obvious training many airlines give to their commanders), to understand and "wear" the responsibilities of the captain. The expression, "high time" here is just flim-flam talk. I strongly suspect that none currently hired, especially for the left seat, will have real "high time" in the sense described above.

Generally it works and is safe because the aviation system has many, many layers of defences at all stages of flight operation - aviation is not a "brittle" system - it accomodates individual shortcomings (and even corporate shortcomings for a short period), and reduced competencies of individuals until they have actual "high time".

I know you know all this...just offering some opinions while we wait for more, likely sad, news.

Well written post. I think this kind of event, if found to be pilot error/weather related, will unfortunately be repeated as a result of the expected airline growth in this part of the world. For example, the current pay scales and continual search for foreign pilots to crew aircaft in China is a clear indication they still cannot produce their own to meet the demand.
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Sad that we have yet another accident thread to discuss. My thoughts are with those who wait. I cannot imagine their suffering.

I will chime in on the notion of experience.

Beyond the issue of competency which Don has so ably covered, long experience has a less concrete safety benefit, and that is resistance to malleability as corporate leadership changes, corporate memory of past mistakes is lost and a new generation tries to "fix" perceived inefficiencies in their flight operations procedures - without the benefit of sober second thought, indeed in some cases having expunged those who advise caution, thereafter referred to as 'naysayers'.

Maybe it's just the curmudgeon factor.

I was very new, and serving aboard a wide body, when I first witnessed the intersection of a young, perky and unguided efficiency 'expert' with a grizzled, but much respected Captain. 20 minutes to push, with an airworthiness concern on the mind of the skipper and awaiting maintenance, on walks said expert with advice for our crew on how we could ensure a sked push, that they had seen a lot of aircraft go with problems worse than this, and if it was them, they would just go.

The skipper simply listened, then fixed the expert with an icy stare and said, 'not on my watch. Now let us get back to doing our job or this delay is on you'. Then silence, until the young person backed out of the flight deck, never to be seen again.

We discussed this little dance in cruise. The skipper summed it up as follows: "That person has no clue what we do and would feel no remorse if we followed their advice and had an accident. They would simply say the crew agreed. They are paid to say yes. We, on the other hand, earn our money on the days we say no. Saying no gets easier the more friends you lose and the more times you scare yourself."

Maybe this is just a nostalgic memory from an ever-more-distant past. But to me it has defined why experience matters.

All the best

Vs

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I couldn't agree more with the last 3 posts. As I am on the doorstep of being high time myself I am frequently surprised (pleasantly) by how often now that I am able to rely on experience in addition to rote memory of procedures when something goes wrong. Being a Canadian though I am fortunate enough to have arrived in the airline world first with a few scares and some hours in my book myself, and then been able to add to that in an environment (corporate) that tolerates minor mistakes and accepts them as learning opportunities rather than as disciplinary or fireable offenses.

I read one if those contracts from Asia- quite a bit of text was devoted to discipline, fines, and forfeited pay. That's a fundamental difference no doubt.

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Re, "That's a fundamental difference no doubt."

As long as punishment is part of the flight operation process, learning will atrophy and accidents that are preventable will continue to occur.

Punishment is the main reason for legitimate concerns regarding flight data analysis programs and other safety programs at some Asian carriers which target individuals instead of finding ways to enhance learning and change where such may be indicated in the data. Organizations can't expect learning and thinking when pilots are required to sign such agreements.

The results are as clear as they are predictable, and sooner or later, responsibility must rest with the carrier to handle and use data appropriately. My bet, (and I have no basis for saying this, just some experience doing this work), is that the SFO accident was in the carrier's data trends but was not addressed. That was the blunt statement made by the ATSB in the investigation into the QANTAS B747 overrun accident at Bangkok - the accident was in your data (regarding reduced flap landings and increased approach speeds). Things changed at QANTAS after that accident in terms of data use.

In more enlightened flight safety systems embodied in the implementation of Just Culture principles which govern how the data is employed and under the principle that confidentiality does not include anonymity, SMS and FDA/FDM programs in some quarters, (mainly British/European) are moving towards routine crew identification as part of the overall flight safety and training process. The adoption of Just Culture principles, supported from the very top right through to mid-level management and training personnel is increasingly becoming the norm as data programs are both easily and relatively inexpensively implemented.

The desire to know "who did that?!", is out-moded and ineffective. It is very possible that if one pilot did something "stupid" or against SOPs, then many or most are also doing it. An individual, serious event in the flight data is rare. And when it does occur, (this is aviation...), under SMS and within a Just Culture, there are enlightened responses which address the event in effective ways and which preserve the integrity of the safety and standards processes while reducing risk.

It comes under the heading of knowing vs. not-knowing; - in this day and age, "not knowing" is no longer acceptable, nor is it an excuse for not handling untoward trends and serious events which are seen in the routine examination of a carrier's flight data.

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Indonesia Asia A320 over Java Sea on Dec 28th 2014,

aircraft went missing believed to have impacted waters

last updated Sunday, Dec 28th 2014 19:09Z

An Indonesia Air Asia Airbus A320-200, registration PK-AXC performing flight QZ-8501 from Surabaya (Indonesia) to Singapore (Singapore) with 155 passengers and 7 crew, was enroute at FL320 over the Java Sea about 120nm eastsoutheast of Pulau Belitung Island at about 06:16L (23:16Z Dec 27th) when radar and radio contact was lost with the aircraft while it was deviating around weather.

A search for the aircraft is underway, the aircraft is believed to have impacted water about 80nm before the island of Pulau Belitung.

The airline confirmed that radar and radio contact was lost at 07:24L (00:24Z). An emergency hotline has been established for relatives of passengers on the flight. The aircraft carried 155 passengers (including one infant and 16 children), 2 pilots, 4 cabin crew and one engineer. The captain had 6,100 hours total experience, the first officer 2,275 hours of total flying experience. 155 occupants were Indonesian citizens, 3 South Korean, 1 Malaysian, 1 French, 1 British and 1 Singaporean citizen. The airline's CEO said in a press conference later, that the captain actually had more than 20,000 hours of total flying experience and was nearing 7000 hours with Indonesia Air Asia. In an updated press release Indonesia Air Asia clarified the captain had a total of 20,537 flying hours, thereof 6100 hours for Indonesia Air Asia, the first officer had 2,275 hours total with Indonesia Air Asia.

Indonesia's Ministry of Transport said last radio contact with the aircraft occurred at 06:16L (23:16Z). The crew requested to climb and deviate to fly around cloud. The captain of the flight had 6,100 hours of flying experience. The aircraft has last undergone maintenance on Nov 16th 2014.

Indonesia's Ministry of Transport also published the load sheet and passenger manifest on their website. According to the load sheet the aircraft carried 158 passengers and 6 crew, according to the passenger manifest 155 passengers (manifest counts/lists 154 names plus one infant). The aircraft departed with a takeoff weight of 63,624kg (MTOW 70,796kg), thereof 8,296kg of fuel.

Indonesia's Search And Rescue Services were briefed that the aircraft contacted Jakarta Center at 06:12L (23:12Z) while enroute at FL320 and requested to deviate left of airway M635 and to climb to FL380. At 06:16L the aircraft was observed normally, radio contact occurred. At 06:17L radio contact was lost, the transponder ADS-B remained available however, at 06:18L the transponder was lost as well, the last recorded position was S3.3708 E109.6911 (about 110nm eastsoutheast of Pulau Belitung). 50 minutes later INCERFA (aircraft position uncertain alert), 70 minutes later ALERTFA (emergency alert) and 98 minutes later DETRESFA (distress alert) was declared by ATC

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So there is belief that it crashed in the sea. If it did (as they presume MA did as well) why is there not any debris? Might be a dumb question but thought I'd ask...

In this case, where the probable location is known, debris will likely be found.

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A Russian (MAK) study done a short time after the disappearance of AF447 examined a number of such disappearances in order to assist in locating the likeliest crash site. The study showed that in all the cases of sudden loss/disappearance studied that the aircraft impacted within about 4 minutes of the first indication of trouble and were found within about a five kilometer radius of the point of disappearance. It was true in AF447's case and the Adam Air case - statistically it is worth examining in this case.

It won't be true of MH370 as we know it flew on for at least five hours after the last-known-position.

From the MAK presentation, (I can't find it online):

Although we fully understand that making findings in such an underdetermined events as upsets is like calculating the average body temperature in the hospital including those who died, still we could conclude with the reasonable probability:

•The distance of the impact point from the initial point of upset depends mostly on the type of upset and, sometimes (in dives and unclosed spirals), from the duration of coming down. In spins and closed spirals the impact point location has significantly lower correlation with the duration of coming down. In any case the distance is hardly possible to be more than 12 NM.

•The average time interval of loss of 1 km of altitude is shortest for dives and longest for spins, but in any case it seems hardly possible to be more than 14-16 seconds. It means that for AF 447 flight, with cruise altitude of about 10700 meters, the duration of coming down was less than 3 minutes.

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From avherald...

"A radar screenshot leaked from AirNav Indonesia shows the aircraft had turned left off the airway and was climbing through FL363, the speed over ground had decayed from 470 knots at FL320 to 353 knots however."

A TAS of 353 kts works out to and IAS of ~210 kts at FL350. Must have been trying to climb pretty fast. Not a lot of wind in the ITCZ so GS and TAS wouldn't be too different... in fact, the wind at altitude in that area is from the southeast today, so if that was the case at the time, it would have an even slower TAS.

Having an 320 back at 210 kts at that altitude would be pretty ugly. Not much power in those things above FL320. I don't think it would have been able to recover to cruise speed (or even maintain 210 kts) at that altitude with such a low ram effect. I had one about 20 kts below target at 370 when we got caught by a jet over the Rockies and had to descend to get the speed back. We would have been a bit heavier than this guy, but still...

Two things, though....

... modern airplanes just don't come apart in flight.... even in severe turbulence.

... it's pretty hard to stall or spiral an Airbus as long as the computers stay on line.

Of course, the whole premise of this is a "leaked" screenshot, but the shot is on avherald.

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Interesting, seems that the air space where the plane wanted to go was pretty crowded, perhaps by planes avoiding the weather, and ATC didn't give them the permission to ascend that they wanted right away. A potential contributing factor to the series of events that might have unfolded thereafter.

http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/12/29/airasia_flight_to_singapore_likely_at_the_bottom_of_the_sea.html

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Interesting, seems that the air space where the plane wanted to go was pretty crowded, perhaps by planes avoiding the weather, and ATC didn't give them the permission to ascend that they wanted right away. A potential contributing factor to the series of events that might have unfolded thereafter.

http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/12/29/airasia_flight_to_singapore_likely_at_the_bottom_of_the_sea.html

Nothing unusual really. Getting to your flight planned altitude when you want it in this part of the world (and many others) can be a problem. Too many aircraft on the same routes. Weather deviations are generally approved but if other aircraft are already occupying that airspace and flight levels, you will need to review plan B.

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