Asiana Crash Landing At Sfo Saturday

[dr1]

This US law firm is not wasting any time.

http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-asiana-passengers-sue-boeing-in-asiana-crash-20130716,0,7439648.story

I find this very interesting in light of the fact Boeing has already issued a statement saying there was nothing wrong with the aircraft, specifically singling out the autothrottle system.

[blues deville]

Probably easier for the Chicago based law firm to target the US airplane builder rather than a foreign based airline as a starting point for this group of passengers. However, I don't believe the airplane was the cause of this crash.

Just my opinion.....I could be wrong.

[blues deville]

I hope he enjoys Etihad. After a 21 year career at Cathay, its a wonder he still needs to work anywhere.

[mo32a]

You're an FA right?

Wrong.

[Seeker]

Wrong.

Well, saying they had only two things to watch makes you sound like an FA - kinda like when they come up to the FD and say we're "just sitting there doing nothing".

[DEFCON]

Don & Rich

I don't have much argument with what you've both said, but I'm not so sure this crash is as much a result of a human / technology interface problems as it is a large but rather vanilla style screw up. Human factors thinking probably needs to catch up and examine areas such as the apparent lack of a modern T-scan and the inclusion of cadets etc in the airline cockpit.

[blues deville]

Well managed cadet programs have produced zero time pilots at British Airwyay, KLM, Lufhansa, etc with great success. It's not something new.

[blues deville]

Were Asiana Pilots Caught In The FLCH ‘Trap’?

By John Croft, Guy Norris

Source: Aviation Week & Space Technology

July 22, 2013

Credit: NTSB

Highly experienced Boeing widebody pilots have independently determined that an autoflight mode called Flight Level Change may explain why Asiana Flight 214 hit the sea wall ahead of Runway 28L at San Francisco International Airport July 6.

The experts, including a Boeing 777 fleet captain, tell Aviation Week that entry into Flight Level Change (FLCH) during the approach would have caused the engines to remain at idle despite the pilots having set the autothrottles to maintain 137 kt., the target approach speed. One group of pilots has concluded this based on intimate knowledge of the 777-200ER's automation systems; the other by flying scenarios in a 777 simulator

Their analyses draw in large part on information presented in four NTSB briefings after the crash from pilot interviews and the cockpit voice and flight data recorders.

The NTSB revealed that the pilots were initially high and fast on the approach but rapidly decreased speed and altitude to intercept a visual glideslope to the runway. At 500 ft. altitude, the right-seat instructor pilot said he saw three red and one white precision approach path indicator (PAPI) lights—a set of four lights located near the intended landing markers that give pilots a visual glideslope—and realized he was slightly low. His speed, at 134 kt., was close to the 137 kt. target speed.

By 200 ft., however, the same pilot said he saw four red PAPI lights (significantly below glideslope) and noticed speed was nearing stall. At that point, he realized the autothrottles had not been keeping up. By the time the pilots added power, the aircraft was too low and slow, and in its high drag state could not climb fast enough to avoid striking the sea wall with its main gear and tail.

The NTSB says the engines and flight controls were responding correctly to inputs and there were no anomalies noted in the autopilot, flight director or autothrottle systems. Switches in the cockpit showed that the left and right autothrottles were “armed,” and the flight director was “on” for the right-seat and “off” for the left-seat pilot, who was at the controls for the landing. Experts say it is not unusual for a pilot to turn the flight director off on a visual approach to reduce clutter or confusing data on the primary flight display.

Based on the NTSB's forensic data, automation decisions earlier in the approach appear to be reasonable: Descending through 4,000 ft., the right-seat pilot said the aircraft was “slightly high” and he used the aircraft's vertical-speed mode to descend at 1,500 ft. per min. with the autopilot controlling. The left and right autothrottles were “armed,” and he correctly assumed the automation system would have controlled the speed to 137 kt. Pilots use the master control panel (MCP) at the top center of the 777's panel to select autonomy modes and input heading, altitude, speed and vertical-speed commands for the autopilot and autothrottle systems.

The 777 experts verified that the pilot's assumptions were reasonable in that respect—the vertical-speed mode uses pitch to control rate of climb or descent, and throttles, via the autothrottle system, to maintain speed. In the simulator, they found that even with the autothrottles “armed” but turned off, the vertical-speed mode would not allow the aircraft's speed to decay a significant amount before autothrottles “woke up” and maintained the preset speed. Boeing recommends setting the minimum descent altitude for non-instrument approaches in the MCP altitude window to ensure the aircraft levels off and maintains speed, though some airlines will set “0 ft.” in the altitude window, the experts say.

Closer to the runway, the mode control decisions are not clear. The NTSB says that during the final 2.5 min. of the flight, “multiple autopilot modes and multiple autothrottle modes” were commanded, according to the flight data recorder. During that time frame, the aircraft was descending at approximately 180 kt. through 2,000 ft. on a straight-in visual approach to 28L. At 1,600 ft., the NTSB says the pilots disconnected the autopilot, presumably to hand-fly the approach with the 137-kt. target speed entered into the “indicated airspeed” field on the MCP.

The 777 experts say the most plausible explanation for what happened next was that the pilots, intentionally or in error, selected the FLCH mode on the MCP with the target altitude set at 0 ft. or the minimum descent altitude. In a descent, FLCH reduces thrust to flight idle. The throttles will typically reengage when the aircraft reaches an altitude selected on the MCP, or if the aircraft's speed nears stall speed at radio altimeter heights greater than 100 ft. If the altitude was selected to zero, however, the throttles would have remained at flight idle as Flight 214's pilots increased pitch to remain on the glideslope, causing airspeed to drop below preset levels.

“Boeing is aware of this shortcoming, which in some circles is known as the FLCH 'trap,' and in its training course demonstrates the danger to pilots,” says one of the 777 experts. “The danger of the FLCH trap is that if the autopilot is disengaged and the aircraft levels off early . . . or the rate of descent is reduced, then the airspeed will decay because the autothrottle is temporarily out of the loop.”

[B75/76]

While it is true that FLCH could be a 'trap' as described, in my 10 years flying Boeing 757/767 and 777 I can't recall ever using FLCH for the final approach.

We have seen with other incidents that any aircraft can be mismanaged to the point of tragedy.

To be clear, we don't have all the facts yet but I have a couple of thoughts about this article and the information presented.

Particularly stabilisation. This from Boeing:

Recommended Elements of a Stabilized Approach

The following recommendations are consistent with criteria developed by the

Flight Safety Foundation.

All approaches should be stabilized by 1,000 feet AFE in instrument

meteorological conditions (IMC) and by 500 feet AFE in visual meteorological

conditions (VMC). An approach is considered stabilized when all of the following

criteria are met:

• the airplane is on the correct flight path

• only small changes in heading and pitch are required to maintain the

correct flight path

• the airplane should be at approach speed. Deviations of +10 knots to – 5

knots are acceptable if the airspeed is trending toward approach speed

• the airplane is in the correct landing configuration

• sink rate is no greater than 1,000 fpm; if an approach requires a sink rate

greater than 1,000 fpm, a special briefing should be conducted

• thrust setting is appropriate for the airplane configuration

• all briefings and checklists have been conducted.

The underlined bits are my doing.

Certainly they were within the speed parameters but the end result suggests they were not trending in the right direction. The information provided indicates thrust at or near idle which is certainly not appropriate.

These conditions should be maintained throughout the rest of the approach for it

to be considered a stabilized approach. If the above criteria cannot be established

and maintained until approaching the flare, initiate a go-around.

Closer to the runway, the mode control decisions are not clear. The NTSB says that during the final 2.5 min. of the flight, “multiple autopilot modes and multiple autothrottle modes” were commanded, according to the flight data recorder. During that time frame, the aircraft was descending at approximately 180 kt. through 2,000 ft. on a straight-in visual approach to 28L. At 1,600 ft., the NTSB says the pilots disconnected the autopilot, presumably to hand-fly the approach with the 137-kt. target speed entered into the “indicated airspeed” field on the MCP.

Multiple A/P and A/T mode selections late in the approach is not typical of a stable situation.

It is not hard to imagine that an approach can get 'messy'. I am sure we have all been there at one time or another. I know I have.

The NTSB will, no doubt, address multiple issues. Including, perhaps, the Boeing AFDS and A/T. Also the ATC environment, especially as it is applied to foreign flights where crews may be less familiar/comfortable with language and expectations. No doubt, with 3 pilots on the flight deck, CRM will also be a topic.

All these issues and more are certainly valid and worthy of discussion in order to improve safety. It is hard, however, not to look at this excerpt and wonder why a missed approach was not flown before it was finally attempted.

...At 500 ft. altitude, the right-seat instructor pilot said he saw three red and one white precision approach path indicator (PAPI) lights—a set of four lights located near the intended landing markers that give pilots a visual glideslope—and realized he was slightly low. His speed, at 134 kt., was close to the 137 kt. target speed.

By 200 ft., however, the same pilot said he saw four red PAPI lights (significantly below glideslope) and noticed speed was nearing stall. At that point, he realized the autothrottles had not been keeping up. By the time the pilots added power, the aircraft was too low and slow, and in its high drag state could not climb fast enough to avoid striking the sea wall with its main gear and tail.

The final report will, indeed, be interesting I am sure.

[J.O.]

Excellent info, thanks!

[DEFCON]

Blues deville

Nothing new here I know, but AF could have made that claim too until the lack of real experience showed up in a somewhat unusual circumstance. Cadet programs really depend on some degree of 'good luck' as well as everything else, do they not?

[blues deville]

Blues deville

Nothing new here I know, but AF could have made that claim too until the lack of real experience showed up in a somewhat unusual circumstance. Cadet programs really depend on some degree of 'good luck' as well as everything else, do they not?

I believe in the AF accident, the experienced Captain was back in the flight deck when things started to go south.

[DEFCON]

Not so; the two rookies left up front got the aircraft into free-fall all by themselves. Essentially, the aircraft was already doomed when the Cpt finally was able to make his way back up there.

[blues deville]

Not so; the two rookies left up front got the aircraft into free-fall all by themselves. Essentially, the aircraft was already doomed when the Cpt finally was able to make his way back up there.

Okay, either way the Captain came back to assist. Were the two so called "rookies" a product of an AF cadet program?

[B75/76]

Seems this issue is solved.

FAA Places Restrictions on Foreign Pilots Landing at San Francisco

29 July 2013

(SAN FRANCISCO) — The Federal Aviation Administration is no longer allowing visual approach landings at San Francisco International Airport to foreign airlines landing there, ABC News has learned.

“Apparently the FAA is seeing that foreign carriers are not able to handle this visual approach at SFO and they’re no longer allowing anybody except U.S. crews to hand fly approaches into SFO,” says ABC News aviation consultant Col. Steve Ganyard.

Ganyard says the new policy is no doubt a result of the July 6 Asiana Airlines crash landing in which three people died.

The Boeing 777, which originated in Seoul, South Korea, was carrying 291 passengers and 16 crew members when it crash-landed on the airport runway and burst into flames.

The National Transportation Safety Board has not yet determined the cause of the crash. However, investigators have said Flight 214 was flying “significantly below” its target speed during approach when the crew tried to abort the landing just before the plane crashed onto the runway.

Ganyard says the policy change is also in response to an increase in “go arounds” by foreign crews landing at the airport.

“Apparently in the past couple weeks we’ve seen more of these visual approaches that have not gone as well as they should have and these aircraft have done what’s called waving off, which means they go around…bring up the gear and they go around and they try again,” he says.

Ganyard notes that the FAA is only focusing on foreign carriers, not U.S. carriers: “They’re saying they’re only seeing these problems with foreign carriers which raises the question: Are foreign carriers trained to the degree they need to be to fly within U.S. airspace?”

[DEFCON]

"Are foreign carriers trained to the degree they need to be to fly within U.S. airspace?”

If foreign crews aren't up to flying a visual approach into SFO, the real question might be; should they be flying at all?

[DEFCON]

That's what you get when we pretend everyone's flying meets the same standards.

[Timothy]

Seems like both Colgan and Southwest have American crews. This is going to stir up a hornet's nest of protest. A typical government knee-jerk reaction.

[J.O.]

What about all of the other major airports where visual approaches are part of routine? And if it's really a problem, shouldn't the new standard apply everywhere, and to everyone?

[rudder]

Typical knee jerk reaction from FAA.

The proper question for each foreign operator should be - are your crews trained to conduct a visual approach (this truly is a dumb question. It is akin to asking if your crews are qualified to land the aircraft without autoland). Also, there is no reason that the Asiana crew could not have selected a non-precision approach from the FMS database and conducted the approach in LNAV/VNAV ( I believe that you still meet the bridge crossing altitude restriction for the Sam Mateo bridge on the RNAV 28L approach but I may be wrong).

At the end of the day, if a crew cannot simply look out the window on a clear day and carry out a safe and uneventful landing to a runway with a serviceable PAPI system then the problem runs much deeper than what the FAA directive is suggesting. What happened here is that a crew was unable to recognize an unstable approach at several points and failed to exercise proper judgement and follow SOP and initiate and execute a go-around at a point where the outcome would have been non-noteworthy to the media.

Now every go-around at SFO is going to be front page news.

[inchman]

It would seem to make more sense to ban individual airlines based on deviation from standard profiles, but I think this blanket ban has more to do with the ability for controllers to sequence arrivals easily onto the correct approach.

Unfortunately, the lack of ability for long-haul foreign carriers to fly visual approaches at SFO will only diminish their skills. As is the case for all long-haul pilots, they only get a few approaches a month and taking this option away will not help the overall safety of their operations.

The irony of the whole situation is that the ILS was off the air because the airport was engaged in construction of upgrades to improve safety at the airport.

There's always a price and an unintended consequence.....

[boestar]

How many G's can the human body itself withstand? It seems to me that if the seat can handle 16 g's that's good for the bloody seat. But if a human were subjected to "lateral and vertical" loads if 16 g, what would the outcome be?

It seems to me that an average 200 pound man (round number) suddenly and unexpectedly being subjected to supporting 3200 pounds would cause damage no matter what the seat was rated at. Heck car accidents at farr less than 16 G will cause serious spinal injury.

[vanishing point]

5G vertically and 12-17G horizontally according to this link:

http://www.ask.com/question/how-many-g-s-can-the-human-body-withstand

[Innuendo]

V-P, I don't think that site is accurate in their data.

I think this info is more realistic. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G-LOC

Most people would start to lose vision at about 4.5 positive, those young, fit and experienced with a G suit will go

further.

FWIW the Martin Baker seat in the old CF-100 produced a kick in the pants around 19G.

A fair number of those who experienced a bail out ended up with various levels of compression

fractures to the vertebrae otherwise no ill effects.

My nav from those days went out that way twice, although not while flying with me I would like to add.

[boestar]

I am not concerned with G-LOC. I am wondering about what the human body can withstand without serious injury. Vertical g loads in the case of an ejection are known to cause compression damage to the spine.

The point I am trying to make is that we can design a seat to survive 100Gs if we want but if the occupant will die anyway then what is the point. Seats should only be designed to withstand a load slightly higher than that survivable by the human body. As was seen in the asiana crash the loads in question were survivable and under the 16g design limit. The seat rails that the seats are attacched to are only designed to a 9g limit.