Ac Makes News Again

[mrlupin]

Who knows if they exercised their right to refuse or if they booked off sick? Not enough details released to know yet.

If the flight attendants and AC make an issue out of it, Health Canada will get involved, Transport Canada will get involved and the investigation should point to what the problem is. Was maintenance in error? Are the FA in error? What of flight crew involvement? Maintenance control is also likely to be in the chain, what is their view on the problem? Is it just a matter of job action? What maintenance was carried out on the aircraft in the prior days?

Too many variable to get a clear picture on a forum. Let the process run it's course and those involved will no doubt be held accountable if their actions were inappropriate.

[Seeker]

Does minimizing others somehow enhance you? Why would you even think it necessary to make such a remark?

I certainly don't agree with the way Rozar phrased his comment but I do think it's a stretch to say that FAs are trained to the same standard as pilots. For some things, yes, they are trained but if you start talking about maintenance procedures for an ACM I think you'll get a lot of blank faces. This is not to say that I think they should just shut-up and go - I don't - their concerns need to be addressed and the most conservative course of action should be taken. The problem is that I've seen a few FAs get quite worked up emotionally about some really, really minor issue so it's hard to say what happened here. Time will tell.

[AMEfirst]

As flight attendants are professionals and trained to the same standards as pilots, regardless of previous experience, why would it even be a question of their judgement.

I think you have been drinking to much Flight Attendant Kool Aid

[UpperDeck]

Seeker----I think we all understood that the remark; "trained to the same standards as pilots..." was hyperbole (at best). Obviously, the training of FAs is directed primarily at the issues with which they might be confronted---and that does not include operational issues.

And---as you note---this matter will be addressed appropriately with all of the information required at hand.

[Seeker]

Seeker----I think we all understood that the remark; "trained to the same standards as pilots..." was hyperbole (at best). Obviously, the training of FAs is directed primarily at the issues with which they might be confronted---and that does not include operational issues.

Well, not to be contrary, but this is what the whole thing hinges on; the pilots and AMEs decided that the aircraft was "operationally" safe - an area of the operation that FAs are not trained in - and the FAs still walked off the aircraft on the basis of rather vague health and safety concerns. Imagine a situation where an FA demands to see the flightplan in order to make their own assessment of the fuel load and alternate selection - these decisions could potentially have a very large impact on the FA's health and safety but naturally flightplanning decisions are left to the Capt and dispatcher. Isn't this essentially the same as leaving the mechanical fitness of the aircraft to the Capt and AME?

[Mitch Cronin]

Well, as smart thinking folks have already mentioned, we don't have all the facts.... but to go with your analogy, imagine if an F/A did see the flightplan, and could see an error!?

.... What I'm driving at is that there's a possibility some, or one, of these F/A's knew of the hazards and did indeed smell the telltale signs of cooking oil.... I'd imagine they'd have behaved as they did. It's entirely possible, for me, to imagine a scenario where the AME involved, and the flight crew, didn't think it was a big deal, 'cause they didn't know how serious the hazards are. But the F/a's, union supplied warnings in mind, had a good idea.... ? Who knows? ...... in any case, for all who listen here, don't dismiss that stench as just a smell.... it's got the potential to mess you up. Ugly stuff..... and I know there are people who will dismiss it as "just a smell".... but it's so much more!

[moeman]

We can walk off the aircraft if the cabin temp is too high too. The aircraft may be perfectly safe to fly, and pilots and/or mechanics may see no reason why we shouldn't just suck it up and board an extremely hot aircraft, but it's within our rights to refuse until adequate cooling is provided.

If these kids got sick or felt that their health was in jeopardy, what would you have them do? They either booked off sick or exercised their right to refuse dangerous work and now the wheels are in motion. If their right to refuse was ultimately denied and they refused to go anyway, they'll be in a heap of trouble, I believe. So I very much doubt they did that. They were either granted that right to refuse or they simply felt ill and told the company that they required medical attention. Being that they were not at a crew base, they would then be required to visit the hospital in Ottawa as per SOP's. A new crew would be required and again, not being a crew base would mean it would take some time to get replacements.

Whatever the case, there are procedures in place to determine if we have a genuine right to refuse dangerous work, whether pilots, AME's or management believe we're being silly buggers or not.

[IFG]

... in any case, for all who listen here, don't dismiss that stench as just a smell.... it's got the potential to mess you up. Ugly stuff..... and I know there are people who will dismiss it as "just a smell".... but it's so much more!

Mitch - I'd be interested in some substantiation. Malcolm posted the MSDS. MobilJet2 is "not classified as hazardous according to criteria of National Occupational Health and Safety Commission".

It does note that "product may decompose at elevated temperatures or under fire conditions and give off irritating and/or harmful (carbon monoxide) gases/vapours/fumes. Symptoms from acute exposure to these decomposition products in confined spaces may include headache, nausea, eye, nose, and throat irritation." I don't know that smelling something necessarily rises to the level of acute exposure, and lots of things are nauseating etc. in higher concentrations.

Many on this forum have experienced this "dirty socks" smell. I doubt that anybody ignored it completely, but as a few here have noted, it will be dealt with without fuss after any write-up, and IAC generally dissipates (as you found in your 76'). None of us seems terribly worse for the experience. Several of us have also had the sort of mountains-out-of-mole-hills experience Seeker has described. The cautions in the MSDS are not unduly alarming. Perhaps you can fill us in a bit.

We can walk off the aircraft if the cabin temp is too high too ....

Moeman - CD posted a couple of links covering the right-to-refuse. As related here, it seems that proper protocols were followed. It's not an absolute, unquestionable right, one certainly hopes there is no labour-relations undertone to all this.

Of course we'll await the final conclusions about this particular story, but in the meantime, some of us will wonder about the credibility of these complaints, which BTW did not seem to afflict the final crew, or a single passenger. If individuals are hypersensitive to some environmental abnormalities in their workplace that do not affect most of the population, and cause delays and operational disruption, who should be making the accomodation?

Cheers, IFG

p.s. Got curious, tried to do a little searching for some info on acute exposure levels and toxicity. Not getting anywhere, so if you have anything, Mitch, I'd be interested to see it. Problem is that altho' anecdotal evidence seems to indicate no harm from the occasional short exposure we get on aircraft (maybe a little less rare on the venerable birds I fly), CO is a vile gas to inhale in any great quantity. There's no way to gauge the concentration from the odours here, since CO is odourless, but if oil is indicated in the packs, it may be there. Is there any documentation on the temperatures required for the chemical breakdown, and whether those temps are generated in the packs? The MSDS is pretty vague.

[CD]

There is lots of information out there, IFG, on both sides of the issue. I think that the largest group is based out of the UK (if you frequent PPRuNe, you'll have heard of it):

Aerotoxic Association

There have also been a number of studies posted in various medical journals over the years ... I think this is one of the most recent:

Organophosphates in aircraft cabin and cockpit air--method development and measurements of contaminants -- May 2011

Again, the discussions on PPRuNe are likely the most comprehensive from an internet forum point of view...

[boestar]

If I am not mistaken the right to refuse is absolute. If I deem the the job to be unsafe I can refuse to perform it. Only after an investigation can I be proven wrong. Once the job is refused it is refused and it is at MY discretion to perform the task or not. I cannot be forced until the OHS people perform a proper investigation. IF it it then deemed that there were no safety concerns to the task then That task cannot be refused for the same reasons. It's like setting a precedent.

[J.O.]

It is only absolute up to a point. If you have been trained to perform a particular function, have been provided with the required tools and PPE to do it, and it is reasonably accepted that said function is part of your normal duties, you cannot later turn around and refuse to do it unless something about that performing that function has changed from "the normal" way of doing it. A change to the environment, such as bad air, would be justification if it wasn't a part of the normal function, because if it was, the employer would be required to provide appropriate PPE to deal with the potential risks.

[boestar]

J.O. I agree 100%. The reason those conditions are met is because someone before them refused to do it because the PPE or whatever else was absent.

[deicer]

I find it very interesting that in this pi$$ing match over authority, nobody has taken into account the fact that much like a cabin that is too hot or too cold, if a smell is obnoxious to the flight attendants, what is the passengers opinion?

Maybe they were just trying to protect the 'Brand' as well?

[AMEfirst]

The brand is important as well.

Given the choice of a smell in the cabin that usually dissipates after a few minutes or no flight, which do you think the passenger would prefer?

It is unfortunate the the APU, or one of the engines introduced some oil into the pneumatic system at that time and place.

That time and place was YOW, where the probability of an aircraft swap is less likely if I remember correctly.

Let's get back to the safety issue then

The aircraft was determined to be airworthy by maintenance (a large team) and the crew (Flt Ops).

Sure, the Flight Attendants can book off because they want to for safety reasons, possibly a perceived hazard to their health.

They have zero ability to assess airworthiness of the aircraft.

[airt]

The brand is important as well.

Given the choice of a smell in the cabin that usually dissipates after a few minutes or no flight, which do you think the passenger would prefer?

It is unfortunate the the APU, or one of the engines introduced some oil into the pneumatic system at that time and place.

That time and place was YOW, where the probability of an aircraft swap is less likely if I remember correctly.

Let's get back to the safety issue then

The aircraft was determined to be airworthy by maintenance (a large team) and the crew (Flt Ops).

Sure, the Flight Attendants can book off because they want to for safety reasons, possibly a perceived hazard to their health.

They have zero ability to access airworthiness of the aircraft.

Passenger (customer perspectives).

http://www.flyertalk.com/forum/air-canada-aeroplan/1352312-vansun-fas-refuse-fly-due-smell-abandon-pax-pilot-3-hrs-restaff.html

[Mitch Cronin]

Mitch - I'd be interested in some substantiation. Malcolm posted the MSDS. MobilJet2 is "not classified as hazardous according to criteria of National Occupational Health and Safety Commission".

Hello IFG... There was a rather glaring qualifier to that statement within the MSDS ... "under normal conditions of use and with appropriate personal hygiene practices."

In addition to the obvious concerns and questions with CO, It's the "tricresyl phosphate" (TCP) within the oil that has some rather nasty possibilities...

Here's a link to an MSDS on that: http://www.avantormaterials.com/SearchDocuments/usa/English/T5161_msds_us_Default.pdf?terms=Tricresyl%20Phosphate

From the Wiki page on TCP : "TCP is used as an additive in turbine engine oil and can potentially get into the airliner cabins via a bleed air "fume event". Aerotoxic syndrome is the name given to the alleged health ill-effects caused by exposure to engine chemicals; UK industry-funded studies are yet to make a link between TCP and any long-term health issues.^[6]"

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tricresyl_phosphate

Interestingly, the wiki page on "Aerotoxic syndrome" says that: " As of 2009 this syndrome is not officially recognized in aviation medicine.^[4]"

Anyway, after looking for a while now (and following many, many rabbit trails and distractions (as is so flippin' easy to do!), I haven't been able to find the one I was looking for, which came from a pilot group (I may have come across a link to it from the prune?), and suggested possible connection to intestinal tract illnesses, such as colitis and Crohn's disease, among other problems...

In any case, it appears to me, while searching, that perhaps there hasn't been a great number of research hours dedicated to any specific study of amounts of TCP one can potentially be exposed to during these types of events...

Come to think of it, I think the AEF's former host JW had some more info on this very topic...? I recall he expressed some concern. I have no idea if he's still around, but perhaps you know him?

Sorry I can't be of more help...

Cheers,

Mitch

[AME]

Aircraft cabin fumes:

The poisoning and disablement of those who fly

by Nickolas Vakas

Aircraft cabin fumes caused by oil leaking from engines and entering the cabin environment have been poisoning air travellers for decades. The resulting fumes also compromise the safe operation of the aircraft. The airline industry, regulators and governments have consistently denied this serious occupational health and safety problem.

In October 2000, the most detailed inquiry into aircraft cabin fumes onboard BAe 146 aircraft was published. This Australian Senate Inquiry report, Air Safety and Cabin Air Quality in the BAe 146, was prompted by hundreds of fume incidents. The Inquiry was demanded by aircraft crew and aviation unions. Appendix four of the Senate Inquiry report included 30 pages of documented fume events and aircraft crew symptoms of varying severity between August 1992 and December 1999, provided by the Flight Attendants Association of Australia. Nonetheless many industry players including Ansett, National Jet Systems (NJS) and Qantas downplayed the problem.

The BAe 146 is acknowledged as the most dangerous fume prone aircraft internationally. The oil used on BAe 146 aircraft in Australia is Mobil Jet Oil II (MJO) and it is the dominant jet oil used on many types of aircraft internationally. Other aircraft that have significant fume problems include Boeing 737 and 757, Airbus A320 and the MacDonald Douglas MD 80 but not to the same extent as the BAe 146. Aircraft crews at some airlines have refused to fly on certain aircraft, for example in 2007 the staff at Flybe boycotted the BAe 146.

Toxic jet oil

The jet oil that enters the cabin environment contains Tricresyl Phosphate. TCP can damage nervous systems, cause loss of co-ordination, muscle paralysis and cognitive impairment. A 1998 study found that symptoms of jet oil exposure on BAe 146 aircraft included disorientation, numbness, tingling of nose and lips, headache, respiratory problems and burning eyes and throat. Some people required hospitalisation.

In 2005, Mohamed Abou-Donia, a Professor in the Department of Pharmacology and Cancer Biology at Duke University Medical Centre, documented neurological deficiencies from an examination of the blood of eight aircraft crew consistent with TCP exposure. He noted that whether a person recovered depends on the level of damage and where damage is extensive there is likely to be a permanent loss of function. Furthermore in 2005, respiratory physician Jonathan Burdon and thoracic physician Allan Glanville undertook a study of 14 aircraft crew. This study found lung injury to all 10 flight attendants and 4 pilots that flew on the BAe 146 and that many ‘abnormalities are irreversible’.

Exposures can also result in long term chronic conditions such as Multiple Chemical Sensitivity (MCS). The variety of symptoms has resulted in the term Aerotoxic Syndrome to incorporate the numerous and often disabling conditions experienced.

http://www.australian-options.org.au/issues/options_59/article_vakas.php

[UpperDeck]

Let's get back to the safety issue then

The aircraft was determined to be airworthy by maintenance (a large team) and the crew (Flt Ops).

Sure, the Flight Attendants can book off because they want to for safety reasons, possibly a perceived hazard to their health.

They have zero ability to assess airworthiness of the aircraft.

Sorry but I don't agree with your assumption; "They have zero ability (etc.)" Why not take it as a given that in the opinion of the pilots on consultation with maintenance, there were no identified issues that would impair safe operation of the aircraft.

There are indeed flight attendants in the employ of Air Canada who in fact are qualified to express an opinion on airworthiness but they would agree----that is not what they are being paid to do by AC.

You are conflating two issues---authority of the pilot and the right of an employee to exercise self-preservation.

The decision of the back-end that noxious air constituted a hazard to their health, whether real or imagined, is NOT an affront to the pilot who assured them "everything is okay". They have a right---no; an obligation---to safeguard their own health. Situational awareness is not a requirement limited to the cockpit.

My feeling is that many of the responses on this thread are "turf-related" and few seem to hear the condescension that is implied by the statement that the flight attendants should have been satisfied with the calming words of their "betters".

[Seeker]

I think we're going around in circles!

Of course everyone agrees that if there really was an issue then the aircraft shouldn't go anywhere except to the hangar, and everyone agrees that if there really wasn't an issue then the FAs were wrong to walk off. The question is about why the FAs were not satisfied with the results of the maintenance investigation and assurances from the pilots - was it not complete in their opinion or done incorrectly or did they actually continue to smell the fumes after the investigation?

[boestar]

Here is a link to a good article on the A320 AC system and cabin air.

http://cmc003.ca/003miss/images/fast19.pdf

[AMEfirst]

UpperDeck

Like I said in my last post, health hazards are up to the individual and committees.

I do not believe a Flt Att has the ability to sign out an aircraft in the Technical logbook.

Don't confuse the 2 issues