Disappointing Year for Airline Safety

[Don Hudson]

Link to source:Ascend Worldwide Aviation Consultants

Disappointing 2010 for Airline Safety

"LONDON (WSJ) -The number of airline accidents and passenger fatalities increased in 2010, while insurance claims have exceeded premiums, according to aviation consultants Ascend Worldwide.

"The fatal accident rate worsened in 2010 to one per 1.3 million flights from one per 1.5 million flights in 2009, which was considered the safest year ever. Apart from 2009, only 2007 and 2006 produced better accident rates. There were 28 fatal accidents in 2010, compared with 23 in 2009.

" 'Despite the relatively poor performance in 2010, we believe that air safety is still improving and this has resulted in 100 fewer fatal accidents during the last decade than in the 1990s-on average, 10 fewer fatal accidents a year,' said Paul Hayes, director of safety at Ascend..

"As the number of fatal accidents increased, so did the number of passengers and crew killed in those accidents. The number of deaths rose 13% in 2010 to 828 people compared, with 731 people in 2009. This year was 4% worse than the past decade average but was a 27% improvement on the 1990s average of 1,128 deaths. The estimated passenger fatality rate for 2010 was one per 3.8 million passengers carried compared with one per 4.5 million passengers carried in 2009.

"The worst accidents in 2010 were the Air India Express Boeing 737-800 crash in May that killed 152 passengers and six crew when it overran on landing at Mangalore in India; the Airblue Airbus A321 accident in July that occurred when attempting to land at Islamabad in Pakistan and killed 146 passengers and six crew; the Afriqiyah A330 that crashed in May while attempting to land at Tripoli in Libya, killing all but one of the 93 passengers and 11 crew on board; and Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737-800, which crashed into the sea shortly after take-off from Beirut, Lebanon, killing all 82 passengers and eight crew on board.

" 'These four accidents account for a total of 472 passenger fatalities, 65% of the total number of passenger fatalities on revenue passenger flights during the year,' Mr. Hayes said.

"2010 was a "disappointing year from the point of view of both safety and insurance," said Mr. Hayes, director of safety at Ascend. He estimates that incurred aircraft hull and legal-liability losses for 2010 were about $2.15 billion, some $370 million less than 2009. However, those losses still exceeded the $2.1 billion of written premiums during the calendar year.

"Mr. Hayes said there tends to be about nine years between two troughs in the cycle in terms of premium income. After the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks, he said, the market "hardened" and written premiums hit $3.6 billion for the year. This was followed by a number of relatively benign claims years, Mr. Hayes said, which led to annual premium income rapidly eroding to just $1.8 billion in 2007 at the bottom of the cycle.

"Mr. Hayes said that since 2007, estimated premium income has increased by about a third. "However, more than half of this increase came in 2009 following the loss of the Air France Airbus A330 in the South Atlantic that summer." Airbus is a unit of European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. EADS N.V.

"Ascend estimates that written premiums have probably only increased about 7% in 2010, and increases in the coming year are unlikely to exceed this level given the high levels of capacity available in the market, and provided there is no catastrophic loss that could push prices for insurance coverage higher. Between 2007 and 2010, total written premiums hit about $7.3 billion, while incurred losses stand at $8.2 billion, Ascend said. "

[AME]

It appears that the bulk of the fatal accidents are from so called third world countries, I wonder if the post 9/11 US restrictions on training foreign nationals may be a contributing factor?

[Don Hudson]

It appears that the bulk of the fatal accidents are from so called third world countries, I wonder if the post 9/11 US restrictions on training foreign nationals may be a contributing factor?

Interesting question. My sense of it without formally examining the data is, no, I don't think this is a factor.

The three accidents with the greatest number of fatalitis were the Afrikiya A330 at Tripoli (103), the AirBlue A321 (152) at Islamabad and the B737 (158) at Mangalore, contributing slightly less than half of all airline fatalities in 2010. Although there were other circumstances, (new on type, cultural hierarchies leading to high cockpit gradients), the crews in these accidents were experienced, veteran pilots. I would consider the Colgan crew "new", especially, sadly, the F/O, who could not have known the kind of operating environment she was in and could not know because Colgan did not teach, did not inculcate and therefore did not have such a culture, how unprofessional some of the accident-crew's cockpit behaviour was and how Colgan was not watching carefully with an eye to risk management, (no FOQA Program, minimal training). This is classic "Normalization of Deviance" organizatonal behaviour.

Don

[AME]

the crews in these accidents were experienced, veteran pilots.

it has been over 9 years now and that could mean upwards of 7-8 thousand hours without the benefit of initial or re-current training on North American soil (not sure what the European rules are)it could be we are just seeing the start of the down side to western policy post 9/11

just a thought

[Guest alkaid]

The blame likely rests elsewhere. Third world airlines have been crashing left, right and centre for as long as they have been flying. It is more important to them to have their own inexperienced or poor attitude types flying than western expats who if flying their aircraft would have an overall much better safety record.

Sometimes you can only find out little details from unofficial sources. For example Kenya Airways. Two major crashes in the last 10 years. According to unofficial sources, both flights had very weak commanders. But the airline had something more important. Their own nationals in the cockpit. The results, especially for the last crash are immediately obvious. Remember that when you fly. And perhaps it should be looked into more thoroughly.

[Guest alkaid]

The sudden silence when I bring up a crucial safety point in the previous post is interesting. This is a huge safety issue yet oddly no wants to expand on it. There are hard truths that can make some uncomfortable, but when it comes to aviation safety, it should not be ignored. I have brought this subject up before in other circumstances with similar avoidance of issue. Perhaps political correctness by some. Imagine if people were dying due to that.

While I am suspicious of the article's accuracy of the actual amount of toal flying experience, there is probably a general accuracy in terms of a local being hired due to being local not experience. It would appear that like many accidents, there are multiple reasons, but preventing one hole in a Swiss Cheese theory can be all it takes to prevent an accident.

While the final report may indicate different causal factors, enough accidents in other areas have proven that it is dangerous to hire based on nationality only when extremely few qualified individuals exist.

They say that experience does not mean everything but a certain amount does mean something. Unless a rigorous training program based on unbiased results is implemented, hiring low time/weak candidates based on nationality is extremely dangerous and widespread.

"Pilot inexperience, exhaustion behind ET409 crash, report

On the eve of the anniversary of the crash in Lebanon of Ethiopian airlines flight ET409, LBC TV reported that the investigation of the incident continues and is being handled by the manufacturer with the participation of Ethiopia and Lebanon.

The Boeing 737 crashed on January 25, 2010 just after taking off from Beirut international airport . All 90 people on board died as a result of the crash.

According to LBC sources the investigation so far revealed that the crash occurred because of poor judgment by the Ethiopian Airlines management in choosing the crew, especially since the the captain and his copilot ,were exhausted as a result of working more than a hundred flight hours during that month, while according to international regulations they should not be working more than sixty flight hours.

Furthermore the captain and his copilot did not have enough experience in flying such a plane . According to the investigation 1500 flying hours are required to fly the 737 while neither the captain nor the copilot had more than 200 hours of experience.

The investigation so far confirms the preliminary report of May 2010 which revealed that “both the pilot’s and co-pilot’s inexperience with the jet was “certainly behind the accident”.

According to LBC sources the committee in charge of the investigation is planning to meet in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa on January 24 to start drafting the reported which is expected to take about 3 month to be completed."

<BR style="mso-special-character: line-break">http://www.yalibnan.com/2011/01/03/pilot-inexperience-exhaustion-behind-et409-crash-report/<BR style="mso-special-character: line-break">

[Don Hudson]

The sudden silence when I bring up a crucial safety point in the previous post is interesting. This is a huge safety issue yet oddly no wants to expand on it. There are hard truths that can make some uncomfortable, but when it comes to aviation safety, it should not be ignored. I have brought this subject up before in other circumstances with similar avoidance of issue. Perhaps political correctness by some. Imagine if people were dying due to that.

I don't think a day between responses is "sudden silence", nor do I think the issue of cultural differences, privileging inexperienced nationals over ex-pat veterans or discussing cockpit gradient issues in third world countries are issues which are off-limits or limited due to political correctness. AW&ST have been discussing these issues for years as has AvWeb, PPRuNe and other forums including the Pakistani forum in which discussion of the Airblue A321 CFIT accident at Islamabad was being discussed, (likely a cockpit gradient component to that accident as well as the Mangalore B737).

While the AEF has a rich history of such discussions, (twenty years, if I recall Jim's original forum), I've noticed that there aren't nearly as many participants on the AEF as there used to be; the threads generally attract around 1 or 2, to around 30 responses with occasional spikes for specific topics, and this may be what you're observing. Also, people are likely putting away Christmas decorations and girding themselves for "Monday morning"...

Specifically, the issue of preferencing inexperienced nationals over experienced foreign pilots may have its roots in the MCPL which makes it easy (in comparison with traditional routes) for anyone to get into the right seat of a modern airliner; Countries are doing this now because they can whereas before there was no organized, recognized licencing process which focus was the cockpit of an airliner and one "found one's way up" until one was discovered/interviewed/hired, etc. The drop in standards around the world so that airlines can hire pilots at far cheaper wages is in my mind part of this trend and is contributing to the increasing accident rate, primarily in the third world but not unknown in the West.

That said, it seems that there are countries which (naturally) prefer their own to "suffering the embarrassment" of having their flag carrier's airliners commanded by ex-pats; -that's putting it bluntly of course - there are nuances in any issue including this one. But over the past few years, we see that many "third world" countries are taking steps the world over to "correct" this situation.

On this specific phenomenon of cockpit gradient, Speaking from just a sense of this issue from experience and reading over the decades and not from detailed research, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Europe, the United States, Peru, Brazil, Chile and likely other South American countries and even some African countries do not appear to have the same kind of "cockpit gradient" issues seen in India, Pakistan, Middle Eastern countries (except Israel), Korea, Japan, China, the Philippines and southeast Asian countries where it has been seen that rank, status and saving face can be, and have been, more important than the safety of the aircraft and passengers.

Africa is different in the sense that the infrastructure normally associated with high aviation safety levels has always been a struggle to establish and sustain. There are many reasons for this but I'm not going down that rabbit trail here except to say that African resources and raw materials are attractive and useful to first world countries...

While none of this is politically correct as currently, culturally defined (and so is going to offend some), it must be realized that it is obviously not complete in the sense that "cause" is finally established and we can talk about other things. Because you have said what you have said, I believe you will already understand that these kinds of safety issues, (preference for inexperienced nationals, saving face, cockpit gradient) are far more complex than is being portrayed here and there are always exceptions which, while they don't disprove the claims, do indicate that the matter is truly human and not necessarily related just to nationality. But flight safety work demands the setting aside of ego, of PC, of "face" while including the willingness to, sensitively, address issues which are not purely technical in nature. These are areas where defensive behaviours and attitudes are quite naturally at their strongest but so is the need to address the safety issues which may lie underneath. What occurs in flight safety work far too often is "shooting the messenger" which is the other side of an unwillingness to face unpleasant but undeniable truths. But one must be extremely careful when discussing cultural differences not to avoid offence, (which is a political matter not an investigative matter), but to avoid being informed by stereotyping and hindsight bias. Many times, the accusation of PC is the attempt to maintain the integrity of the dialogue while gently inching towards the truth, towards which there are many paths.

Don

[JL]

When culture is brought up in flight safety discussions I always am reminded of the efforts that Korean Airlines went to to solve their abismal accident rate in the 90's. The fix was to reduce as much as possible, the Korean culture on the flight deck. I recall that the hierarchy of status in the Korean cluture/community that the captain's had defeated any CRM and assertiveness that the FO's may have tried. In an attempt to level the playing field, the company discouraged the use of Korean language and used English instead.

This recognition of culture being a detriment to safety was quite profound and in my opinion, not being considered enough in non Western like countries. Another way to put it, is that cultures that are 'we' in nature versus 'me' in nature will have more challenges in developing a crew environment where individuals feel comfortable in speaking up with confidence.

Sorry for the over simplification of what is a complex topic that I am sure a doctorate thesis could be made on.

[Don Hudson]

From the Aviation Safety Network:

Airliner accident review 2010: 831 fatalities in 29 accidents

By Harro Ranter

"The Aviation Safety Network released the 2010 airliner accident statistics showing a total of 831 airliner accident fatalities, as a result of 29 fatal multi-engine airliner accidents.

"Over the year 2010 the Aviation Safety Network recorded a total of 29 fatal airliner accidents, resulting in 831 fatalities and 6 ground fatalities. The number of fatalities is higher than the ten-year average of 810 fatalities. On the other hand, 2010 was the 6th safest year since 1945, by number of fatal accidents.

"Of those 29 fatal accidents, 15 involved passenger flights, compared to eleven in 2009.

"Six out of 29 accident airplanes were operated by airlines on the E.U. "black list" as opposed to five out of 30 in 2009.

"In 2010 Africa showed marked decline in accidents: 17% of all fatal airliner accidents happened in Africa. Although this is still out of sync compared to the fact that the continent only accounts for approximately 3 percent of all world aircraft departures.

"The Aviation Safety Network is an independent organisation located in the Netherlands. Founded in 1996. It has the aim to provide everyone with a (professional) interest in aviation with up-to-date, complete and reliable authoritative information on airliner accidents and safety issues. ASN is an exclusive service of the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF). The figures have been compiled using the airliner accident database of the Aviation Safety Network, the Internet leader in aviation safety information. The Aviation Safety Network uses information from authoritative and official sources like NTSB, ICAO etc."

www.aviation-safety.net

[Guest alkaid]

http://www.cnn.com/2...dex.html?hpt=C2

In fact, aviation safety keeps on improving. Even with the arrival of more and more low cost carriers, there seems to be no detrimental effect on safety. Accidents are so rare, that when there is one such as the Dash-8 in Buffalo, there is a massive amount of media attention, then not much for several years. An incredible record.

Global accident rate is lowest ever for Western-built jets

(CNN) -- Last year was the safest in aviation history for passengers flying on Western-built jets, an international aviation trade group said Wednesday.The 2010 global accident rate was 0.61 per million flights, a rate equating to one accident for every 1.6 million flights, according to the International Air Transport Association (IATA). That is just below the previous historic low rate of 0.65 rate in 2006, and a "significant improvement" over the rate of 0.71 recorded in 2009.

There were 17 plane accidents -- or hull losses, in the lingo of the business -- involving Western-built jet aircraft in 2010, compared to 19 the previous year. A hull loss is an accident in which a plane is destroyed or damaged beyond repair.

There were 786 fatalities in passenger aircraft compared to 685 in 2009, IATA said.

As in the past, there were significant regional differences in the accident rates, with North America having relatively low rates and Africa having the worst rate. While Africa's hull loss rate was 7.41 -- four Western-built planes crashed in Africa -- it was lower than the 2009 rate of 9.94.

IATA Director General Giovanni Bisignani said African systems must improve.

"Flying must be equally safe in all parts of the world," Bisignani said. "An accident rate in Africa that is over 12 times the global average is not acceptable." He said African carriers should make use of an IATA audit system to improve safety.

Runway excursions -- instances when a plane leaves the runway during take-offs or landings -- accounted for 21 percent of the worldwide accidents, IATA said, saying the number has dropped because of attention to the problem. Some of the accidents occur when planes land on wet runways; others when the aircraft approaches too fast, too high or touches down beyond the desired spot on the runway. IATA said it is working with the industry and regulators to address the issue.

IATA said 2010 had the following results:

2.4 billion people flew safely on 36.8 million flights.

94 accidents for all types of aircraft -- Eastern and Western built -- compared to 90 in 2009.

23 fatal accidents for all passenger aircraft types, compared to 18 in 2009.

IATA represents some 230 airlines comprising 93 percent of scheduled international air traffic.

[Don Hudson]

alkaid;

Thanks for posting this - it is important to provide as many views of statistics as are available.

That said, it is a fact that IATA is a different organization than ICAO, the FSF or the Aviation Safety Network. IATA is the airline industry political representative and lobby organization, and is in the business of putting blush on statistics. The others are in the business of ensuring there is no blush whatsoever. Because the numbers are there and can't be ignored or manipulate, both the blush and the absence of blush in these statistics is tiny and subtle...more a point of view than an actual portrayal. Both approaches yield results with which one must engage with caution. I don't want to use the term, "slicing and dicing" because that conveys a sense of manipulation that I don't think is the case. That's what I mean by "subtle". Nevertheless, the difference in approaches is material.

Both agree that Africa "must improve" but they disagree on fatalities, (831 "airline fatalities" in the ASN report, 786 "in passenger aircraft" in the IATA numbers. But even the IATA report acknowledges 786 fatalities vice 685 in 2009...not an improvement at all. When focus is kept to a specific grouping, (western-built jets), these numbers are legitimately lower but do not convey the entire story. That is what I mean by "blush". IOSA Audits are good as far as they go but there are wide areas of disagreement as to whether passing such an audit is a "seal of approval", and if it is, what does such seal mean when certain standards remain to be met. The point is, like any interaction where strong interests are in play, the process is both technical AND political...subtlely so, but nevertheless not objective.

The original reason for posting the story was to examine the present circumstances within the industry, not to point out the weaknesses or strengths of one way of examining data or another. All should be examining a system which few disagree, is showing signs of inordinate stress in critical areas. These stresses are in the area of regulatory oversight, intense production pressures, (more for less), the battle of the use of data...(to learn from, or to use to prosecute), the need for investor reward and the need to rejuvenate employee circumstances such that the industry will again attract, in Sully's words, "the best and the brightest".

It is my view that all these large issues are having an effect on the accident rate which trend is at the moment, static and neither markedly improving nor degrading. The problem with such statistics is, we can keep the same percentages as somehow "acceptable" and watch the actual numbers of fatal accidents and fatalities increase as the industry growth "explodes" as it is going to do in China and elsewhere.

This is the kind of reading I give both IATA's work, and the others which I chose to mention.

Thanks again...

Don

[BoomerPete]

When culture is brought up in flight safety discussions I always am reminded of the efforts that Korean Airlines went to to solve their abismal accident rate in the 90's. The fix was to reduce as much as possible, the Korean culture on the flight deck. I recall that the hierarchy of status in the Korean cluture/community that the captain's had defeated any CRM and assertiveness that the FO's may have tried. In an attempt to level the playing field, the company discouraged the use of Korean language and used English instead.

This recognition of culture being a detriment to safety was quite profound and in my opinion, not being considered enough in non Western like countries. Another way to put it, is that cultures that are 'we' in nature versus 'me' in nature will have more challenges in developing a crew environment where individuals feel comfortable in speaking up with confidence.

Sorry for the over simplification of what is a complex topic that I am sure a doctorate thesis could be made on.

JL,

As somebody working the coal face at the time I can tell you that this "Malcolm Gladwell" version of what went on at Korean Air bears almost no resemblance to reality. The company never in any practical way discouraged the use of the Korean language as suggested and indeed most of the individuals that were the greatest individual sources of the CRM problem were (and are) completely incapable of coherent communication in any language other than Korean.

Likewise, KE stood out for me as one of the few places where CRM teaching actually seemed to produce a contrary result. It never changed the attitude or approach of most of the senior Korean Capts as was (for some) hoped but it did create an expectation among many of the younger Korean F/Os that it was a necessary thing for foreign Capts to accept and follow any comment/advice/concern that they provided regardless of whether it was appropriate. Not doing so was considered to be "Bad CRM". If followed the precept resulted in judgement and decision making that was only as smart as the least experienced crew member on board.

The accident rate at KE has improved versus what it was in the 90's principally for 3 reasons. First a significant improvement in the quality and consistency of training and checking (including the removal of several unwritten conventions regarding how checks were passed). Second the induction, and later promotion to Capt. of a large number of civilian trained "Jeju" graduates who had better initial training, CRM and language skills versus inductees from the Air Force. This has, somewhat, had an effect similar to what Gladwell suggested and has improved overall CRM and language skill, but unfortunately Korean has since shut down the Jeju Academy. The third reason for improvement is, quite simply, luck. To the point that I left there were still an unacceptably high number of incidents that had a potential for worse that was fortunately not realized. That rate was improving, but was still not close to a "1st world" standard. More recently I'm told that an audit of FOQA data found that something on the order of 27% of it had disappeared in mid process for reasons that couldn't be accounted for leading to some very interesting questions.

There is no doubt that Korean is an improved carrier now versus what it was a decade ago, but it is still a place that struggles with the culture issue as it applies to how safe operations are assured. This becomes increasingly obvious when one gets a chance to view it comparatively with other carriers that operate in countries with similar tradition/cultural norms. Having had that opportunity I can honestly say that Korea, while now being ahead on things like training systems and process is still at the back of the pack when it comes to the effect of culture on CRM and safe operating decisions.

BP

[Guest alkaid]

Both agree that Africa "must improve" but they disagree on fatalities, (831 "airline fatalities" in the ASN report, 786 "in passenger aircraft" in the IATA numbers. But even the IATA report acknowledges 786 fatalities vice 685 in 2009...not an improvement at all.

In all honesty, I think the pax fatality count is very misleading.

Air Austral has ordered A-380's with 840 seats. Having just one plane crash in a year if it was that A-380 full(840 pax+60 infants under 2 on laps+30 crewmembers) would exceed this years fatality count even though that one crash will be a great safety improvement compared to the bunch that crashed in 2010.

http://www.flightglo...a380-order.html

[JL]

Thanks for the reality check BoomerPete. I thought I was getting better at perfecting my "filter" for what I consume in mainstream media, but the odd time I still get duped as evidenced by Mr. Gladwell's apparant over simplification of a complex issue.

[JL]

Further to BoomerPete's comments on his experience in Korea, the heart of the issue for developing aviation countries (who are selecting/training their own pilots more than ever) is summed up in this occurrence. Download the December issue Aero Safety World and go to page 57 and read the synopsis "Panic Hinders Upset Recovery". The question is how to train these folks to be aviators and not just pilots.

[BoomerPete]

Thanks for the reality check BoomerPete. I thought I was getting better at perfecting my "filter" for what I consume in mainstream media, but the odd time I still get duped as evidenced by Mr. Gladwell's apparant over simplification of a complex issue.

JL,

I have to say I was disappointed with the chapter relating to KE in what was an otherwise interesting book by Gladwell. His referenced source for the changes at KE was David Greenberg who was brought in from Delta to head the company after the Guam crash. Greenberg certainly knows better than that the reality of the situation the organization faced and what the successes and failures along the path to improvement were. For him to suggest that it just came down to changing the language of communication in order to remove an intense cultural bias towards deference to elders/authority would be a very deliberate sanitizing of history. But then, when you are going to be quoted in a widely read book about your recollections of an organization that you are still doing significant business with, you are going to choose your words with care, aren't you? The reality, like Korea itself, is far more complex and takes an appreciation of the unique nature and history of the Korean people before you can recognize that there is an inherent difference in how the issue manifests itself there versus in other cultures with similar Power/Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance indices.

The question is how to train these folks to be aviators and not just pilots.

Bang on, you've nailed it one. This issue is the paramount problem facing carriers in many of the emerging economy and Confucian culture markets. For the most part it isn't that they lack a desire to operate safely and efficiently but rather that they lack an inherited understanding of why there is more to being an aviator than just memorizing procedures and more to safety management than punishing errors and exceedances. The most obvious place where this tends to show up is in a lack of professional curiosity, especially as it relates to accident/incident/safety events. As well training often relates only to demonstrating a knowledge of procedures rather than the application of judgement or the acceptance and analysis of errors as a means of learning. The Air India Express incident that you referenced is a good example. The training for Indian F/O's with low time is a very suspect area where what is being examined appears to be more an ability to read checklists and execute rudimentary maneuvers than any overall level of airmanship. Unfortunately, India is far from alone in having that problem to deal with.

Cheers from the front,

BP

[Don Hudson]

Commerical jet accident rates were good in 2010, just not better.

Leveling Off

by James M. Burin

The trend of an impressive but non-improving safety record continued in 2010.

Link to the rest of the story: Flight Safety World (FSF)