CRM...none here

[Kip Powick]

Certainly annoying noise..(two different types)

[ChicoChico]

You are insinuating they did not know their gear was up?

[thor]

You are insinuating they did not know their gear was up?

Sounds expen$ive.

[GTFA]

Any background story to that video?

[Moon The Loon]

You are insinuating they did not know their gear was up?

As far as CRM goes, I have no idea how one would teach CRM to a private or even commercial pilot who by nature of initial training is not part of a crew, and who must rely entirely upon him/herself to be aware of everything to do with the flight, and to do everything that is necessary to conduct a safe flight.

As far as this video goes: we don't know who was sitting in the seats. It would seem the fellow in the left was flying. We don't know who was shooting the video. Were they all pilots, or was it just the guy flying?

If I was the guy flying and the others weren't pilots, I'd be pretty pisssd at this video showing up on YouTube!

[Kip Powick]

You are insinuating they did not know their gear was up?

And your theory is.......?

[Say Again, Over!]

Idle thoughts:

Could it be that the gear wouldn't come down? That it was a planned belly landing? Or was there anything suggesting a surprise event. Certainly, I suppose I would have expected an engine shutdown prior to ground contact but...

Back to the cave, now!

Felix

[Moon The Loon]

Idle thoughts:

Could it be that the gear wouldn't come down? That it was a planned belly landing? Or was there anything suggesting a surprise event. Certainly, I suppose I would have expected an engine shutdown prior to ground contact but...

Back to the cave, now!

Felix

No need to hibernate yet, Felix. That is a real possibility. Maybe that's why the guys were so calm right down to the time the aircraft slid to a stop. Some might have put it down on the grass; some might have shut down the engine. We don't know.

[Kip Powick]

No need to hibernate yet, Felix. That is a real possibility. Maybe that's why the guys were so calm right down to the time the aircraft slid to a stop. Some might have put it down on the grass; some might have shut down the engine. We don't know.

If one checks away back in the 'comments' section there are remarks that state it was the left seaters bi-annual check ride...apparently 'someone' in the know has posted that....true? dunno.

PS..if the gear would not come down and it was a planned belly landing wouldn't there be CR vehicles visible on the side of the runway etc??

[Guest alkaid]

I would be willing to bet that this was an accidental gear up landing. I notice that they were high and close in and then on final were to the right of the centreline with the approach perhaps requiring what may have been an above normal amount of concentration. The reaction at the very end suggests that it was a surprise accident.

One might wonder how they could not have heard the warning. It reminded me of an incident that happened to me many years ago in a retracable single engine Cessna. A simulated engine failure by having the throttle pulled back. The gear up horn immediately sounds and is annoying so I intentionally tune it out as I want to be in the best gliding configuration. I will put the gear down later when the field is made. Then I totally forgot about the warning as I concentrated on setting up the off-airport approach and felt quite embarrassed when the instructor pointed it out on the missed approach after I approached a field with full flap and gear up.

It can happen and maybe these guys were above their gear extension speed when the power was brought back if they were high and fast and close in for some reason. Beware of tuning out warnings. Lesson for me learned the easy way. For the unfortunate, it is learned the hard way.

[Slim]

I would be willing to bet that this was an accidental gear up landing. I notice that they were high and close in and then on final were to the right of the centreline with the approach perhaps requiring what may have been an above normal amount of concentration. The reaction at the very end suggests that it was a surprise accident.

One might wonder how they could not have heard the warning. It reminded me of an incident that happened to me many years ago in a retracable single engine Cessna. A simulated engine failure by having the throttle pulled back. The gear up horn immediately sounds and is annoying so I intentionally tune it out as I want to be in the best gliding configuration. I will put the gear down later when the field is made. Then I totally forgot about the warning as I concentrated on setting up the off-airport approach and felt quite embarrassed when the instructor pointed it out on the missed approach after I approached a field with full flap and gear up.

It can happen and maybe these guys were above their gear extension speed when the power was brought back if they were high and fast and close in for some reason. Beware of tuning out warnings. Lesson for me learned the easy way. For the unfortunate, it is learned the hard way.

I suspect a unexpected gear up based on the reaction. Had this been a "planned event" they would have been high fivin... just sayin.

Another thought I have had is that perhaps those fancy noise canceling headsets are not wired into the gear horn audio? IE: Horn audio comes from an external source (speaker)and those N/C headsets did a really great job :-) The video guy caught the audio but was obviously unaware of it's importance.

Fasten Belt Sign... ON

[GTFA]

As far as CRM goes, I have no idea how one would teach CRM to a private or even commercial pilot who by nature of initial training is not part of a crew, and who must rely entirely upon him/herself to be aware of everything to do with the flight, and to do everything that is necessary to conduct a safe flight.

CRM is not just for multi-pilot crews. CRM is about understanding the interaction and value of all the resources that share roles in a safe and successful flight whether a short flip around the circuit in a 152 or a 1000 mile business trip in a Biz-jet. A "crew" can be a single pilot and the resources he manages are as numerous as anyone else. That is CRM. Some circles refer to it at SRM: Single-pilot Resource Management.

GTFA

[inchman]

From the YouTube website:

This video was taken by Paul Wingo, who was sitting in the back. I have uploaded it here WITH HIS WRITTEN PERMISSION.

Cessna 172 RG

Charles W. Baker Airport

USA January , 2007

From Paul Wingo:

"There was a snow storm approaching in about an hour and we were doing a check ride. Because of possible ice, we had been flying with the gear down the entire time. We started doing touch and goes after a while. Habit when you take off is to raise the gear. This is what happened. So, when we come around, they were conversing and what not and simply forgot the gear was up. The prop got bent up pretty bad along with the belly of the plane."

[Moon The Loon]

CRM is not just for multi-pilot crews. CRM is about understanding the interaction and value of all the resources that share roles in a safe and successful flight whether a short flip around the circuit in a 152 or a 1000 mile business trip in a Biz-jet. A "crew" can be a single pilot and the resources he manages are as numerous as anyone else. That is CRM. Some circles refer to it at SRM: Single-pilot Resource Management.

GTFA

That's very interesting. And a fairly new concept I gather. I would expect the heart of a single-pilot cockpit and SRM would be The Checklist. Just one tiny lapse in situational awareness = current discussion.

[GTFA]

The teaching of the philosophy of CRM can also be a benefit in the political world:

15 Oct 2010

National Post

DAN GARDNER Dan Gardner is a columnist for the Ottawa Citizen.

Evidence matters

The cultural norms that keep science from veering off into bias are almost non-existent in democratic politics

As campaign controversies go, it was minor stuff: Ottawa Mayor Larry O’Brien accused the government of Ontario of funding a study to examine the feasibility of safe-injection sites in the province — and of keeping the study under wraps until the Oct. 25 municipal elections were over. This was immediately denied. The province hadn’t funded the study. And the study hadn’t been released because it hadn’t been completed.

Larry O’Brien

O’Brien withdrew his accusation and the media mused about the damage this embarrassing performance would do to his campaign. And that was the last we heard of it.

Which is unfortunate. Because this little incident was only trivial in a political sense. Seen from the perspective of how public policy is made, it is devastatingly revealing.

Go back to O’Brien’s original press release. “The fact that this research is even considering drug injection sites for Ottawa,” it said, “should be of concern to every resident.” O’Brien wanted to make an issue of the study because he is opposed to the creation of an injection site. And he thought he could score votes with his opposition.

It didn’t work out that way, however. Jim Watson, his main opponent, said he is also opposed to the creation of a safe-injection site. For good measure, police chief Vern White called safe-injection sites “absolutely ridiculous” and regretted that O’Brien had even mentioned the study. “I’m a little disappointed that we’re giving this any legs,” White told a reporter.

So the issue was a political dud. But notice that not one of these civic leaders expressed the slightest interest in reading the study. No, their minds were closed. They already knew the truth. No need to examine evidence as it becomes available, and certainly no need to adjust opinions accordingly.

This is indefensible. It is nakedly irrational. Unfortunately, it is also perfectly natural.

Every brain is stuffed with certain understandings of human nature and how the world works. Whatever their origins, they shape our subsequent perceptions and thoughts, thanks to the brain’s insistence on maintaining order in its mental universe.

When we encounter new information that fits with our existing beliefs, we have a natural tendency to embrace it uncritically. It’s consonant. It fits. It sits comfortably in our brains and makes us feel good. But information that contradicts existing beliefs is dissonant. It’s jarring, upsetting. And so we struggle mightily to find some excuse to reject it. Or ignore it altogether.

The potency of this “confirmation bias” should not be underestimated. Brain scans show consonant and dissonant information is processed in different regions. That’s how deep the bias runs.

In a sense, the whole point of science, or any rational inquiry, is to overcome this crippling tendency to make facts fit beliefs. Don’t cherry-pick evidence. Make an extra effort to find contrary evidence. And be prepared to review evidence as it becomes available and change existing beliefs if the evidence suggests they are wrong.

Unfortunately, the formal rules and informal cultural norms that keep science from veering off into confirmation bias are almost non-existent in democratic politics.

“When the facts change, I change my mind,” John Maynard Keynes famously said. “What do you do, sir?” For most politicians, the answer is: “I avoid facts that don’t fit what I believe. Problem solved.”

Look at the Conservatives’ mandatory minimum sentences, which they say will deter crime. That’s not an unreasonable hypothesis. Any evidence?

In a 2006 interview, the justice minister claimed there were lots of studies that said so. So I called his office and asked for them. They gave me five citations. Four were old and used dubious methodologies; three of those four provided only very weak support for the government’s claim, while the fourth actually contradicted the government’s position. The fifth study was the most recent and the best quality. And it concluded mandatory minimums don’t work.

But more importantly, the Conservatives ignored a long list of other studies that contradicted its position. In other words, they cherry-picked. Badly.

Since that time, the government has given up on evidence altogether. It simply makes assertions about the value of mandatory minimums and scoffs whenever criminologists say they’re wrong. How is that even remotely rational?

In politics, this sort of thing is so common we seldom stop to think how bizarre it is. The recent ruling on the constitutionality of prostitution laws is a perfect case in point.

The trial judge spent months reading studies and listening to the testimony of both sides’ experts. Much of the 132-page ruling is composed of a painstaking summary and evaluation of the voluminous evidence before the court. It’s an invaluable resource.

So how many of the politicians who loudly objected to the court’s ruling read the decision before spouting off? Judging by the many comments which were belied by evidence in the decision, I suspect none did.

Imagine a scientist angrily rejecting the results of another scientist’s study without bothering to even read it. That would be outrageous. Shocking. Irrational. And yet something similar happens all the time in politics.

Of course it’s easy to blame this on the likes of Larry O’Brien. But it’s not his fault. The media seldom ask about evidence. And the people don’t insist that they do.

Thus, in our political system, public policy is made by closed-minded politicians who play to the prejudices of an electorate in whom knowledge and certainty are inversely correlated. It’s called “democracy.”

Consider if pilots and their crews made decisions and took action this way?

GTFA

[Moon The Loon]

I'll give you some of that, Rich. But in civilian fare, many flying instructors are very junior commercial pilots simply building time. The DFTE's are certainly more experienced and one would think, in their roles as CFI's (if that's what they are), they are giving their junior instructors the correct guidance.

CF pilots have had spectacular training in comparison to the civilian route.

So I reiterate my earlier observation that this is "new to me". Yes, pilot decision making made its way gradually into the Canadian training system in the early 90's but the idea of Crew Resource Management never enters a young pilot's vocabulary until he/she is hired by a 704 or 705 (Canadian) operator.

Perhaps we need to establish an actual course (class & practical) for the ATPL. We insist on it for the PPL, we insist on it for the CPL. We've even instituted it for the AME's - gone are the days where a young 'un would swab floors and clean wrenches in the hopes that his mentor would recommend him to write the TC exams. Now, ALL aspiring AME's must attend a two year tech college course prior to apprenticing and writing the TC exam.