E1craZ4life

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  1. https://yourlogicalfallacyis.com/appeal-to-authority And what reason exists for Canada to cover up an attack on an American-operated aircraft with American soldiers on board? They have nothing at stake for unanimously blowing the whistle on an attack on the flight. A cover-up by the Canadian government of an attack against the US makes about as much sense as a lemon tree growing pomegranates. If there are problems with those points, someone (anyone) should have a sound argument for each and every one of them.
  2. Unless someone reports that they actually got on top of the DC-8's wings and felt the surface for ice, I can't be assured that the lack of sightings of ice by the ground crews and/or flight engineer are enough to show that there was no ice on the airplane, since a visual check would miss traces of clear ice on the wings. I've already pointed out that ice was not the only factor in this accident; there was the issue of excess weight brought about by inaccurate weight tables used by the crew. The experience and expertise of the flight crew is not an ultimate barrier from the ability to make mistakes, and there's perfect proof of that in Tenerife and Santa Bárbara Airlines Flight 518.
  3. I came here to talk about this accident, not to argue about each other.
  4. Take a look at the holes I've pointed out in the minority opinion and tell me that isn't a sound argument.
  5. The issue is not ambiguity, but that the dissenters are looking for constant assurance that they're right, even though they're not.
  6. I've made a list of pitfalls to the minority report, and I would encourage you to look at those.
  7. I absolutely agree that the fly-by-wire tech on Airbus aircraft isn't completely flawed; if it were, we'd be having accidents almost every day involving those kinds of planes. And we do have a few instances of pilots knowing the workings to the point of making a life-saving landing (the Hudson River ditching being one such example). What I'm saying is that the aircraft automation can reach a point that pilots don't really take the time to learn just what the technology does and how to use it to their advantage. What I'm saying is that the FBW of the A320 had some role, even as a contributory factor, in every fatal accident involving the aircraft that use A320 technology. As an example, TAM Airlines Flight 3054 ran off the runway while landing in São Paulo, Brazil and hit a gas station and office building, totaling 199 fatalities. I've seen that crash as a self-fulfilling prophecy, with the design of the Airbus avionics as a contributing factor in the design of the thrust levers. The reversers are activated by pulling the levers back past the idle position instead of there being a separate lever on top of the throttles. This was part of the fly-by-wire tech to allow the autopilot to deploy its own reversers (from what I've managed to gather), and problems arose with single-reverser landing procedures; the design of the thrust levers meant that a pilot activating only one reverser while at the same time leaving the other engine at full power could be under the impression that the engine was at idle even though it was not, especially if it was night outside. Even though the procedure was changed to deploying both reversers, that added 55 meters to the necessary stopping distance, which prompted the TAM 3054 pilot to use the old procedure on the night of the crash, subsequently making the same mistake that got the procedure banned in the first place. So the cause of the crash was fear of not stopping on the runway that was common among Brazilian pilots flying in the area, but an element of the A320 design was a factor in the accident as well. The conviction of a cover-up in the case of Air France 296 comes from a notable discrepancy between the times of the pilot's calls to ATC recorded in the tower and recorded on the CVR. It's a discrepancy of 4 seconds, the difference between the time the captain applied full power to clear the trees and the time the engines started to spool up. The pilot did make mistakes that led to the crash, there's no question there, but the delay in the engines starting to spool up also contributed to the outcome. And if the delay had not been covered up through tampering with the CVR, the problems would likely have been made known and rectified. (In case you wanted to know, this is the only place that I think a cover-up did in fact take place; I've spent the last few years contesting missile theories about TWA Flight 800.) My mention of the DC-10 was comparing companies, not aircraft. McDonnell-Douglas was in a tight spot in a wide-body jet competition with Boeing and Lockheed after a DC-10 was forced to make an emergency landing following a cargo door blowout over Windsor, Ontario. They were trying to fix the problem without grounding their aircraft, but they didn't try to cover up the problem with the cargo door, which wasn't that difficult a problem to fix. Airbus, on the other hand, was in a tighter spot with an aircraft that had a problem integrated in the entire control system, which was having the computers control the plane over the pilots. They couldn't fix that with a number of small tweaks; they'd have had to have make a whole new airplane to put those problems to rest.
  8. Just because the pilot determined that deicing wasn't needed doesn't mean that the fact of the matter was that deicing wasn't needed. This was one of the first accidents to investigate just how much ice would be necessary to disturb an airplane, so the pilot didn't really have any measurable gates for determining definitively whether deicing would be needed, especially when he was under the impression that the plane was lighter than it was in reality.
  9. What I'm getting at is the fact that the Airbus designers gave the flight computer authority over the pilots, rather than the pilots having command over the flight computer. This design proved its dangers in the crash of Air France 296, but the cause of the crash was covered up as total pilot error instead of Airbus coming clean about their product. Though I can see why they would be reluctant to admit their flaws in the philosophy of computers controlling the pilots, since they would have to design a completely new aircraft if they did. (They put themselves in a tighter spot with their A320 than MD did with their DC-10; in the latter case, the only problems were the design of the cargo door and the design of the floor vents.) If the problems with the A320 fly-by-wire had not been covered up after Air France 296, then every fatal accident involving an A320 (and every model aircraft derived it) would not have happened the way they did if at all.
  10. Any amount of ice can have a notable effect on an airplane, especially when other factors including (but not limited to) weight are involved. The lack of perception of ice by anyone other than the forecaster would further augment the argument that the lack of sightings of ice does not prove the absence of ice on the airplane. In case you were wondering, I am pursuing a career as an airline pilot.
  11. In the case of Scandinavian 751, the engines were positioned right behind the wings, increasing the chances of ice being sucked off the wings, and there was a greater amount of ice on the wings (the plane was de-iced twice, so the layer of clear ice that was left was smooth on top), which caused it to shear off when the plane got airborne. With Arrow Air 1285, the ice came from freezing rain in the area, which would've only left a small amount of ice on the wings, which would've adhered to the wings even after takeoff. Unless someone actually stood on top of the wings and felt around for ice, the ground crew would've certainly missed the ice buildup on the wings. The point about the captain reflects on point #7. Ice was not the only factor in the Arrow Air accident; the plane's takeoff weight was greater than the crew believed it was. Either one by itself was not enough to cause a crash, but both of them together would have a dramatic effect on the outcome of the takeoff.
  12. The minority report hinges entirely on the following assumptions being true: 1.) The fact that nobody saw ice on the wings meant that there was no ice on the wings. 2.) The fact that a terrorist group claimed responsibility for the accident meant they had a hand in its taking place. 3.) The fact that there was so much damage to the aircraft despite the plane having just taken off meant that the structural integrity of the aircraft was compromised before impact. 4.) The fact that several bodies had combustion products inside their bodies meant that they were exposed to fire before the plane hit the ground. 5.) The fact that witnesses saw the plane on fire before impact meant that something exploded on the plane before impact. 6.) The fact that there were outward indentations in the aircraft skin meant that something exploded on the plane before impact. 7.) The fact that so many people involved were highly experienced in their roles meant that they were 111% right in their judgments and perceptions. Each of those arguments has its own problem, among other counterarguments: 1.) There is a such thing as clear ice, and that can only be detected by feel, not by sight. Unless someone were to actually physically stand on top of the wing and feel the wing for ice, they're not going to be able to cover all of the wing surface in search of clear ice. The crash of Scandinavian Airlines Flight 751 demonstrates exactly that. 2.) The fact that somebody says something proves nothing if you don't prove it yourself. Tests for explosive chemicals showed no evidence of a bomb on board the plane. 3.) The minority report does pretty much nothing in the way of explaining how impact with the ground could not have caused the movement of flaps, reversers, or anything else on the plane. And many takeoff accidents before and after Arrow Air 1285 have left a severely fragmented airplane and no survivors (or almost no survivors). These include American Airlines Flight 191, KLM Flight 4805 (Tenerife), Northwest Airlines Flight 255, Air France Flight 4590 (Concorde), Air Midwest Express Flight 5481, and Comair Flight 5191. Crashes in wooded areas are bound to cause extreme damage to an aircraft, so it's to be expected that any takeoff accident in a wooded area will have a badly wrecked airplane with very few if any survivors. 4.) Bodies being ripped apart are just as susceptible to reception of combustion products as a living person breathing combustion products. On top of all that, the time between when the landing gear left the runway and the time the plane hit the ground wasn't even 30 seconds, nowhere near the time it'd take for even an explosive fire to generate the amount of smoke found in the toxicology tests. 5.) Witnesses are bound to have erroneous perceptions of an event and should only be relied on in the absence of hard evidence; the location of a fire by itself is not enough to explain where or how it started. The clipped trees spelled out the position of the plane, which was in a greatly stalled profile. The engines showed they were working when the plane struck the trees, but because of the stall, weren't getting enough air and suffered compressor stall, creating the fire seen by witnesses. 6.) The indentations have noticeable parts that would be missing if flattened out. If that damage had been caused by an in-flight explosion, something would've been thrown off the plane and landed somewhere between the runway and the point of impact. Nothing was found in that region, meaning nothing departed the plane before it hit the trees. The plane's impact with the ground would've easily driven anything through the aircraft structure to create those holes. 7.) Even the best of the best are vulnerable to mistakes, and there's a long list of accidents to show for it. Authority and/or expertise on its own has no bearing on the validity of any kind of information.
  13. Is AC supposed to mean Air Canada, or...?