Maverick

Dreamliner #4

I'm thinking this airplane is now dying a slow death... Boeing 737 MAX Production Increases Could be a Whisper, Not a Roar Michael Bruno February 05, 2020 Credit: Jason Redmond/Getty Images Boeing’s Jan. 29 teleconference will be remembered as one of the most humbling earnings reports in the 103-year-old company’s history, but for 737 MAX suppliers it will also set the tone for the next two or three years. “Slowly” was the buzzword repeated often by Boeing leadership, especially when it came to the narrowbody’s monthly production rate ramp-up—assuming the MAX is set to become “ungrounded” and production resumes after halting this month. Boeing CEO David Calhoun and Chief Financial Officer Greg Smith said during the call that production flow will return “one step at a time,” even “one airplane at a time.” Boeing still has not forecast production plans beyond stating it can restart manufacturing months before the MAX is returned to service. But already major suppliers, analysts and consultants are piecing together a road map that foresees MAX monthly unit production rates hitting the mid-20s this year, the 30s most of next year and possibly back to 52—where it stood before the MAX crisis—by the end of 2022. “Probably the most distressing aspect of the line shutdown was the relative lack of guidance provided to suppliers,” Teal Group analyst Richard Aboulafia said Jan. 23. “Rate 52—if we get that in late 2022, I’d be super happy.” Considering that Boeing has indicated a new public marker of a midyear MAX return to service that seemingly is backed by the FAA, the supply chain is expecting Boeing’s own production to restart in March or April. “We’ve assumed roughly a 90-day production delay, which is consistent with direction that we’ve received from Boeing,” says United Technologies Corp. (UTC) Chairman and CEO Greg Hayes. More anecdotal evidence came Jan. 30 from aerostructures leader Spirit AeroSystems, when managers there announced a new agreement with Boeing over MAX production. “Under the agreement, Spirit will restart production slowly, ramping up deliveries throughout the year to reach a total of 216 MAX shipsets delivered to Boeing in 2020,” the Wichita supplier said. “Spirit does not expect to achieve a production rate of 52 shipsets per month until late 2022.” In turn, that would imply an average production rate of 24 per month in 2020, according to financial analysts Sheila Kahyaoglu and Greg Konrad at Jefferies, who note that Spirit already counts about 95 737 units parked in or near its factory. Other suppliers are making similar noises. Hayes of UTC, home to Collins Aerospace and Pratt & Whitney, says managers assume an average production rate of 21 per month in the second half of the year for Collins. General Electric executives say their Leap engine production has not stopped, but the rate this year will fall to roughly half what it was in 2019, also indicating a rate of 21. This is all a world apart from the five-a-month jumps Boeing and suppliers originally envisioned shortly after MAX production was cut to 42 a month last April. Based on what they heard at Aviation Week’s MRO Americas 2019 conference, Leeham News and Analysis reported at the time that MAX-makers had eyed a rate increase to 47 in June, 52 by August and finally 57 by last September. Of course, rate 57 is where Boeing and suppliers were poised to go to before the MAX crisis erupted. Now it is a “creep, crawl, walk, jog, and then run approach,” as industry consultant Jim McAleese puts it. Among the consequences, the first year of “normal” MAX production will be 2023, also when Boeing might get up to rate 57. In turn, Boeing and its suppliers have to adjust their earnings expectations to account for both the lack of previously planned deliveries as well as new costs, since they were positioned for rate 57 by last summer. For its part, Boeing added $9.2 billion to its summary of MAX-related financial charges as part of its latest earnings report, bringing the total to $18.6 billion so far. Cost estimates from the supply chain are trickling in, and they range from mild to eye-popping. Hayes says the production pause is projected to cost UTC just $100 million per month in sales. “We do not anticipate any layoffs,” he adds. “I think that would be the easiest thing to do, but quite frankly, given the scarcity of talented aerospace workers out there, we’re not going to be laying anybody off for a 90-day delay here. I think we’re going to work on the backlog.” But Spirit has already announced layoffs of at least 2,800 workers in Wichita. Increasingly, smaller suppliers are warning Wall Street of bad news, too. British aerostructures provider Senior said Jan. 31 its aerospace revenue this year could drop 20% compared with last year, due to the MAX production halt. Senior’s operating margins will slip as well, and according to media reports the company is saying the recently announced sale of its aerostructures business might have to be shelved until more MAX certainty emerges. https://aviationweek.com/aerospace/boeing-737-max-production-increases-could-be-whisper-not-roar?utm_rid=CPEN1000000441429&utm_campaign=23054&utm_medium=email&elq2=e0fb6229acf04146928fa33833812736

Wrong.

By Andy Pasztor and Alison Sider Nov. 26, 2019 9:46 pm ET SHARE TEXT 24 In the latest hurdle confronting Boeing Co. ’s bid to get its grounded 737 MAX fleet back in the air, federal regulators now intend to inspect and sign off on every jet individually before delivery to airlines. The move, spelled out Tuesday by the Federal Aviation Administration in a letter to the plane maker, signals that resuming MAX flights will be more complicated and perhaps time-consuming than previously projected. The FAA stripped Boeing of longstanding authority to perform such routine, pre-delivery safety checks and signoffs of MAX planes on its own, amounting to another public pushback by the agency against company pressure to accelerate the reinstatement. SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS Do you trust Boeing to inspect and sign off on its jets? Why or why not? Join the conversation below. It isn’t clear how much of a delay the change is likely to create. Some of the fallout is symbolic, while the eventual impact will partly depend on how effectively Boeing prepares jets removed from service and partly on the availability of FAA employees to process steps to get them back in the air. The decision comes as industry officials world-wide increasingly question whether initial MAX deliveries are probable before year’s end. In an email, a Boeing spokesman said: “We continue to work with the FAA on the safe return to service of the MAX fleet.” Early Wednesday, the spokesman said “we welcome and embrace this decision by the FAA. Safety is our number one priority.” At the very least, the FAA’s message appears to continue a public-relations tussle between Boeing, which has been angling to start some MAX deliveries by late December, and FAA leaders, who have increasingly been stressing that they don’t have a specific timeline and won’t sacrifice safety to speed up the process. Even if Boeing receives the FAA’s signoff on software fixes to flight-control computers and begins a trickle of MAX deliveries in December, it is expected to take additional weeks for the FAA and foreign regulators to complete associated changes in pilot training. Boeing vs. Airbus: The Aviation Industry’s Swinging Power Balance YOU MAY ALSO LIKE UP NEXT 0:00 / 6:22 Boeing vs. Airbus: The Aviation Industry’s Swinging Power Balance As Airbus is set to overtake Boeing to become the world’s largest plane maker by deliveries, WSJ explains how two jetliners—the 737 MAX and the A320neo—ended up at the center of the biggest rivalry in the aviation world. Photo illustration: Jaden Urbi But the language in the letter, signed by John Piccola, head of the FAA’s Boeing oversight office, and sent to Elizabeth Pasztor, a senior company compliance official, raises doubts about Boeing’s overall safety practices and safeguards. The letter extends the revised delivery procedures to newly manufactured MAX aircraft, an area that hasn’t received stepped-up public scrutiny in the past. According to the letter, the FAA made the decision because the current backlog of some 600 MAX jets in storage around the globe poses challenges that “significantly exceed any that the Boeing system has previously experienced.” Boeing will need to vet the planes it has stored, as well as assisting airlines to prepare planes that have been sitting idle for eight months to resume commercial service. In addition, the letter said that, going forward, the FAA will have sole authority “to issue airworthiness certificates and export certificates” for all 737 MAX models. Without such paperwork, airlines typically won’t pay Boeing for delivering jets. “At a minimum,” the letter indicates, the agency won’t return authority for such pre-delivery approvals to Boeing until the company’s “737 MAX compliance, design and production processes meet all regulatory standards” to ensure public safety. Airlines have been anxious for Boeing to resume delivery of the MAX jets. The carriers have to follow a series of steps to prepare their aircraft to carry passengers, and some had been hoping to avoid bottlenecks and long waits as customers clamor to receive their MAX jets once the plane is cleared for service. Southwest Airlines Co. , American Airlines Group Inc. and United Airlines Holdings Inc.have cleared the MAX from their schedules through early March. A spokesman for American said the airline is working closely with the FAA and Boeing and awaiting guidance from the agency. “The FAA controls this process,” he said. A spokeswoman for Southwest said the FAA’s latest strategy doesn’t change the airline’s planning for return to service. A representative for United declined to comment. Boeing’s earlier proposals to start delivering MAX jets by the end of the year prompted pushback from within the FAA. Ali Bahrami, the agency’s top safety official, wrote a note to Administrator Steve Dickson earlier this month, saying that reports of Boeing’s plans “have resulted in concerns” among safety professionals. “I would like to send a strong message to the 737 Max team to reassure them that safety, not Boeing’s schedule, is our top priority,” Mr. Bahrami wrote. In a memo and in a video message, Mr. Dickson reassured employees that the FAA “fully controls” the approval process and told them to make safety—not Boeing’s schedule—the priority. “I know there’s a lot of pressure to return this aircraft to service quickly,” he said. “I want you to know that I want you to take the time you need and focus solely on safety. I’ve got your back.” The setback for Boeing comes as regulators from the U.S., Canada and other countries appear to be moving closer together on eventual training requirements for MAX pilots. Barring some unexpected changes, the FAA seems headed toward allowing U.S. carriers to put their jets back into service using only computer-based training for crews—without mandating any time in ground-based simulators. But afterward, according to industry and government officials, the FAA may require extra simulator time for MAX pilots in the U.S. as part of their normal recurrent training. Similarly, some of these officials said, regulators in Canada and elsewhere are leaning toward the same sequence, including additional simulator time to practice unusual flight upsets. European regulators, seeking to impose their own requirements without creating major disruptions in pilot training, also could embrace such steps as part of a compromise to start the MAX flying passengers again, according to industry officials on both sides of the Atlantic. Write to Andy Pasztor at andy.pasztor@wsj.com and Alison Sider at alison.sider@wsj.com https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-faces-new-obstacle-in-returning-737-max-jets-to-service-11574822775

This is a sticker on my (now retired) tool box I just took... Not the first time this kind of scenario has occurred. ?

That’s a gorgeous airplane!

As the long time super fan of WestJet that you’ve always been, I’ll pass on your concerns to HQ. We’ll have that pulled pronto!

Resurgent Boeing 737 MAX could trigger jet surplus, analyst warns Tim Hepher, Anshuman Daga 4 MIN READ HONG KONG (Reuters) - Airlines struggling to cope with the grounding of the 737 MAX could face a markedly different problem when Boeing Co’s (BA.N) best-selling jet is cleared to re-enter service: a switch to concerns about aircraft oversupply, carriers have been warned The U.S. planemaker has continued to produce the jet since it was grounded in March after two fatal accidents, and is expected to speed deliveries by 40%, to 70 units a month, when its factory doors reopen, in a bid to clear the backlog. Rob Morris, global head of consultancy at UK-based Ascend by Cirium, said the combination of any rapid rebound in deliveries, economic worries and an accumulation of market pressures dating back before the crashes could make it hard to absorb the jets. “Next year is the challenge. When the dam breaks and the MAX starts to flow, there are going to be a lot of aircraft,” Morris told financiers at a Hong Kong briefing late on Monday. “There could potentially be as many as 1,000 surplus aircraft next year.” The forecast is based on both a rebound in MAX deliveries and a potential glut of second-hand airplanes flooding back onto the market after standing in for the MAX during the grounding. The crisis has rekindled demand for older and less efficient jets, with airlines using more than 800 planes that are more than 15 years old, compared to conditions four years ago, Morris told the Airline Economics Growth Frontiers conference on Tuesday. TWO-YEAR LOGJAM Until now, most concern has focused on whether regulators would permit an orderly return to service by avoiding gaps in approvals by different countries. But Morris, who has warned a long up-cycle in aviation is nearly over, said there were also risks in opening floodgates too quickly, overwhelming fragile growth in travel demand. Still, he and other delegates at back-to-back aviation finance gatherings in Hong Kong agreed it would take Boeing 18 months or longer to deliver all the stranded aircraft. The operation will be one of the industry’s biggest ever logistical challenges and any glitches or delays could further brake supply. “Getting all those aircraft, that are currently parked, off the ground could take two years,” John Plueger, chief executive of Air Lease Corp (AL.N), told Reuters, adding he did not see fundamental changes as a result of the MAX’s return. “It is not as if all these MAX could be delivered over a one-, two- or three-month period ... so it is not an open floodgate and 350 planes all coming onto the market tomorrow,” he said on the sidelines of last week’s Airfinance Journal Asia Pacific conference. Boeing aims to return the 737 MAX to service in the United States by the end of 2019, after making software changes in the wake of the crashes, which killed 346 people. Europe’s top regulator said on Monday the airliner is likely to return to service in Europe in the first quarter of 2020. ADVERTISEMENT Analysts say more than 300 MAX aircraft have been produced since March, when commercial flights were banned and deliveries frozen. This could rise to 400 by the time it resumes service. Boeing is additionally expected to deliver close to 600 jets straight from the production line next year. It has indicated it plans to deliver up to 70 jets a month, equal to a previous record. Of this, analysts say around 20 are expected to be drawn from inventory parked at its factories and the rest newly built. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-737max-supply/resurgent-boeing-737-max-could-trigger-jet-surplus-analyst-warns-idUSKBN1XE21P

I think this might be more than a shot-across-the-bow for both carriers. WJ has a somewhat aging 737-600 and -700 fleet that will need to be replaced in much the same way that Air Canada has a lot of older A319 and A320's. I can see one or both Goeing (you see what I did there?) to Airbus for their narrow-body requirements. I can't really see it for the wide-bodies though, AC has a fairly new fleet of 777's and a very new fleet of 787's and WJ has invested a lot into getting their initial 787 ops up and going. The wildcard for WJ could be the new owners who also have a leasing company with over 500 aircraft already. I can't think of a case where a company of Boeing's size has ever had this much self inflicted damage.

No doubt about that. WJ was supposed to have 16 in the fleet by now and AC at least 30. I'm thinking there's another shoe to drop soon, I have no inside information but I think one or both carriers will announce some sort of "adjustment" in their Max orders...

What's Canada bitchin' about? Our CF-18's are barely 30 years old! RAF Tornado flypast marks active service retirement 19 February 2019 Crowds have gathered to watch the last official flights of the RAF Tornado. The aircraft will be flown over many of the country's RAF bases in a series of flypasts before leaving active service at the end of March. Tornados first took to the skies in 1979, seeing action in several conflicts, and were first used in live operations during the Gulf War in 1991. Hundreds of people turned out to watch the first leg of the aircraft's final farewell. After leaving its home base of RAF Marham in Norfolk, the aircraft was seen over Rutland, the West Midlands, North Wales, Lincolnshire and Yorkshire. Although no longer to be used in active service, they will still be flown as part of air force training. "As the Tornados have retired from frontline flying service, we at RAF Cosford have started to take them in because we can use them for engineering in years going forward," Sqn Ldr Chris Wilson explained from the base, which was among points visited on Tuesday. "Although they won't fly with the air force going forward, they will continue giving excellent service on the ground for many years to come." https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-47291557?fbclid=IwAR3XXC22dCihdV19os02jmn8PDf5vWZ99l-f1wmlLG7P1rZ994hQYBPcrcU

Airbus open to a fighter plane assembly plant in Quebec ahead of federal bids The Canadian Press Published: Jan 14 at 5:34 a.m. Updated: Jan 14 at 6:50 p.m. MIRABEL, Que. — Airbus is not ruling out the possibility that Quebec will host a fighter plane assembly line and satellite construction plant if the European giant manages to win federal contracts in Canada. Simon Jacques, head of Canadian operations for the multinational, mentioned the possibility Monday at a company event in Mirabel, an off-island Montreal suburb, where it manufactures A220 jetliners, previously known as the Bombardier C Series. A call for tenders for 88 new fighter planes is expected from Ottawa before the start of the 2019 election campaign in a bid to replace the government’s aging CF-18s. Airbus makes the Eurofighter Typhoon. "Absolutely," Jacques said, when asked if the assembly line could be in Quebec. “We’re evaluating our options." Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Saab are all in the running alongside Airbus for the federal contract. Jacques said the construction of a new assembly line, which would create numerous jobs, would not pose a logistical challenge given the extra space at the Mirabel plant. He stressed the need for a "Canadian solution,” given that the call for tenders would include local content requirements. In 2016 Airbus landed its first major contract with Ottawa, which ordered 16 search and rescue aircraft under a $2.4-billion agreement, on top of a pledge for $2.3 billion in maintenance and after-sales service for 20 years. The first vehicle must be delivered by the end of 2019. The CF-18s put into service in the 1980s were set to be phased out by 2020, but their replacement has turned into a drawn-out saga. Six years ago, the Harper government abandoned its controversial plans to purchase untendered F-35 fighter jets to take the place of the aging fleet. The Trudeau government, which had subsequently decided to buy 18 Super Hornet aircraft from Boeing — also without a tender — cancelled that purchase in 2017 in the wake of a commercial dispute between Boeing and Bombardier over the C Series. According to Jacques, Canada is "really committed" to "stimulating competition," which may open a door to a manufacturer other than the U.S.-based Boeing. "I think it's important for Canada to have a different fleet from what is in the United States [with Boeing]," he said, calling the prospect “a good thing for NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command].” Jacques suggested Canada could learn from the United Kingdom, which counts counts Airbus and Lockheed Martin aircraft among its fighter fleet. Airbus executives also said the Netherlands-based company may turn to Quebec for satellite construction if its proposal is accepted up by Telesat Canada, a satellite operator. The company had solicited offers from Airbus and the France-based Thales Group as part of an Internet service project tied to the launch of "between 300 and 500 satellites,” Jacques said. "This would change the situation in Quebec," he said, adding that the project would create about 200 new jobs. Airbus said it is having ongoing discussions with various levels of government, including Quebec and Ottawa, to set up shop in the province if the multinational wins the contract. Julien Arsenault, The Canadian Press https://www.thechronicleherald.ca/business/airbus-open-to-a-fighter-plane-assembly-plant-in-quebec-ahead-of-federal-bids-275720/

Eurofighter Typhoon to bid to replace Canadian CF-18 fleet 14 January, 2019 SOURCE: FlightGlobal.com BY: Garrett Reim Los Angeles Eurofighter intends to pitch its Typhoon aircraft to replace the Royal Canadian Air Force’s fleet of Boeing CF-18A/B Hornet fighters. Eurofighter, a joint venture among Airbus, BAE Systems and Leonardo, was assumed to be one of the bidders in the competition to replace the RCAF’s fighter fleet with 88 advanced jets, but it hadn’t yet publicly acknowledged its desire to play for the contract. Simon Jacques, head of Airbus defense and space in Canada, said at a company event in Montreal that his firm intends to submit a proposal for the Typhoon. “We are very engaged,” he says. “We want to propose the Typhoon, the most advanced new generation multi, swing-role fighter on the market today." Italian Air Force Eurofighter Typhoon Italian Air Force In October, RCAF issued a draft request for proposal to replace its aging CF-18A/B fleet. Ottawa listed five suppliers eligible to compete: Dassault Aviation, maker of the Rafale; Saab, maker of the JAS 39 Gripen; Airbus Defense – on behalf of the Eurofighter joint venture, maker of the Typhoon; Lockheed Martin, maker of the F-16 and F-35; and Boeing, maker of the F/A-18 Super Hornet and F-15E Strike Eagle. Only those five will be allowed to submit proposals. The RCAF plans to receive initial proposals from bidders between summer and winter 2019. A contract is anticipated to be awarded during the winter months of 2021-2022. Canada wants initial aircraft to be delivered in 2025, with initial operational capability achieved by 2026. The government wants all aircraft delivered by 2031 or 2032, at which time the CF-18 fleet will be retired. Jacques says the Eurofighter bid will include some sort of participation from Canadian manufacturers, though the type of involvement in the aircraft’s supply chain or extent was not specified. "With our Canadian partners, it is going to be a Canadian solution and a good value for Canada," he says. "The RFP is coming out in mid of this year, right before the election." Additional reporting by Jon Hemmerdinger https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/eurofighter-typhoon-to-bid-to-replace-canadian-cf-18-455004/?fbclid=IwAR0sR-CFPW6_cBAQOO3R9CcWBDGK3zjyxOEfNe3anWvMRH6xNplL6GAOHZo

RAAF Hornet sale to Canada finalised – Report written by australianaviation.com.au January 7, 2019 Three RAAF Hornets parked on the ramp at Cold Lake alongside Royal Canadian Air Force CF-18 Hornets ahead of Exercise Maple Flag 51 in 2018 (RCAF) Canadian media has reported the sale of 25 former RAAF F/A-18A/B classic Hornets to Canada has been finalised and the transfer of the aircraft will commence this year. The January 3 report in Canada’s National Post says 18 RAAF Hornets will be acquired by Canada to bolster the Royal Canadian Air Forces’ own CF-18 Hornet flying ranks, while an additional seven aircraft will be acquired for spares and testing. “The first two aircraft will be here this (northern) spring,” Canada’s assistant deputy minister for materiel, Pat Finn told Postmedia. “I would say it could be by the (northern) summer the first couple are on the flight line and painted with the maple leaf.” The report says the acquisition cost of the aircraft is C$90m (A$95m), while a total of C$500m (A$525m) has been budgeted for the acquisition which will also include spares and the fitting of unspecified “Canadian-specific equipment” and upgrades. Canada’s CF-18s are of a similar configuration to those of the RAAF, having undergone an extensive upgrade in the late 1990s and early 2000s to a configuration similar to that of Australia’s multi-phased AIR 5375 Hornet Upgrade Program (HUG). Canadian CF-18s are fitted with a spotlight on the forward port fuselage, and there are minor differences in the weapons carried and in operational flight program software. Canada’s Trudeau Liberal government froze the country’s planned acquisition of about 90 F-35As when it came to power in late 2014, and instead looked to acquire 18 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets as an interim capability while it conducted a competitive evaluation for a permanent fighter replacement. Canada remains a JSF partner nation pending the outcome of the evaluation. But the Super Hornet acquisition was cancelled in 2017 in response to a complaint by Boeing to the US Commerce Department over what it said were unfair Canadian Government subsidies of commercial manufacturer Bombardier’s new C Series airliner (now the Airbus A220). Boeing’s complaint was subsequently dismissed by the US federal trade tribunal in early 2018, while the C Series line was sold to Airbus. In November 2018 a Canadian Auditor General report found that the purchase of the RAAF aircraft would not fix what it said was a declining combat capability and an overall shortage of pilots and support personnel. “The Australian F/A-18s will need modifications and upgrades to allow them to fly until 2032,” the report reads. “These modifications will bring the F/A-18s to the same level as the CF-18s but will not improve the CF-18’s combat capability.” “In our opinion, purchasing interim aircraft does not bring National Defence closer to consistently meeting the new operational requirement introduced in 2016.” In the meantime, Canada plans to complete its competitive evaluation in 2020, with the first of 80 new fighter aircraft scheduled to enter service in 2025. The current contenders include the F-35, the Super Hornet, the Saab JAS-39E/F Gripen, and the Eurofighter Typhoon. Dassault withdrew its Rafale fighter from the evaluation in late 2018 over reports it could not meet Canada’s strict industry offset requirements. A RCAF CF-18 over Alberta. (RCAF) http://australianaviation.com.au/2019/01/raaf-hornet-sale-to-canada-finalised-report/?fbclid=IwAR0fk9ws04Bq867zgl52yolOgLGkYeZyF6jclhA3V6o6GY7MfVHgglNRGLE

NP View: The Liberals promised new fighter jets. They delivered utter lunacy instead Incompetence is now layered atop mismanagement to such an extent that it's almost breathtaking to behold Tories call on feds to cancel purchase of rusty fighter jets...2:29 National Post View November 23, 2018 5:43 PM EST Filed under Canada is a country blessed — or, make that cursed — with a long history of utterly catastrophic military procurement failures. The multi-decade Sea King helicopter replacement escapade springs immediately to mind (and it will endure for at least a few weeks longer before the last Sea King is retired). As does the disastrous purchase of rusted-out British submarines to replace Canada’s elderly sub-surface fleet; only in recent years has that 1990s-era procurement actually begun producing functioning warships. The pathetic end of service for our last two supply ships, retired without replacement because they were simply unsafe to operate any longer at their advanced age, must surely also make the list. But even against that history of spectacular disgrace, the Liberal government’s handling of the Royal Canadian Air Force’s CF-18 fighter jet replacement still stands out as an especially shameful display. Although it’s too soon to say for certain, future historians may well come to regard this slow-motion train wreck as the defining Canadian military procurement embarrassment. It’s a bold claim, but the signs are pointing in that direction. Incompetence is now layered atop mismanagement to such an extent that it’s almost breathtaking to behold. The core problem is easy enough to grasp: Canada’s fleet of CF-18 jets is approaching 40 years of age, double its intended service life. The basic design is a few years older than that. The jets have been well maintained and periodically upgraded, and remain effective weapons. But there is only so much life that can be squeezed from such a high-performance machine before it simply becomes dangerous to expect any more from them. There is a real risk that they could actually start falling apart, even in mid-air, if pushed much longer and harder than they have been already. The only solution is new jets, and those jets will cost a lot of money, something no Canadian politician has much appetite for. But there is no way around this. And considering the long delivery time for such aircraft, the clock is very much ticking. A photo taken out the window of a Canadian Forces CC-150 Polaris tanker shows a CF-18 Hornet fighter jet being refuelled in the air over Vancouver on Feb. 18, 2010. Master Corporal Andrew Collins, 14 Wing Imaging As it has been for years. Part of this debacle is bipartisan: the urgency of replacing the CF-18s was as clear to the Harper Tories during their tenure as it is today. They didn’t get the job done, and that’s to their shame. But that failure has now been compounded and outdone by astonishing levels of Liberal government mismanagement. This is a crisis. The Liberal failures stemmed from their absurd campaign promise during the 2015 election to proceed with a fighter replacement process that was fair and transparent, but which also excluded the Conservatives’ preferred Lockheed Martin F-35, an advanced American stealth jet now entering service with several allied nations. It was instantly obvious that the Liberal proposal was inherently contradictory: you can’t hold a fair competition while excluding a clear front-runner. Trapped from the outset, the Liberals have been trying to find a way out ever since. A Royal Canadian Armed Forces CF-18 Hornet fighter jet pilot walks down the flight line in Kuwait after a combat mission over Iraq on Oct. 30, 2014. A report by auditor general Michael Ferguson says the RCAF no longer has enough pilots or ground technicians to keep its existing fleet of CF-18s in the sky. Canadian Forces Combat Camera They been forced to concoct an irrational fiction to provide themselves political cover: they claim that the CF-18 jet fleet has dwindled in number to such an extent that Canada can no longer meet its dual primary obligations: to North American defence in partnership with the United States, via Norad, and our obligations to assist our NATO allies abroad. It’s true that the fleet is too small, but that’s all the more reason to replace it, all of it, without further delay. Since the Liberals can’t do that thanks to their own silly promise, they’re trying to delay making that decision by spending billions not only to keep the CF-18s flying longer, but also by buying used Boeing F-18s from Australia, a similar model. This, the Liberals say, will add some bulk back to the Royal Canadian Air Force’s squadrons. (Left unmentioned is the reason the Australians can part with their F-18s: because they’ve been able to procure replacements for them — something we’ve proven incapable of.) So, Canada will spend billions to augment a fleet that is already becoming obsolete, to avoid spending billions on replacing that augmented fleet just a few years later. And all of this misspending just to get the Liberals out of a political pickle of their own making. The government is manifestly putting its own partisan interests ahead of the national interest and the safety of our pilots. They’re barely even trying to hide it. But as if the above wasn’t bonkers enough, a report by auditor general Michael Ferguson this week revealed that, due to chronic underfunding and mismanagement, the RCAF no longer has enough pilots or ground technicians to keep our existing fleet of CF-18s in the sky. Our fleet is too small to meet Canada’s needs and yet we cannot even properly use the small fleet we have for want of pilots and technicians. And the Liberals want to spend billions of precious defence dollars adding yet additional planes to a fleet that’s already beyond our ability to fly and maintain. But wait. There’s more. To add one final ridiculous insult to this farcical injury, since the Australian hand-me-downs will require work to get into service with Canadian squadrons, by adding new jets to the fleet, the technician and pilot shortage will actually be made worse than it already is. That work requires Canadian pilots and technicians, of whom there are already too few. The government does not have the ability to train more pilots and technicians in a timely manner without further cannibalizing our scant resources. . Gary Clement/National Post What can possibly be said of this utter fiasco? What could be more damning, more embarrassing for Canada and its government, than these uncontested facts above? Rhetorical flourishes here cannot hope to match the impact of the sobering reality. Our air arm has been allowed to wither to the point where it’s going to be almost impossible to rebuild it. We can’t buy new planes, we can’t sustain the ones we have and we can’t absorb the used Australian planes, or train the staff that would make that possible. The only thing we do have, arguably, is a new humiliation in Canadian military procurement history — the one thing Canadian forces already had in abundance. John Ivison: Auditor General shoots down federal government’s fighter jet follies NP View: Permanent Mideast peace isn’t possible with Hamas NP View: An out-of-this-world offer that Canada shouldn’t refuse NP View: On Nov. 11th we remember their sacrifice. If only we remembered every day A Canadian CF-18 Hornet manoeuvres over Lithuania during a NATO operation on Sept. 15, 2014. Cpl Gabrielle DesRochers 0 Comments Share your thoughts https://nationalpost.com/opinion/np-view-the-liberals-promised-new-fighter-jets-they-delivered-utter-lunacy-instead?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook&fbclid=IwAR3Aw7uXWfd3_CCa7LHUiS69zYv5uHydd9Vrs-MC3AdKw03mM11U3gT8kmU#Echobox=1543156960

Airbus Delivers Latest Standard Eurofighter to Spanish Air Force (Source: Airbus Defence and Space; issued Jan 23, 2018) Airbus has delivered to the Spain the first two Eurofighter Typhoons built to the latest P1Eb FW configuration. Their enhanced air-to-surface capabilities will be retrofitted to all Eurofighters in service with the four partner nations. (Airbus photo) MADRID --- Airbus Defence and Space has delivered to the Spanish Air Force the first two Eurofighter Typhoons to be produced in the latest configuration with enhanced air-to-surface capabilities. The aircraft were manufactured at the Getafe Final Assembly Line in the P1Eb FW (Phase 1 Enhanced Further Work) configuration which marks a key step in the overall Eurofighter evolution plan. This same configuration is being retrofitted to in-service aircraft by other Eurofighter nations. It provides increased integration of a variety of air-to-surface weapons and enhanced targeting among other improvements. Spanish procurement agency DGAM took delivery of the aircraft on 22 December and they were subsequently ferried to Albacete air force base to enter service. The remaining six of the 73 aircraft currently contracted by Spain will be delivered to the same P1Eb FW standard during 2018 and 2019. Airbus Operating Officer, Military Aircraft, Alberto Gutierrez said: “The smooth introduction of these enhanced features is a vital element of Eurofighter’s evolution. It is a big tribute to the Airbus and Spanish customer teams that they achieved this on-time through effective collaboration and clearly demonstrates the rich manufacturing capability here at Getafe.” DGAM Head of Aeronautical Systems Gen Léon Antonio Machés said: “The entry into service of these aircraft is the outcome of strong collaborative activity between our personnel and those of Airbus. It is an excellent illustration of the technical expertise that will support many more years of Eurofighter industrial activity in Spain.” Airbus is a global leader in aeronautics, space and related services. In 2016, it generated revenues of € 67 billion and employed a workforce of around 134,000. Airbus offers the most comprehensive range of passenger airliners from 100 to more than 600 seats. Airbus is also a European leader providing tanker, combat, transport and mission aircraft, and is one of the world’s leading space companies. In helicopters, Airbus provides the most efficient civil and military rotorcraft solutions worldwide. Eurofighter Typhoon is the most advanced swing-role combat aircraft currently available on the world market. Eight customers (Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Austria, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait) have already ordered the Eurofighter Typhoon. With 623 aircraft ordered, Eurofighter Typhoon is currently the largest military procurement programme in Europe. Its high technology strengthens the position of European aerospace industry in the international market. The programme secures more than 100,000 jobs in 400 companies. Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH manages the programme on behalf of the Eurofighter Partner Companies, Airbus Defence and Space in Germany and Spain, BAE Systems in the UK and Leonardo in Italy, which are the most important aviation and aerospace companies in Europe. http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/190122/airbus-delivers-latest_standard-eurofighter-to-spain.html

This turd continues to stink. Broken F-35 Parts Take Six Months To Fix, GAO Finds Oct 30, 2017 Lara Seligman | Aerospace Daily & Defense Report Comments 4 An F-35 Lightning II from Hill Air Force Base, Utah, takes off from the Gowen Field runway Oct. 16, 2017, in Boise, Idaho. USAF If a part on one of the U.S. military’s growing fleet of 250 F-35s fails, it takes about six months for the depots to repair it—twice the program’s objective, a key government watchdog has found. The Pentagon does not have enough capacity to repair F-35 parts in a timely manner because the establishment of repair capabilities at the military depots is six years behind schedule, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) writes in a recent report on the controversial fighter. These capabilities were planned to be completed by 2016, but some have now been delayed until 2022, according to the watchdog. Neither the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) nor the military services would take responsibility for the delay, GAO says. Program officials attributed it to the services not providing enough funding for depot requirements, but service officials pointed fingers at the JPO, saying the program office did not clearly identify some depot requirements soon enough for the services to provide adequate funding. In addition, GAO found that a shortage of spare parts in the F-35 supply chain is leading to low readiness levels. From January through August 7, 2017, prime contractor Lockheed Martin reported that F-35s were unable to fly because they were awaiting parts on average about 22% of the time—more than double the Pentagon’s objective of 10%, according to the report. The program office and Lockheed have identified steps needed to increase the availability of spare parts, GAO writes. Still, parts shortages are expected to continue for several years to come and may worsen if the JPO and Lockheed don’t follow through. GAO reported the striking repair limitations and parts shortages as part of a wide-ranging report on F-35 sustainment challenges, even as the Pentagon plans to triple the size of the fleet by the end of 2021. “DOD is taking steps to address some challenges, but without more comprehensive plans and aligned funding, DOD risks being unable to fully leverage the F-35’s capabilities and sustain a rapidly expanding fleet,” GAO writes. The report also notes that initial Marine Corps F-35 deployments on ships in 2018, and potentially initial Navy deployments, will not include the intermediate-level maintenance capabilities that will allow repairs to be done at sea. This likely will lead to degraded readiness, GAO concludes. Meanwhile, GAO also reports delays in planned updates to the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS), the logistics backbone of the fleet that is central to supporting operations and maintenance. These sustainment challenges are leading to lower-than-expected aircraft availability and full-mission-capable rates across the fleet, GAO notes. The F-35 already is the Pentagon’s most costly weapon system, with sustainment costs alone estimated at $1.12 trillion over 60 years, according to GAO. “Without revising sustainment plans to include the key requirements and decision points needed to fully implement the F-35 sustainment strategy, and without aligned funding plans to meet those requirements, DOD is at risk of being unable to leverage the capabilities of the aircraft it has recently purchased,” GAO says. JPO spokesman Joe DellaVedova acknowledged that the report is “factually accurate,” but said due to its origination date it does not account for the work the F-35 sustainment team has done over the past few months to accelerate depot capability and capacity, implement solutions to increase spare parts and reduce overall sustainment costs. GAO conducted the performance audit from October 2016 to October 2017, according to the report. The JPO pointed to several initiatives it has undertaken to improve F-35 logistics and sustainment, including a disciplined reliability and maintainability program, improved maintenance procedures and manuals, continued improvement in ALIS, better forecasting of spares requirements, improved repair turnaround times from suppliers and incorporation of aircraft design improvements. These efforts are having a positive effect, but “at a slower rate than desired,” according to the JPO. Additional actions include: • In fiscal 2017, the JPO moved forward with accelerating depot capability by executing $114 million to fast-track the standup of depots. • In fiscal 2017, the JPO invested $3.4 million in Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) improvement projects, with 28 projects in work to reduce the top maintenance cost drivers. • In fiscal 2017, the JPO spent $1.4 billion to increase spare part purchases, build up repair capacity and improve the speed of repairs. • To increase F-35 intermediate-level maintenance capabilities for shipboard deployments, the JPO has identified select avionics and support equipment for repair and is working with the services to resource requirements. • The JPO has developed a five-year ALIS technical roadmap to address future requirements. • The JPO has jointly developed a Lifecycle Affordability Board with Lockheed Martin Aeronautics and Pratt & Whitney to provide a single location for experts in manufacturing, supply chain management, cost estimating, and acquisition to work jointly on driving down operation and support (O&S) costs. “The F-35 Joint Program Office is moving out on all fronts to accelerate depot capability and capacity; implement solutions to increase spare parts and reduce overall sustainment costs,” DellaVedova said. “We remain focused and fully committed to developing, delivering and sustaining this next-generation stealth fighter for the warfighters.” http://aviationweek.com/defense/broken-f-35-parts-take-six-months-fix-gao-finds?NL=AW-05&Issue=AW-05_20171101_AW-05_821&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_1&utm_rid=CPEN1000002544843&utm_campaign=12361&utm_medium=email&elq2=0b3d623ade264d2a82c5d11d5e1dcd4a

What Went Wrong with the F-35, Lockheed Martin's Joint Strike Fighter? The F-35 was billed as a fighter jet that could do almost everything the U.S. military desired but has turned out to be one of the greatest boondoggles in recent military purchasing history By Michael P. Hughes, The Conversation US on June 14, 2017 Lockheed Martin F-35A. Credit: Erik Simonsen Getty Images The following essay is reprinted with permission from The Conversation, an online publication covering the latest research. The F-35 was billed as a fighter jet that could do almost everything the U.S. military desired, serving the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy – and even Britain’s Royal Air Force and Royal Navy – all in one aircraft design. It’s supposed to replace and improve upon several current – and aging – aircraft types with widely different missions. It’s marketed as a cost-effective, powerful multi-role fighter airplane significantly better than anything potential adversaries could build in the next two decades. But it’s turned out to be none of those things. Officially begun in 2001, with roots extending back to the late 1980s, the F-35 program is nearly a decade behind schedule, and has failed to meet many of its original design requirements. It’s also become the most expensive defense program in world history, at around US$1.5 trillion before the fighter is phased out in 2070. The unit cost per airplane, above $100 million, is roughly twice what was promised early on. Even after President Trump lambasted the cost of the program in February, the price per plane dropped just $7 million – less than 7 percent. And yet, the U.S. is still throwing huge sums of money at the project. Essentially, the Pentagon has declared the F-35 “too big to fail.” As a retired member of the U.S. Air Force and current university professor of finance who has been involved in and studied military aviation and acquisitions, I find the F-35 to be one of the greatest boondoggles in recent military purchasing history. Forget what’s already spent The Pentagon is trying to argue that just because taxpayers have flushed more than $100 billion down the proverbial toilet so far, we must continue to throw billions more down that same toilet. That violates the most elementary financial principles of capital budgeting, which is the method companies and governments use to decide on investments. So-called sunk costs, the money already paid on a project, should never be a factor in investment decisions. Rather, spending should be based on how it will add value in the future. Keeping the F-35 program alive is not only a gross waste in itself: Its funding could be spent on defense programs that are really useful and needed for national defense, such as anti-drone systems to defend U.S. troops. Part of the enormous cost has come as a result of an effort to share aircraft design and replacement parts across different branches of the military. In 2013, a study by the RAND Corporation found that it would have been cheaper if the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy had simply designed and developed separate and more specialized aircraft to meet their specific operational requirements. Not living up to top billing The company building the F-35 has made grand claims. Lockheed Martin said the plane would be far better than current aircraft – “four times more effective” in air-to-air combat, “eight times more effective” in air-to-ground combat and “three times more effective” in recognizing and suppressing an enemy’s air defenses. It would, in fact, be “second only to the F-22 in air superiority.” In addition, the F-35 was to have better range and require less logistics support than current military aircraft. The Pentagon is still calling the F-35 “the most affordable, lethal, supportable, and survivable aircraft ever to be used.” But that’s not how the plane has turned out. In January 2015, mock combat testing pitted the F-35 against an F-16, one of the fighters it is slated to replace. The F-35A was flown “clean” with empty weapon bays and without any drag-inducing and heavy externally mounted weapons or fuel tanks. The F-16D, a heavier and somewhat less capable training version of the mainstay F-16C, was further encumbered with two 370-gallon external wing-mounted fuel tanks. In spite of its significant advantages, the F-35A’s test pilot noted that the F-35A was less maneuverable and markedly inferior to the F-16D in a visual-range dogfight. Stealth over power One key reason the F-35 doesn’t possess the world-beating air-to-air prowess promised, and is likely not even adequate when compared with its current potential adversaries, is that it was designed first and foremost to be a stealthy airplane. This requirement has taken precedence over maneuverability, and likely above its overall air-to-air lethality. The Pentagon and especially the Air Force seem to be relying almost exclusively on the F-35’s stealth capabilities to succeed at its missions. Like the F-117 and F-22, the F-35’s stealth capability greatly reduces, but does not eliminate, its radar cross-section, the signal that radar receivers see bouncing back off an airplane. The plane looks smaller on radar – perhaps like a bird rather than a plane – but is not invisible. The F-35 is designed to be stealthy primarily in the X-band, the radar frequency range most commonly used for targeting in air-to-air combat. In other radar frequencies, the F-35 is not so stealthy, making it vulnerable to being tracked and shot down using current – and even obsolete – weapons. As far back as 1999 the same type of stealth technology was not able to prevent a U.S. Air Force F-117 flying over Kosovo from being located, tracked and shot down using an out-of-date Soviet radar and surface-to-air missile system. In the nearly two decades since, that incident has been studied in depth not only by the U.S., but also by potential adversaries seeking weaknesses in passive radar stealth aircraft. Of course, radar is not the only way to locate and target an aircraft. One can also use an aircraft’s infrared emissions, which are created by friction-generated heat as it flies through the air, along with its hot engines. Several nations, particularly the Russians, have excellent passive infrared search and tracking systems, that can locate and target enemy aircraft with great precision – sometimes using lasers to measure exact distances, but without needing radar. It’s also very common in air-to-air battles for opposing planes to come close enough that their pilots can see each other. The F-35 is as visible as any other aircraft its size. Analysts weigh in Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon say the F-35’s superiority over its rivals lies in its ability to remain undetected, giving it “first look, first shot, first kill.” Hugh Harkins, a highly respected author on military combat aircraft, called that claim “a marketing and publicity gimmick” in his book on Russia’s Sukhoi Su-35S, a potential opponent of the F-35. He also wrote, “In real terms an aircraft in the class of the F-35 cannot compete with the Su-35S for out and out performance such as speed, climb, altitude, and maneuverability.” Other critics have been even harsher. Pierre Sprey, a cofounding member of the so-called “fighter mafia” at the Pentagon and a co-designer of the F-16, calls the F-35 an “inherently a terrible airplane” that is the product of “an exceptionally dumb piece of Air Force PR spin.” He has said the F-35 would likely lose a close-in combat encounter to a well-flown MiG-21, a 1950s Soviet fighter design. Robert Dorr, an Air Force veteran, career diplomat and military air combat historian, wrote in his book “Air Power Abandoned,” “The F-35 demonstrates repeatedly that it can’t live up to promises made for it. … It’s that bad.” How did we get here? How did the F-35 go from its conception as the most technologically advanced, do-it-all military aircraft in the world to a virtual turkey? Over the decades-long effort to meet a real military need for better aircraft, the F-35 program is the result of the merging or combination of several other separate and diverse projects into a set of requirements for an airplane that is trying to be everything to everybody. In combat the difference between winning and losing is often not very great. With second place all too often meaning death, the Pentagon seeks to provide warriors with the best possible equipment. The best tools are those that are tailor-made to address specific missions and types of combat. Seeking to accomplish more tasks with less money, defense planners looked for ways to economize. For a fighter airplane, funding decisions become a balancing act of procuring not just the best aircraft possible, but enough of them to make an effective force. This has lead to the creation of so-called “multi-role” fighter aircraft, capable both in air-to-air combat and against ground targets. Where trade-offs have to happen, designers of most multi-role fighters emphasize aerial combat strength, reducing air-to-ground capabilities. With the F-35, it appears designers created an airplane that doesn’t do either mission exceptionally well. They have made the plane an inelegant jack-of-all-trades, but master of none – at great expense, both in the past and, apparently, well into the future. I believe the F-35 program should be immediately cancelled; the technologies and systems developed for it should be used in more up-to-date and cost-effective aircraft designs. Specifically, the F-35 should be replaced with a series of new designs targeted toward the specific mission requirements of the individual branches of the armed forces, in lieu of a single aircraft design trying to be everything to everyone. This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-went-wrong-with-the-f-35-lockheed-martins-joint-strike-fighter/?WT.mc_id=SA_FB_TECH_NEWS

http://macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/MLICommentary_June2017_SurveyF_webready.pdf Quite long read so I didn't post the text. Very interesting though!

OTTAWA — Federal officials are expected to sit down with representatives from different fighter jet makers in Paris next week, as uncertainty swirls over the Trudeau government's plan to buy "interim" Super Hornets. The meetings on the sidelines of the prestigious Paris Air Show are being billed as the first step towards the eventual launch of a competition to replace Canada's aging CF-18 fleet with 88 new fighters. That is how many warplanes the Liberals' new defence policy calls for Canada to buy, an increase from the 65 previously promised by the Conservatives under Stephen Harper. The policy estimates the cost at between $15 billion and $19 billion, up from the $9 billion previously budgeted by the Tories. But while much of the attention will be on the competition, which the government says it will launch in 2019, the companies are also expected to pitch their own ability to sell Canada "interim" jets if needed. Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan on Monday said the government was still reviewing its decision to buy 18 "interim" Super Hornets from U.S. aerospace firm Boeing. The Liberals previously said they needed the Super Hornets to address a critical shortage of fighter jets, referred to as a "capability gap," until the full competition to replace the CF-18s could be run. The government said at the time that the Super Hornet was the only aircraft that met its immediate requirements, including being compatible with U.S. fighters and not in development. But that was before Boeing complained to the U.S. Commerce Department about Canadian aerospace firm Bombardier, sparking a trade dispute and threats from the Liberals to kill the Super Hornet deal. The plan to purchase an interim fighter jet has been unpopular with retired military officers and defence officials as well as analysts, who have instead called for the competition to start now rather than in 2019. A survey of 75 such experts conducted by the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and released on Tuesday found that the vast majority didn't believe there was a capability gap, and opposed the plan to buy interim jets. But a senior government official told The Canadian Press that the Liberals have no intention of backing away from their plan to buy an interim fighter — even if it means going with a different jet. Sources say the government has not actually approached any of Boeing's competitors about stepping into the breach if the Liberals decide to scrap the Super Hornet deal. But the Paris meetings offer an opportunity for U.S. defence giant Lockheed Martin, French firm Dassault, Swedish company Saab, and European consortium Eurofighter to make their best pitches on the issue. Each has indicated that it is prepared to provide interim fighter jets upon request. The government's delegation will be led by Maj.-Gen. Alain Pelletier, head of National Defence's fighter program, and Lisa Campbell, who oversees military procurement at the federal procurement department. http://www.nationalnewswatch.com/2017/06/13/feds-set-to-meet-with-fighter-jet-firms-amid-super-hornet-questions-3/#.WUBVGNy1uM- While sources say meetings with Boeing's competitors have been set up, it wasn't immediately clear whether the delegation would sit down with the Super Hornet manufacturer as well. That is despite Boeing's plan to enter the Super Hornet in the full competition to replace the CF-18s. Public Services and Procurement Canada spokesman Pierre-Alain Bujold said in an email that details of the delegation, including its schedule for the Paris Air Show, were still being finalized. "Canada is committed to fair and transparent procurement processes," Bujold added. "Supplier engagement and industry feedback are important elements of PSPC's work." The Liberals have cut off most contact with Boeing since the government threatened to cancel the planned Super Hornet purchase over of the company's spat with Bombardier last month. Boeing spokesman Scott Day said in a statement that the company continues to work closely with the U.S. Navy, through which any sale of interim Super Hornets to Canada would actually be arranged. The government also recently paid another $30 million to remain at the table as a partner in the development of the F-35, and largely backed off its promise never to buy that stealth fighter. Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press

OTTAWA – Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan has announced that the government will add $62 billion in defence spending delays over the next 10 years. The new procurement strategy titled ‘Postponed. Deferred. Delayed.’ seeks spend 70% more money on delays over the next decade to modernize the military’s setbacks. “If we want to be a significant global security player, we have to get serious about bogging down our equipment acquisition process,” the Defence Minister explained at an announcement. Tens of billions have been dedicated to 15 hypothetical surface vessels for the navy so that shipyards in Quebec, Nova Scotia, and BC may produce technologically advanced excuses on why the ships are not ready yet and why it will cost more. “We have allotted $15 billion for Boeing and Lockheed-Martin for state-of-the-art, frivolous lawsuits against our government when we select a competitor’s bid for a new fighter jet,” added Sajjan. This does not include bonus delays such as Canadian premiers complaining on how their province’s industries were left out in military contracts. “We have carefully planned for the Parliamentary Budget Office to release a report on how we underestimated the Operations and Maintenance costs moments before announcing a successful bid.” According to sources inside the Department of National Defence, the Sea King’s phase-out was pushed back to 2065. TAGS: CANADIAN ARMED FORCES, DEFENCE PROCUREMENT, DEFENCE STRATEGY, HARJIT SAJJAN https://www.thebeaverton.com/2017/06/ottawa-announces-62-billion-worth-defence-spending-delays/

Are Australians being misled over the real cost of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter A Joint Strike Fighter lands during the Avalon Airshow in March. Pic: Getty Images ROBERT GOTTLIEBSEN Business columnist Melbourne @BGottliebsen One of the world top independent defence experts has conduced an incredibly exhaustive examination of the real cost of the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) to those countries that are buying it. The expert, Paris-based Giovanni de Briganti, of Defence-Aerospace, estimates that the average unit cost of Lockheed Martin JSF in the ninth low-rate initial production run is $US206.3 million. The Australian parliament has been told by Defence Minister Marise Payne and Defence Industry Minister Christopher Pyne that the cost of our Joint Strike Fighters will be in the vicinity of $US90 million. Such a huge variation means that either Giovanni de Briganti has completely got his calculations wrong when applied to Australia, or Pyne and Payne may have misled parliament. I do not have the ability to decide which of the alternatives are correct but there is a good chance that the Pyne/Payne $90 million vicinity estimate leaves out essential costs. F-35 fighter deal doesn’t fly Giovanni de Briganti believes the aircraft’s engine is one of the costs they leave out. Let me explain what I think has happened. Defence officials for over a decade have been hoodwinking politicians on both sides by conveniently leaving out the massive expenditures required to get the JSF aircraft into service. At least in the past that has included leaving out the cost of the engine. De Briganti believes the low cost estimate covers only a partially-completed aircraft about to leave the factory and not one that is ready for action, which is the only true cost. Pyne and Payne may have fallen into the trap. The parliament needs to get to the bottom in the real cost of the JSF. De Briganti emphasises that his $US206.3 million cost includes “engines, fixes and upgrades” — as any proper cost calculation would include. A series of US defence officials have claimed that the cost of the JSF has been reduced thanks to the intervention of President Donald Trump. De Briganti disputes whether there has been a significant fall, so Trump may also have been hoodwinked. The Joint Strike Fighter. There are three different JSF aircraft, which each have slightly different cost structures. De Briganti calculates a “generic” F-35, which a notional aircraft used to compare unit costs from year to year. It is calculated on the basis of the average cost of one aircraft in each of the three versions (F-35A, F-35B and F-35C) in the same production lot. He says that a direct comparison of the aircraft costs released by the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) shows that the cost of a “generic” F-35 has actually increased by $US7.63 million over the five years, 2012 to 2017. According to de Briganti, JPO’s figures show that, of the three variants, only the F-35A saw its cost decline — a modest $3 million over those five years. Australia is buying the F-35A so at least the claim that we have had a cost reduction may be justifiable. However de Briganti is adamant that the official Joint Strike Fighter costs produced by JPO only compare airframe costs, and for reasons it has not explained exclude engine and other costs. If de Briganti is right then clearly the Australian parliament has been quoted costs for the JSF without the engine. If he is right, words fail me. De Briganti says his detailed analysis and indeed the JPO’s own figures contradict many public statements by Lockheed Martin and the F-35 Joint Program Office claiming that unit costs are dropping with each successive production lot. In December, JPO Director Lt Gen Christopher Bogdan claimed that by the time the plane enters full rate production in 2019 the price will be down to $US80-$US85 million for an F-35A, $US110 million for a F-35B, and $US96 million for an F-35C. These figures are the ones Pyne and Payne use. Unfortunately, according to de Briganti, “Lot 9” aircraft being delivered today actually cost $US206 million, on average, including their engines, fixes, retrofits and upgrades, Not (repeat NOT) anything like $US85 million. Furthermore, de Briganti says the JPO continues to award contracts for “Lot 9”, so it is likely the unit cost of “Lot 9” aircraft will continue to grow. Pyne and Payne might say we are parroting what the Americans tell us. That’s not good enough. Our parliament and the public deserves the full facts. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/opinion/robert-gottliebsen/are-australians-being-miseled-over-the-real-cost-of-the-f35-joint-strike-fighter/news-story/84959f679258706536efcfcb25439614

This might be another "Too big to fail" program. It won't be the end of them but it would certainly hurt. I'm hoping that junior just might step out and do what he said they'd do. Kill the F-35 and get a fighter we need.