Don Hudson

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Posts posted by Don Hudson

  1. Perhaps, Rich. Maybe the truth might lie this side of sensationalism as I'm not sure what's being sold - what the 'product' in terms of who directly benefits financially. "World conspiracy theories", though all the rage at the moment because they are without question designed & intended to create F.U.D., fear, uncertainty, doubt, but don't explain the phenomenon. The "abundance of caution" may be coming from the avoidance of blame . . .a genuine concern for previous patterns and responses as well as authorities in all countries managing the spread responsibly. The prospect of being trapped behind quarantine walls is another aspect as is the "management of information and perspective" by the Chinese government.

  2. 14 minutes ago, dagger said:

    It's likely that the number of infected is much higher - perhaps as many as 150,000 (mostly in China). But of those, maybe only 10% have been reported because 90% of the cases as quite mild.        

    . . . .

    Today, we have far better knowledge of these viruses, how to respond to it, even how to treat serious cases, than we did in 1918.)

    And better still than when we faced SARS in 2003. From https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5249a2.htm, December 12 2003, a CDC website discussing case definitions and numbers of infected, (("MMWR" -  Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report).

    Quote

    During the 2003 epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), CDC and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) developed surveillance criteria to identify persons with SARS. The surveillance case definition changed throughout the epidemic as understanding of the clinical, laboratory, and transmission characteristics of SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) increased (1--5). On June 26, CSTE adopted a position statement to add SARS-CoV disease to the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS). The position statement included criteria for defining a SARS case for national reporting. On November 3, CSTE issued a new interim position statement* with a revised SARS case definition. This report summarizes the new U.S. surveillance case definition for SARS and updates reported cases of SARS worldwide and in the United States.

    Summary of Changes to Case Definition

    The revised SARS case definition (Box) modifies the clinical, epidemiologic, laboratory, and case-exclusion criteria in the U.S. surveillance case definition used during the 2003 epidemic. In the clinical criteria, "early" illness replaces "asymptomatic" or "mild" illness. The epidemiologic criteria include the following new categories: 1) possible exposure to SARS-CoV and 2) likely exposure to SARS-CoV. Laboratory criteria for evidence of SARS-CoV infection reflect advances in testing technology. The case-exclusion criteria have been changed to allow for exclusion when a serum sample collected >28 days after onset of symptoms is negative for antibody to SARS-CoV.

    The revised case definition also classifies each SARS case as either a SARS report under investigation (SARS RUI) or SARS-CoV disease. SARS RUI is a sensitive, nonspecific case classification based solely on clinical or epidemiologic criteria and includes cases classified previously as probable or suspect. SARS-CoV disease is a more specific case classification based on selected clinical and epidemiologic criteria or laboratory confirmation. SARS RUIs might subsequently meet the definition for SARS-CoV disease based on results from laboratory testing (Tables 1 and 2).

    Editorial Note:

    The revised surveillance case definition for SARS reflects an improved understanding of the clinical and laboratory characteristics of SARS-CoV. The revision differentiates patients with nonspecific clinical illness or less definitive epidemiologic associations (i.e., SARS RUIs) from those with laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV infection or more definitive epidemiologic links (i.e., cases of SARS-CoV disease). Local and state health departments will monitor SARS RUIs to ensure implementation of prompt public health measures for preventing disease transmission if SARS-CoV is confirmed subsequently. Numerous SARS RUIs probably will be excluded as SARS cases as laboratory results become available during the course of illness. Surveillance data for cases meeting the SARS-CoV disease case definition will be reported to NNDSS and included in the weekly statistical summary of notifiable infectious diseases in the United States published in MMWR (Table 1. Summary of provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States).

    Reporting of cases meeting previous SARS definitions ended in late July 2003. However, case numbers continue to change as new clinical information or results of additional laboratory testing on cases reported previously become available. Updated case counts reflecting these changes are available from CDC at http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/sars/cases.htm.

     

  3. Created here because it is as much an aviation-related story as any, given the effect of SARS on our industry.

    From Melbourne, Australia:

    Australian lab first outside of China to re-create coronavirus, helping vaccine push

    Exclusive by national medical reporter Sophie Scott and the Specialist Reporting Team's Penny Timms and Loretta Florance

    Updated about 2 hours ago

    Space to play or pause, M to mute, left and right arrows to seek, up and down arrows for volume.

    In a major breakthrough in the global fight against coronavirus, scientists in Australia have developed a lab-grown version of the disease.

    Key points:

    • Australian scientists have become the world's first outside of China to recreate the coronavirus
    • The discovery will enable scientists to develop a test to identify people who might be infected, even before they show any symptoms
    • It will also help speed up work towards a vaccine for the disease, which has claimed more than 100 lives in China and infected five Australians

     

    Described as a "game changer" that will help scientists determine whether a future vaccine is effective, experts at Melbourne's Peter Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity on Tuesday became the world's first scientific lab outside of China to recreate the virus.

    They will now share it with the World Health Organisation (WHO) in Europe, which will in turn share it with labs worldwide — including one from Queensland — involved in the worldwide race to develop a vaccine.

    The team of scientists grew the virus from a patient who had been infected since Friday.

    The ABC was in the lab the moment scientists discovered they had successfully grown the virus, with Mike Catton, the co-deputy director of the Doherty Institute, confirming it with three words.

    "We got it," he said. "Fantastic."

     

    Dr Catton told the ABC the discovery was "vitally important" and would become a critical part of the tool kit to show if vaccines work, with scientists able to test any potential vaccine against a lab-grown version of the disease.

    It will also enable researchers to develop a test to identify people who might be infected with the virus, even before they show any symptoms.

    Right now in Australia, patients with initial coronavirus symptoms undergo testing in hospital, with samples sent to the Doherty Institute, the only lab in Australia that can test samples a second time and give a 100 per cent answer about whether someone is infected or not.

    But this could all change following Tuesday's discovery.

     

    Doherty Institute lead scientist Julian Druce, who was there with Dr Catton at the moment of discovery, described it as a significant development in the global understanding of the virus, and for the response to it.

    "This will be a game changer for other labs within Australia," Dr Druce said.

    Growing the virus will also help experts understand more about how coronavirus behaves.

    The Doherty Institute is the second lab in the world to recreate the disease. A lab in China was the first, but did not share its discovery with the WHO.

    However, the same lab released images of the genetic sequence of the disease, which helped scientists at the Doherty Institute recreate it.

    Dr Druce said scientists at the institute had been working hard to understand more about the illness, which has already claimed at least 106 lives in China and infected another 4,200 people worldwide.

    "It's been 10-12 hour days, 2:00am finishes; so it's been pretty full on," he said.

    "We've designed and planned for an exercise like this for many years. This is what the Doherty Institute was built for.

    "And that's really why we're able to get an answer from Friday to today [of] diagnosis, detection, sequencing, and isolation."

     

    Australia 'alert not alarmed'

    Dr Catton, who is also the pathologist supervising at The Doherty Institute, said Australian scientific facilities were well prepared to deal with outbreaks like the coronavirus.

    "This virus qualifies as a three out of four, so it's a level three virus and that's based off our understanding of SARS (sudden acute respiratory syndrome) and MERS (Middle Eastern respiratory syndrome), which are its close cousins," Dr Catton said.

    "It's dangerous, it does kill some people, but it hasn't got the lethality that viruses like Ebola do."

    But he said early diagnosis of a disease outbreak like the coronavirus was important because it gave health authorities around the world a better chance of containing its spread or, at the least, its severity.

    What is different is how much more mobile the world is, he said.

    "I'd still say we're alert but not alarmed," Dr Catton said.

    "We shared the view of national health authorities that it was likely there would be cases in Australia. That didn't happen with SARS, which is a similar virus.

    "I think it's something like 150 million visits more each year with China to countries like Australia than was true back then."

     

    At this stage, coronavirus does not have a death rate as high as SARS.

    "SARS we know had a death rate — a mortality rate — of about 10 per cent. This [coronavirus] appears to be 3 per cent; my personal opinion is it will turn out to be lower than that," Dr Catton said.

    Chief medical officer Brendan Murphy said in Australia there has been no known human-to-human transmission of the coronavirus.

    "There is no cause for concern in the Australian public, there is no human to human transmission of this virus," he said.

    "It's important to note because we had some media [ask] about masks today; there is no need for the Australian public to wear masks."

    Those who have the illness are being kept in isolation.

    All Australian-based patients are in stable conditions.

    Coronavirus Infection: Symptoms and treatment

    On this page

     

    Government of Canada

    About coronaviruses

    Coronaviruses (CoV) are a large family of viruses that cause illness ranging from the common cold to more severe diseases. Some coronaviruses transmit between animals, some between animals and people, and others from people to people.

    Symptoms of coronavirus infections

    Coronavirus infections are common and typically lead to the common cold. Gastrointestinal disease is possible for young infants. Symptoms are usually mild to moderate and can include:

    • runny nose
    • headache
    • cough
    • sore throat
    • fever
    • a general feeling of being unwell

    Although rare, other types of coronavirus infections cause illnesses such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) can produce more severe illnesses such as pneumonia, respiratory failure, kidney failure, or even death.

    If you get a coronavirus infection

    If you have cold-like symptoms, you can help protect others by doing the following:

    • stay home while sick
    • avoid close contact with others
    • cover your mouth and nose with a tissue when you cough or sneeze, then throw the tissue in the trash and wash your hands
    • clean and disinfect objects and surfaces

    How coronavirus infections are diagnosed

    Coronavirus infections are diagnosed by a health care provider based on symptoms and laboratory tests.

    In some cases, travel history may be important.

    Coronavirus infection treatment

    For now, there is no specific treatments for most people with coronavirus infection. Most people with common coronavirus illness will recover on their own. Your health care provider may recommend steps you can take to relieve symptoms.

    Consult your health care provider as soon as possible if you are concerned about your symptoms or have a travel history to a region where severe coronaviruses are known to occur. The sooner you get treatment, the better your chances are for recovery.

     
     
     
     
    Date modified:
    2020-01-21
  4. I am placing this note here as well as the thread on the Turkish B738 crash at Amsterdam for those interested. TOC is listed below.

    Sidney Dekker, Human Factors Specialist, who has spoken at Canadian flight safety conferences before, did a human factors examination on the Turkish B738 Amsterdam accident and the Dutch Safety Board has decided to publish this report. It can be found at https://www.barracuda.com/products/essentials

    Don

    SUMMARY
    CONSIDERATIONS FOR A HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS
     A word on hindsight  
     The scope of this human factors analysis
     A word on time
    A SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
    TK1951: AN AUTOMATION SURPRISE
     TK1951 and research on automation surprises
    AUTOMATION TRAINING AND BUGGY MENTAL MODELS
     Autothrottle in the airplane manuals
     Alerts and indications associated with RA failure  
     Comparison with other TRTO
     Experience on aircraft type and buggy mental models
    SPEED, MODE MONITORING AND THE NOTICING OF A NON-EVENT
     How to see that something doesn’t happen
     Not noticing a mode change
     Automation surprises and representations of the future
     “Moving thrust levers” that didn’t move and other cues
     Workload and interleaving task demands  
     Speed tapes: How a cockpit knows its speed
    CRM AND THE INTERVENTION DECISION
     The flight crew of TK1951  Training
     (CRM) at THY TK1951: A breakdown in CRM?
     Was TK1951 a rushed approach?
     Why not make a go-around?
  5. Sidney Dekker, Human Factors Specialist, who has spoken at Canadian flight safety conferences before, did a human factors examination on the Turkish B738 Amsterdam accident and the Dutch Safety Board has decided to publish this report. It can be found at https://www.barracuda.com/products/essentials

    Don

    SUMMARY
    CONSIDERATIONS FOR A HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS
     A word on hindsight  
     The scope of this human factors analysis
     A word on time
    A SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
    TK1951: AN AUTOMATION SURPRISE
     TK1951 and research on automation surprises
    AUTOMATION TRAINING AND BUGGY MENTAL MODELS
     Autothrottle in the airplane manuals
     Alerts and indications associated with RA failure  
     Comparison with other TRTO
     Experience on aircraft type and buggy mental models
    SPEED, MODE MONITORING AND THE NOTICING OF A NON-EVENT
     How to see that something doesn’t happen
     Not noticing a mode change
     Automation surprises and representations of the future
     “Moving thrust levers” that didn’t move and other cues
     Workload and interleaving task demands  
     Speed tapes: How a cockpit knows its speed
    CRM AND THE INTERVENTION DECISION
     The flight crew of TK1951  Training
     (CRM) at THY TK1951: A breakdown in CRM?
     Was TK1951 a rushed approach?
     Why not make a go-around?

  6. Well, that's what I thought would happen, (yippee...), so it was a surprise and a bit disappointing. I think it was the thrust lever system; there was a lot of concern and discomfort disconnecting the autothrust and flying it, (A320, A330, A340) like a C172. It was all just a matter of knowing how it worked. There was also a lot of unspoken discouragement at hand-flying. The FCOM had a statement in it that the design of the autoflight system contemplated that it would be engaged immediately after takeoff and disengaged on the landing roll-out at destination, or something like that. It was challenged by good people who wanted FCOM statements permitting hand-flying and gradually it became "acceptable" with reminders of reconnecting the automagic in busy terminals, untoward weather and so on, which was fair enough. And of course one can't hand-fly above FL290.

    There was nothing so satisfying as doing a visual in one of those machines and making it pretty, (but I haven't been upside down pulling 'g' in a fighter...;-)

  7. Hi Kip;

    Well, two to five hours a year of manual handling is probably all you and I did when we weren't "dots"! 😉, eh? I handflew every airplane I was on up to 10, sometimes to cruise altitude, and often disconnected at top-of-descent and handflew the approach/landing. Later on I found that it got everybody's attention when the old guy in the left seat disconnected everything - they had to listen, set the altitude alert, the headings and speeds as well as program the FMS...(but not out of LHR and not into HKG).

    Bits'n bytes...no matter what, it's about training, training, training, and more training.

    Kip, re ". . . anticipating a 100 or so feet below the warm, clear and  blue waters of the Caribbean in a few days ... ", now THAT says it all !! Enjoy, and post a photo or two of that turquoise water!

    👍

     

     

  8. 3 hours ago, xxx said:

    My 2 cents.

    I have flown all the different types at Air Canada.

    The auto throttle on the 737 is rudimentary. When the autopilot is disconnected, the autothrottle must be disconnected, ( one can leave it on longer with changes to SOP lately.)

    The other types of autothrottles or autothrust can remain on till rollout. Some people will laugh and say pilots should be able to fly their airplanes....

    Airspeed control is critical, and I find that it can creep up . If one gets too slow, then one can add too much power and speed gets too fast as well.

    To compensate for this higher speed, one has a tendency to raise nose slightly to bleed off the speed . In doing so, they eat up valuable runway, landing too long. Add a slight tailwind and contaminant, it is a huge problem. 

    I like the technical comments and the talk of over use of automation etc., but it all happens in the last 50 feet on any aircraft where a pilot earns their money in my opinion.

    Your "2c" very much appreciated, XXX because it provides some insight into the thinking that may contribute to longer airborne distances, particularly if one knows in the back of the mind that one has 10,000ft in front of one.

    In general, the accuracy with which Vref+5 plus corrections is flown is much better on the Airbus than the B737, so I think your comments make good sense.

    Re "...in the last 50 feet...", couldn't agree more. In fact, (as all are probably aware by now), actual "hands-on, manual flight" for a year's flying might amount to a couple of hours depending upon type.

     

  9. 10 hours ago, Turbofan said:

    The fleet types appear to be migrating that way.  A few aircraft are now getting Landing performance data via ACARS as part of the descent planning stage. The 737 is one of them.  It is quite advanced as they can input a FICON report and the ACARS spits out contaminated landing distance data. So far the NB 320 doesn’t so long as certain criteria is met.  That criteria is probably the same as prior to your retirement.

    Re FICON & transmitted contaminated landing distance data, that's very cool.

  10. DSB Final Report

     

    FROM: THE BOEING COMPANY TO: MOM [MESSAGE NUMBER:MOM-MOM-09-0063-01B] 04-Mar-2009 05:29:01 AM US PACIFIC TIME Multi Operator Message This message is sent to all 737-100,-200,-300,-400,-500,-600,-700,-800,-900,-BBJ customers and to respective Boeing Field Service bases, Regional Directors, the Air Transport Association, International Air Transport Association, and Airline Resident Representatives.

    SERVICE REQUEST ID: 1-1228079803

    ACCOUNT: Boeing Correspondence

    (MOM) DUE DATE: 10-Mar-2009 PRODUCT TYPE: Airplane

    PRODUCT LINE: 737 PRODUCT: 737-100,-200,-300,-400,-500,-600,-700,-800,-900,-BBJ ATA: 3400-00

    SUBJECT: 737-800 TC-JGE Accident at Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam - 25 February 2009

    REFERENCES: /A/ 1-1222489391 Dated 25 February 2009 Reference /A/ provides Boeing's previous fleet communication on the subject event. The US NTSB, FAA, Boeing, the Turkish DGCA, the operator, the UK AAIB, and the French BEA continue to actively support the Dutch Safety Board's (DSB) investigation of this accident. The DSB has released a statement on the progress of the investigation and has approved the release of the following information. While the complex investigation is just beginning, certain facts have emerged from work completed thus far: - To date, no evidence has been found of bird strike, engine or airframe icing, wake turbulence or windshear. - There was adequate fuel on board the airplane during the entire flight. - Both engines responded normally to throttle inputs during the entire flight. - The airplane responded normally to flight control inputs throughout the flight. The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data indicates that the crew was using autopilot B and the autothrottle for an ILS (Instrument Landing System) approach to runway 18R at Amsterdam Schiphol airport. During the approach, the right Low Range Radio Altimeter (LRRA) was providing accurate data and the left LRRA was providing an erroneous reading of -7 to -8 feet. When descending through approximately 2000 feet the autothrottle, which uses the left radio altimeter data, transitioned to landing flare mode and retarded the throttles to the idle stop. The throttles remained at the idle stop for approximately 100 seconds during which time the airspeed decreased to approximately 40 knots below the selected approach speed. The two LRRA systems provide height above ground readings to several aircraft systems including the instrument displays, autothrottle, autopilots and configuration/ground proximity warning. If one LRRA provides erroneous altitude readings, typical flight deck effects, which require flight crew intervention whether or not accompanied by an LRRA fault flag, include: - Large differences between displayed radio altitudes, including radio altitude readings of -8 feet in flight. - Inability to engage both autopilots in dual channel APP (Approach) mode - Unexpected removal of the Flight Director Command Bars during approach - Unexpected Configuration Warnings during approach, go-around and initial climb after takeoff - Premature FMA (Flight Mode Annunciation) indicating autothrottle RETARD mode during approach phase with the airplane above 27 feet AGL. There will also be corresponding throttle movement towards the idle stop. Additionally, the FMA will continue to indicate RETARD after the throttles have reached the idle stop Boeing Recommended Action - Boeing recommends operators inform flight crews of the above investigation details and the DSB interim report when it is released. In addition, crews should be reminded to carefully monitor primary flight instruments (airspeed, attitude etc.) and the FMA for autoflight modes. More information can be found in the Boeing 737 Flight Crew Training Manual and Flight Crew Operations Manual. Operators who experience any of the flight deck effects described above should consult the troubleshooting instructions contained in the 737 Airplane Maintenance Manual. Further, 737-NG operators may wish to review 737NG-FTD-34-09001 which provides information specific for the 737-NG installation. Initial investigations suggest that a similar sequence of events and flight deck indications are theoretically possible on the 737-100/-200/-300/-400/-500. Consequently the above recommendations also apply to earlier 737 models.

     

    FROM: THE BOEING COMPANY
    TO: MOM [MESSAGE NUMBER:MOM-MOM-09-0063-01B<WBR></WBR>] 04-Mar-2009 05:29:01 AM US PACIFIC TIME
    Multi Operator Message

    This message is sent to all 737-100,-200,-300,-400,-50<WBR></WBR>0,-600,-700,-800,-900,-BBJ<WBR></WBR> customers and to respective Boeing Field Service bases, Regional Directors, the Air Transport Association, International Air Transport Association, and Airline Resident Representatives.

    SERVICE REQUEST ID: 1-1228079803
    ACCOUNT: Boeing Correspondence (MOM)
    DUE DATE: 10-Mar-2009
    PRODUCT TYPE: Airplane
    PRODUCT LINE: 737
    PRODUCT: 737-100,-200,-300,-400,-50<WBR></WBR>0,-600,-700,-800,-900,-BBJ<WBR></WBR>
    ATA: 3400-00

    SUBJECT: 737-800 TC-JGE Accident at Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam - 25 February 2009

    REFERENCES:
    /A/ 1-1222489391 Dated 25 February 2009

    Reference /A/ provides Boeing's previous fleet communication on the subject event. The US NTSB, FAA, Boeing, the Turkish DGCA, the operator, the UK AAIB, and the French BEA continue to actively support the Dutch Safety Board's (DSB) investigation of this accident.

    The DSB has released a statement on the progress of the investigation and has approved the release of the following information.

    While the complex investigation is just beginning, certain facts have emerged from work completed thus far:

    - To date, no evidence has been found of bird strike, engine or airframe icing, wake turbulence or windshear.
    - There was adequate fuel on board the airplane during the entire flight.
    - Both engines responded normally to throttle inputs during the entire flight.
    - The airplane responded normally to flight control inputs throughout the flight.


    The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data indicates that the crew was using autopilot B and the autothrottle for an ILS (Instrument Landing System) approach to runway 18R at Amsterdam Schiphol airport. During the approach, the right Low Range Radio Altimeter (LRRA) was providing accurate data and the left LRRA was providing an erroneous reading of -7 to -8 feet. When descending through approximately 2000 feet the autothrottle, which uses the left radio altimeter data, transitioned to landing flare mode and retarded the throttles to the idle stop. The throttles remained at the idle stop for approximately 100 seconds during which time the airspeed decreased to approximately 40 knots below the selected approach speed.

    The two LRRA systems provide height above ground readings to several aircraft systems including the instrument displays, autothrottle, autopilots and configuration/ground proximity warning. If one LRRA provides erroneous altitude readings, typical flight deck effects, which require flight crew intervention whether or not accompanied by an LRRA fault flag, include:

    - Large differences between displayed radio altitudes, including radio altitude readings of -8 feet in flight.
    - Inability to engage both autopilots in dual channel APP (Approach) mode
    - Unexpected removal of the Flight Director Command Bars during approach
    - Unexpected Configuration Warnings during approach, go-around and initial climb after takeoff
    - Premature FMA (Flight Mode Annunciation) indicating autothrottle RETARD mode during approach phase with the airplane above 27 feet AGL. There will also be corresponding throttle movement towards the idle stop. Additionally, the FMA will continue to indicate RETARD after the throttles have reached the idle stop

    Boeing Recommended Action
    - Boeing recommends operators inform flight crews of the above investigation details and the DSB interim report when it is released. In addition, crews should be reminded to carefully monitor primary flight instruments (airspeed, attitude etc.) and the FMA for autoflight modes. More information can be found in the Boeing 737 Flight Crew Training Manual and Flight Crew Operations Manual.

    Operators who experience any of the flight deck effects described above should consult the troubleshooting instructions contained in the 737 Airplane Maintenance Manual. Further, 737-NG operators may wish to review 737NG-FTD-34-09001 which provides information specific for the 737-NG installation. Initial investigations suggest that a similar sequence of events and flight deck indications are theoretically possible on the 737-100/-200/-300/-400/-50<WBR></WBR>0. Consequently the above recommendations also apply to earlier 737 models.

  11. Thanks for the response, Turbofan. Good to know that this aspect of the -800 is being emphasized; it deserves to be. One question, -does AC require that the landing distance be calculated and recorded for all landings?

    On brake / wheel size, understand the point being made regarding reduced margins compared with other types; - reduced brake energy absorption capability, smaller wheel footprint.

    The question and the point being made is, given all things equal, the correctly-calculated performance data provides sufficient (but reduced?) margin for the landing when compared to other B737 types and the Airbus. Aside from sudden windshear conditions and hot runways, both of which can cause "float", the other variable in otherwise normal landings may be handling techniques of the flare and touchdown, (note: some Classics and the 800 & 900 are certified for a 15kt tailwind landing. If the numbers are critical, one wonders why this is so?)

    To test the notion, I'm wondering if there is an -800 overrun event in which the airplane touchdown was within 3000ft of the threshold?

    Interesting question from Marshall! I've been long-wondering why some airborne distances are still a few hundred feet over the 3000ft point. Most of the time, the touchdown point is within the pilots' control give or take ~400ft or about 2 seconds.

    One other point is, any data analysis must be sampled often enough to examine certain parameters every one-eighth or even one-sixteenth of a second. Determining touchdown point is not at all straightforward as looking at the "air-ground" switch - not at 220ft to 250ft per second, anyway.

     

  12. We haven't seen anything further from the TSB on the YHZ14 overrun so we don't know what the circumstances were other than what the METARS provides, (I'm not a fan of using ADS-B/Flightradar24 data because the sample rates, data sources, data validity, etc., are not defined so don't have standards which would permit use in a serious investigation).

    By recollection only, the overrun accidents which have final reports associated, appear to indicate that the touchdown point is beyond the normal TDZ of between 500ft & 3000ft/first-third-of-runway, (see FAA doc below). For example, the 2018 Sochi overrun accident report which has just been issued by the MAK. Two causal factors are listed in the Report as:

    3. Conclusion

    The aircraft overrun, destroying and damage by fire were caused by the following factors

        - repeated disregarding of the windshear warnings which when entered a horizontal windshear (changing from the head wind to tail one) at low altitude resulted in landing at distance of 1285m from the RWY threshold (overrunning the landing zone by 385m) with the increased IAS and tail wind;

        - landing to the runway, when its normative friction coefficient was less than 0.3 that according to the regulations in force, did not allow to land.

    The full report is available at https://mak-iac.org/upload/iblock/f4b/report_vq-bji_en.pdf

    In general, for airborne distances longer than 3000ft there have been several factors involved, not just one single cause. The most common one appears to be "float time" - flying just above the runway surface waiting for touchdown rather than "planting" the airplane under one's control. Long, dry runways can invite "finessing" the landing I suppose, holding the aircraft for a smooth landing instead of following the Boeing SOPs which requires a flare duration of 8" or less from the 50ft/threshold point to the touchdown point, but that builds operational habits including cognitive and "muscle-memory" habits that can get one into trouble when landing on a short, contaminated runway. Boeing's landing data tables for normal landings, (vice non-normal procedures), provide for a touchdown at 1500ft past the threshold.

    Approach speeds for the 800 appear to be roughly the same as the Classic (400) B737, perhaps a few knots higher but not significantly so. Regardless of type, approach speeds are in the neighbourhood of 220fps to 250fps, sp the margins built into the certification data for published landing distances get swallowed up very quickly. It's been a while since I flew the A320 but i have the impression that the approach speeds are somewhat lower for that type. (I haven't flown the B737 at all, just the B727).

    I don't sense that brake size has much to do with overruns. I think the causes lie in those decision-making, energy-management and SOP areas of an operation. Where needed, I think -800 brake performance in a rejected takeoff is impressive. 

    Runway excursions, (off either side) are a different kettle of fish, involving loss-of-control during crosswinds, assymetric thrust, contaminated runways...

    *https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_91-79A.pdf

     

     

    • Thanks 2

  13. Panel Clears 737 MAX’s Safety-Approval Process at FAA
    Boeing’s 737 MAX was certified as a derivative rather than an all-new plane
    Boeing 737 MAX Photo: Ted S. Warren/Associated Press
    By Andy Pasztor and
    Doug Cameron
    Jan. 16, 2020 10:21 am ET

    The Federal Aviation Administration’s certification of the Boeing Co. 737 MAX was effective and the plane wouldn’t have been safer if it had been scrutinized as an all-new aircraft, according to an independent panel set up last year to evaluate the troubled jet.

    The special committee created by the U.S. Department of Transportation to review the FAA’s safety-approval process backed the continued delegation of some work to aircraft makers, though the committee also called for the agency’s staffing to be expanded to improve its oversight.

    The panel—headed by retired Air Force Gen. Darren McDew, former head of the U.S. Transportation Command, and Lee Moak, former president of the Air Line Pilots Association—provided its initial report on Thursday.
    Share Your Thoughts

    What should the FAA do to boost public confidence in safety oversight of new planes? Join the conversation below.

    The six-month study called for a range of improvements including stepped-up analysis of human factors that could lead pilots to act differently in the cockpit versus existing assumptions.

    The FAA took five years to certify the 737 MAX 8, the first version of the plane and the one involved in two fatal crashes. That time period is at the lower end of scrutiny of new aircraft types or derivatives.

    The MAX was certified as a derivative rather than an all-new plane, the 13th time the FAA has updated an approval first issued in 1967.

    The panel said evaluating the MAX as an all-new plane wouldn’t have produced “more rigorous scrutiny” or “a safer airplane.” It said the FAA retained design approval of the flight-control system that has been linked to two fatal MAX crashes.

    The plane remains grounded world-wide.

    “We will study these recommendations closely as we continue to work with government and industry stakeholders to enhance the certification process,” Boeing said in a statement.

    The panel is one of various probes already under way delving into how rigorously FAA officials followed and enforced mandatory standards in endorsing the safety of the planes, which entered service in May 2017.

    Justice Department prosecutors, in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the DOT inspector general’s office, are looking into whether the plane maker provided incomplete or misleading information to regulators regarding the aircraft.

    The FAA has launched a separate inquiry to determine whether certification rules and procedures were properly followed. And the DOT inspector general has launched still another effort, by conducting an audit of FAA decisions regarding 737 MAX certification.

    In addition, House and Senate committees embarked on hearings and inquiries looking into certification of the 737 MAX.

  14. Hi Kip;

    Yes, the point is moot, sadly.

    Last Tuesday, before there was solid evidence of missiles and people were speculating, I was hoping against hope that it was a turbine section that had gone thru the wing and compromised the fuel tank much like was seen in QF32, which was leaving a large trail of fuel as it returned to land. Knowing the nationalities of the passengers, I just couldn't see what was in it for the Iranian government.

  15.  

    Bloomberg News
    business
    Boeing Mocked Lion Air Calls for More 737 Max Training Before Crash
    By Ryan Beene and Harry Suhartono

    13 January 2020, 18:55 GMT-8 Updated on 14 January 2020, 08:36 GMT-8
    •    House panel confirms Indonesia carrier asked about simulators
    •    Unclear if added training would have averted 737 Max crashes
    Boeing Persuaded Lion to Drop Simulator Training for 737 Max

    Indonesia’s Lion Air considered putting its pilots through simulator training before flying the Boeing Co. 737 Max but abandoned the idea after the planemaker convinced them in 2017 it was unnecessary, according to people familiar with the matter and internal company communications.

    The next year, 189 people died when a Lion Air 737 Max plunged into the Java Sea, a disaster blamed in part on inadequate training and the crew’s unfamiliarity with a new flight-control feature on the Max that malfunctioned.
     
    Boeing employees had expressed alarm among themselves over the possibility that one of the company’s largest customers might require its pilots to undergo costly simulator training before flying the new 737 model, according to internal messages that have been released to the media. Those messages, included in the more than 100 pages of internal Boeing communications that the company provided to lawmakers and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and released widely on Thursday, had Lion Air’s name redacted.
    But the the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee provided excerpts of those messages to Bloomberg News that un-redacted the Indonesian carrier’s name.

    “Now friggin Lion Air might need a sim to fly the MAX, and maybe because of their own stupidity. I’m scrambling trying to figure out how to unscrew this now! idiots,” one Boeing employee wrote in June 2017 text messages obtained by the company and released by the House committee.

    In response, a Boeing colleague replied: “WHAT THE F%$&!!!! But their sister airline is already flying it!”

    That was an apparent reference to Malindo Air, the Malaysian-based carrier that was the first to fly the Max commercially.

    Doing simulator training would have undercut a critical selling point of the jet: that airlines would be able to allow crews trained on an older 737 version to fly the Max after just a brief computer course.

    In a report on the Oct. 29, 2018 accident, Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee cited a failure by Boeing to tell pilots about the new flight-control feature on the jet, called MCAS, and the need to provide training on it so that pilots would be able to better respond to malfunctions.
     
    The report also cited shortfalls in the crew’s ability to perform emergency check lists, fly the plane manually and communicate about the emergency. The copilot, who took nearly four minutes to look up an emergency procedure he was supposed to have memorized, was singled out for repeated failures during training.

    The 737 Max was grounded worldwide last March after an Ethiopian Airlines plane crashed following a similar MCAS malfunction.

    To be sure, simulator training that didn’t address a malfunction of the system like the one crews in both disasters encountered might not have saved the jets. Separate decisions had been made not to inform pilots about MCAS, something that has drawn sharp criticism from pilots’ unions in the U.S.

    But the prospect of simulator training for Max pilots -- and opposition to it within Boeing -- were major themes in the latest batch of embarrassing internal company messages released last week.

    U.S. Representative Pete DeFazio, chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee that is investigating the 737 Max, said the probe has found “more and more evidence of how far Boeing was willing to go in order to essentially cloak MCAS in secrecy from MAX pilots while also downplaying the information it shared about MCAS with federal regulators. That’s incredibly damning, and is opposite of Boeing’s repeated insistence that safety drives its decisions.”

    Lion Air has declined to comment whether it was the carrier discussed in the messages released last week by Boeing but people familiar with the exchanges, who asked not to be identified discussing a private matter, said Lion Air had initially raised concerns about the need for simulator training on the Max but ultimately accepted Boeing’s recommendation that it was unnecessary.

    Some of the messages revealed the pressure on employees -- and customers -- to avoid the additional training. Boeing’s resistance to simulator training for Lion Air pilots was reported earlier by Forbes.

    Boeing didn’t respond to a request for comment but said last week that “any potential safety deficiencies identified in the documents have been addressed.”

    “These documents do not represent the best of Boeing,” Greg Smith, the company’s interim CEO, said in a message to employees Friday. “The tone and language of the messages are inappropriate, particularly when used in discussion of such important matters, and they do not reflect who we are as a company or the culture we’ve created.”

    Technical Pilot
    The communications include a 2017 email from Boeing’s chief technical pilot on the 737 in which he crowed to colleagues: “Looks like my jedi mind trick worked again!” The email was sent two days after the earlier messages expressing alarm about Lion Air potentially demanding simulator training.

    Attached was a forwarded email exchange in which the person warned an unnamed recipient against offering simulator training for Max pilots, pushing instead for the computer-based course that regulators had already approved for flight crews transitioning to the Max from earlier 737 models.

    “I am concerned that if [redacted] chooses to require a Max simulator for its pilots beyond what all other regulators are requiring that it will be creating a difficult and unnecessary training burden for your airline, as well as potentially establish a precedent in your region for other Max customers,” the Boeing pilot wrote in the forwarded message.

    While Lion Air was not identified in the redacted emails, the discussions are consistent with those Boeing held with Lion Air at the time, according to people familiar with the matter.

    “The story always comes back to the same thing: that Boeing was advancing the sale of this plane to capture market share, to capture the profits and cash flow that goes with it, and safety was treated as something that would occur without a great deal of focus,” said Robert Clifford, a Chicago lawyer who has sued Boeing on behalf of victims of the Ethiopian Airlines crash. “That’s just never the case in engineering.”

    — With assistance by Alan Levin, Julie Johnsson, and Peter Robison
    (Updates with lawmaker comments in the 13th paragraph, crash-victims’ lawyers in last paragraph.)

     

  16. Hi Specs, yeah - the article struck me as someone trying to put an academic blush on the writing and got a well-known notion wrong.

    Also, the author says:

    Quote

    There remains a possibility that the crew were changing squawks as part of the SID prior to handover to another ATC agency, or, in doing so, had inadvertently left the transponder in ‘Standby’ mode rather than reselecting it ‘On’ (it is common practice in aviation to select the transponder to Standby whilst changing squawks to avoid inadvertently cycling through an emergency squawk code and causing ATC to react).

    Even retired twelve years, I think I can say this statement is out of date. IIRC, we stopped going to STBY decades ago as the "7700" issue was dealt with. Also, I think many a/c, (don't know about the B737-800 specifically), use the air-ground state to activate/de-activate the transponder. Also, we just don't "change squwaks at FIR boundarys or waypoints without specific ATC requests. The article struck me as a bit presumptuous and "puffed-up".

    That said, the "accidental" theory is one that demands examination if only because, so far, there is no reasoned/reasonable theory with evidence yet that supports intentional shoot-down.

  17. Ultimately, "on-purpose / by accident" must be settled on evidence both physical and circumstantial. The Forbes OpEd argues that the shoot-down was accidental.

    We'll see how the TSB investigation says when it comes out.

     

    Quote

     

    4,194 views

    https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulkennard/2020/01/12/ukraine-international-flight-ps752a-shakespearean-tragedy/?fbclid=IwAR22kzjv7LDItmBQ4B3IcmWRvtxJe28V1r7-4mG06PD-gJ-YZE24VZxb1Is#3dc1ae7267ab

    Jan 12, 2020, 08:47am

    Ukraine International Flight PS 752: A Shakespearean Tragedy?

    , Contributor

    Aerospace & Defense

    I view today’s defense & aerospace issues using history as a prism.

    IMAGE_KYIV REGION, UKRAINE - JANUARY 8, 2020 - Employees of the Ukraine International Airlines (UIA) Barcroft Media via Getty Images

    The past couple of weeks have played out like some macabre adaption of the Bard’s greatest works. The opening scene was the attack on the US Embassy in Baghdad by Iranian backed militias recruited, trained and directed by Major General Qasem Soleimani of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).  

    The attack on the Embassy was in response to the seemingly never-ending cycle of violence in the Middle East. The militias had attacked Kirkuk airbase and killed an American contractor and the US responded by launching airstrikes on militia facilities in both Iraq and Syria, killing some 25 militia personnel. The Embassy attack came directly after a funeral for those killed in the airstrikes and it is still uncertain if the assault was pre-planned or simply a violent extension of the mourning.

    The IRGC, however, must have calculated that the US has something of a trigger-point when it comes to Embassy attacks: the bombing of the Beirut Embassy in 1983 and the hostage taking in Iran in 1979 still linger long in the corporate memory. The latter, although not resulting in US casualties, was seen as a key factor in President Carter’s election loss in 1980 and 2020 is, after all, an election year. The parallels are important to consider.

    IMAGE_American hostages arrive at Wiesbaden Air Base in West Germany after being released from the US Getty Images

    In response, the main act of the Tragedy was the precision strike by a UAV on General Soleimani’s convoy near Baghdad airport. Exactly as per the script, the General was killed along with many in his security detail and little/no collateral damage inflicted. Revenge was inflicted by the forces of ‘good’ and the ‘villains’ retreated to lick their wounds and consider their next step. 

    The third act, and one that many observers fervently hoped was also the denouement, was the retaliatory missile strike on US bases in Iraq. The IRGC carefully calibrated this attack; a significant number of ballistic missiles were fired to look good on the domestic newsreels but launched at a time when most personnel would be in bed and not vulnerable in the open. Furthermore, the use of ballistic missiles rather than militia-fired rockets is in itself telling: the rocket plumes and trajectories of ballistic weapons are eminently observable by satellites fitted with specialist sensors that detect the rocket motor and by ground/ship based Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) radars. These systems enabled sufficient warning to be provided for personnel to get into cover. 

    There is also the rumour that the IRGC tipped off elements of the Iraqi forces, who, in turn either deliberately or via behavioural change, would have cued the US forces that something was afoot. If the militias had used closer range systems, such as 122mm rockets, then warning time is significantly reduced. 

    I’ve had the ‘pleasure’ of being on the receiving end of both ballistic missile and short-range rocket attack; with the former, the warning was sufficient to seek hardened protection and wait. With the latter, there is barely time to roll out of bed and pull the ‘Kevlar duvet’ over oneself before the explosions start. Therefore, the use of ballistic missiles was, in my opinion, a very carefully judged attempt at de-escalation by the IRGC and elements of the Iranian regime. Enough to assuage hurt pride and the embarrassment of so easily losing a senior commander, but not violent enough to invite further US retaliation. 

    Like so many Tragedies, both Shakespearean and more modern, the tale then features a dramatic twist. When I first heard reports of a Ukrainian International Airlines aircraft, Flight PS752, crashing near Tehran, I, like many of my defense and aviation colleagues, instinctively thought it was an accident with a bizarre timing coincidence. The initial photographs of the wreckage appeared to confirm the hypothesis that it was an uncontained engine failure, leading to catastrophic break-up of the engine on the wing.

    When a turbofan engine disintegrates, the turbine blades can break up and create a cloud of high energy, high temperature fragments. These fragments can puncture the fuselage, leaving shrapnel-like damage, and cut control systems as well as hydraulic and fuel lines. 

    Such an uncontained failure was the primary cause behind the Sioux City DC-10 crash in 1989, and, more recently, to a Southwest Airlines 737-700, Flight 1380, in April 2018. This latter incident was my unconscious confirmation bias for Flight PS752, which was a similar 737-800 series aircraft. In the Southwest incident, the engine exploded causing fragment damage to the fuselage, an explosive decompression in the cabin and resulted in the partial extraction through a broken window of a passenger who, sadly, later died from her injuries. 

    My imagined sequence, therefore, for Flight PS752 was a catastrophic engine failure, loss of cabin pressure, possible loss of flight controls and a crew struggling desperately to save a wounded aircraft and, ultimately, failing.

    IMAGE_ PHILADELPHIA, PA - APRIL 17: In this National Transportation Safety Board handout, NTSB investigator 2018 NTSB

    Why did I not assume it was a Surface to Air Missile attack? I just couldn’t see how an Air Defence battery could mistake an airliner departing a major international airport on an established Standard Instrument Departure (SID) and ‘squawking’ an allocated IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) transponder code for a threat. 

    The ‘squawk’ is important. All aircraft operating in Controlled Airspace are allocated a discrete transponder code to aid Air Traffic Controllers to identify, track, deconflict and control aircraft. As the radar beam passes over the aircraft, the transponder is triggered to respond with both the 4-digit code, and also, if Mode ‘Charlie’ is selected, a read-back of the aircraft’s current altitude above mean sea level. Military SAM radars also have an IFF Interrogator which can distinguish civil ‘squawks’ and, using appropriate cryptographical codes, determine which military aircraft are friendly and which are potential threats. 

    Therefore, if fitted with such a simple method of determining ‘friend’ from ‘foe’ why did the SAM battery open fire? At the top level, it’s either a deliberate act or a tragic mistake.

    IMAGE_ Russian Tor-M2U surface-to-air missile system, known as the SA-15 Gauntlet by NATO, and similar to. ASSOCIATED PRESS

    I don’t buy into the deliberate act hypothesis. What would be the regime’s motive for committing such a heinous crime? If we assume that the ballistic missile strike was calibrated to draw a line under recent events, then there would be little to gain politically by shooting down an airliner and inflaming tension yet again. Furthermore, if the regime wanted to send a message to the US and its allies, why select an airliner from a non-aligned country, full of 3rd party nationals and your own? The world is very sensitive when it comes to attacking airliners; they are patently non-combatants and much of the world’s trade depends upon them receiving safe passage, free from interference. 

    Any sympathy that Iran may have accrued as a result of onerous US sanctions and the assassination of a top military officer will inevitably diminish or evaporate as a result of this act. The evident dislocation that the regime suffered trying to respond to the incident is also telling — there appeared to be significant confusion over what had happened. They genuinely did seem to be ignorant of the role of the IRGC in the incident in the immediate aftermath. One can only imagine the horror at discovering their culpability. 

    There does remain a lingering possibility that someone at a senior level in the IRGC felt that Soleimani’s death had not been adequately avenged by the missile strikes. Ordering the shootdown of a foreign airliner seems an odd way of expressing such bloodlust given that the IRGC employ proxy militias all over the region and have extensive low-tech threats that can challenge and attack shipping in the North Arabian Gulf. Regimes such as Iran also tend to deal harshly with commanders who go ‘off message’ – it would take someone very senior to calculate they could make such a move and survive the consequences.

    Therefore, in my opinion, the principle of Hanlon’s razor applies here. It was not a calculated, malicious act, but a tragic mistake, effected at the lowest unit level. But why?

    To understand ‘how’ if not ‘why’ it’s important to put oneself in the position of the SAM Battery crew. The current ‘official’ position from the IRGC is that the airliner was approaching a ‘sensitive site’. This statement is informative. The IRGC would have been informed, at a senior level, of the missile strikes. Doubtless, as any sensible military organisation would do, they would have likely, tacitly, informed their missile crews that the possibility of a US strike would be higher than normal that night – therefore, there is the distinct possibility that the SAM Battery was on an enhanced state of alertness.

    Anyone that has studied the ‘Western Art of War’ will understand that the Suppression or Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (S/DEAD) is a key battlespace shaping activity to permit NATO aircraft to operate at greater freedom. Therefore, sitting in a SAM Battery radar or command and control vehicle has the effect of placing a target on one’s forehead. The shootdown of an RAF Tornado GR1 by a US Patriot missile system during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was caused by the failure of the Tornado’s military Mode 4 IFF and the flight profile as it recovered to Ali Air Salem airbase closely approximating that of an Anti-Radiation Missile (ARM). The Patriot crew, understandably nervous they were being targeted, acted under self defense. 

    There is a credible theory that the Iranian SAM battery, tasked with protecting a sensitive IRGC site, as well as guarding Tehran itself, and already on a heightened state of alert, suddenly detected a target on their screens as it climbed into the radar horizon. Doubtless, IRGC SAM batteries are briefed to expect ‘pop up’ attacks deep in their own airspace from B2 Spirit stealth bombers. What we don’t know is the Command and Control chain influence upon permission to fire, nor the extant rules of engagement.

    Most Middle Eastern countries, due to their largely conscripted armies and fears over reliability, have highly centralised command structures, requiring a high-level commander to approve weapon release. Indeed, this very convoluted firing chain has been successfully exploited by Allied and Israeli air forces over recent campaigns. The IRGC are, presumably, considered more reliable and politically pure. Learning from the experience of other Middle Eastern countries, they may well have granted a higher level of autonomy to individual battery commanders, especially in a potential ‘use it or lose it’ situation against a radar picture that is within the parameters of an expected ARM attack delivered by a Low Observable platform. 

    In such circumstances, only a few seconds are available for appreciation, decision and action. It is analogous to a cop shooting a suspect dead thinking he’s reaching for a weapon, only to find they were trying to get their phone out of their pocket. Pressure, fear and expectation are all powerful drivers.

    The remaining mystery is the IFF. Most SAM systems have IFF interlocks of some sort on the firing system – helping to prevent ‘blue on blue’ engagements. The ATC radar trace, if released, will show if PS752’s transponder was working correctly. There remains a possibility that the crew were changing squawks as part of the SID prior to handover to another ATC agency, or, in doing so, had inadvertently left the transponder in ‘Standby’ mode rather than reselecting it ‘On’ (it is common practice in aviation to select the transponder to Standby whilst changing squawks to avoid inadvertently cycling through an emergency squawk code and causing ATC to react). However, the most obvious point of technical failure in the SAM unit is the IFF interrogator.

    Sadly, the most obvious point of ultimate failure remains the SAM crew. Despite increasing automation, over 80% of all air accidents are still caused by Human Error. We are imperfect machines. Perhaps the crew were tired, on edge and startled by the sudden appearance of a target seemingly matching an expected threat system. Perhaps they were scared. Perhaps they were still angry at the loss of a senior commander. Perhaps the IFF interrogator was defective - perhaps they never even checked it. For whatever reason, ultimately, they took the shot.

    They will now have to live with the consequences of that fatal decision. Like all flawed heroes and tragic villains in Shakespeare’s work they will suffer the fate that’s due – and one that will inevitably be unforgiving in order to provide the necessary closure to all of the injured parties.

    I served 23 years in the RAF as a helicopter pilot, flying the CH47 Chinook in, inter alia, The Former Yugoslavia, Kosovo and both Iraq and Afghanistan – logging nearly 1000 combat hours during operational deployments. I specialised in tactical training and development, electronic warfare, operational test & evaluation and procurement – the latter as the Capability manager for the Chinook, responsible for buying new systems to help my friends and colleagues stay safe on the front line. After leaving the military I established my own consultancy company, Ascalon (named after St George’s legendary sword), where I provide independent advice to Industry, NATO and Governments, as well as Systems Engineering support to major defence projects. History has been my lifelong passion, and I try to asses today’s aviation and defense challenges with an eye to historical context. When not writing for Forbes, I’m a contributing editor to the Heli-Ops family of magazines.

    • ©2020 Forbes Media LLC. All Rights Reserved.

     


     

     

  18. The notion of an accidental shoot-down may be gaining credibility not only because of heightened tensions but because the flight path of the aircraft was in a right turn towards the airport, (could be mistaken for towards Tehran), likely descending and on fire. Missile crews would not have access to ATC transmissions, (none here anyway - just silence) and so may have appeared as "hostile incoming".

    Also, after the loss of ADS-B signal when the a/c was still heading north and just starting the right turn about 10nm from the airport, unless the wiring has changed recently for the B737, the recorders may have stopped functioning.

    In one image, the vertical stabilizer has been turned over to reveal a deeply soot-blackened surface, indicating a large & sustained fire on the left side and likely close in to the fuselage.