Don Hudson

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Posts posted by Don Hudson

  1. For those directly affected by these very difficult decisions as well as those now looking over their shoulder...

    Having seen a bit of this in a previous life, this too, shall eventually pass to become a distant memory.

    Keep hope strong, keep optimism alive and most of all keep in "touch" with one another using the usual electronic means.


    • Like 4
  2. Opinion: Rethinking ‘Shareholders First'

    Kevin Michaels March 11, 2020

    Credit: Adrian825/iStock

    The recent passing of former GE CEO Jack Welch may represent more than the loss of the icon named Manager of the Century by Fortune magazine in 1999. It may also symbolize the passing of an era in capitalism—“shareholders first”—that Welch did so much to promulgate. What does this have to do with today’s aerospace industry? Plenty, as it turns out.

    Before the “shareholders first” mantra took hold in the 1990s, publicly traded companies considered four stakeholders in allocating capital: customers, local communities, employees and suppliers, and shareholders.

    Before Welch took over in 1981, GE publicly stated it valued workers and research labs before shareholders. After 20 nears of relentless focus on productivity, cost-cutting and shedding more than 100,000 jobs, GE’s market capitalization skyrocketed from $12 billion to an astounding $410 billion. Much of this profit growth was driven by financial services rather than traditional manufacturing.

    Encouraged by the late economist Milton Friedman and success stories such as GE, aerospace executives began to adopt “shareholders first” in the 1990s. McDonnell Douglas famously embraced this philosophy and focused on quarterly earnings while refusing to invest in new civil aircraft. Its CEO, Harry Stonecipher, eventually took the leadership helm at Boeing. Responding to the perception that he was only interested in making money, he responded, “You’re right, I am.” 

     Employees were the first casualty, with unions weakened and raises curtailed. For example, until recently, Honeywell International imposed mandatory unpaid leave on its employees—while it was making 20% margins. As employees lost pace, so did local communities. In the early 2000s, the number of employees in low-wage countries became a key performance indicator. New aerospace clusters in places such as China, Eastern Europe and Mexico followed suit. The blind push to leverage labor-arbitrage has ebbed in recent years, but the compact of secure employment was violated, and employee morale suffered.

    A decade later, suppliers became the target of OEM supply chain cost-reduction initiatives with double-digit price reduction demands, longer payment terms, aftermarket royalty payments and other concessions. Market capitalization shifted from suppliers to the OEMs, while the lower tiers of the supply chain were bled of working capital. Today, many subtier suppliers are fragile, and their ability to invest in the future—let alone ride out a crisis like the 737 MAX production shutdown—is diminished compared to a decade ago.

    What about customers? On the one hand, brutal competition between Airbus and Boeing held jetliner prices relatively flat over the past 15 years. On the other hand, customer satisfaction in the aftermarket and customer support is suffering. In last year’s AeroDynamic Advisory/Aviation Week Network customer satisfaction survey, just one out of 41 OEMs received a positive net promoter score from airlines.

    The manifestation of the “shareholders first” philosophy is very negative for a long-cycle industry like aerospace, which faces enormous challenges—including sustainable development—that will require large sums of R&D. Boeing, for example, spent an average of $12.8 billion in share buybacks and dividends in 2018 and 2019, while averaging just $2.2 billion in R&D. This is not just a Boeing problem; it is a corporate America problem. In 2018, share buybacks and dividends for the S&P 500 were an astounding 109% of net income, according to The Wall Street Journal. This disparity points to another issue: Companies are taking on debt to fund shareholder generosity. This is not sustainable in the long run and leaves no capital to invest in customers, suppliers, employees or local communities. 

    Contrast this behavior with OEM customer Delta Air Lines, which earned $6.5 billion in 2019. It shared $1.6 billion (16.7%) of that with employees—a record amount for a U.S. company. This translates into improved employee morale and in turn improved customer satisfaction, higher yields and growing market share.

    Don’t get me wrong. I am a pro-business, free-trade capitalist who depends on increasing stock prices to fund his retirement. Making money and rewarding shareholders is a good thing. However, our long-cycle, innovation-driven industry is clearly out of balance. 

    “Shareholders first” needs to be replaced by a more balanced version of capitalism if the aerospace industry is to thrive in the long run. The change must originate not only from aerospace leaders, including the new CEOs of Airbus and Boeing, but also from the boards that evaluate them and set priorities.

    Kevin Michaels

    Contributing columnist Kevin Michaels is managing director of AeroDynamic Advisory in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

  3. 43 minutes ago, Marshall said:

    When air taxis become widely commercialized, they will definitely ease the traffic burden on city roads. They will usher in a nimble form of intracity travel, transporting people on the shortest possible route between two locations.

    Will they have TCAS...? 😉

  4. Further, from the Miami Herald:

    Top Atlas Air flight training directors retire as government crash investigation looms

    By Taylor Dolven
    February 22, 2020 06:30 AM

    Read more here:

    Nearly one year after Miami International Airport’s largest cargo airline Atlas Air crashed a plane killing three pilots, two top directors of the company’s training program in Miami suddenly retired this week.

    Fleet captain Joe Diedrich and training director Scott Anderson abruptly left the company Tuesday. An internal email titled “Miami Training Center: Organizational Update” from senior vice president Jeff Carlson announced their departures as retirements. The shakeup comes as the National Transportation Safety Board’s final report about the fatal Feb. 23, 2019, crash is pending and the company reported a deep earnings loss for 2019.

    The Atlas Air Flight 3591 crash happened as Diedrich was head of the Boeing 767 training program and Anderson was overseeing procedures, training and standards for the entire airline.

    After departing Miami, the plane full of Amazon shipments suddenly increased in power and pitched upward about 40 miles outside Houston, likely in reaction to an activation of the go-around switches. Thirty seconds later, the plane nosedived 6,000 feet down into Trinity Bay, killing three people: captain Ricky Blakely, 60, of Indiana; first officer Conrad Jules Aska, 44, of Miami; and Mesa Air pilot Sean Archuleta, 36, of Texas, who was riding as a passenger on the flight.

    Government crash investigators released a trove of documents in December showing that Blakely failed his proficiency test on the Boeing 767 in 2015 and was placed in a monitoring program “as a result of [his] repetitive need for additional training.” Blakely was removed from the monitoring program in February 2017. The documents also show that Atlas hired Aska despite his repeated training failures at other airlines.

    “If I had that information at the time we would not have offered him a position,” Anderson told investigators about Aska. At the time of the crash, Blakely had worked for Atlas since September 2015 and had 11,000 hours of flying time, 1,250 hours on the 767. Aska had worked for Atlas since July 2017 and had 5,000 hours of flying time, 520 hours on the 767.

    Atlas Air did not respond to requests for comment about the training directors’ retirements.

    A Miami Herald investigation found that pilots for Atlas Air repeatedly warned company executives in the years leading up to the 2019 crash that if they did not bolster the training program and hire pilots with more experience, a plane was going to crash. At a meeting with executives in Miami in 2017, a pilot who had been with the company for two decades described an “erosion of level of experience in the cockpit.”

    The training headquarters for MIA’s largest cargo airline Atlas Air is near the airport. At a meeting here in 2017, a pilot warned executives that unless they recruited more experienced pilots, a plane crash was imminent. Carl Juste

    Carlson, the senior vice president for flight operations, agreed with the captain’s assessment. “I worry about quotas on the flight deck,” he said, according to the recording obtained by the Miami Herald. “I’m not oblivious to any of that. ... We know experience level decreases over time. That’s a challenge for this group. ... Regardless of the experience, the bar never changes. And I just want to make sure that sticks in the back of your mind.”

    Since the crash, former CEO of the company William Flynn stepped down, and chief operating officer John Dietrich ascended to the role in January. On Wednesday, one day after the training directors’ departures, Dietrich announced a $293.1 million net loss for Atlas Air in 2019 and said the company has taken five of its Boeing 747 planes out of service due to a “softer market.” In 2018, the company reported a profit of $270.6 million.

    Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings, formed in 2001, is the parent company of four cargo airlines — Atlas Air, Polar Air, Southern Air and Titan Aviation Leasing. Since 2010, the company’s fleet has grown from 29 planes to 123, boosted by contracts with Amazon and the U.S. Department of Defense.

    In its interim report on the crash released in December, the NTSB found that total average flying time for new hires at Atlas Air and Southern Air dropped to around 5,600 hours in 2018, compared to 7,303 hours in 2015. Two-thirds of pilots have been with the company for less than five years. The FAA requires that new hires have at least 1,500 hours.



    Delays in 737 MAX certification flight may push off Boeing’s goal to win approval by midsummer

    Feb. 21, 2020 at 5:13 pm Updated Feb. 21, 2020 at 8:26 pm


    Dominic Gates

    Seattle Times aerospace reporter

    The critical flights on the updated Boeing 737 MAX that must be flown by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) pilots before the plane can be certified again are now unlikely to happen before late April, according to two people familiar with the details.

    The delay of more than a month from recent plans means that Boeing’s publicly announced goal of winning FAA approval to fly the plane again by “midsummer,” previously considered a very conservative schedule, now looks tight and could slip further.

    One person with close knowledge of the required steps said that after the certification flight, assuming all goes well, it could take up to a further 60 days for regulators to complete the remaining steps in the process, which would push out the ungrounding of the aircraft to late June at the earliest.

    A person who is familiar with Boeing’s internal efforts, however, expressed hope that the jetmaker can still meet its target schedule: “I think we’re still within the midyear ungrounding estimate. So middle/late summer,” said the second person.

    He added that the midsummer target had “a lot of margin built in to deal with emergent issues” like those that have recently arisen.

    Still, it was just over two weeks ago that FAA Administrator Steve Dickson told reporters in London that a MAX certification flight could occur “in the next few weeks.” Since then, that schedule has clearly slipped considerably.

    Software and wiring fixes pending

    Before a certification flight can happen, Boeing must have at least one MAX aircraft ready with all the final fixes and software updates installed. Among the issues to be resolved first are a faulty cockpit indicator light and a decision on whether Boeing must rewire some of the flight control wiring bundles to comply with safety regulations.

    During flight tests of the upgraded MAX flight control system this year, an indicator light erroneously came on in the cockpit indicating that the horizontal tail of the jet — the stabilizer that controls the aircraft’s nose-up or nose-down pitch — was “out of trim,” meaning out of position to maintain the pitch the pilot has commanded.

    Boeing initially dismissed this as merely a nuisance light that would require a simple software patch and wouldn’t cause a delay.

    However, engineers have now established that the problem is trickier to fix than first thought. It stems from a small disagreement between the angles of the two parts of the stabilizer on either side of the tail. Unlike in the original MAX system design, the upgraded MAX now uses both of the plane’s two flight computers to compare data from the two sides of the airplane. The computers note the discrepancy between the angles and the software logic triggers the light.

    Collins Aerospace, a unit of United Technologies headquartered in West Palm Beach, Florida, makes the flight control software to Boeing’s specifications. Boeing has tasked Collins with fixing the software, but it’s turning out to be more work than is suggested by the term “patch.”

    “We feel good about the software fix to correct it,” said the person familiar with Boeing’s internal efforts. “It will just take some time.”

    The other unresolved issue is that the flight control wiring in the MAX does not meet the latest safety regulation that was introduced to prevent electrical shorts. Boeing missed this during original certification. It has proposed to the FAA that it be allowed to leave the wiring as is, based on the safe history of the earlier 737 NG model, which has the same wiring.

    But the person familiar with the required steps to certification said “Boeing has a daunting task in making a case that they don’t have to rewire the airplanes.”

    The second person, the one familiar with Boeing’s internal efforts, said that a certification flight “is likely in April or May” and that rather than any specific issue, the delay is due to “the overall work on the system safety analysis” (SSA).

    The SSA requires detailed analysis of all the possible system failures and estimating a probability for each.  The painstaking work of combing through the potential faults and their probabilities is taking a lot of time, he said.

    “I don’t ascribe it to stab trim-out light or wire bundles specifically,” the second person said. “This is the most scrutinized plane system, probably ever. Issues that in the past or on any other plane … would be done in service are being asked to be resolved now,” before being allowed to fly again.

    Final hurdles

    After successful FAA certification flights are completed, the MAX must then pass a series of further milestones before it can fly again, a process estimated to take 45 to 60 days.

    After the certification flights, the Joint Operations Evaluation Board (JOEB), which comprises the FAA’s Flight Standardization Board (FSB) and officials from foreign regulators in Canada, Europe, and Brazil, will meet to evaluate minimum pilot training needs.

    The FSB will issue a report that will be made available for public review during a comment period expected to be about 15 days.

    Additionally, the FAA will review Boeing’s final design documentation, which also will be reviewed by the multi-agency Technical Advisory Board (TAB).

    After all these FAA technical reviews are complete, Administrator Dickson has said he won’t give the final clearance for the MAX to fly until he has flown it himself and is “satisfied that I would put my own family on it without a second thought.”

    For now, Boeing’s target for that remains midsummer. Airlines will need another month at least after that to train their pilots and get their first MAX jets out of storage and readied to fly.

    American and Southwest this month removed the MAX from their flight schedules until mid-August. United Airlines has pushed out the MAX until early September.

    Dominic Gates: 206-464-2963 or; on Twitter: @dominicgates.



  6. Apropos the subject on how to train pilots, there is in my view an excellent insight on PPRuNe, to which, with the Mods' kind permission/understanding, I will take the opportunity afforded by the above subject, to provide a link. I think this contributor has provided one of few keys into achieving a good balance between mere technical proficiency and becoming a professional airman in full sense of the term.

    Here is the link:


    • Thanks 1
  7. Good OpEd from AW&ST regarding Boeing's decision on a new midmarket design:

    Opinion: Airbus Can Coast On Its Product Line; Boeing Cannot
    Richard Aboulafia February 05, 2020

    One of incoming Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun’s first actions has been to order a rethink of the company’s new midmarket airplane (NMA). This is the right move. It has never been clear how the NMA, a twin-aisle design, could match the economics of the single-aisle A321neo.

    Yet Calhoun should keep in mind three realities that weigh on Boeing’s new product strategy. First, the middle market is booming, and Airbus is winning it with the A321neo. Second, Airbus can expand and update its single-aisle and midmarket product line. The third is that Boeing cannot do that. There is a lot at stake for Boeing and not much time.

    First, airlines clearly want midsize jets. Last year, there were just 673 net orders for all Airbus and Boeing jets; 476 of these were for the A321neo. This is more than just upgauging; much is due to increasing airline route fragmentation, a trend that will keep growing for years to come.

    This midmarket growth also reflects a shift away from twin-aisles (Boeing’s strongest position) and toward single-aisles (where Airbus is strongest). Airbus has sold 3,255 A321neos since the type was launched in 2011, or three times as many as the 1,049 Boeing 757s sold over 25 years. By contrast, Boeing has sold around 650 737 MAX 9/10s (the company does not break out variant orders). The A321neo is winning by a 5:1 ratio.

    While the 737 MAX 8 has done well against the A320neo, as the A321neo continues to grow in popularity, it will bolster Airbus’ smaller single-aisles, as airlines seek commonality across their fleets.

    Second, Calhoun should remember that there is quite a lot that Airbus can do with its single-aisle product line. In addition to increasing commonality between the A220 and A320 families, it could stretch the former C Series, creating a 145-150-seat A220-500, likely offering lower seat-mile costs.

    While an A220-500 would take away demand for the A320neo, Airbus could compensate by making the A320neo and A321neo more capable models. The A220’s wings use resin transfer infusion (RTI) composites.  Adapting this technology for the A320/321neo, perhaps with an engine update, would produce 150-240-seat jets with greater range and superb economics.

    Most intriguingly, if the A321neo can be stretched, Airbus would have an even greater midmarket category killer. With new RTI wings and new, more powerful engines, an A322neo would be a true global route-fragmentation machine, building on the Boeing 787’s remarkable work in creating new thinner routes.

    Third, by contrast with this incredible menu of Airbus possibilities, Boeing can do nothing more to the 737. The MAX 9/10 and MAX 200 are clearly outclassed by the A321neo, and there is probably nothing that Boeing can do to make them more competitive.

    Most of all, the 737 family has clearly reached the end of its evolutionary line. After the MAX program, there will not be a fifth 737 incarnation. Boeing needs a new clean-sheet, single-aisle model eventually.

    Analysts, including me, point to the McDonnell Douglas experience as an example of what can happen when a jetmaker neglects new product investment. But there is a difference. When McDonnell absorbed Douglas in 1967, it inherited a single-aisle jet—the DC-9—that proved reasonably well-suited to updates. And its MD-80 series was a success, staying in production through 1999. This also allowed McDonnell to address the core of the single-aisle market, albeit in a declining way, without having to launch any new products.

    But if Boeing is to copy McDonnell and neglect investment in its jetliner business, it will not have 30 years to coast. The 737 MAX will have 10-12 years before it needs replacement.

    And unlike during the McDonnell sunset years, the market is shifting upward. If Boeing does not build a clean-sheet midmarket airplane, it will lose at least 15%, and perhaps 20%, of the market. What was a 50/50 duopoly will become a 65/35 duopoly, or perhaps even a 70/30 one. In an industry that is heavily dependent on volume to achieve the lower costs that airline customers demand, such a market-share decline would be tough to recover from.

    Whether Calhoun remains as CEO or not, Boeing needs to digest the clear conclusion from these three realities: Product development inaction is a recipe for Airbus market dominance, possibly for decades to come.
    Richard Aboulafia
    Contributing columnist Richard Aboulafia is vice president of analysis at Teal Group. He is based in Washington.


    • Like 1
  8. Again very helpful, thank you. I believe there's been an overall increase in the industry of go-arounds due instability. Nice to see the gradual trend.

    From an earlier life I understand long days of LGA turns & crappy weather...well done on the legibility.

  9. Final Report

    The UAE GCAA AAIS has now completed their investigation and has released their final report.

    The report documents findings in 12 different areas identifying 4 causes and 11 contributing factors.

    There were 40 safety recommendations issued as follows: Operator (11), Dubai Air Navigation Services (7), Dubai Airports (3), Boeing (5), UAE GCAA (8), US FAA (4), and ICAO (2).

    Boeing is reviewing the details of the final report and will work with the FAA and UAE GCAA to address the safety recommendations. Boeing has no recommended operator action at this time.



  10. Thanks again Kip...that does help me sort out perceptions of what would be considered a "long landing". I suspect that would be most everyone's view on the matter.

    I think that any airborne distance that exceeds 3000ft is in "no-man's territory" and, all being equal, is indefensible if something goes wrong. There is no "slop" built into the performance data and no documentation that I'm aware of that provides validation or support for any airborne distance beyond 3000ft or flare durations above eight seconds.

    I emphasize for others reading this who sit in either front seat, that every touchdown point is, with very rare exceptions, within the PF's control because that's the way these aircraft are designed, tested and certified to be flown. Recent events have demonstrated that if the flare/touchdown is incorrectly planned and/or handled, one's airplane can overrun a 9000ft runway.

  11. Thanks Kip, a good read. I've not flown anything with two 16ft "speedbrakes" but I'll bet they test the shoulder harnesses. 

    From one comment, (unless we landed about 3000ft down the runway), would it be fair to say that three-thousand feet from the threshold is probably not what to aim for, no matter what conditions?

    An airborne distance from the threshold to touchdown of three thousand feet appears to be the upper limit in most of the documents which govern(ed) us, (FCTMs, FCOMs), and two-thousand feet from the threshold seems the upper end of the touchdown zone according to Boeing, (B737 NG FCTM, "Landing" chapter, p.6.8.), with a flare duration of 4" to 8".

    I wish I knew the psychology and perhaps the physiology behind long landings but I don't, and so can't make any assumptions or conclusions although I think most here could hazard a good SCWAG. One factor can be ego but in discusions I find that that is less important now, (so they say...); I'm wondering more about experience and training.

    Fortunately I suppose, the frequency of overruns vs. the tens of thousands of landings each day around the world doesn't provide a very good "dataset" to tell us anything solid. What that does tell us is the opposite - that the safety levels and standards and threat-management systems preventing untoward/expensive events which aviation has achieved is the envy of other industries.

    As has been pointed out by several here, there is simply no good reason to "land long"; I've heard most of the reasons early in the career...,"stay above the wake turbulence from the previous heavy", "aim for this exit point or taxiway (to save time to the terminal)", "give the passengers a nice arrival" and so on and none of them are valid. There is simply no justification for a fifteen-second flare duration - anytime.


  12. Yes, late night, not well-worded 😉 Also, when composing the post I somehow lost the quote from Leeroy's post in which the question was posed:

    10 hours ago, Leeroy said:

    I also cannot figure out why NG pilots continue to accept long landings and tailwinds.

    So yes, the question I'm asking is the one you've posted above.

    Obviously there will be a range of values and flare durations. What is 'normal' and acceptable, what draws one's attention with eyebrows raised and what raises the hair on the back of one's neck? I know it depends upon weather & runway conditions.

  13. Kip,

    Bad decisions and actions happen, but rarely in complete isolation. Considering a company's culture, training/checking regime and even hiring practises is not exonerating individuals where investigations make clear how an accident occurred. But unless the context is considered, the same accidents seem to re-occur.

    Question for any and all here: I understand any answer depends upon conditions but what would you consider a "long landing", and what would you consider acceptable?

  14. hi rudder;

    Yes, clearly this approach, this accident is shaping up to be, by a very long way, an outlier so far away from SOPs that the books are meaningless. Reminds me of the American Airlines 738 accident at Kingston. I wonder what the pressures were to cause such decision-making?

  15. 2 hours ago, Marshall said:

    or is the aircraft just too aerodynamic (floats more)? 

    Hi Marshall;

    In general. Not commenting on this latest accident...

    As you might expect, I'm reluctant to accept that an airplane is "too aerodynamic and so floats more" as a reason for long landings and potential overruns. I think that the touchdown point is, with the rarest of exceptions, well within the pilots' ability to control, and if the airplane is floating along just above the runway, almost invariably the pilot is permitting it to do so.

    Let me push this just a bit if I may as I wish to avoid handing over to the airplane, what may be human factors, decision-making and skill levels in overrun accidents. If I recall, most overrun accidents occured after touching down in the last half of the runway?...I'd have to look, of course.

    I think that, once the planning work has been done and the decision has been made to begin the approach, the touchdown point in all but the rarest of circumstances is well within the crews' ability to control when the airplane touches down. Of course, this assumes a stabilized approach from 1000ft AGL.

    Put another way, whether Boeing or Airbus, I think that in a majority of landing circumstances it is a choice to allow the aircraft to float along just above the runway surface waiting longer than 8" for the airplane to settle and land.

    I think the techniques provided in both the FCTM and the FCOM for the 50ft-to-touchdown segment provide ample guidance for getting the airplane onto the runway within the first 2000ft.* By this I mean, if one flares a bit high and begins to ride on ground effect, one can put the aircraft onto the runway with suitable control input. "Rolling it on" (slight forward check on the CC), was almost standard on the DC8 & DC9. The only aircraft one never pushed the CC forward just a little was the L1011 as the MDLC raised the spoilers to increase the descent rate!

    Most of the time our runways are suitable and sufficiently long to permit some 'finesse' in the touchdown without compromise. But in my opinion I think one should fly the aircraft onto the runway to the touchdown point one has mentally selected on the approach.

    I don't think smaller wheels/brakes, too-aerodynamic an airplane, the requirement for (slightly) higher approach speeds for the 800 are primary or combined contributions to overrun accidents. The Actual Performance FCOM Chapter provides data for crews to plan the landing on a less-than-ideal runway in less than ideal weather conditions.

    *B737 NG FCTM, "Landing", p6.8, June 30 2019

  16. 2 hours ago, boestar said:

    The trajectory of the debris is whats puzzling.  There is no direct line from A to B.

    Not an engineer or mathematician!, but I think of the tire as a "pinwheel"...any object that breaks away from an object that is rotating, flies away in a linear track. The round object rotating has an angular speed that is offered to everything attached. If anything detaches, the object doing the breaking away is no longer restricted to going around and its velocity becomes tangential velocity. (for those that want more info....Zzzzzzzz). That speed would essentially be the groundspeed of the aircraft, (about 270fps), minus any resistance such as wind, how clean the break was or any physical objects in the way. 

    Non-aerodynamic piece(s) of heavy rubber aren't going to be affected much by the slipstream. They're pretty well free to find a linear path away from the disintegrating tire including just over the front tire, out in front of the local area ahead of the gear & engine into or near the path of the engine and ingested, aided by the intake flow at takeoff thrust.

    So the direct line was actually, A to B to C, tire (A), to point of reversal ahead of the engine/wing (B), and (C), ingestion. More than a few pieces of shrapnel were likely ingested but that's for the investigation.

    As J.O. has mentioned, the underside of the wing will almost certainly have a lot of damage, (this is how & where the fire on Concorde began - the damage was caused "hydraulically" by the intense pressure on the underside of the wing-enclosed fuel-tank caused by the impact from the disintegrating front left wheels after hitting debris on the runway - this had occurred on previous at Washington, D.C.).

  17. Hi boestar...not sure what you mean by strange physics. I was thinking of the rotational speed of the wheel at say, Vr, (~160kts?) and the speed of any chunks of retread that were flung away from the carcass out in front of the engine during takeoff and ingested.

    Wow, thanks, AAS - now we know why the engine compressor section was "stalling"!

    • Like 1
  18. If the shraphnel from the tread or the tire carcas, (it looks 'blown' in the above image), was thrown forward during the takeoff roll, it could be ingested by the engine something like the tire disintegration on Concorde at CDG where shrapnel was ingested by both #1 & #2 engines.

    The #1 engine appears to have damage and lost power but was operating for the approach/landing.