Subject: B787 Info From A Ua Pilot

[Mitch Cronin]

I think the timing of all that happened worked against them. Specifically, the left seat guy, having just been hit with a problem he'd never trained for, which makes him doubt his instrumentation in the first instant - and who had no trustworthy visual clues of the moves made in error by the PF in the right seat (ie the missing CC) ...had little hope of identifying the problem, especially after he himself had verified the 'pushing forward gets the stall warning back' oddity.

I further think that needs correction. Stall warning should not be so inhibited, when the bird is in the air.

I've been having a devil of a time with written communication of late, but I'd really like to hear someone address those two points... and tell me why they're not part of a serious safety discussion?

Remember the phrase, "fat, dumb, and happy"? ... there they were.... and then, "DING".... an assortment of information you didn't want shows up telling you all sorts of interesting failures are occurring... you hear your partner say "I have control", but you don't see him pulling on his little sidestick because you're busy trying to assimilate all this new information you didn't expect, and as you do so, some of it confirms your interpretation that some of your instrumentation cannot now be trusted.... when you do look back to see what and how your partner is doing with that first fly the airplane business, nothing you see makes any sense... you take control and push on the stick, because what you see looks like you may be stalled.... but when you do, the stall warning comes back! Can you see the 'thought balloon'? ---- "ok, I don't know what's happening either, I shouldn't have taken control - good, he's taken it back"...

I can't answer for any of these fellas, but of the three of them, that guy, in the left seat and PNF when it all started.... his ownership of any mistakes are, in my mind, fully explainable. The ship failed him (and his training, and the other guys).

[DEFCON]

First the qualifier; I have no SS experience. On the other hand, I’m not sure an opinion respecting the good, the bad and the ugly of the CC versus SS debate is all that relevant to the present discussion?

From the AF 447 investigation we know, the FDR data depicting the position of the L/H SS throughout the event was critical to the investigators understanding of the ‘causal mechanics’ behind the ac’s deviation from controlled flight.

That being the case; why do we accept ‘after the fact’ knowledge of the SS position as crucial to an accident investigation, but not so ‘critical’ to a crew’s appreciation ‘ of what might be going on in ‘real time’, and of course, before an ‘after the fact’ analysis is required?

From my POV, I believe the so-called ‘accident’ would have been little more than an ‘incident’ had the F/O and for certain, the Captain, been able to instantly note the position of said SS.

[Mitch Cronin]

Hmmm... Ok, responses not overwhelming me.... Maybe I'll try asking another way...

Is there any large transport category aircraft built, which wouldn't be in a stalled condition following 30 seconds of sustained full-aft elevator application (my apologies for my earlier error in calling it a minute, it was 30 seconds to the aft & left stops)??

Is there any pilot here who could envision a pilot qualified to fly any of those aircraft, who, if presented with that situation in the presence of a control column, would fail to recognize it, and it's significance? IOW, imagine you're the PNF.... you probably believe you'd already have understood and corrected the problem, but imagine you hadn't.... do you think you could fail to notice a CC held full aft/left for 30 seconds? ....and then, of course, the question would be, ok, so you notice... does that help you understand your situation any better than not noticing? (as you quite possibly wouldn't, I believe, with the SS)? I think it does.

[Don Hudson]

Hi Mitch;

Re, "Is there any pilot here who could envision a pilot qualified to fly any of those aircraft, who, if presented with that situation in the presence of a control column, would fail to recognize it, and it's significance? IOW, imagine you're the PNF.... you probably believe you'd already have understood and corrected the problem, but imagine you hadn't.... do you think you could fail to notice a CC held full aft/left for 30 seconds? ....and then, of course, the question would be, ok, so you notice... does that help you understand your situation any better than not noticing? (as you quite possibly wouldn't, I believe, with the SS)? I think it does."

I'll give your questions a try, but I did address your second question in an earlier response which cites two separate accidents in which the CC was held fully back, in full view of all crew members, all the way down to the impact with terrain. I don't think any crew member "failed to notice" the position of the control column in each accident. But the stall was either not recognized or the instruments not believed, but for whatever reasons, no action to unstall the wing was taken and the control column was held full back until impact.

The AF447 PNF didn't fail to notice the pitch attitude of the aircraft and told the PF to get the nose down. What he failed to do was take control when it became quickly and abundantly clear that the PF was in over his depth and primal, self-preservation emotions had quickly taken over and displaced situational awareness and SOPs.

Re, "Is there any large transport category aircraft built, which wouldn't be in a stalled condition following 30 seconds of sustained full-aft elevator application (my apologies for my earlier error in calling it a minute, it was 30 seconds to the aft & left stops)??"

No, not unless that transport secretly has a full set of afterburners or JATO bottles standing by... ;-)

I would like to emphasize this notion as strongly as I can - for a transport pilot, no matter how achieved, a pitch attitude of 10 to 15deg, achieved in 10 seconds with a 1.55g instant pull-up, at FL350 is a very scary, very serious departure from controlled flight, particularly when it is done without announcement, coordination, reference to or calling for any checklist, drill or even just calling out what is being done. There was no emergency here and no need to act swiftly - the airplane was in no immediate danger. Given this, I would expect the other crew member to take control and keep it. Such a pitch-up isn't a loss of control but it turned into that within 30 seconds.

To achieve this pitch attitude did not require full back stick, and would not require a "huge" CC displacement. I figure back about four inches would be sufficent, (out of a throw of say, 10 or 12" from fore and aft from neutral or so - others should correct me if this is off).

In responding to questions, I also offered the point of view that stall recognition is set out in the AOM and it does not require or state the need to observe the CC position. One of the key metrics in stall recognition is being unable to arrest a rate of descent with a positive pitch attitude. That means the nose must be lowered to reduce the wing's AoA. This is the SOP. For whatever reason, the crew never changed their approach to the problem and, despite clear indications on the PFD in terms of rate of descent and pitch attitude.

Does this help at all?...Not sure what else is missing.

Best

Don

[Mitch Cronin]

Thanks Don.

I guess where I'm having trouble is in the expectation of immediate response from the PNF, given all that occurred in such a short timeframe.... and given that, due to circumstances, he possibly had no idea the pitch-up was either real, or pilot induced. You are evidently adamant that he indeed should have, and I'm saying you took away one of his best clues when you went to the SS.

I tried to say this earlier, but I really rot at communication these days, ...: Evidence that others have missed the clue, surely is not evidence that the clue is meaningless, nor is it any indication that there haven't been oodles of would-be incidents/accidents that became non-events because of that clue.

Have I missed something large? ...it seems pretty significant to me, but I know I my thoughts are often offside....?

[Don Hudson]

Mitch - Re, "I tried to say this earlier, but I really rot at communication these days..." You!!? Nope - only in your own mind, eh? But I sure know how you feel - I think I'm the one who's terrible at communications these days - can't write a sensible sentence or type to save my life. Maybe its both of us...maybe we're okay and its the rest o' the world. Yeah. That's IT!

Don....(I think)

[Guest rozar s'macco]

Maybe they were trying to engage alpha floor. In the sim the alpha floor demo is conducted by placing the thrust levers in the idle detent, pulling and holding full back stick. The airplane convincingly flies out at full thrust and 20+ degrees nose up "automatically".

Granted 200AGL is far different than FL350 but in their mental state, perhaps the alpha floor demo was a factor. Did any of those pilots have experience on types other than airbus? Was PF all cadet-jet-airbus lifer, never having bombed aroud in a Dash-8 or B-1900 or Navajo, Beaver, or Cessna? That is the future of these sim-jockey MPL's that Europe seems so hot for.

[Don Hudson]

Mitch;

Re, "Evidence that others have missed the clue, surely is not evidence that the clue is meaningless, nor is it any indication that there haven't been oodles of would-be incidents/accidents that became non-events because of that clue."

And just because something isn't included in the SOPs for stall recognition doesn't mean it is meaningless - so yes, true statement.

It can't be in the realm of "SOPs" but it could be an indication that all is not well - it's airmanship, but so is realizing what a lot of blue on the artificial horizon means at FL350.

I think the point being made is, the SOPs were instantly out the window along with any cockpit discipline and, as others have observed, in the case of AF447, it likely wouldn't have made any difference at all. Did it make a difference in the thirty-six other UAS events? We don't know - because they maintained control of the aircraft and we don't know why although I think it is pretty obvious: they did "nothing" instead of something, and waited, because it wasn't an emergency.

Don

[Don Hudson]

rozar;

Alpha-floor isn't available in Alternate Law, but that doesn't mean your notion doesn't have some validity. IIRC from BEA Interim Report 3, both of the F/Os had had recent UAS training, but right after takeoff, where the aircraft is indeed at immediate risk and the memorized items are to establish 15deg pitch, set TOGA thrust if below thrust reduction altitude, and if above, set 10deg pitch and CLB thrust. If above FL100, (which I think caters to high-altitude airports), set 5deg pitch and CLB thrust.

In all other cases, "Level off and troubleshoot", which means get out the QRH while the PF makes sure that the last known pitch in level flight is maintained and that the thrust is taken out of "THR LK" and the power set to what it was before the failure.

IIRC, the PF had a cadet-type experience background, but the BEA Interim Reports will provide this info.

I admit to a very strong bias against the MCPL but it seems that the old ways (bush, military) are disappearing, along with suitable candidates and perhaps this is the best of a bad series of methods?

Don

Don

[J.O.]

Never thought I'd hear that coming from you BD. That WAS a surprise. Good on ya!

Ditto that! What's next, Neil Young doing ad jingles for Pepsi or Coke?

As to my own preferences, the SS wins hands down for two reasons. The first being comfort. Long-haul flying is tiring enough without having to endure the additional impingement on my personal space that comes with a CC. The second is weight. At a time when CEOs are ordering the removal of a few pages from inflight magazines and environmentalists are up in arms about carbon emissions, you have to wonder how much fuel gets burned every year to carry around those bulky CCs.

My second choice is still a stick; just not a SS. (Think C17)

In last place is the traditional yoke.

... and then there's the ram's horns in the Embraer. Those things aren't meant for human consumption (unless you're 5' 2" and weigh 90 lbs soaking wet). An EMJ pilot's flight bag should include a set of those knee pads that some soccer players wear.

[Seeker]

Don, you got most of them but somehow forgot my favorite. This is the best solution (in my favorite aircraft) and it was dreamed up sometime back in the late 40s;

http://www.airliners...25b4dfcb3f20d99

[Don Hudson]

Seeker...seems to me the Banana (Bonanza) has this arrangement too.

My personal favourite arrangement, the Fleet 80 Canuck:

[Seeker]

he Mk1 layout also provides positive feel.

Yeah I know they made these but really no true Beaver pilot would choose this instead of the swing-over version.

[Seeker]

Seeker...seems to me the Banana (Bonanza) has this arrangement too.

My personal favourite arrangement, the Fleet 80 Canuck:

...but I thought you said you didn't want that to give up any personal space between your legs?

Oh, and please tell me you didn't just compare the Mighty DHC-2 with a Bonanza?

[boestar]

Rich: Have you ever see the SS out of the aircraft. It is actually quite a bulky arrangement. At least the early A320's were I am not sure if they have slimmed them down any.

[Don Hudson]

Seeker - "compare the Mighty DHC-2 with a Bonanza?"

Naw, but I recall it had swing-over controls...

[Kip Powick]

(Student training)

Not sure how the SS works in this example. I was flying with a fellow and shortly after we leveled out and set cruise power I noticed that, although we were flying a straight line---- wings level, the 'yoke' was canted about 3 or 4 degrees to the right...(indicating right wing down) but we were flying a straight and level with no problems.

A quick peek at all the gizmos and I noticed that he had excessive left aileron trim wound on the trim wheel and naturally the autopilot was compensating for the 'wrong trim' and in effect cross controlling.

I mentioned the error to him, (supposed to trim prior to engaging autopilot), and he casually disconnected the autopilot and as he did so we had an abrupt roll to the left....which shocked the crap out of him.

Question...how does the SS or FBW compensate for a "pilot induced" trim error or is the above scenario not possible in the new 'voodoo machines'??

[boestar]

This is a prime example of the point I was trying to make. You noticed the CC was showing a "turn" but you were straight and level. You investigated to see why and found your reason. The initial indication was the CC. That communication led you to an incorrect configuration WITHOUT having to ask anyone else. The SS would have told you nothing as it always returns to neutral when released.

Of course the voodoo machine will probably not allow the situation in the first place.

[Mitch Cronin]

Hello Rich. Thanks for indulging me with my queries...

1) Instrument Flying 101 says to trust your instruments, not the seat of your pants.

Accepted. However, if I'm not mistaken, Instrument flying 101 also calls for the student to practice under the hood with airspeed indication blocked off, and maintain altitude + - 100ft. So one of the crew failed IF101 right off the bat.

Once an aircraft has departed controlled flight, the position of the CC does not necessarily relate to any known flight parameters. So using its position as some sort of guide to regain control may not yield the desired results.

True enough... Again however, IIRC, one of the practices within instrument training calls for the student to be under the hood while the instructor throws the airplane all around the sky in an attempt to disorient the student, who then he must recover to straight and level flight... During the excersize, the student is not permitted to watch what the instructor is doing, so he won't have any clues....

In the AF case, there was never any reason to doubt the instrumentation; and even if there was, the position of the SS would be irrelevant unless there was a visible horizon to aid recovery. After all, how would you know where to put it if you doubted the instruments? So that argument for a CC versus a SS is moot.

In the first seconds following the initial "cavalry charge" accompanying the AP drop, there were a bevy of ECAM messages that (agreed, "shouldn't" have, but) may have caused some doubt as to the validity of instrumentation, as well as obvious erroneous airspeed indication... As the PNF first began attempting to sort out what was going on, I think he may easily have missed the PF's actions and contributions to their further difficulties... I don't think he had any reason to believe - in the first several seconds - that they had "departed controlled flight"... and in fact, the bird continued flying quite well until the stall. The added G from the climb didn't appear suddenly... it was gradual and mixed with other turbulence (they'd all been expecting) could easily have been missed as a clue to their climb...

2) If you are the PNF and the PF departs controlled flight, your initial reaction should not be to inquire "where is the CC/SS?" It should be to immediately and positively take control of the aircraft. Your duty at that point is not to be polite or wonder "what's going on here"; it is to recover the aircraft. Any hurt feelings can be dealt with later.

Again, I don't think the PNF recognized any departure from controlled flight... and of course, "where is the SS/CC?" isn't a question he'd ask, but my supposition is that, if he'd seen it, he may have recognized that such large movements, at cruise altitude and speed, were likely to be responsible for something less than desirable flight attitudes and conditions.

3) The Airbus doesn't inhibit the stall warning because the speed it too low (<60 knots); it inhibits the warning because the systems can no longer confirm the flight conditions.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think the inhibit came as AS<60kts AND AOA>30 degrees. The alternative would be to remove that >30 degrees bit while the aircraft is aloft... because clearly it can happen.

And for those who say: "Well Richard, if the aircraft was stalled BEFORE the 60 knot barrier was reached, it must continue to be in that condition once the barrier is breached and will continue to be so until a flying speed is achieved", you need to brush up on your physics. It is ENTIRELY possible to not be stalled even when below 60 knots.

Either the fog of age has corrupted my ability to digest that, or I'm just thick, but I'm going to need help with the "How?" of that.... It sounds wrong to me?? In any case though, let me roll your statement on itself a little and ask: Is it possible for the aircraft to go from stalled to unstalled while remaining under 60 kts?

[Mitch Cronin]

Maybe its both of us...maybe we're okay and its the rest o' the world. Yeah. That's IT!

Don....(I think)

Yeah, that's it!

Cheers mate,

Mitch (I think, therefor I am! )

[DEFCON]

Malcolm's post above leaves me wondering if anyone 'over there' knows how to fly on instruments?

[mo32a]

Yeah, I think I will be avoiding flying with Air France if there is an alternative.

[Don Hudson]

mo32a;

While an inadvertent pressure on the SS or CC may in some circumstances be unavoidable, not knowing the status of the aircraft's autoflight system at all times, by reading the FMA, is a fundamental cockpit discpline and training matter. I'm sure the Boeing's the same, but the Airbus IS the FMA - it can't be put more strongly than that. If it isn't there on the FMA, you don't have it and must govern yourself accordingly, (as in fly the airplane, and at altitude, with great care). So not knowing the AP had disconnected delayed understanding and appropriate action. Even as one can understand that the collision of two important aural warnings, (overspeed and AP disconnect), maintaining control at all times by whatever means possible, is what pilots do.

I wrote a long paper, (now longer) on automation and the loss of piloting skills a while back and this incident is within what I would put a category of competencies which are atrophying first because things go so well 99.9% of the time, (which still leaves a huge margin for error given the millions of hours flown!), and because the assumption that automation "flies the airplane" and protects one from all kinds of sins.

In one way, automation has been seen as "the third pilot". I think that is almost a complete mistake except for one airmanship item: Treat automation just like any other pilot when it comes to CRM - always question what automation is going to do next, always watch what automation is telling you what its doing, always understand what it's doing and take action the moment any one of these requirements isn't met to your complete satisfaction.

In AF447's case, the only course of action was to do nothing. Training, standards, SOPs, memorized drills and checklists are supposed to help with the startle-factor. I've been there - it is hard to fight but the first thing to do is to slow down, absorb and wait. Very few things require immediate action in a transport aircraft.

Ach...this is so easy, typing this...

Don

Don

[canadairguy]

FWIW, the world's third largest manufacturer of civil aircraft is opting for a side-stick for its first FBW production aircraft, the CSeries, Global 7000 and 8000.

[mo32a]

mo32a;

While an inadvertent pressure on the SS or CC may in some circumstances be unavoidable, not knowing the status of the aircraft's autoflight system at all times, by reading the FMA, is a fundamental cockpit discpline and training matter. I'm sure the Boeing's the same, but the Airbus IS the FMA - it can't be put more strongly than that. If it isn't there on the FMA, you don't have it and must govern yourself accordingly, (as in fly the airplane, and at altitude, with great care). So not knowing the AP had disconnected delayed understanding and appropriate action. Even as one can understand that the collision of two important aural warnings, (overspeed and AP disconnect), maintaining control at all times by whatever means possible, is what pilots do.

I wrote a long paper, (now longer) on automation and the loss of piloting skills a while back and this incident is within what I would put a category of competencies which are atrophying first because things go so well 99.9% of the time, (which still leaves a huge margin for error given the millions of hours flown!), and because the assumption that automation "flies the airplane" and protects one from all kinds of sins.

In one way, automation has been seen as "the third pilot". I think that is almost a complete mistake except for one airmanship item: Treat automation just like any other pilot when it comes to CRM - always question what automation is going to do next, always watch what automation is telling you what its doing, always understand what it's doing and take action the moment any one of these requirements isn't met to your complete satisfaction.

In AF447's case, the only course of action was to do nothing. Training, standards, SOPs, memorized drills and checklists are supposed to help with the startle-factor. I've been there - it is hard to fight but the first thing to do is to slow down, absorb and wait. Very few things require immediate action in a transport aircraft.

Ach...this is so easy, typing this...

Don

Don

I agree completely.

All pilots should have to demonstrate their airmanship skills (not button pushing skills) on a routine basis, in different conditions, in order to remain current.

Perhaps an hour or two every six months in a old twin in unusual attitudes wouldn't hurt either.