A320 Hard Landing incident KOS, Greece 2007/07/05

[Don Hudson]

I don't think this particular report has been posted here. On July 05, 2007, an A320 experienced a hard, bounced landing. While not the only incident of it's kind, the report is worth reading because of the MCPL, (MCC) licencing discussion and training issues. A number of issues will be familiar here with regard to Line Indoctrination training and responsibility.

Report on the A320 hard landing at KOS, Greece on July 7, 2007.

Excerpts below, on the First Officer's experience and training.

Link to the Report.

Commander’s Flying Experience: 12,100 hours (of which 950 were on type)

Last 90 days - 174 hours

Last 28 days - 38 hours

Co-pilot’s Age 34 years

Co-pilot’s Flying Experience 381 hours (of which 147 were on type)

Last 90 days - 154 hours

Last 28 days - 49 hours

That is 381 hours Total Time...

The co-pilot

The co-pilot began his flying training in late October 2005, on an intensive course with a flying school in Florida, USA, for a UK JAA PPL on single engine piston (SEP) powered aircraft. He passed the skills test for licence issue approximately one month later, after 45 hours of flying. He then gained hours, flying privately, with the aim of obtaining a Commercial Pilot’s Licence (CPL). In 2002, he passed the CPL skills test at the second attempt and the Instrument Rating (IR) skills test at the third attempt.

He flew privately for nine hours in 2003, and eight hours in 2004. In 2005, he flew a further eight hours and trained for a Multi-crew Co-operation Certificate (MCC), for which he undertook 20 hours of simulator training. In 2006, he flew for five hours. All his flying between 2003 and 2006 was in SEP [single Engine Piston] aircraft types. Between 2005 and 2006, he worked as a ground manager for the operator at one of their bases.

Late in 2006, he attended selection tests for a ‘Cadetship’ programme offered by a commercial flying training organisation (FTO), in conjunction with the operator (of G-DHJZ)6; the tests were run by the training organisation. Under the scheme, a cadet would pay for a ‘Jet Bridge’7 course, type rating and 150 hours of line flying with the airline. Thereafter, there would be a possibility of employment should the airline concerned have any vacancies. The commercial training organisation paid the airline for its involvement in the training, enabling the airline to generate revenue through their training department, and to have a ‘pool’ of trained pilots available to meet seasonal operational needs.

For consideration for the cadetship programme, the co‑pilot underwent psychometric, literacy and numeracy tests, and an interview, before his flying skills were assessed in a Boeing 737 simulator. Although he performed well in the non-flying aspects of the assessment, his performance in the simulator did not meet the required standard. However, he was offered a further assessment in an A320 simulator with a senior training captain employed by the training organisation. He passed this second assessment and was offered a place on the scheme. His previous commercial flying training record was not reviewed.

In January 2007, having by then logged 180 hours SEP and 60 hours Multi-Piston Engine (MEP) flying, the co-pilot began the ‘Jet Bridge’ course. This included a number of training details, including landings in an A320 simulator but this did not cover the specific landing technique relevant to the A320 type.8 The course consisted of 14 hours in an A320 fixed base training device, and 16 hours in an A320 full flight simulator. After this course, he undertook simulator training towards the grant of an A320 type rating, which consisted of a further 28 hours in a fixed base device and 50 hours in a full flight simulator.

His first training detail in the full flight simulator was on 10 March 2007 and, during this part of his training, he was taught by six different instructors. During this period his landing technique was a recurring theme of concern and relevant notes were made a number of times in his reports. Some of these indicated that a satisfactory landing had been performed, others identified unsatisfactory performance. Although instructors identified that more time needed to be spent training the co-pilot to land, this time was not found, and the training was repeatedly deferred. Moreover, it was not until the tenth detail that specific comment was made as to the cause of the co-pilot’s inconsistency, with the instructor noting that the co-pilot appeared to be following the flight director commands below 200 ft.

The co-pilot’s ninth training detail was scheduled as the Licence Skills Test (LST) for issue of the A320/321 type rating, but the co-pilot did not perform satisfactorily. The report stated that one landing was:

‘firm - little or no flare’

and, in detailing the examiner’s three main areas of concern, stated:

‘landings are still an area of concern with very late flare leading to very firm touchdown.’

A further note stated:

‘following discussion with the chief pilot it has been decided that [the co-pilot’s] next sim will concentrate on further training to include single engine handling and landings. It has also been decided that a full LST shall be completed after this [next] training detail. Note - no items have been recorded as tested so far on Form SRG/1158.’

The final, twelfth, detail of his simulator training occurred on 30 March 2007 and was dedicated to pre‑base training, and consisted of 15 touch-and-go landings and one full stop landing. This detail was completed:

‘to a satisfactory standard,’

and the report stated that there were some:

‘good touchdowns;’

however, these were:

‘not always consistent’

and the co-pilot still had a:

‘tendency to flare late sometimes.’

The report noted that he was asked to:

‘remember to look outside in the last stages of the landing.’

On 5 April 2007, the co-pilot undertook base training at Prestwick Airport. A low cloudbase made it necessary for each circuit to be directed by radar, culminating, each time, in an ILS approach. The report on this training stated:

‘initial landing OK but [the co-pilot]could not subsequently stabilise the aircraft on approach after going visual…..below 200 feet he allowed the nose to rise leading to a steep descent just prior to a hard landing. Three attempts with no improvement.’

The instructor recommended further simulator training to improve the co-pilot’s final approach technique.

An additional simulator training detail was carried out on 17 April 2007. It was noted in the first half of the detail that:

‘the variable flare and landing was cause for concern’

and that

‘the second detail initially did not see much improvement but then something clicked and the final 5 approaches and landings were to a [satisfactory] standard. On that basis [the co-pilot] is cleared to re-attempt base training but he must be under no illusion that he needs to reproduce the standard of the final 5 approaches consistently to pass.’

On 24 April, the co-pilot completed a base training detail and the report stated that he:

‘settled into a series of consistently accurate circuits with good landings…….’

He was cleared to commence line training, which began on 26 April 2007.

During the first 38 sectors of line training, he flew with eight different training captains and their reports generally reflected good preparation, good performance and a keen, willing, attitude. However, his landing technique was a recurring theme of concern and relevant notes were made a number of times in his reports. Some of these indicated that a satisfactory landing had been performed, others identified unsatisfactory performance, with many of the comments generated during his earlier training being repeated. On several occasions, the aircraft commander either intervened or took over control. However, towards the end of this period of line training, there were favourable reports of his landings.

etc, etc etc

Anyone interested in how "time in" equates with competency, please take a look at, "Outliers", by Malcolm Gladwell. It doesn't matter how keen or nice a pilot candidate is; at 400hrs, nobody is a "pilot" who is competent to occupy the right seat doing regular line operations in a demanding airliner like the A320.

[Moon The Loon]

Wait a minute. KOS is what they call in Europe a B Category airport. I've been there several times in both the 75 and the 767. It's a "do it right the first time" strip. It's primary difficulty is its position in the middle of the island, the visual illusions that can lead to disorientation and the runway slope. It's dramatic.

Why was the F/O allowed to land here in the first place? Why take it out on him? This is a "Captain Only" landing field. Do you have the rest of the report?

Now, having said all that, yes - the cadet program is a real problem. The single most scary part of it is you have a two crew airplane, with two "qualified" crewmembers, of which one really isn't during incapacitation of the other, without an experience qualified third pilot on duty, on board. The airlines refuse to place three pilots on the flight deck while one of them is learning the ropes. I know this first hand, through personal experience. I look back at my experiences with this and shake my head wondering what was I thinking???

Start building the triage units.

[Don Hudson]

Moon;

Do you have the rest of the report?

Yep, it's at the link in my post.

Why take it out on him?

Precisely. He was never in a position to judge whether he should be doing the approach. The captain, and the airline were however and nothing was done and according to the report no guidance regarding these issues was provided by the airline for the line indoc guys; BTDT. In fact that is among the recommendations. That's the "doesn't something sound familiar?" part of my post.

That said, something raises a flag: When did someone who really, really ached to be an airline pilot, giving up every second and every penny to buy hours, fly and get the licences, only fly six to eight hours per year while working as a ground manager?

There was a time when we took a "student", (really, a veteran who was just new to the airplane), out on LITC work and could talk airplane talk - the nuances, the fine points, the polish and occasionally a "what was THAT?" without leaving the candidate confused or lost, with hurt feelings or whatever, about what was being said to him or her. We could talk about energy management, flare heights, swept wing characteristics, fbw technology and C* Laws, high altitude flight and aerodynamic damping, contaminated runways, certification standards for first, second and third segment climbs with engine out, accelerate/stop performance, proper use of the radar, weather analysis, when to listen when everything inside says to set the park brake and everyone outside is saying 'go' (and very occasionally, the opposite) and other decision-making kit, and on and on...

To someone with a hundred and fourty-seven hours on the A320 and just over 200 hours in small, light piston airplanes as the only other actual time in a real airplane sitting in the right seat of a 320, all that basic stuff would be Greek.

To a veteran who has grown up (mentally) in aviation and knows a few things including the taste of adrenaline, these topics and the experience, are, as you and I and all who do this work know, as familiar as the road home.

I know all the arguments in favour of the MCC/MCPL. But because the approach to this kind of licencing, like everything including SMS, will be driven not by "doing the right thing and doing it well", but only by how cheaply and quickly it can be done, more candidates are going to be put in the same position of not knowing what they don't know.

You are so right MtL - if the captain becomes incapacitated, everyone is along for the ride. I can't fathom why ICAO and ALPA have gone along with this.

Start building the triage units.

Yup. And if SMS keeps going the way I've seen it performed, same thing.

[SkyBlazer]

Great Read....

This was interesting.

For consideration for the cadetship programme, the co‑pilot underwent psychometric, literacy and numeracy tests, and an interview, before his flying skills were assessed in a Boeing 737 simulator. Although he performed well in the non-flying aspects of the assessment, his performance in the simulator did not meet the required standard. However, he was offered a further assessment in an A320 simulator with a senior training captain employed by the training organisation. He passed this second assessment and was offered a place on the scheme.

SB

[anonymous]

Don

While I agree with many of the issues you raise, a couple of points.

A/ The Air Forces of the world engage in similar training programs and a person with approx 200-300hrs can be flying a CF-18 solo or a C130 or CP-140 as a FO (or similar aircraft around the world).

B/ While it is tempting to blame this system for this incident, what do we say when a very experienced western hemisphere crew - a/ go NORDO for 90 minutes b/ land on a taxiway instead of a runway c/ insert any other embarrassing incident that has happened in the past. Experience means something but there is bad experience and good experience. To say that a 10,000hr pilot is twice is good as a 2,500hr pilot or that the 2,500hr pilot is twice as good as a 1,250hr pilot doesn't work in my books.

Good 500 hr pilots tend to make good 1000 hr pilots and good 10,000 pilots. Bad 500 hr pilots tend to make bad 10,000 hr pilots. IMHO.

One only would have to look at the confidential PBS "twitchell" bid options of Air Canada FOs to see how many "bad" 10 or 20 thousand hour pilots there are (at least in the opinion of the FOs).

[John S.]

One only would have to look at the confidential PBS "twitchell" bid options of Air Canada FOs to see how many "bad" 10 or 20 thousand hour pilots there are (at least in the opinion of the FOs).

First you better list the 1000 different definitions of 'bad'.

(Pilot skills, verbal skills, SOP adherence, too relaxed, too uptight, wrong haircut, wrong postal code, wrong former airline. . . . )

[Don Hudson]

A/ The Air Forces of the world engage in similar training programs and a person with approx 200-300hrs can be flying a CF-18 solo or a C130 or CP-140 as a FO (or similar aircraft around the world).

B/ While it is tempting to blame this system for this incident, what do we say when a very experienced western hemisphere crew - a/ go NORDO for 90 minutes b/ land on a taxiway instead of a runway c/ insert any other embarrassing incident that has happened in the past. Experience means something but there is bad experience and good experience. To say that a 10,000hr pilot is twice is good as a 2,500hr pilot or that the 2,500hr pilot is twice as good as a 1,250hr pilot doesn't work in my books.

Good 500 hr pilots tend to make good 1000 hr pilots and good 10,000 pilots. Bad 500 hr pilots tend to make bad 10,000 hr pilots. IMHO.

Excellent points to make.

To point A/, agree - in most cases a suitable candidate can be taught how to manipulate the controls and learn rudimentary anticipation of the flight path to respond with suitable control and power inputs; 9/11 was perhaps the starkest example of that level of flying - it can be done. I think we'd agree that it takes much longer to make a seasoned airline pilot. Besides, what's a "landing flare" in a CF-18?

B/ - We can say nothing important about such incidents that aren't already understood in terms of human factors and the inherent probability of an incident while engaging in risky activities. It neither proves nor disproves the points made regarding MCC/MCPL's. I think your last statement really says it all. It is far less about time-in than it is about aptitude and suitability. The #1 guy off my course had 250hrs when he joined as an oiler and first flew the DC9 a few years later. Quality of instruction, having spent a number of years "in the back seat, observing", being bright and keen, all contributed to the transition being a non-event so I think your observation is absolutely spot on and key to understanding this issue. Some people simply don't belong in an airplane but of course no one is allowed to say that.

In short, one cannot set down in dot-point form, those qualities which make a good airline pilot but within very wide variations of personal qualities, character and talent, we still know one when we fly with one.

We also know that a history of only passing licencing or endorsement rides on the second, third or ? try is, if there aren't health issues involved, an indicator that there is likely an issue of suitability or capability.

We know that such issues are notoriously difficult to illuminate and deal with especially in an otherwise very keen, bright student who is "always well prepared and keen on the ground", but seems to not understand in the air. A student who can fly an airplane and who seems to show an insight into how the airplane is controlled and how energy is managed, (just using these as examples of early "comprehension") and show promise to an experienced instructing eye at 500hrs likely isn't going to change in the next 10,000hrs.

In many ways, I think that "time-in" only improves on ability but does not substitute for ability.

This problem is, in my view, admirably outlined in this short AIBB Incident Report; the expectation that MCC/MCPL programs can turn someone off the street into an airline pilot in the time and curriculum set out by these flight training schools who have climbed on the bandwagon is to me and perhaps many, an illusion. I hope this will highlight these problems so that the concept may be at least be improved upon, (first by questioning the notion that someone who can't rent a Cessna 150 or a light twin because s/he doesn't have a real pilot's licence, can still be a crew member in an A320). For obvious reasons I think the airlines are salivating at such cheap licencing and training costs. I think that is a problem.

How many here (who fly professionally), reading this report, quietly said to themselves (but not here because that is politically incorrect or perceived as being unkind) that the person involved should have been washed out and sought another career? How many think that the MCPL system failed this person utterly by prolonging what was clearly a below-average performance, (which wasn't anyone's fault - not everyone who wants to, can fly)? What is the "truly unkind" response? - to permit the continued lack of suitability by coaching and passing marginal rides possibly placing passengers at risk, or blunt honesty?

I would hate to contemplate how the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal would answer that question...

[Kip Powick]

First you better list the 1000 different definitions of 'bad'.

(Pilot skills, verbal skills, SOP adherence, too relaxed, too uptight, wrong haircut, wrong postal code, wrong former airline. . . . )

John,

True and oh so funny !!!

[mo32a]

To say that a 10,000hr pilot is twice is good as a 2,500hr pilot

Just goes to show that even the best among us can make mistakes. might wanna check the math

[DEFCON]

This particular case aside; consider the damage to the career of the new UWO aviation degree program graduate when with 250 hours TT in hand he gains entry into an air cadet program and then washes out because he should have been in the circuit practicing for his ‘Instructors Rating’ on Cherokee’s?